







**CONSTANTINE I
AND THE GREEK PEOPLE**





THE AUTHOR

CONSTANTINE I AND THE GREEK PEOPLE

BY

PAXTON HIBBEN, A.B., A.M., F.R.G.S.

Chevalier of the Order of St. Stanislas,
Officer of the Order of the Redeemer

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ΤΗ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΜΕΓΑΛΕΙΤΗΤΙ
ΤΩ
ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙ ΤΩΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΩΝ
ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΩ

SIRE!

I do not believe in kings
nor in the business of kings.

But I believe in you, Sir, as
a Man.

It is therefore not to the
King of the Hellenes that I
dedicate this book, but to the
sincere democrat, the leader and
comrade of his people, the brave
and able soldier, the loyal
friend, the devoted patriot and
the generous, open-hearted man
that I have found you.

ATHENS, JANUARY 25, 1917.

FOREWORD

From the first contact, Latins and Greeks looked upon each other with mistrust, and the fundamental antagonism which separated the two civilizations was manifest in mutual suspicions, continual difficulties, incessant conflicts and reciprocal accusations of violence and treachery. . . . It was easy to see that Greek hospitality did not inspire the crusaders with unbounded confidence. It must be admitted, however, that the Latins were extraordinarily uncomfortable guests. . . .

The westerners, moreover, complained bitterly of the ingratitude, the perfidy, the treachery of the Greek emperor and his subjects, and they held Alexis solely responsible for all the final failures of the crusade. As a matter of fact, that is a pure legend, carefully fostered by all the enemies of the Byzantine monarchy, and the echo of which, transmitted down the ages, explains so many injustices and stubborn prejudices which even to-day unconsciously persist against Byzance.

In reality, once Alexis had treated with the crusaders, he was true to his word, and if the rupture came, its cause should be sought above all in the bad faith of the Latin princes. Charles Diehl, "Figures Byzantine," vol II.

What appears to have happened a thousand years ago between the Crusaders and the Greek emperors of the Byzantine Empire has repeated itself to-day between the Allied forces in the Near East and the Greek King Constantine. It would be difficult to construe a more faithful characterization of the spirit of events in Greece in the last five years than that given by Mr. Diehl, writing of the Byzantine Empire.

The pages which follow were written in the spring of 1917. I had been in Greece, Macedonia, and Serbia since the summer of 1915. On the ground, unrestricted by censorship, I had

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been able to follow step by step the progress of the diplomacy of the great European Powers in respect to Greece, so like their recent diplomacy in respect to Armenia. When I returned to America I had a talk with one of the best informed men in the United States.

"You have no idea what is going on in Greece," I told him. "You cannot have. The censorship is such that you get nothing but one side — garbled accounts devoid of truth or propaganda purposely misleading."

"You are wrong," he replied. "We do know, in a way. Of course we do not know the details, but we have it fairly clear in mind that the Allies have been pulling some pretty rough stuff in Greece. The American newspaper-reader puts two and two together more shrewdly than you think. He knows, for example, that it is being framed up on your friend King Constantine. He suspects that France and England are going to drive him out of Greece. I do not say that what they are going to do is right. I say that they are going to do it, whether it is right or wrong, and I get my ideas from following the press despatches like any American newspaper-reader. We realize that the French and the British have let themselves in for a bad business in Greece by being a little hasty in their action, and that they feel their prestige will be hurt if they turn back now. They feel that they have got to go through with it, cost what may. They will naturally try to justify themselves any way they can. They will blackguard Constantine like a pickpocket and advertise Venizelos as an angel from heaven. They have to; it's their game.

"But I think you will find that the American newspaper-reader will not be badly fooled by all of this froth. Some day the war will be over, and the truth will come out. You will find then that it will not surprise people much. But it is no use to try to tell them about it now; they have something else on their minds. Greece is only one corner of the big business — the war. When the war has been won, people may look into the

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matter of what has been done in Greece, or they may forget all about it. You never can tell."

Nevertheless, I wrote this book then. I myself was eager to get into the war. Virtually the only dispassionate witness of events I have here set forth, I felt that I should set down in black and white what I had seen and knew before anything could happen to prevent my writing it. Every phase of the Greeek tragedy was very clear and living in my mind in the early days of 1917, and that is what I wrote, the living truth, before time and long service in the army, in the United States and the A. E. F., could dim or confuse any of it. That is what this book is.

As I wrote the pages which follow, I sent a carbon copy to the State Department for its information. When the book was printed and ready for publication, I took a copy to Mr. Creel's office, and said I was quite ready to conform to any desire the administration might express regarding its publication. There was not the slightest suggestion of opposition to its appearance.

But while the book was being written, precisely what my friend had predicted was taking place in Greece. No whisper of what was going on under cover reached the American people, however. We had entered the war against Germany on April 6; but our allies saw in that fact no reason to share with the American people their secret intentions toward Greece, nor the unusual course they were even then planning to follow in respect to a sovereign people determined to remain as neutral as Spain or Holland, and for much the same reasons.

On March 19, 1917, Ribot replaced Briand as Premier of France. Immediately, negotiations looking to the forcible deposition of the constitutionally elected head of the Greek state originated with the new French Government. Russia, united to Greece by ties of a common church, was no longer in a position to oppose this French project; the Italian Government was unalterably hostile to it; even in England the suggestion shocked the Government, and when it was specifically proposed

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to Mr. Lloyd George and Sir Robert Cecil on May 4, a month after the entry of the United States into the war, the scheme was frowned upon.

Nevertheless, the French Government continued preparations to this end, of which the people of France as well as those who were fighting beside the French were kept in ignorance, and the full extent and purpose of which even the governments allied with France were unaware.¹ The French Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, under Clemenceau's chairmanship, moved "the appointment by the Protecting Powers of a single representative at Athens, capable of giving the decisions taken by the Allies consecutiveness, firmness and dignity, by gathering in its hands the reins of the Entente chariot," and Senator Jonnart was chosen that single representative. On May 27 he and French War Minister Painlevé went to London to obtain British consent to more drastic action in Greece. Mr. Lloyd George insisted, however, that at least the semblance of liberty of action on the part of the Greek people be retained, and that the new coercive measures to be adopted in Greece be calculated to compel the Greeks to dethrone their own king rather than that the French and British themselves commit the overt act. A program of three successive steps in compulsion of the Greeks was agreed upon: (1) the wheat crop of Thessaly, upon which the entire population of Greece depended for bread, was to be seized; (2) an ultimatum requiring Greece's entry into the war on the side of the Entente was to be presented to King Constantine; (3) the Isthmus of Corinth was to be seized militarily by the Allies, thus absolutely cutting off from Athens

¹ "The whole Italian press was violently hostile to M. Venizelos. It made no secret of preferring Constantine to him. . . . However, in an enterprise having as its aim the deposition of Constantine and the return of Venizelos to power, it would be imprudent to ignore the state of mind of a part of the Italian public. There was a considerable chance that Italy might regard with no very favorable eye—might indeed raise a protest against an adventure upon the principle of which it had taken so much time to obtain an accord between the cabinets of London and Paris." Raymond Recouly, "M. Jonnart en Grece et l'Abdication de Constantin," pp. 72-75.

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and the remainder of Greece the entire Greek Army, which, as an act of good faith toward the Allies, King Constantine had concentrated in the Peloponnesus.¹ Should all of these measures fail to produce the submission of the Greeks to the will of France and England, the British Government agreed to the dethronement of King Constantine, but on the express condition that force was to be employed only as a last resort and in the event that King Constantine's partizans were guilty of acts of hostility toward the Allies. The British Government was unwilling to countenance another bombardment without notice to a city filled with women and children unless there was at least a plausible excuse.

Judging by his actions, Senator Jonnart had not the vaguest idea of complying with these conditions, nor did his government intend that he should. M. Raymond Recouly, the French chronicler of this epoch, is explicit on that head.² Jonnart lost no time. Arriving in Paris from London with Painlevé on May 30, he was in Brindisi on June 4, whence he embarked at once, and secretly, for Corfu. Here he arranged with Admiral Gauchet, in command of the Allied fleet, for a naval force to protect with its heavy artillery a landing of troops both on the Isthmus of Corinth and within sight of Athens. On June 5 Jonnart was at Keratsina Bay in consultation with the British and French Ministers to Greece. He did not, however, consult either the Italian or the Russian Ministers, nor did he even land. On June 7 he was in Saloniki, submitting his plans to the approval of Venizelos and arranging the coöperation of the

¹ pp. 524, 525, 545.

² "The more he thought about it, the more M. Jonnart was convinced that to accomplish the result under the most favorable conditions these measures should not be taken successively, but simultaneously. . . . M. Jonnart was confronted by this dilemma: if he followed the instructions he had received literally, he would leave Constantine a possibility of resistance. . . . In order that the business might be carried out comfortably without spilling any blood, it was indispensable to modify somewhat the execution of the measures planned. M. Jonnart courageously took this decision. He decided to make the modification." Raymond Recouly, *op. cit.* pp. 71, 72.

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Allied military forces under General Sarrail. M. Raymond Recouly summarizes the result:

It was decided, in order to avoid all possibility of resistance and to retain the peaceable character of the operation, to carry out at one and the same time (1) the occupation of Thessaly; (2) the occupation of the Isthmus of Corinth; (3) a landing of troops in the neighborhood of Athens.

It was expected that the simultaneous execution of these three acts, rapidly carried through, would make it quite impossible for Constantine to attempt anything whatever.

Definite plans were therefore made: the ultimatum was to be delivered to Constantine the night of the 10th; the invasion of Thessaly was to take place on the night of the 10th-11th; the occupation of the Isthmus of Corinth and the landing of troops in Attica was to be carried out at the same moment, and the French General Staff immediately set about the arrangements for the departure of the expeditionary troops, so they might be in position and ready to act upon the date fixed.¹

At the instance of Venizelos, Crown Prince George, who had been trained and educated for his post as chief of state under the Greek Constitution, was to be excluded from the throne, also. A younger and more tractable member of the family, Prince Alexander, was to be imposed upon the Greeks as king.

The entire character of the action to which Mr. Lloyd George had given a reluctant consent had altered. There was no longer any question of a series of coercive steps calculated to induce the Greek people to act. The seizure of the wheat crop of Thessaly had become the military occupation of Thessaly; the use of troops as a last resort to force the abdication of King Constantine, under threat of another fleet bombardment of Athens, had become a first step. When it came to basing any practical action on the idea that the people of Greece would rally to Venizelos the moment King Constantine was out of the way, a legend reiterated both in the French and British press

¹ Raymond Recouly, *op. cit.* pp. 88, 89.

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for two years, that assumption was promptly rejected as a dangerous fallacy, and preparations were made to impose the Cretan in power only after the French military occupation had completely disposed of any opposition to Venizelos's return. In this view Venizelos, feeling that there might be some personal peril in accompanying the French expeditionary force, readily agreed.

The invasion of Thessaly began on June 10, but it was not until the following day that Jonnart presented his ultimatum to Prime Minister Zaïmis. In the name of the "Protecting Powers," of which one, Russia, could not and did not approve this action, while another, Great Britain, had explicitly required a method of procedure wholly other than that followed, Jonnart demanded the abdication of King Constantine and a reply within twenty-four hours. King Constantine, the document stated, would be left free to designate one of his heirs as his successor, with the approval of the "Protecting Powers." A memorandum presented at the same time, however, excluded Crown Prince George and virtually forced the designation of the king's second son, Prince Alexander, who had already been chosen by Venizelos. A written pledge was given by Jonnart that no reprisals against the supporters of King Constantine would be tolerated.

King Constantine called a crown council at once and made known his intention to save Greece further bloodshed and suffering by complying immediately and literally with the demands of the ultimatum, precisely as he had complied throughout with all the demands made upon him by the self-styled "Protecting Powers of Greece." To every counsel of resistance — and there were many, for the Greeks adore him — he was adamant. As constitutional commander in chief of the army he issued a formal order against any demonstration. He put the entire weight of his popularity in the scale to prevent what might have proved a hideous business both for Greece and for France and England. He asked his people, *as they loved him*, to raise no hand

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to prevent his departure. That same night Premier Zaïmis replied to Jonnart that "His Majesty the King, as ever mindful of the interest of Greece, has decided to leave the country with the crown prince, and designates as his successor Prince Alexander."

Despite this immediate and complete acceptance of Jonnart's demands, the French seemed unable to resist the temptation to beat the drum and rattle the saber. Though there was neither need nor excuse for it, a French infantry brigade, a regiment of artillery, and a regiment of Russian mercenaries were landed in the Pireus and marched against Athens. It was a mad thing to do, and only the utmost personal efforts of the king avoided that open conflict which the French seemed determined to provoke.

One June 12 King Constantine, Queen Sophie, and their children, Crown Prince George and the princesses Helen and Irene, left Greece. It is characteristic that King Constantine refused to embark on any save a Greek ship. They went directly to Switzerland, where they are still living very modestly in a hotel, like any other transients.

No sooner were the French in absolute military control of Greece than the guaranty given by Jonnart that no reprisals against the supporters of King Constantine would be tolerated was ignored. The French demanded and obtained, within a week of giving the pledge in question, thirty prominent Greeks, who were placed under arrest, without trial, and taken to Corsica. A long series of arrests, trials by drum-head courts martial, executions, banishments, and imprisonments followed, until finally the ghastly train of political persecutions was halted by the mediation of the American minister.

On June 21 Jonnart summoned Venizelos from Saloniki, and on June 24 he informed Prince Alexander, recently sworn in as King of the Hellenes, that Venizelos would be made prime minister. At the same time Jonnart also ordered the convocation of the last Boule in which Venizelos had a majority to give a

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certain semblance of representative government to this administration wholly imposed by France. On June 27 Venizelos and his new cabinet took office.

These events were in progress when this book was about to appear. In certain quarters it was felt that its publication at that precise moment would embarrass our associates in the war. This intimation was conveyed to the publishers. I had already expressed my willingness to follow whatever course might be thought wise in the matter of the publication of the book. Its issue was therefore postponed.

The smoke of war has since, in some measure, cleared away. It is now generally known, and our Government has been convinced, that the charge repeatedly brought against King Constantine that he had any understanding either written or verbal with Germany or any one in Germany, or that he was moved in the exercise of his constitutional duties by any considerations whatever save the good of his country and the will of his people, was wholly without foundation. Press despatches from London and Paris reporting that King Constantine or Queen Sophie had gone to Germany when they left Greece, that Crown Prince George had volunteered for service with the German Army, and a constant stream of similar propaganda, have proved to be as groundless as the accusations against King Constantine which were floated to excuse in some degree the action taken against him by France, with the acquiescence of Great Britain.

All of this is of little consequence. What is of great consequence, however, is that during the war and after our entry into it as an ally of France and Great Britain, without our knowledge and consent the constitution of a little, but a brave and fine, people was nullified by the joint action of two of our allies; the neutrality of a small country was violated, the will of its people set at naught, its laws broken, its citizens persecuted, its press muzzled. By force a government was imposed upon this free people, and by force that government has been

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and is to-day maintained in absolute power. In the words of General Sarraïl, "Venizelist Greece has become a British dominion."¹ He might have added a French colony as well, and been within the truth.

The process by which this was brought about is herein set forth in detail. It is not a pretty story. Whether our allies did or not, a great many Americans went into this war with very definite ideals. They agreed with the President that "no peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed," and they fought "that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful."

We have been sorely disillusioned, but we have not lost our ideal or our faith in the principles for which we fought. We still believe that "they are the principles of mankind, and must prevail."

The time has come when Greece is entitled to a hearing. That is why I am publishing this book now just as it was written three years ago.

New York, May 1, 1920.

¹ La Grèce Venizéliste. "La Revue de Paris," December 15, 1919.

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
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**CONSTANTINE I
AND THE GREEK PEOPLE**



CONSTANTINE I AND THE GREEK PEOPLE

CHAPTER I

GREECE IN 1914

“THE cardinal error of the Entente powers has been to consider their Balkan problem as a political question, not a military one. They have never taken the Balkans seriously as a field for military operations. They have tried by intrigue to get something for nothing, without risk to themselves, in Bulgaria, in Serbia, in Rumania, and in Greece. If they had spent a tenth the effort in studying and carrying out a serious military campaign in the Balkans that they have in dabbling in the internal politics of the various Balkan States, they would have succeeded where they have failed. And the war would probably be over by now.”

Thus King Constantine of Greece, after two

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and a half years of experience with the policy of the Entente powers in the Balkans. Essentially a soldier himself, the military side naturally looms large to him. Fundamentally direct, sincere, and incapable of intrigue, he despises the jockeying between the Entente diplomatists and the various party leaders in the Balkan States, which has resulted in a splitting of the Balkans among themselves to the disaster of the countries concerned. Finally, a man of action, used to the quick decisions of the battle-field, the King of the Hellenes has been frankly intolerant of the subtleties of diplomatists, and, above all, of the hesitations of the governments of the Allied powers. Much of the legend of his pro-Germanism arises from his appreciation of the unerring speed with which the German designs in the Balkans have been carried out. King Constantine lives in the Balkans. It is his sphere of action, and he knows his Balkans like a book. To him, therefore, it is less significant that the French defeated the Germans at the Battle of the Marne or held them at Verdun than that the French marched into Serbia a year later—and then marched out again, leaving the Serbs to be crushed. This is the view of every Greek

and every Serb; indeed, of every man in the Balkans. His horizon is bounded by the interests vital to him and his country. The Allied powers are judged in the Balkans by what they have accomplished there, not in France, Italy, or Russia. It is largely for this reason that the judgment is not favorable and that to-day the influence of the Entente powers is weaker in the Balkans than anywhere else in the world.

I met King Constantine for the first time early in September, 1915, at his country château, "De-kaleia," some fifteen miles from Athens, at Tatoy, on the slopes of Mount Parnes. I had just come from France and Italy, and the king was eager for the trained impressions of a correspondent who had seen both sides of the great conflict. His questions were those of a soldier seeking to divine the relative values of the warring armies and their respective chances of success. As he talked with perfect frankness and deep interest in the subject, he was himself a study. For King Constantine I looks every inch a king—and there are a good many inches to look it, as the Greek sovereign is six foot six and weighs about two hundred and thirty pounds.

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Just at that period he was thin from his recent illness, however, and was in flannels, not uniform. But he is impressive in any costume. More democratic, perhaps, than any monarch of his day, he has known always how to keep the authority of kingship about him. When little Princess Catherine, his youngest child, was born during the Second Balkan War, King Constantine made the army and navy of Greece her godfathers. In the Greek Church the fact creates a relationship between the real father and the godfather which is expressed by the Greek word *koumbaros*. King Constantine is, therefore, the *koumbaros* of each soldier and each sailor of Greece. As such, he is intimate with them, and they with him; they regard him as a soldier, like themselves, and he looks upon himself as a soldier, like the least of his subjects. For in Greece every able-bodied man is a soldier.

But when he is being king, he is king indeed. On occasions of ceremony, in full dress, with blue and white plumes on his helmet and marshal's baton in hand, he is the personification of majesty. He drops the vernacular, which he is accustomed to use with his soldiers. He embodies

the idea of sovereignty as few men have embodied that idea in the history of the world.

King Constantine then stated very frankly the thesis he has always since maintained, that in principle the present war is one of great states with huge armies and immense reservoirs of credit; that for a small state to enter the war voluntarily is madness, unless the small state is able to discount a decided advantage to be secured in no other way; and, finally, that the essential condition of the participation of a small state in the general European hostilities must be a definite program of immediate action, having at least a prevailing chance of rapid success.

On the latter point the ideas of the King of the Hellenes in respect to his own country were very clear. He pointed out that Greece is today, and has been since the Turkish War of 1897, in the hands of a receiver; that while the last two successful Balkan wars had doubled the territory of Hellas, they had also cost a vast deal of money and, in the new territory acquired, had opened up an endless vista of expenditures for the development of the islands, Epirus, and Macedonia that would require a considerable capi-

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talization to carry out. A war—especially such a war as that now raging—would sink Greece further in the mire of insolvency and put off for years, perhaps for generations, the work of rebuilding and consolidating his doubled kingdom.

Moreover, King Constantine laid stress on the fact that the increase in the number of inhabitants of Greece through the accession of the redeemed provinces had added many heterogeneous elements to the population of the country—elements to a certain extent not even Greek, and accustomed to a concept of responsibilities of government wholly at variance with the essential democracy of Hellas. Under Ottoman rule the Greek got what he wanted by paying bakshish; under the democracy of Greece he must secure what he requires by passing laws which will be equal for all, and by personally bearing his share of the heavy burden of taxation, the heritage of generations of costly struggle for the freedom of the Greeks.

The territory acquired by the Balkan wars—Macedonia, Epirus, and the Greek islands—has a population of 2,066,647, as against a total population of 2,631,972 for Greece before their ac-

quisition.¹ The work of consolidating this immense accretion of new citizens must necessarily be long and difficult. For its accomplishment, King Constantine declared peace to be essential.

Plainly the Greek monarch did not share the dreams of still further aggrandizement for Hellas voiced by his prime minister, E. K. Venizelos. Indeed, the sovereign looked upon any immediate increase in the size of Greece as a contingency fraught with peril for the Hellenistic ideal, kept burning in old Greece through the centuries.

"Mind you," he said, "I do not say we shall not go to war,—on the side of the Entente, of course,—as all our interests are bound up with the Entente. We could not go to war against the Entente, and nobody in Greece dreams of doing it. But if we enter the war at all, it will have to be with a fixed rôle which can be quickly played to success or failure before the country has been ruined by a long campaign."

In September, 1915, Constantine I saw for Greece no prospect of playing such a part. Immediately after the outbreak of the European

¹ Census of 1907.

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War, a cabinet council under the presidency of the King of the Hellenes, and with his hearty concurrence, expressed the sympathy of Greece with the Entente powers and more particularly with her Balkan ally, Serbia, and decided that Greece should maintain an attitude characterized as one of "benevolent neutrality" toward Serbia and her allies in the Great War.

King Constantine, moreover, rejected without a moment's hesitation a German offer to join the Central empires in return for Monastir and the surrounding parts of Serbia, which are inhabited largely by Greeks. By this refusal the Greco-Serbian treaty of alliance of May 19, 1913, remained intact; but construed by the Greek Government as applicable only to Balkan warfare, it was not called into play. Saloniki was at the disposal of the Serbs as the door through which their war material might enter. The best information and advice of the Greek general staff was at their call. The Greeks granted Admiral Hubert S. Cardale of the British naval mission in Greece, serving by virtue of that position as an officer in the Royal Hellenic Navy, leave of absence to go to Serbia to serve with the British naval unit

defending Belgrade. The Greeks lent the Serbs money, arms, supplies, and men, and in every way of practical, unsentimental value aided Serbia to the utmost.

This was not sufficient, however, in the view of Premier Venizelos. He did not share his sovereign's apprehensions of danger within the Greek state from further territorial increases, like inverted pyramids of population where only the apex was actively Greek. To Venizelos the present war was an opportunity for aggrandizement of Hellas such as would never come again. He wanted to profit at once and to the utmost from the opportunity by throwing Greece unconditionally into the arms of the Entente powers. He was impatient of any caution or of any well-considered plan of coöperation, consumed only by a fear lest the war should end before Greece, by her participation, should have gained vast territorial compensations in Asia Minor or elsewhere, a smaller dream of empire than that conceived by the German kaiser, but not less imperialistic.

On August 18, 1914, this difference in view as to the stand Greece should take toward Europe

convinced

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at war came to a head. The Greek foreign minister, Dr. George Streit, an international jurist of world-wide reputation and one of the judges of The Hague Court, resigned from the Venizelos cabinet, in consequence. Sir Edward Grey finally telegraphed the Greek premier that his persistence was embarrassing to the British Government and advised Venizelos to cease for the moment his warlike propaganda in Greece. The same month Great Britain suggested tentatively that Greece cede Cavalla to Bulgaria as a means of securing the coöperation or at least the friendly neutrality of Greece's late enemy. The mere suggestion nearly caused the fall of the Venizelos cabinet, so much opposition was there in Greece to the surrender of any of the territory recently won from Bulgaria. Sir Edward Grey accordingly dropped the matter, to return to it in January, 1915.

Meanwhile, however, the Entente powers, under the threat of a second Austrian invasion of Serbia, finally summoned Greece in October, 1914, to apply the Greco-Serbian treaty and come to the aid of her ally in the struggle against Austria. It was Venizelos who refused this time,

making the coöperation of Bulgaria and Rumania in the hostilities against Austria a condition precedent to Greece's leaving neutrality. Further insistence on the part of France and Great Britain, and even a promise to send two divisions of French and British troops as a moral pressure to keep Bulgaria at least neutral, were unavailing. Serbia was already being overrun by her enemy, but Mr. Venizelos could not be persuaded that the Greco-Serbian treaty required Greece to succor her ally so long as Bulgaria remained a menace on the flank of any Greek army that might march into Serbia. Every effort to move Rumania proved equally fruitless. Greece, at the instance of Austria and Germany, transmitted to Serbia a proposal of separate peace. The Serbs refused. When the second invasion of Serbia had failed and the Austrians had again been swept across the Danube, Greece was still neutral—under the government of Mr. Venizelos, whom, four months previously, the British foreign secretary had been at some pains to hold in check lest he thrust Greece willy-nilly into war on the side of the Entente.

At that time Venizelos gave as his reason for

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✓ not leaving neutrality the fear that Bulgaria would join the Central empires and attack Greece. Nine months later, when Bulgaria had actually joined the Central empires and was ready to attack Greece, the same Venizelos, no longer a prime minister responsible to the Greek people, maintained that the Greco-Serbian treaty required Greece to assist Serbia even against a combined attack by the Germans, Austrians, and Bulgarians. Speaking of the Greco-Serbian treaty a year later, in October, 1915, he declared, "The feeling of loyalty to our national obligations has never wavered even for a moment."

Throughout the present war the attitude of each of the Balkan States has been influenced more by that of the remaining States than by any other consideration. Greece has been closely allied with Serbia since 1913, but not with Rumania. Nevertheless, all three States were moved during the first year of the war by the same fear: that Bulgaria, with the assistance of Turkey and perhaps of Germany and Austria, would seek to annul the treaty of Bukharest and regain the territory of which she had been deprived at the con-

clusion of the Second Balkan War. From the moment of Turkey's entry into the European conflict, in November, 1914, the alinement in the Balkans was evident: Bulgaria and Turkey on one side; Greece, Serbia, and Rumania on the other. It was a condition, not a theory. Sir Edward Grey's plan to reconstitute the Balkan block of 1912 was mere theory, taking no account of Bulgaria's deep-seated resentment against the treaty of Bukharest and her scarcely concealed intention to overthrow its decisions at the first propitious moment.

In fostering the reconstitution of the Balkan block, Sir Edward Grey was counseled, perhaps led, by Prime Minister Venizelos,¹ who in the negotiation of the treaty of Bucharest had already shown himself disposed to make concessions to conquered Bulgaria. The first point of difference between the Greek premier and his sovereign was upon this head. The king, a trained soldier, preferred to regard Turkey and Bul-

¹ In this view of Mr. Venizelos's responsibility for the Allied policy in Greece at this period, my friend and colleague, George Renwick, correspondent of "The Daily Chronicle," agrees. "M. Venizelos aimed at the reconstruction of the Balkan League on a somewhat extended basis," he writes in "War Wanderings," p. 250.

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garia as the potential enemies of Greece their policy had shown them, and to bend every energy to assure his army sufficient support from western Europe to drive a war with them to a definite, final conclusion. His plan was not to treat with Turkey and Bulgaria, but to defeat them, break the power of Turkey in Europe forever, and limit Bulgaria to the comparatively scant confines of the territory actually inhabited in majority by Bulgarians.

The British policy was guided rather by the subtle diplomacy of Venizelos than by the frank, military point of view of King Constantine. Indeed, throughout the Entente negotiations with Greece a certain recurring coincidence between the advocacy by Mr. Venizelos of a policy in respect to Greece and the adoption of an identical policy in respect to Greece by the governments of London and Paris leads to the assumption that the action of the Entente in the Balkans was rather directed by Mr. Venizelos than conceived in France or Great Britain.

CHAPTER II

GREECE IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1915

Two days before the war council in London debated the question of an attack on the Dardanelles, Venizelos presented to his sovereign a memorandum, dated January 11,¹ setting forth certain rather vague inducements held out early in January, 1915, by the Allied powers to Greece to enter into the war by joining the Dardanelles adventure. To guarantee Bulgaria's neutrality (and Venizelos scarcely ventured to hope to secure more than neutrality from Bulgaria) the Greek prime minister proposed that Greece restore to the Bulgars the port and province of Cavalla, recently won from them, and that she urge even greater sacrifices in favor of Bulgaria on the part of her ally, Serbia. An effort was also to be made to secure Rumania's coöperation with Serbia and Bulgaria in joining the Entente's operations against Turkey.

The day following the war council's definite de-

¹ Appendix 1.

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cision to undertake a naval attack upon the Dardanelles, Venizelos laid before his sovereign another memorandum, dated January 17,¹ revealing Rumania's refusal to take part in the enterprise and forecasting that all concessions he was urging would obtain at most only the neutrality of Bulgaria. Nevertheless, in this as in the first memorandum, Venizelos was eloquent in his insistence that the Allied offers be accepted at once. His original proposal of the cession of Cavalla is enlarged to the cession of the whole of the "Cazas," or districts of Sali-Chaban, Cavalla, and Drama, probably the richest piece of land for its size in the whole world. In return he speaks of vast possessions in Asia Minor of which the most he can say in the way of assurance from the Entente is, "I believe that, if we ask, there may be considerable probability of our request's being granted." In the same breath in which he speaks of Serbia's "obligation of alliance and motives of gratitude" toward Greece he coolly proposes to despoil this harrassed ally of the Doiran-Ghevgheli sector of Serbia, which, he says, "we shall also demand."

¹ Appendix 1.

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As political documents Venizelos's two memoranda to King Constantine are without precedent in history. He transplants the populations of whole provinces; he outlines Bulgaria's probable future course as if he himself were directing it; Serbia is moved about like a pawn on a chess-board; he disposes of the armies of the Entente as if he were their commander-in-chief; and brushes aside as a mere detail the administrative difficulties of Ottoman territory double the size of present Greece. Throughout he writes with the exaltation of one carried away by a great enthusiasm; "an opportunity furnished by Divine Providence to realize our most audacious national ideals" is his phrase. Moral considerations in favor of the action he supports appear only parenthetically in his first memorandum; they disappear altogether in the second. His whole argument is that Greece will again be doubled in size,—quadruple what she was in 1912,—and the tone of the memoranda is that of a man who has been taken up into a high mountain and shown the world, and has chosen the world.

The conclusion of a large Bulgarian loan in Berlin, however, cooled the ardor of the British

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to conciliate Bulgaria, albeit the fact dimmed nothing of Venizelos's purpose. It required a message from Sir Edward Grey that "there could be no question of a cession to Bulgaria for the present" to check Mr. Venizelos's political campaign in Greece to that end.

Nevertheless, the negotiations for Greece's participation in the expedition against Constantinople continued in a desultory way. Both King Constantine and his general staff favored the enterprise, if undertaken upon serious military bases. The consideration being given the venture by the British war council struck them, however, as haphazard and based upon no real knowledge of the difficulties of the undertaking. The Greek staff had spent years in the study of every possible method of taking the Turkish capital, the dream of every Greek for five hundred years. A purely naval attack was, in their estimation, doomed to certain failure. When he learned that precisely this was under consideration, King Constantine sent two of his best staff officers to Malta with the Greek staff's own plans to demonstrate the folly of a purely naval movement and to propose several alternative operations, each dependent upon

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the sending of a very considerable Allied land expedition to work in conjunction with the Greeks.

Despite this warning, the first Allied bombardment of the straits took place on February 19, 1915. Not only were no troops landed in support of the naval expedition, but the attack was made when no troops were available. The bombardment served no purpose save to apprise the Turks that the Entente was preparing to strike directly at Constantinople. It gave them plenty of leisure in which to complete an impregnable fortification both of the Dardanelles and Gallipoli—a leisure which they employed immediately and well. This fruitless enterprise, projected by Mr. Winston Churchill in August, 1914, for which in five months no serious military preparations had been made, not only put the Turks on their guard, but betrayed to the Greeks the weakness and lack of plan in the Entente policy in the near East. It became at once evident to the Greek staff that if, upon joining the Entente, Greece were to protect herself effectually from disaster, she must do so by her own caution and intelligence. The Allies could not be counted upon to appreciate

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the extent of their own blunders, much less not to sacrifice Greece to an ill-chosen and carelessly executed adventure.

Following the failure of the naval bombardment of February 19, the Entente acquired respect for the Greek staff's suggestion of a simultaneous land and naval expedition against the Dardanelles. Negotiations were reopened with Greece with this in view. On March 1, Mr. Venizelos proposed that Greece participate with her fleet and an army corps of three divisions, the Entente furnishing the remainder of the land force to be employed in the attack. During the discussion of the details of the enterprise the Greek staff, taught caution in dealing with the Entente by the naval fiasco of February 19, took the view that, with the Bulgarian attitude still undefined, Greece could not in conscience risk more than a division of her land army, albeit willing to add the entire Greek fleet to the Entente's naval forces. This arrangement King Constantine accepted in principle on March 4, and Great Britain charged General Sir Arthur Paget to report upon the attitude of Bulgaria with a view to disposing of the Greek staff's hesi-

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tations on that head. The emissary was ill chosen. Sir Arthur Paget's predilection in favor of Bulgaria was well known in Greece. Not even Mr. Venizelos would have dared to act upon his judgment of Bulgaria's intentions.

The question of the intervention of Greece in the war at this juncture, however, was decided upon other and entirely unexpected grounds. Russia at the eleventh hour opposed any Greek coöperation in an attack on Constantinople. The idea that a Greek king styled Constantine XII by his extreme partizans—taking the numeral in the line of the Greek emperors of Constantinople—should enter the “city of Constantine” a victor was too much for them. They insisted that if the help of the Greeks be accepted at all, it be used against the Austrians, not against the Turks.

Unfortunately for this disposition, the Greeks, who had nursed five centuries of hatred of the Turks, had no rancor whatever against the Austrians, had never really come in contact with them, in fact. The Turkish massacres of Greek inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire, which had never ceased since 1913, inflamed the Greeks to the fighting-point; but a motive of this sort was

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wholly lacking in any war with Austria. The proposal that the Greek army should be used on the Danube, where they had neither interests nor animosities, impressed them as did a similar suggestion that the Greek troops be employed for the defense of Egypt—as turning the Greek forces into an army of mercenaries to be moved about at the will of the more powerful Allied powers.

It is difficult to exaggerate the unfortunate effect upon Greece of Russia's attitude, especially in view of the reasons for that attitude. The Greeks are a proud people, given to lending a somewhat too great importance to the rôle their history has played in the development of the modern world. Their past is always with them, often to the detriment of their future; and to deprive them of any participation even in the Christian reconquest of Constantinople was too gross a wrong to be stomached. Only those wholly unacquainted with the psychology and the traditions of the Greek of to-day could have formulated so wounding a condition to Greece's coöperation with the Allies. Negotiations for Greece's entry into the war ceased at once. Prime Minister Venizelos, failing in his efforts to effect an alli-

Acte du 1/14 Avril 1915.-

Bénéfice de la pleine solidarité avec ses alliés c-à-d de leur garantie, durant la guerre et une certaine période qui en suivrait le terme, l'intégrité de son territoire continental et insulaire, y compris l'Épire du Nord.

Les diverses modalités de . . . notre Coopération feraient l'objet d'une Convention spéciale dont les termes seraient fixés d'un commun accord par les États-Majors respectifs.

L'acte définitif déterminant les Concessions et Compensations territoriales qui seraient faites à la Grèce.

AUTOGRAPH NOTES MADE BY MR CHRISTOPHER ZOGRAPHOS, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF GREECE, during his discussion with King Constantine of the terms upon which Greece's offer of coöperation with the Allies of April 14, 1915, should be made.

TRANSLATION: Act of 1/14 April 1915

"Assurance of full solidarity with her (Greece's) Allies; that is to say, their guarantee during the war and for a certain period following its termination of the integrity of her (Greece's) continental integrity, including North Epirus.

"The various extents of our coöperation should be defined in a special convention, the terms of which should be fixed in common accord by the respective leading states.

"The final agreement should lay down the concessions and territorial compensations which may be made to Greece."



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ance between Greece and the Entente, resigned. But before he resigned he permitted, under paper protest, an Allied occupation of the Greek islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Tenedos, at the mouth of the Dardanelles, setting a precedent for future Allied use of Greek soil for military purposes. On March 7, King Constantine dissolved the Boulé,¹ calling for new elections on June 13. As prime minister, in the interim, he sought first the coöperation of Alexander Zaimis, but finally accepted a reactionary cabinet under Demetrios Gounaris. On March 17, General Sir Arthur Paget reported Bulgaria safely on the side of the Entente and perhaps even ready to join them in an attack upon Turkey. The following day, March 18, the Allied attempt to force the Dardanelles, still solely by sea, was made with signal unsuccess. The *Bouvet*, *Irresistible*, and *Ocean* were sunk. A number of other ships were badly damaged. The moral effect on the Balkans was immediate and far-reaching.

While negotiating with Greece for her entry into the war just preceding the Dardanelles at-

¹The Boulé is the Congress of the representatives of the Greek people.

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tack, Great Britain had simultaneously been negotiating secretly with Bulgaria for her coöperation, offering King Ferdinand not only part of the territory of Great Britain's ally, Serbia, as compensation, but part of the territory of Greece as well. The failure of the Dardanelles attack put an end to this discussion. In the face of this setback the Russians withdrew their objection to the participation of the Greeks in an expedition against Constantinople. The French and British returned to their negotiations with Greece, offering the new Gounaris cabinet one last chance to come in.

King Constantine had not wavered in his willingness to undertake a serious military operation, and the occasion now seemed propitious to define precisely what the Greek staff, with its specialized knowledge of the difficulties to be met, regarded as a serious military operation. Three essential political conditions of coöperation were laid down in Foreign Minister Zographos's memorandum of April 14, 1915: (1) that Greece be accepted as a full ally of the Entente powers, the latter guaranteeing during the war and for a certain period afterward, the integrity of Greece's con-

tinental and insular territory, including north Epirus; (2) that the extent and nature of Greece's coöperation in the war be fixed by a special convention, the terms of which were to be laid down by the respective military staffs, in common accord; (3) that the final agreement for Greece's entry into the war define whatever concessions and territorial compensations it might please the Entente powers to make Greece for her assistance.

The first condition was to dispose of any question of Great Britain's retaining the Greek islands she had occupied for the Dardanelles expedition, and to settle in advance any claims Italy might in future bring forward to north Epirus. The second proviso was to settle any possibility of the Greek army's being used in Egypt, on the Danube, or on the French front, dispositions of it to which the Greek people were unalterably opposed. The third provision was not a demand for compensation, but merely the expression of a desire that whatever concessions were to be made be defined, not left to be fixed after the war. In this proposal from the Gounaris cabinet the military people of Greece were speaking, not the poli-

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ticians. They felt the necessity of being able to say to the Greek whom they called upon to fight: "You are fighting to free your brother Greeks in this given district of the Turkish Empire. When you have won, we have the guarantee of the Entente powers that those for whom you have fought shall be free." In making the proposals, the Gounaris government expressly renounced all expectation of the coöperation of Bulgaria.

On their side, the Greek staff proposed to march 300,000 Greeks through Bulgaria, and in company with 250,000 European troops to attack Constantinople from the land. Bulgaria was to be summoned to define her attitude. If she declared hostility to the Entente, after all her negotiations to join the Allied powers, the Greeks were quite ready to finish with Bulgaria first and come on to Constantinople later; if, however, Bulgaria were to reiterate her professions of friendship to the Entente, she was to be asked to prove it by permitting the Greek army to pass through her territory. A memorandum embodying these points was submitted to the Entente by the Greek general staff on April 20.

The Allies refused to consider this offer, re-

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garding the Greek estimate of the number of troops required for a successful attack upon Constantinople as greatly exaggerated. Six months later General Sarraïl set the requisite minimum for an offensive against Bulgaria from Saloniki at virtually the same figures. The British, besides, believed firmly in the friendship of Bulgaria and opposed the Greek plan as calculated to provoke war with King Ferdinand. Every insistence of the Greek king that he had reason to believe Bulgaria had been planning hostility to the Entente from the date of the floating of the Bulgarian loan in Berlin was met by the Allies not only with unbelief, but in a spirit of irritation with King Constantine for maligning his neighbor.

As for the guarantee of the integrity of Greece during the war, the Entente was not disposed to furnish any other than the acceptance of Greece as an ally; they refused to undertake any engagement for after the war. They ridiculed Greece's uneasiness as to the attitude of Bulgaria and proposed that the Greek army be sent into Asia Minor, leaving the Macedonian frontiers of Greece open to any attack the Bulgars might de-

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sire to make. Finally, they who had suggested compensations in Asia Minor to Venizelos, suddenly found it unwise to plan the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.

To the Greeks all these objections appeared mere chicane. Nevertheless, on the suggestion of Jean Guillemin, afterward French minister to Greece, a fortnight later the Greeks proposed a new combination, withdrawing their condition of a guarantee of the integrity of Greece for a period after the war, and offering their ports and islands to the Entente as military and naval bases and their fleet to coöperate with the Allied fleet against Turkey. The Greek army was to remain inactive as long as there was danger of a hostile move by Bulgaria. The Greeks renounced any idea of a land attack on Constantinople in view of the unwillingness or the inability of the Entente to furnish a force additional to the Greek army sufficient to give the enterprise a fighting chance of success.

This second proposal, although made at the instance of France, was sharply rejected. Greece was given to understand that she must join the Allies entirely without conditions if she wished to

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be accepted at all. The Allied landing at Gallipoli was counted upon to demonstrate the serious intentions of the Entente. Greece, however, insisted upon the point of the guarantee of her integrity. But the Entente, already in negotiations with Italy for her departure from neutrality, refused to discuss the integrity of Greece. After the Entente's signature of the secret agreement with Italy on April 25, 1915, what had been an impression in Athens became a conviction; namely, that the Entente was no longer able to guarantee the integrity of Greece, having already promised part of Greece (Epirus) to Italy and intending to offer another part (Cavalla) to Bulgaria to keep her from joining the Central empires. On May 1, the Greek Boulé was dissolved.

In May, also, Italy entered the war, thereby clinching any arrangement in respect to Epirus that may have been secretly made between her and her new allies. In these circumstances the Greek people lost all enthusiasm for joining the Entente. They conceived a very profound feeling that the Allied powers were not playing squarely. This sentiment was strengthened by the action of the English in stopping and

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seizing Greek ships or holding them indefinitely at Gibraltar, Malta, or Cyprus on flimsy or no excuses, in seizing and condemning cargoes of wheat and coal necessary to the economic existence of Greece, in stopping or delaying telegrams from or to Greece, often occasioning heavy losses to Greek business men—all on the ground that hostile submarines were being supplied from Greece, an assertion the Entente authorities were never able to prove.

To these repressions and irritations was added the patent unsuccess of the Allied land operations at the Dardanelles as further reason for Greece's waning desire to join the Entente powers. Jealous of concessions promised to Italy in Asia Minor at the same moment that the Greek Government was being informed that the Entente could not see their way clear to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire; suspicious of the sincerity of the Entente in all her negotiations with Greece; persuaded that Great Britain was still hoping to secure the aid of Bulgaria at Greece's expense; convinced by the facts of the Dardanelles adventure that the Entente in their operations in the East were blundering, through

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ignorance of conditions and incapacity to meet them effectively, the Greeks settled down without regret to the idea of staying out of the war.

In June, convinced in the same sense as his sovereign of the insincerity of the Entente powers in their negotiations with the Gounaris cabinet, Foreign Minister Christopher Zographos resigned. With his resignation any hope of reaching an agreement with the Gounaris government was eliminated.

CHAPTER III

THE SERBIAN TREATY

THE Greek elections, held on June 13, 1915, gave Elephtherios Venizelos 180 deputies out of 316 in the Boulé of the Hellenes. Despite shameless efforts to control the balloting by force, the Conservative government of Demetrios Gounaris was overwhelmingly voted out. But not even Venizelos himself pretended that the vote in question had been a vote by Greece in favor of going to war on the side of the Entente. The greater part of the negotiations between Greece and the Entente representatives had been conducted, as is usual in the near East, without the details being more than divined by the people at large. Venizelos had taken the Greeks into his confidence only to the extent of publishing his two memoranda to his sovereign, an action regarded by the Greeks generally as in doubtful taste. In addition, he had given the Entente governments, and to a certain extent the Greek people, to

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understand that the failure of his negotiations to join Greece with the Allies had been due to the opposition of King Constantine and the general staff.

At this period the Greeks were unquestionably passionately in favor of France in the European War. They also trusted Venizelos and respected his undoubted abilities. But they were by no means disposed to part with a portion of the territory they had won from Bulgaria at the point of the bayonet, even at the behest of Venizelos or to help France in her war with Germany. Moreover, the voters, almost all of whom had fought victoriously under the orders of the general staff, had confidence in the military judgment of their officers, and they considered the participation of Greece in the European War a military matter upon which General Dousmanis, the chief of staff, might be better qualified to pronounce than even Venizelos. For this reason Venizelos's censure of the general staff left the people cold. As King Constantine put it, "They elected Venizelos, not his policy."

An exceedingly astute politician, Venizelos himself was as well aware of this general senti-

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ment as anybody. He had, therefore, gone very lightly on the war part of his program during his electoral campaign, purposing to achieve his ends by more devious ways. Scarcely was his majority in the chamber known before the Entente powers acted upon it—in Athens, it is assumed, at the instance of Mr. Venizelos. A note was addressed on August 3 to the Greek Government by Great Britain, France, and Russia, advising Greece that the Entente, without asking the permission either of Serbia or Greece, had entered into an engagement with Bulgaria to deliver to her the Greek port of Cavalla and a territory lying behind the port, to be enlarged, according to the verbal statements of the Entente ministers in Athens, in proportion to any concessions which might be made later to Greece in Asia Minor. At the same time the Greek Government was advised that a similar notice had been sent Serbia, the ally of the Entente, acquainting the Serbian Government with the Entente's intended cession to Bulgaria of all Serbian Macedonia not in dispute, under the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912. This proposed grant of the territory of an ally to a hostile

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neighbor thrust a Bulgarian wedge between Serbia and Greece, thus effectually nullifying the Greco-Serbian treaty of alliance, which had been conceived to keep the two countries in such close contact as to enable them to oppose a solid front to their common enemy, Bulgaria.

To say that this cavalier disposition of the territory of an independent state provoked indignation in Greece would be to fail in describing the feeling the Entente's move aroused. The Greeks felt precisely as the Americans did when the German foreign minister proposed aiding Mexico to reconquer Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, save that in this instance the Entente did not promise to aid Bulgaria to take the territory in question: they ceded the territory to her as if it were their own. Not a man in Greece was ignorant of the rôle of undeclared ally that Bulgaria had played in respect to Turkey since the latter's entry into the European conflict. Not a man was ignorant that every sacrifice short of actual armed coöperation had been made by Greece in favor of Serbia and her greater Allies since the war began, and that even armed coöperation had been offered and re-

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jected. No one was unaware of the heroic fight that Serbia had made, nor of her refusal to conclude an advantageous separate peace with Austria just before the second Austrian invasion. Yet the two countries that had been faithful in sympathy and sacrifice to the cause of the Entente, one an ally and the other an independent neutral state, were to be despoiled in favor of the one Balkan country that had shown herself consistently hostile to the Entente in deed and in intrigue from the outset of the war. The Greek Government formally protested.

The Serbian Government, in no position to protest, remained silent. Already cooled toward her greater allies by their secret treaty of April 25 with Italy, Serbia was slowly reaching the conviction, later to be emphasized by disaster after disaster which overtook her, that the Entente powers were more or less indifferent to her fate. After the first Austrian invasion at the outbreak of the war, the Serbian general staff begged France and Great Britain to send a sufficient quantity of heavy artillery to Belgrade to keep the Austrians on the other side of the Danube. Three tiny naval missions were sent,

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the British under, first, Admiral Troubridge and then Admiral Cardale, the French under Commander Picot, and the Russian under Lieutenant Volkovinsky. But unsupplied with either guns or sufficient ammunition, despite frantic appeals to Malta for the needed supplies, these inadequate missions were able to be of little use. When the third invasion of Serbia began, they gave it up entirely as a bad job.

The common Greco-Serbian frontier erected by Greece and Serbia at the conference of Bukharest was as necessary to Serbia as to Greece. Her only communication with the sea was through the Greek port of Saloniki. An extension of the Bulgarian frontiers toward the Vardar threatened to cut Serbia off from every possibility of developing and consolidating her newly won territory.

Venizelos naturally did not openly support the Entente's demands; but no more did he oppose them. Following the elections, Prime Minister Gounaris resigned, and King Constantine summoned Venizelos to the premiership. The Boulé was first called for July 20, and then postponed until August 16, at the premier's desire. On as-

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suming power, Venizelos declared the situation no longer the same as during the previous January, when he had urged the juncture of Greece with the Entente powers, and, on the assembly of the Boulé, he formally repeated his renunciation of his previous policy of alineing Greece with the Allied powers upon any conditions and at any cost. To appreciate the events which followed it is important to note this change of front on the part of the Cretan. For later, when King Constantine removed him from power for trying to compass Greece's departure from neutrality without a mandate from the Greek people to that effect, he declared his sovereign's act unconstitutional on the ground that the Greek people had pronounced upon a question of coöperation with the Entente in the elections of June 13. And his whole claim to any standing in Greece to-day rests on the assumption that he alone represents the will of the Greek people constitutionally expressed at that time.

It is important, too, to note that at this moment there was no voice raised in Greece—least of all that of Mr. Venizelos—to maintain that the Greco-Serbian treaty of alliance required

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Greece to come to the armed aid of Serbia in a general European war. On the contrary, by offering additional inducements to Greece to join the Serbs at the time of the second Austrian invasion, the Entente powers had virtually admitted that the Greco-Serbian treaty did not suffice to compel Greece to enter; besides, by promising to Bulgaria Serbian territory specifically mentioned in the treaty as essential to the maintenance of effective military contact between the two contracting countries, the Entente powers had not only ignored the treaty in question, but had undertaken to treat it as a scrap of paper of no importance or applicability to the existing situation. ✓

Between Serbia and Greece a long series of conversations as to the best method of applying the military provisions of the treaty, should it ever become operative, proved abortive. The document itself is in two parts, a treaty of defensive alliance against an attack upon either of the contracting parties by Bulgaria, and a military convention defining with meticulous accuracy the precise obligations of both parties in that event. On August 17, 1914, just before

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Turkey's entry into the war, the Greek staff, under Mr. Venizelos's premiership, advised Serbia that if Turkey were to attack Greece alone, Greece would support the attack alone; but that if, as seemed likely, Bulgaria were to declare war at the same time, Serbia must oppose Bulgaria with at least 100,000 bayonets (actual combatants) in order to prevent a Bulgarian concentration against Greece. The requirements of the military convention are explicit:

At the opening of hostilities at whatever moment they may begin, Serbia contracts to put 150,000 men in the Ghevgheli-Koumanovo and Pirot sectors.¹

To this voluntary reduction of the number of troops Greece could expect of Serbia, the Serbian staff replied that Serbia could not take her forces from the Austrian frontier to send them to the Bulgarian border because of certain obligations she had contracted toward the Entente. Again, on April 3, 1915, the Greek staff sent Colonel Vlachopoulos to Kraguyevatz to enter into a conference with the Serbian staff with a view to ascertaining just what the Serbs could do in the way of fulfilment of their side of the contract. The Voivode Putnik refused flatly to enter into

¹ "Le Temps," Paris, August 15, 1915; No. 20,128.

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any conversations on this head. On August 10 the Serbian staff informed Colonel Vlakhopoulos that, far from being able to transport the treaty requirement of 150,000 bayonets to the Bulgarian frontier in the event of the then impending declaration of war by Bulgaria, the most that Greece could count upon in the future was two Serbian divisions, or fewer than 20,000 men.

Evidently this situation was not the fault of Serbia; neither was it the fault of Greece. The plans had been made by both staffs in full knowledge of the military needs of a campaign against Bulgaria. It was not a sentimental problem, or even a political one; it was a military emergency that arose by mid-August, 1915, when both Greece and Serbia became convinced of Bulgaria's hostile intentions. Serbia at once approached her greater allies to supply the missing contingent of 100,000 bayonets, with which the Greek staff thought that a campaign might be undertaken. The Entente governments treated the idea of a Bulgarian attack with contempt, and refused to treat Serbia's plea seriously. The French minister to Serbia, M. Bopp, had preached the ultimate hostile action of Bulgaria

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to M. Delcassé for months. His only satisfaction was to be told that he was a Serbophile. The French minister in Sofia, M. Panafieu, telegraphed his Government daily for a fortnight before Bulgaria's declaration of war that Bulgaria's hostility was inevitable. He received no reply from the Quai d'Orsay at all.

On September 15 the Greek staff advised the Serbian staff, as well as the Entente ministers in Athens, that it was in the possession of information that sixteen Austrian and German divisions had passed through Budapest bound southward. They also told the Entente that October 14 was the date set for Bulgaria's declaration of war. The information was too precise to be wholly ignored. For the first time the scorn the Entente had previously exhibited for the idea of a combined Austro-German-Bulgarian invasion of Serbia from two sides appeared to be shaken, albeit Great Britain clung to her assertion that Bulgaria would never move from neutrality. New pressure, however, was brought from London and Paris to bear upon Greece, and on September 21 Venizelos promised the French and British ministers that Greece would mobilize.

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At the same time, on his own responsibility and without authorization from the sovereign of Greece or the Boulé of the Hellenes, he asked France and Great Britain to send 150,000 Allied troops to Macedonia. The two governments replied that they were favorably disposed to consider the matter.

On September 23 the Bulgarian mobilization was decreed, but officially stated to be "solely for defensive purposes." Four days later Sir Edward Grey formally declared in the House of Commons: "According to official information reaching us, Bulgaria has decided to assume hereafter an attitude of armed neutrality to defend her rights and independence. Nevertheless she has no aggressive intentions against any of the neighbors of Bulgaria."

On September 24, King Constantine signed a decree mobilizing the Greek army. He ordered it to take up the positions on the Bulgarian frontier indicated in the Greco-Serbian treaty of alliance, that it might be ready to act in case the situation altered in Serbia or in case France and Great Britain, at last alive to a possible Bulgarian attack the imminence of which the Greek

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king and the Serbian staff had long urged upon them, should decide to send a force to the aid of their hard-pressed ally.

In decreeing the mobilization, however, King Constantine took the precaution to state that it was "for the defense of the national territory only," so as to prevent his prime minister from rushing Greece into war without sufficient consideration of its consequences to Greece and to Hellenism in general. Later, he embodied his idea in a declaration which he gave me for publication:

Greece is merely loosening her sword in the scabbard. She menaces no one. But she cannot permit that events shall constitute a menace to the integrity of the nation or to the freedom of the Greek people. It is my duty to preserve my country from the danger of destruction through becoming involved in the general European conflict. I shall do this at all hazards, if it be possible.

At the request of the Central empires, the Greek Government at this juncture transmitted to Serbia a second offer of a separate peace. The Serbs wavered. Convinced of Bulgaria's intentions and in despair at the indifference of the Entente to their peril, they asked permission of

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their Allies to fall upon Bulgaria before the latter's mobilization could be completed. Great Britain refused to permit this. Faced with the certainty of an attack from two sides, knowing herself in no position to concentrate on the Bulgarian frontier the troops required to render the Greco-Serbian treaty operative and thus assure the assistance of the Greek army, a large party in Serbia openly advocated the acceptance of the proposal for a separate peace.

Serbia's danger had failed to arouse the Entente to any action in her behalf. The prospect of Serbia's defection, however, produced an immediate result in London and Paris. The Serbs were promised aid, and in consequence they refused the offer of a separate peace. General Sarrail's expeditionary force, which had been designated for operations in Syria on September 3, was suddenly ordered to proceed to Saloniki instead on a day's notice. It was, however, as Sir Edward Grey frankly characterized it, "a comparatively small force."

The preliminaries to this landing were characteristic of the methods of the Cretan statesman. Rumania was first asked to coöperate against

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Bulgaria, and refused. Then, on October 2, after having completed all his arrangements with the Entente ministers in Athens for the sending of a nominal expeditionary force to Macedonia, Venizelos broached the matter to his sovereign. "If the Entente will supply the 150,000 bayonets required by the Greco-Serbian treaty to call the Greek army into operation, will King Constantine, as commander-in-chief of the Greek army, undertake to lead the army in a campaign against Bulgaria?" was his fashion of putting the question. The king demurred that he could not decide unless he knew what quality of troops the Entente proposed to send. Venizelos promised that they should be "metropolitan," or line, troops, not colonials. The king objected that so important a military matter should be thoroughly threshed out with the general staff before reaching any definite decision. His prime minister replied that time pressed, and urged immediate action. King Constantine maintained, as he has always maintained, that the Greco-Serbian treaty was not in question, as it was conceived solely in reference to purely Balkan combinations and could not be



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operative in the case of a general European war. However, disposed in every practical way to be of aid to the Serbs, he declared his willingness to consider any combination based upon the essential military requirements of such a campaign as laid down in the Greco-Serbian treaty. It was not the form that interested him, but the material result.

On this assurance, and on the definite understanding that the Entente force to be sent was to total 150,000 men, or at least 100,000 bayonets, Venizelos left the king's presence at Tatoy and went at once to the French and British legations.

"The king consents," he informed the two diplomatists. "Let the troops come!"

Later in the evening King Constantine telephoned his prime minister to repair to Tatoy the following morning to discuss the details of the proposed arrangement with the officers of the Greek staff.

"It is too late, Sire," answered Venizelos. "The French are already on the way."

Article XCIX of the Greek Constitution reads:

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“No foreign army can be admitted to the Greek service without a special law, nor can it sojourn or pass through the state.”

CHAPTER IV

THE SALONIKI ADVENTURE

THE Allied expeditionary force, ordered to Saloniki on October 2, 1915, began debarkment October 5. The whirlwind Austro-German attack upon Serbia under General von Mackensen began October 6. The whole story is a heroic eddy at one side of the great, boiling caldron of the European War. The Serbs fought desperately, but they had no chance from the very outset. The French advance into Serbia, begun October 14, and the retreat upon Saloniki ending just two months later, was an operation in the nature of the "Charge of the Light Brigade"—magnificent, but not war. It is impossible to praise too highly the gallant conduct of the French troops under incredibly difficult conditions. The position of General de Lardemelle's force, especially, occupying the extreme left beyond the Tscherna ¹ River in an effort to effect a juncture

¹ Also spelled improperly Cerna.

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with the Serbs at the northern end of Babounas Pass, was never seriously tenable for a moment. Yet he held it for ten days, waiting, as the entire expeditionary force was waiting, for the reinforcements that were sent to Saloniki only in December, after it was too late—and then in too small a number to be of any use.

If the expedition was political (and only the chancelleries of London and Paris know what they had in mind in ordering the expedition), calculated to induce the Greeks to enter the war, it was both childish and dishonest; dishonest because it assumed that the Greeks would be led by sentiment to throw themselves into the war at the first appearance of Allied troops on Greek soil, and that, once precipitated thus into the hostilities, they would be compelled to fight it through even to the destruction of Greece, without further help from the Entente powers. The proof that France and Great Britain would have sent no adequate reinforcements to the Greeks, had the latter embarked upon the hazardous adventure as the Allies hoped, lies in the fact that they sent no adequate reinforcements to their own troops, who were caught like rats in a trap. The enter-

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prise, if undertaken with the hope of persuading the Greeks to go to war, was childish because it assumed that the Greek staff would not know an expeditionary force of serious proportions from a handful of armed men—the Greeks who, in the present generation and before the outbreak of the European War, had seen more real war than France and Great Britain combined.

It is almost impossible to conceive of the adventure as having been seriously undertaken as a military emprise. If so, however, it is perhaps the greatest single folly of the war, not excluding the Dardanelles affair. For the Saloniki adventure involved the possibility of a far worse disaster to the Allied arms than that of Gallipoli. General Sarrail's troops were saved from destruction when they retired upon Saloniki only by the purely fortuitous circumstance of the presence of friendly Greek troops on both his flanks—a circumstance upon which, as the capable soldier he is, he could not properly count. Had the Greeks retired before the Bulgarian advance in December, 1915, as they did in May, 1916, no power on earth could have saved General Sarrail from defeat; had the Greek staff and the Greek king

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actually favored the Germans, as both Mr. Venizelos and the Entente press insist with such vehemence is the case, a combined Greco-Bulgarian attack upon Sarraïl's retreating army would have meant its capture or its complete annihilation. It was these mad risks that the expedition ran.

There were greater military and moral issues involved in the adventure than the fate of an Allied army of less than 60,000 men. The whole prestige of the Entente in the Balkans was at stake. Serbia had been promised help. She did not get it. Serbia and Montenegro were crushed, because the promised help was not brought in time, or, indeed, ever. It is of no avail in the Balkans, and I doubt if it is of much avail anywhere else—save perhaps in the Entente countries themselves—to seek to blame the issue on the Greeks. This is not the war of the Greeks; it is the war of the Entente, and the Entente powers had no business to stake the very life of two of their allies on a mere gamble. Moreover, it was not even a gamble when regarded from a cold-blooded military point of view. The Entente powers would themselves have been the

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first to despise and criticize the Greeks had they entered the war under heavy handicap and in consequence been destroyed by the armies of the Central empires, precisely as to-day they despise and criticize Rumania for the same reason.

The Entente were perfectly aware of the position of the Greek staff in regard to entering hostilities without forces and equipment adequate to victory. This position had been made clear in November, 1914, and in January, March, and April, 1915, during previous negotiations between the Entente and Greece, for the latter's participation in the war. Colonel Sir Thomas Cunningham, the British military attaché in Athens, was in closest touch with the Greek staff and had advised his government fully as to its disposition to remain unmoved by considerations of sentiment or politics and to govern the conduct of the Greek army by rule of sheer military probabilities. The haphazard manner of planning and pursuing the Dardanelles adventure merely strengthened the Greek staff in its conviction that the Entente were both badly informed in respect to conditions in the near East and inclined to take the military problems of the Bal-

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kans far too lightly. Before this concrete example of incapacity had been thrust under their noses, it is possible King Constantine and the Greek staff might have inclined to credit Venizelos's claim that the Entente were prepared to send 150,000 metropolitan troops to Saloniki; after the Gallipoli failure became evident, however, they preferred to count the French and English troops as they arrived, and to move only when a reasonable number of properly trained men were on the ground. On this basis, the forces furnished by the Entente gave them no occasion to move at all.

Finally, the Entente knew better than any one that their hopes of Greek aid were founded on a politician, not a soldier; yet they required military, not political aid. They knew Venizelos to be their man; his political fortunes in Greece were bound up with their policy, which he had made his. It was evident, therefore, that for the Entente to reach an understanding with Venizelos for the aid of Greece was about as effective to the end of securing for the Allied powers the coöperation of King Constantine's army, as for the Entente to reach an understanding with Sir

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Edward Grey for the aid of Greece. Venizelos no more controlled the Greek army than did the British foreign minister. The negotiations of the Entente with Greece for her participation in the war at this juncture were in no sense a frank discussion on a military basis between two parties who expect thereafter to work together in the close association of alliance; they were simply a diplomatic and political intrigue, powerless, even if successful, to obtain any real advantage either for Serbia or for the Entente.

The loss to the Entente in the failure of the effort to rescue Serbia is not measurable in prestige alone. It was a loss of men far in excess of the comparatively small casualties suffered by General Sarrail's army, for it meant the virtual annihilation of the Serbian and Montenegrin armies. Serbia had begun the war with some 300,000 trained and experienced soldiers whose hardihood and staying powers were second to those of no soldiers engaged in the entire European conflict. To-day 75,000 is a generous estimate of the Serbian army. Montenegro began the war with twelve brigades of infantry and a brigade of artillery, a very considerable

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force for so small a country. To-day no Montenegrin army remains.

In Athens, the news of an Allied expedition to Saloniki precipitated an acute political crisis. Venizelos played his last card as premier. On October 5 he appeared in the Boulé with the purpose of using his majority to jam through the resolution constitutionally required to legalize the landing of a foreign force on Greek soil; for at that moment, having as prime minister of Greece invited a foreign army to debark in Greece without the permission of the deputies, he had violated the Constitution and stood entirely without the law. He had acted as a dictator and he felt the need to regularize his position at once. But the representatives of the Greek people did not prove as tractable as he had anticipated. The powers' note of August 3, giving Cavalla to Bulgaria, had had its effect, and there was a marked opposition for the first time to Greece's leaving neutrality on any terms. The session of the Boulé lasted until five o'clock in the morning. In the course of the debate Venizelos was forced to make admissions that put him in the light of having completely altered his ground since his election;

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on the subject of the Greco-Serbian treaty he had to renounce the position he had taken in October and November, 1914, that the alliance did not require Greece to participate in a general European struggle. He was compelled to go back on his earlier statement that conditions had altered since January, 1915, and that the recent elections had not recorded the decision of the people in favor of war, and to take the contradictory stand that the vote in the elections of June 13 had been a vote for war—a stand which nothing in fact justified. In fine, he was shown by his own admissions to have been intriguing with the representatives of the Entente powers while the sovereign and the people of Greece had been kept in ignorance of what he was about. As a crowning revelation of his policy, he asserted from the tribune of the chamber that he believed Greece must join the Entente, not only to fight Bulgaria or Turkey if necessary, but to fight Austria and Germany as well, should occasion require. He pronounced this course imperative because of Greece's obligation to Serbia created by the treaty of May 19, 1913—an obligation which he now declared binding whether the En-

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tente sent a sufficient force to be of real value in the Macedonian operations or not, and binding even to the destruction of Greece.

With the majority of his most devoted followers behind him, Venizelos weathered the storm in the chamber, but only in the face of bitter opposition which scarcely augured such unity of enthusiastic purpose as would be required if war were to be waged. The extreme interpretation which he put upon the Serbian treaty was a new one, upon which the Greek people certainly had never been called to pass. If their sentiment in respect to war with Bulgaria was clear, certainly they had never pronounced upon war against Austria and Germany. Indeed, since the Entente's note of August 3, there had been reason to believe that the people of Greece would have liked to pronounce much more definitely than hitherto they had had opportunity of doing upon the entire foreign policy of the country.

On the following day, therefore, October 5, King Constantine called his first minister to the palace. The interview was a stormy one. The monarch felt that the prime minister's course had been one of intrigue at the expense both of the

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Greek people and of his own position as head of the army. Excessively frank himself, the Greek sovereign despises the devious ways of politicians. He voiced his feeling on this occasion, and his hand is not light in dealing with what he cannot approve. He asked the Cretan if the reports of his declarations in the previous evening's debate were correct. Venizelos reviewed for the benefit of his sovereign the position he had taken in the Boulé.

"I can no longer coöperate with you along those lines," the king said dryly, when his minister had finished. "I shall accept your resignation. The people of Greece will decide whether you are authorized to plunge them into war or not."

Venizelos saw the place in the sun he had worked and schemed for since the beginning of the European War suddenly obscured. He claimed that, as he had been reëlected in June after his resignation in March, the throne had not the constitutional right to send him back to the people for a second vote, whatever may have been the alteration of the external as well as the internal situation of Greece in the interim. He

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has maintained that position ever since, making the foundation of his revolutionary movement against the present King of the Hellenes the claim that the Greek sovereign violated the Constitution under which, according to the Cretan, Constantine I is merely the "highest functionary" of a democratic state. Article XXXI of the Greek Constitution reads, however: "The king appoints and dismisses his ministers." There is no qualifying clause whatever.

In this connection a statement which Venizelos gave me for publication the morning of October 4 is interesting, albeit somewhat confusing when compared with the facts. He received his summons to repair to the palace while I talked with him; at that time, so far as he knew, the bold stroke he had attempted in inviting the French and British to land troops in Macedonia was in a way to succeed. The significant detail, however, is that I submitted the statement to him for his approval after he had left the king, when he knew that his interpretation of the Greco-Serbian treaty had not met the views of the Greek sovereign, and that the matter would, in consequence, be referred to the people of Greece for their

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judgment. He knew, too, that he was then no longer premier, and that whatever declaration he might give out could only serve to embarrass the incoming premier and, in the eyes of the public abroad, bind the new government to a policy which was yet to be pronounced upon by the people. Yet, far from altering the statement in these circumstances, he countersigned it himself, so that it might pass the censor. He said in part:

One thing is absolutely certain: Greece will abide by the terms of her alliance with Serbia not only in the letter but in the spirit, to the last man and the last drachma. More, the Greco-Serbian treaty foresaw only the possibility of a Balkan war. When it was made no one could predict the present European conflict with all its widespread complications. But the spirit of the alliance was one of mutual defense, and because the dangers threatening our ally have increased with unforeseen conditions, there is no excuse for hiding behind the verbiage of the treaty to escape the responsibilities of our pledge.

Though the entire available forces of the Central Empires be added to those of the Bulgarians in an attempt to crush Serbia, Greece will unflinchingly remain true to her passed word. . . .

Nor has there ever been at bottom the slightest wavering among the Greek people respecting the terms of the alliance, although every desperate effort has been made to becloud the issue. . . .

Respecting the landing of the French troops at

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Saloniki, there is but one thing to be said: we have protested, of course, for we wished to remain neutral in the European struggle, and we wish it now, if it were consistent with our rights and duties. But the Greek people cannot declare war on France, and would not if they could.

What France has done for Greece no Greek can forget. There comes now France asking nothing of Greece, declaring categorically her sole intention to be to support Greece's ally in the case of a need wherein Greece herself would be bound to support her neighbor. It is something offered, not something asked. *Indeed, since I have been premier I may say quite frankly that the Entente have not asked one concession of Greece.*

The last assertion is astonishing in view of the Entente's long negotiations with Greece, conducted through Venizelos as prime minister, for the cession of Cavalla to Bulgaria—negotiations frankly admitted by the British Government in the House of Commons. There appears to be a certain inconsistency also between the insistence upon Greece's "passed word" and the admission that "the Greco-Serbian treaty foresaw only the possibility of a Balkan war"—precisely King Constantine's own interpretation of that document.

Moreover, what the Cretan statesman says about wishing to remain neutral "even now" is extraordinary in the light of Mr. Asquith's state-

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ment to the House of Commons on November 3, 1915: "on September 21," the British prime minister declared, "after the Bulgarian mobilization had begun, Premier Venizelos asked France and Great Britain for 150,000 men on the express understanding that Greece would mobilize also."

When Venizelos gave me the statement which I have just quoted, he said, speaking of the king's action in dismissing him as prime minister, "The Constitution of Greece has ceased to exist."

Later I had occasion to question King Constantine on this head. "The only violations of the Constitution that I know anything about," he said, "were those committed by Venizelos: first, when he authorized foreign troops to land on Greek soil without the consent of the Greek chamber; and, second, when he tried to exercise the power of declaring war which, by Article XXXII of the Constitution, is vested solely in the crown."

CHAPTER V

SERBIA ABANDONED

GENERAL SARRAIL arrived in Saloniki in a bad temper. The complete change of plan from the Syrian expedition which he had been assigned to command, and which promised well, to this wild-goose chase in Macedonia, filled him with misgivings. He sensed a political intrigue in France at the bottom of the whole expedition, and had a premonition that he was to be made the scapegoat of a failure. Distinctly active in French politics, a partizan and political protégé of Caillaux, General Sarraïl felt that he had reason to fear he was being sent to Saloniki to get him out of France, and that he would be left in Macedonia, without sufficient support, to bear the blame of an unsuccessful campaign. A personal and a political enemy of General de Castelnau, then the leading influence in the French army, Maurice Sarraïl knew that he had no mercy to

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expect at the hands of the French staff if he made a misstep.

Whatever else he may be, Sarraill is a first-rate soldier. He landed in Saloniki October 12, just a week after the first French contingent had disembarked. One glance at conditions in Macedonia filled him with gloom. Everything was to be done—organization, sanitation, port arrangements, policing, transport, road building, housing for an army and its commissary, and the discharge and storage of war material and supplies. The country furnished nothing, not even the beasts of burden and wagons essential to moving the impedimenta of an army.

I had a long talk with him in his personal quarters in the French school shortly after his arrival. The room was bare of carpet; one small table held maps over whose inaccuracies Sarraill swore roundly; in one corner was a narrow bed, in another, a wooden box containing the commander's kit. There was one chair, which I was constrained to take; Sarraill sat on the bed; Colonel Jacquemot, his chief of staff, on the box. He asked me many questions about the disposition of the Greeks to join the expedition into

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Serbia. I told him frankly that they would be likely to do so only if convinced that a really strong Allied force would be sent to support them.

"What about King Constantine?" he asked. "Is he *Boche* or is n't he?"

"No more than you or I," I told him. "But he's a soldier, and he knows this country up here. He's taking no chances that you would n't consider good yourself."

He made me a statement, publication of which he authorized:

It would be of no use to pretend that the task of the Allied armies in the Balkans at this moment is not a difficult one, but it is in no wise insurmountable. The present lack of transportation, the bad condition of the roads, in which men and horses easily get stuck in the mud; a single-line railway, exposed in many places to attacks by the enemy without great risk to himself—all of these things combine to make our undertaking most difficult. There is, therefore, nothing to be gained in attempting serious action before we have finished our preparations with all the care that conditions require. The result will prove whether we were right or not to undertake this business.

As for Greeks, the people have given us a generous and friendly welcome. I have only admiration for the Greek soldiers. The officers especially seem to me to be first-class. If the Greeks decide that their own interests behoove them to join the Allies, they cannot fail to be of great value to our common cause.

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General Sarrail made no concealment of his anxiety as to the number of troops he was to be given. Yet he began his operations two days after his arrival, starting a mixed detachment under Colonel Ruef up the railway line into Serbia. From this moment until the Austrians and Germans completed the conquest of Serbia, November 25, Sarrail never had more than 35,000 men. The British, who were not under Sarrail's command at that time, were a confusion of miscellaneous, uncoördinated troops, the relics of regiments, battalions, brigades, and divisions decimated by the Turks on Gallipoli and not yet reformed into any cohesive force. A part of the Tenth Division and what was left of the Irish Brigade were of some use; the rest might as well have been in England. Moreover, they had no orders to move from Saloniki and remained there inactive while Sarrail stretched his line far beyond the point of safety in an effort to occupy strategical positions as far into Serbia as possible, trusting that he might receive reinforcements later to fill in the great gaps he was leaving in his line.

General Mahon, the British commander, tried

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repeatedly to provoke instructions from England. He received none. Finally, on his own responsibility, on October 26, he undertook to release the French forces guarding the Belaschitz, a plateau in the Dedeli-Causli-Doiran region. General de Lardemelle was at Kafardar, his line pushed beyond the Rajhdehcke River in the direction of Babunas Pass; General Leblois was at Negotine, his line stretching to Gradsko and the mountain of Kara Hodzali, in the direction of Veles; General Bailloud occupied Strumnitza station, guarding the single railway line of communications with Saloniki and threatening a descent into the valley of the Strumnitza River in Bulgarian territory whenever a sufficient force should arrive; to the east the British kept the passes and prevented a sudden flank attack upon Saloniki from the north.

It was all tentative, all dependent on the arrival of more troops. Already the Serbs were in full retreat from the Danube, and no Allied reinforcements were in sight. It was heartbreaking business. Not only General Sarraill, but every French soldier realized the perilous game the Allies were playing with their overtaxed

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line. Officers and men were "jumpy." The French were irritated at the British inaction, and the British themselves were in despair over the weird scrap-bag conglomeration of which their forces consisted.

The Greeks, mobilized for war, looked on and made unfavorable estimates of the Allied forces. Had they wavered about joining the Entente armies, what they saw in Saloniki would have decided them against the venture. Munitions were lacking, discipline was bad, organization, especially among the British units, was pitiful. Bad camp sites were chosen and had to be altered. The equipment was suited for the deserts of Gallipoli, not the mountains of Macedonia. The transport horses were huge animals that never in the world could negotiate the steep mountain paths of Serbia; there was heavy artillery that no bridge in Serbia or Bulgaria would stand up under, and no mountain artillery at all; there were immense motor drays that would scarcely pass through the narrow streets of Saloniki, much less along the primeval Macedonian roads. The men were clothed for the heat of the Dardanelles, not the penetrating cold of Macedonia;

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they were paid in French or British money, both at a loss of exchange in neutral Greece, and the Jews who comprise the local population of Saloniki accepted these uncurrent coins at a discount that carried with it a superficial but unfortunate impression of impaired Allied credit. The intelligence service was recruited among the riff-raff of the refugees from Thrace and Asia Minor—Armenians, Levantines, islanders of uncertain citizenship and dubious honesty. The army purchasing was recklessly extravagant. The frugal Greeks were appalled by the waste, the confusion, the lack of intelligent preparation.

On the other hand the mere sight of the Greeks inactive while the French were fighting enraged the latter. The dirt and disorder of Saloniki, so recently a Turkish city, filled both the French and the British with disgust. The strange costumes of the local population gave an impression of lack of civilization, and the French and British promptly treated and spoke of the Greeks as "natives." Moreover, the Greeks, resentful of the presence of a foreign army on their soil, were far from helpful. The Jewish tradesmen found the opportunity golden to put up their



"GENERAL de LARDEMELLE WAS AT KAFARDAR"

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prices. The Greek soldiers, on mere route marches, filled the roads where the Allies wanted to move troops that were going to do battle. The railroad service in civilian hands was inadequate for efficient military transport. The Greek customs officers made endless difficulties about the landing of supplies; the port authorities gave preference to Greek merchant vessels while Allied troop ships hung about the harbor, waiting to dock. The telegraph service was wretched, the Greek censorship infinitely annoying.

The Allies were also at a language disadvantage. Greek-English and Greek-French interpreters were rare, high-priced, and untrustworthy. An officer who sent his orderly to buy a stamp might wait half a day for it—the man secure in the excuse that he could not make himself understood. Worst of all, the presence of Germans, Austrians, and Turks among them was unbearable to many, especially the French. They, at war with the Germans, meeting Germans in streets and cafés, crushed against them in street-cars, hearing their hated accents, catching their hostile glances! Two newspapers in French, but subsidized by the Austrian consu-

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late, made the French see red with their daily reports of Allied defeats, created out of whole cloth. There was the consciousness, too, that they were constantly watched by the spies of their enemies, their movements reported, their numbers and equipment catalogued. Had they felt their organization effective, it would have mattered less. But to know that they were cutting a poor figure in the eyes, not only of the Greeks, but of their enemies, was humiliating. They resented it keenly; they resented all the impediments to their work and the hostility to their presence. Most of all, they resented having been sent on a wild-goose chase, and the failure of the expedition. They resented feeling that the despised Greeks could probably have done the job better, and that the Greeks knew it. Then there was fear, also,—that mistrust which is the inevitable concomitant of all war. "Who is not with me, is against me." The Greeks were not with them. Might they not be against them? And the Greek forces in Macedonia outnumbered the Allied armies five to one.

All of this irritation, this resentment, this fear, found its reflection in the rapidly shaping En-

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tente policy in Athens. To the Venizelos cabinet, purely a party and personal ministry entirely under the thumb of the Cretan, succeeded, on October 7, a national ministry, headed by Former Premier Alexander Zaïmis, director of the National Bank of Greece, an able, patriotic, tried administrator, friendly to the Entente and—unlike Venizelos—not a politician, having no ambitions to satisfy, no political organization to maintain at the expense of the public treasury. With the exception of the ministers of war and marine, who were respectively a general and an admiral, the cabinet was made up of former prime ministers—reactionaries all, save Zaïmis, but men of high purpose and unimpeachable integrity. The Boulé continued its sessions, Venizelos conserving his majority and, according to his phrase, “tolerating” the new cabinet.

The Zaïmis government’s first act was to renew the declaration of “benevolent neutrality” with which Venizelos had defined the position of Greece toward the Entente in August, 1914. The second was to issue a lengthy statement of the Government’s position on the Greco-Serbian treaty of alliance. There were three general

lines of argument: that the alliance was exclusively Balkan in scope and could not be justly interpreted to force Greece into a general European war; that Serbia had assumed other subsequent engagements with the Entente that placed her in the impossibility of fulfilling her part of the joint military agreement, thus releasing the Greeks from the performance of their part; and, finally, that a nation, no more than a person, can legally contract to its own destruction, and that the inability of the Serbs and the failure of the Allies to concentrate along the Bulgaro-Serbian frontiers the number of troops which had been judged by both the Serbian and the Greek staffs, in the cold judgment of peace, to be essential to a successful campaign, rendered the venture near enough certain to destruction for the Greeks to release them from any obligation.

On the first point, Venizelos's own declaration to me that "the Greco-Serbian treaty foresaw only the possibility of a Balkan war," appears to be final. Since giving me that statement, however, he has made me another very recently, in which, to justify his present criticism of King

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Constantine's attitude, he reviewed the negotiations for the Greco-Serbian treaty and sought to prove to me that his statement of October 5, 1915, was not true, by asserting that Serbia delayed the ratification of the treaty until Greece was forced to concede that it might extend beyond the Balkans in its scope, and alleging at the same time that King Constantine was present at the discussion of this point and himself personally accepted the Serbian proviso. It is difficult to reconcile this last statement, made evidently in support of a position for which a defense is necessary, with the former one, as well as with Venizelos's own attitude in respect to the alliance when prime minister in October and November, 1914. Moreover, in May, 1914, before the European War, Greece had sounded Serbia as to the applicability of the treaty of alliance should Greece go to war with Turkey over the islands remaining in dispute between the two countries. On June 1, 1914, the Greek representative in Belgrade was advised "not to push things too far," as Serbia was not disposed to extend the alliance to cover such a contingency. Prince Nicholas of Greece, also, who had quite as much to do with

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framing the treaty as did Venizelos, tells me positively that only a war with Bulgaria was contemplated by its provisions, and cites the minute military dispositions made in the tactical annex as proof of this assertion. And, indeed, the fact that Serbia did not insist upon the fulfilment of the terms of alliance from the very outbreak of the war would seem to indicate that this was the accepted view of the treaty until Venizelos, for reasons connected with politics within Greece, chose to give the document another interpretation.

On the second point the case seems clearer. Granting the Entente claim that Greece was bound to aid her ally by the treaty of alliance, she was bound only under definite conditions laid down in the document itself; to wit, that Serbia furnish 150,000 bayonets concentrated at specified points. Since Serbia could not do this directly, it is necessary to admit that she might be permitted to do it by proxy; that is, to supply Entente bayonets to replace her own. This view the Entente powers themselves accepted, Sir Edward Grey stating in the House of Commons on November 3, 1915, that "a definite num-

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ber of men would be sent to Saloniki for the express purpose of enabling Greece to fulfil her treaty obligations with Serbia." The definite number of men required by the treaty was never sent. Greece, therefore, seems fully released of her obligations, even according to Sir Edward Grey.

As to the third point, no man who was in Saloniki and Serbia with the Allied expeditionary force could for a moment harbor any illusions as to the possibility of a successful outcome to the adventure. Not even 150,000 bayonets, equipped as were the forces the French and English sent to Saloniki, would have served to stem the tide of Germans, Austrians, and Bulgarians. Greece, neutral, was saved from invasion; Greece, a belligerent, would unquestionably have been crushed as readily as was Serbia—and it is difficult to see what useful purpose would have been served the Entente, Serbia, or Greece herself by such an eventuality.

It was easy for any one attending the sessions of the Boulé during this period to see that Venizelos's "toleration" of the Zaïmis cabinet was a mere political manœuvre. It could not last, and

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it endured less than a month. Free to express himself without responsibility, Venizelos spent his time consolidating his majority and exhibiting a truculence toward his opponents that was bound to end in the overthrow of the ministry. In a last desperate effort to persuade the Greeks to take the brunt of the work in Macedonia, the Entente offered Greece the island of Cypress as a compensation, hinting at further concessions to be made after the war. General Yannakitsas, the minister of war, voiced the opinion of the King and the general staff in stating that "compensations" could not compensate for military weakness; that alluring offers would not take the place of the soldiers necessary to a successful campaign in Serbia. King Constantine himself said: "The whole world will not persuade me to offer up my country as a sacrifice on the altar of the Entente's military unpreparedness."

The line between considering the Balkan situation as a political or as a military question was sharply drawn in the Boulé on November 4. Venizelos, sponsor of the former view, returned personally to the charge, speaking of the obligations of Greece toward Serbia and the benefits to



Photograph by the Author.

KING PETER OF SERBIA AT AEDYPSOS

"Sitting on a bench in the warm sun"

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be gained by joining the Entente, making a combined appeal to the sentimentality and the cupidity of his countrymen. General Yannakitsas took his stand sharply as a practical soldier—that all of this was beside the main point of whether the campaign could be won or not with the forces available; and he thought not. There was a sharp “incident” in the chamber. Venizelos triumphed on purely party lines, though the vote of 147 to 114 showed a marked decrease in his original majority. Zaïmis resigned. The fate of Serbia, could the aid of Greece have saved her, was sealed.

Months later, sitting on a bench in the warm sun, looking out over Mt. Olympus, snow-crowned, King Peter of Serbia told me what it meant to the waiting Serbs—this whole Saloniki muddle of intrigue, mismanagement, and needless disaster.

The old man’s head sank on his breast, as he talked. His eyes closed wearily. It was as if his soul had left the bent, worn, pain-racked body and had flown over the far mountains to his own people.

“If only they had come a little sooner, our al-

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lies!" he said. "I used to tell my men: 'Hold on! Just a little longer! They have said they will come, and they will come!' And they believed me and held on.

"You know we could n't even see the Germans! It was all artillery—machine-made war! My men used to grind their teeth, and the tears would run down their poor, thin faces, and they would say: 'If only we could just get at them! We would show them!'

"And then, as I rode by their lines, I could see them shaking their heads and nodding at me and whispering among themselves. 'Poor old King!' they were saying, 'he still believes the Allies will come in time to save us!'"

CHAPTER VI

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STEPHEN SKOULOUDIS succeeded Zaimis as premier. He was regarded as a capable man, satisfactory to the Entente. Mr. H. Charles Woods, writing in the "Fortnightly Review" of September, 1916, refers to him as "a very far-seeing man, who, if he were opposed to the intervention of Greece in the war, was in favor of neutrality, not to further the interests of Germany, but in order to safeguard those of his own country." He repeated Greece's assurances of a policy of "benevolent neutrality" and set about seeking a definition of the position of Greece in relation to the Entente powers on that basis. Such a definition appeared essential to both sides. On November 3, in a debate in Parliament, Lord Charles Beresford declared: "Until the Government has a clear and definite policy in the near East, the war will continue and Eng-

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land will lose thousands of lives and waste millions [pounds, not dollars] of money."

The German conquest of Serbia was rapidly drawing to a close. The Serbian army, completely disorganized by the attack from two sides, was seeking escape through Albania to the Adriatic coast. The work of the Bulgarians against Serbia was virtually finished, and they turned their attention to the hopelessly inadequate French force extended into Serbia along the railway line as far as Gradsko, at the junction of the Vardar and the Tscherna rivers. A retirement of the French expeditionary corps was evidently a mere question of days, since the Bulgars greatly outnumbered the newcomers and were already effecting a concentration of troops for serious attack.

Under these circumstances the Entente governments grew suddenly uneasy for the safety of their expeditionary force. No thought seems to have been given what might happen in case the French were compelled to retreat into Greek territory. Venizelos, who had induced the French and British to come to Saloniki, was no longer premier and could not be depended upon

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to bend or break the Greek Constitution to meet any requirements of the Allied military commanders. The Greeks had shown very plainly that they did not like the presence of strange troops on their soil; and the Greeks had a large force concentrated in Saloniki and its vicinity, of whose temper the Allies were uncertain.

No attempt was made to reach a frank understanding with the Greek king or the Greek general staff. No effort was made to handle a military situation in a military way, through an arrangement with the competent military authorities of Greece. King Constantine's suggestion that the military requirements of the retiring army be fixed in joint consultation by representatives of the Greek and Allied staffs was rejected. Such a practical solution of the problem, by being unofficial, would have saved Greece friction with the Central empires. The Entente would not have it. Instead, the Entente ministers in Athens put a hypothetical question to the Skouloudis cabinet: Should the French force then in Serbia be driven back upon Greek soil by the Bulgarians, what would be the attitude of the Greek Government?

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According to international law, an armed force compelled by an enemy to seek refuge in the territory of a neutral country must be disarmed and interned precisely as the British naval reserves who fled from Antwerp were disarmed and interned by Holland. Prime Minister Skouloudis so replied. International law, however, has played so small a part in defining the attitude of the Entente toward Greece that Mr. Skouloudis's answer, albeit theoretically correct, may be regarded as of doubtful wisdom. If the Entente desired to suspend international law, certainly Greece, dependent entirely upon the Ally-controlled sea for bread, was in no position to invoke international law to shape her action. Her best course would probably have been to close her eyes to the violation of international law and try to manage the Central empires as best she could.

It is difficult to see, however, how a theoretical declaration of this sort could really be taken seriously in London and Paris. The spectacle of 35,000 French troops returning from Serbia being disarmed and interned by the Greek army in Saloniki when an Allied fleet that could have

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destroyed the Greek army and the entire city as well in a few hours' bombardment lay within rifle shot of the quays of the Macedonian capital, is fantastic. The Greeks themselves certainly did not take it seriously, and they regarded this real or feigned uneasiness over the security of the Allied army as a mere pretext to try to force the Entente's man, Venizelos, back into power.

Whatever purpose was to be served by a display of panic over the safety of their forces, the method employed by the Entente to compel a grant of large powers in Greek Macedonia was drastic and immediate. On November 17, the French Government ordered the port authorities of Marseilles to pass no further merchandise destined to Greece. On November 18, Great Britain issued an order that no Greek vessel should be allowed to proceed to its destination. The ship bearing to Saloniki the English Princess Alice of Battenberg, the wife of King Constantine's brother, Prince Andrew, was stopped and held on the high seas. The price of coal at water level in the Piræus ran up to \$40 per ton in a few days. Greece was totally unprepared

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for a blockade of this sort, and its effect was felt instantly.

On November 19, the British legation issued a *communiqué* explaining the action of the Allied powers:

Because of the attitude of the Hellenic Government in regard to certain questions touching closely the security and liberty of action to which the Allied troops have right under the conditions of their disembarking on Greek territory, the Allied Powers have deemed it necessary to take certain measures which will have the effect of suspending the economic and commercial facilities which Greece has received from them heretofore.

It is not the intention of the Allied Powers to constrain Greece to abandon her neutrality which, in their eyes, is the best guarantee of her interests.

Just what rights the disembarkment of the Allied troops on Greek soil, in violation of Article XCIX of the Greek Constitution and in the face of a formal protest of the Greek Government, had given the Entente powers in Greece, were not made clear. Nor were the economic and commercial facilities Greece had hitherto received from the Entente particularized; for some time they had seemed to consist chiefly of having vessels bound to Greek ports delayed for weeks on end at Gibraltar or Malta and their

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cargoes frequently confiscated. The paragraph about not constraining Greece to abandon her neutrality struck most Greeks as highly ironical; they felt that it was at bottom precisely to secure the aid of Greece in their war that coercive measures were being applied by the Entente.

No demands were made, however, of the Greek Government until a week after the blockade went into practical effect. ✓ Meanwhile, to clear the situation up once for all, Cabinet Minister Denys Cochin for France and Lord Kitchener for England visited both Athens and Saloniki. M. Denys Cochin, whose friendship for Greece had endeared him to every Greek, was well fitted by that fact to conduct the diplomatic negotiations which the situation rendered imperative; Lord Kitchener, as the first (and the last) representative of the Allies to look upon the Entente's relations in the near East with a purely military eye, was distinctly indicated to pronounce upon the necessities of the situation arising from the perilous position in which the failure of the Serbian adventure had placed the Allied army in Macedonia, as well as upon the continuance

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of a venture which, so far, had proved not only profitless but costly in loss of prestige.

M. Denys Cochin's talk with King Constantine on November 18 was satisfactory in every way. The Greek monarch gave his personal word that under no circumstances, whatever the fate of the Allied expedition in Macedonia, would the Greek troops ever attack the Allies. As commander-in-chief of the Greek army, he was in a position to carry out the assurance. At the same time he displayed a willingness to aid the Entente in every practical way short of joining them. The retreat of the French forces from Serbia was plainly imminent. King Constantine offered to cover the flanks of the retiring army with his Greek troops against any attempt to cut it off from its base. In general, the scope of the Allied military operations in Macedonia was defined in a way entirely satisfactory to the French. The Greek sovereign made it clear to the French cabinet minister that his own position was one of sympathy and friendliness for the Entente; but that in his estimation the interests of Greece made it imperative that she remain neutral at least for the present. M. Denys

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Cochin left for Saloniki the following day to convey the results of his conference with King Constantine to General Sarrail.

While M. Denys Cochin was in Saloniki reporting to General Sarrail, Lord Kitchener arrived in Athens. He had visited Saloniki previously and had conferred with General Sarrail on the situation. He knew better than any one the precarious position of the Allied armies in Macedonia. He had been witness of the futility of the expedition as it had been undertaken and of the failure in which it had resulted. Better equipped than any man to judge of the military situation of the Entente in the near East, Lord Kitchener talked with King Constantine as soldier to soldier.

They understood one another perfectly and were in accord at once. The British war minister explained that he had never approved the Serbian adventure and that it had been only at the insistence of the French that it was undertaken.¹ He declared that in his opinion the war

¹ Cf. M. Painlevé's report of the findings of the committees of the French Chamber on war, the navy, and foreign affairs, of August 13, 1915: "In view of the fact that all delays and all setbacks increase the danger, and that the issue of the war is bound up with the taking of Constantinople, we recommend the

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would be decided in France, not in Bulgaria, and that effort spent on minor fronts, like that of Macedonia, was bootless waste. Every statement he made confirmed the wisdom of King Constantine in having kept clear of the Serbian hazard. Lord Kitchener's attitude toward the expedition fostered in the Greek sovereign the hope that once the failure of the attempt to rescue Serbia had been registered, the Allied war council would decide to abandon the Balkan enterprise and withdraw their armies from Greece. This hope was strengthened by the fact that the very day before Lord Kitchener's visit, General Sir Charles G. Monro had declared that the Gallipoli campaign ought to be abandoned.

King Constantine felt, after his talk with the British war minister, that he had every reason to believe that the haphazard operations of the Entente in the near East would be given up, and that Greece would be left tranquil again. It was in a spirit of deep satisfaction over this prospect that he told Lord Kitchener that the military

government to take such urgent measures as the circumstances require and to organize an expedition that will ensure the fall of Constantinople."

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authorities of Greece had never for a moment considered anything so fantastic as interning the Allied forces; he assured the British general that his only purpose in maintaining his troops in Macedonia was not hostility to the Entente, but the legitimate requirements of national safety, especially in the event that the Allied armies should abandon their Macedonia front and leave Greek Macedonia at the mercy of a victorious Bulgarian army, already in the field. He added, however, that the moment the Allied forces operating in Macedonia assumed proportions sufficient to guarantee a serious prosecution of the Balkan campaign, thus rendering Greece's own defense of Greek Macedonia superfluous, he would not refuse to consider a demobilization of his army, or at least a withdrawal of the Greek troops from Saloniki, if their presence there were regarded as embarrassing the movements of the Allied forces. He pointed out at the same time, however, that the Greek army, as circumstances were, constituted the most potent safeguard of the French and British at Saloniki, since the Greek army remained out of the war only so long as the Bulgarians did not invade Greece. Should the

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Entente's enemies essay to pursue into Greek territory the Allied armies falling back upon Saloniki, they were well aware that the act would force Greece into war on the side of the Entente—a result they were far from desiring. To demand the demobilization of the Greek army, King Constantine told the British war minister, would be equivalent to inviting the forces of the Central empires to invade Greece, to pursue and to seek to hem in and, if possible, to cut off General Sarrail. For this reason, he urged that the Greek army should remain where it was.

Finally, King Constantine repeated to Lord Kitchener the assurance he had given M. Denys Cochin that under no circumstances would the Greek forces attack the Allied Orient armies. Lord Kitchener accepted it and believed it. He told Admiral Cardale, of the British naval mission, that he found King Constantine a straightforward, fair-minded soldier, well-disposed toward the Allies, and with a very clear conception of the military situation in the near East. When Lord Kitchener left Athens, matters seemed to be amicably arranged.

On November 24, M. Denys Cochin returned

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from Saloniki with new and much further reaching demands from General Sarrail. On the day following his arrival, the Entente ministers in Athens presented a formal joint memorandum to the Skouloudis government requiring written assurances confirming those verbal assurances King Constantine had given Lord Kitchener and M. Denys Cochin, and generally looking "to the use of Greek territory as a base of field operations." On the next day, in a new note, the partial demobilization of the Greek army was demanded, as well as the retirement of the bulk of the Greek force from Saloniki and the right of the Allies to police Greek waters in search of enemy submarines. To insure the Greek acceptance of these exigencies, the "commercial and economic blockade" of Greece was stiffened. No contact between Greece and the outer world was permitted.

The demands were, of course, contrary in every way to the spirit of King Constantine's talk with Lord Kitchener. Far from presaging an early withdrawal of the Allied forces from Greece, the demands suggested rather a permanent Entente occupation of Saloniki, at least for the duration

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of the war.¹ The king's purpose of defending his own territory with his own army was brushed aside as of no consequence. No assurance of any kind was given as to what would become of Greek Macedonia in case of the defeat of the Allied armies and no arrangement made or suggested by which King Constantine could secure the protection of his own territory which his armies had won from the Bulgarians so short a time before.

Under the strangling coercion of the blockade, the Skouloudis cabinet accepted the demands "in principle," proposing certain modifications with a view to permitting the Greek authorities at least to share in the execution of the Entente demands and in the administration of so large a part of Greece's own affairs. This was not satisfactory to the Entente. The blockade was continued and, ignoring the Greek suggestion of administrative coöperation, General Sarrail construed this "acceptance in principle" to authorize him to seize the Greek railways and he did so.

The French retreat from Serbia was drawing

¹ On December 14, Captain Mathieu, Sarrail's confidential staff officer, put the matter squarely: "You may take this as final," he declared to a number of correspondents, "the Allies will not quit Saloniki until the European peace has been signed."

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to a close. On December 3, the Bulgarians occupied Monastir. It was no longer possible to conceal from any one the extent of the Allied disaster in Serbia. The Serbs were crushed, almost annihilated; the French were beaten back upon their base, though a masterly retreat saved the army. The British in the Doiran sector lost several batteries of heavy guns. The Allied prestige in the Balkans was gone. Even the French and English soldiers were aware of the futility of the whole enterprise and its costly conclusion. In Saloniki, no less than in London and Paris, the question was asked repeatedly, Who is to blame?

General Sarrail refused to shoulder the responsibility. He had done all he could with the troops he had been given, under grueling conditions of transport and commissary. Naturally, the governments in France and England did not care to take the odium of the failure. The Serbs could scarcely be blamed, considering all that they had suffered—though there was a marked tendency in London and Paris to hold them responsible for their own defeat. The only people upon whom the full responsibility could safely be

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placed was the Greeks. Naturally not Venizelos, as Venizelos had tried to swing the Greek army into line with the Entente, and it was hoped that he might yet be able to do it. It was, therefore, to King Constantine that the entire muddle was attributed in the Entente press and even among the Allied soldiers on Greek soil. King Constantine's wife is the sister of the German Kaiser. Therefore King Constantine must be pro-German and must have betrayed the Allied armies in Serbia to the Germans.

It is one of the sad aspects of war that otherwise intelligent people come under its sinister influence to accept reasoning so puerile. King Constantine's father was a Dane, who loved the French and hated the Germans cordially. His mother is a Russian, who is now in Petrograd. His three brothers have married French, Russian, and English princesses, respectively. He is cousin of King George of England and of Nicholas Alexandrovitch of Russia. Primarily, he is a soldier, and the influence of any of his generals is more than that of Queen Sophie, whose life in Athens is sadly isolated. Those who are in a position to know these things, like the British

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minister or the Italian minister to Greece, keep their own counsel. A popular legend is launched, with no foundation save an effort to shield those who have been guilty of a blunder from its consequences. It grows; it comes to create inevitable misunderstandings, to guide the policy of nations, to motive the most unworthy politics.

One small thing, however, repeated on every occasion, has done much to strain relations between King Constantine and the Entente. His word has been considered of no value. There has been a reiterated effort to entrap him into a given position by devious means. When, on March 1, 1915, he was willing to join the Allied expedition against Turkey, Russia's eleventh-hour objection to Greek forces before Constantinople and her proposal that the Greeks be used on the Danube, was hardly playing the game. When, on April 14, 1915, Foreign Minister Zographos offered Greece's coöperation with the Entente, on terms which were afterwards slightly modified and improved from the Entente point of view, the Allied governments attempted to assume that by modifying the conditions of his

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coöperation, King Constantine had abrogated them entirely, and to force him to join the Entente unconditionally. When, on October 2, 1915, the Entente promised to send 150,000 bayonets to Serbia to secure the active aid of the Greeks, they really sent less than a third that number, most of whom arrived too late to be of use. Finally, when King Constantine had frankly talked the situation over with Lord Kitchener, giving the British soldier assurances which were found satisfactory and agreeing on a course of amicable action on both sides, within a week of the British war minister's departure demands in flat contradiction of this arrangement were presented diplomatically, and their acceptance forced by a blockade of Greece.

Slowly the conviction was borne in upon King Constantine that the Entente were never sincere in their negotiations with him; that they had assumed among themselves obligations in respect to the integrity of Greece which made it impossible to treat with them frankly.

CHAPTER VII

CONSTANTINE I TAKES A STAND

THE 1915 blockade of Greece was at its acutest when I came from Saloniki to Athens to see King Constantine. The situation between Greece and the Entente had become so complicated and confused that it seemed necessary to a clear understanding of it to go to the fountain head for enlightenment. I went, therefore, first to General Sarraïl and then to King Constantine and Premier Skouloudis.

At this moment—early in December, 1915—the attitude of Elephtherios Venizelos was puzzling. Following his dismissal as prime minister on October 5, he had made certain public declarations which, as the situation developed, proved to be misleading. He stated, first, that Greece wished to remain neutral in the European War. Yet subsequent official statements made in the British House of Commons revealed that

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Mr. Venizelos had been working secretly to entrap his king and the Greek general staff in a situation which would force them to join the Entente, whatever the disadvantages of such a course. In his public utterances and in his formal protest against the Allied landing at Saloniki, he implied that the disembarkment had been made on the Entente's sole responsibility, contrary to the volition of the Government of which Mr. Venizelos himself was the responsible head. Yet on November 3 the Russian Government issued an official *communiqué* to the effect that "the Allies have been invited by Greece to send troops through her territory to help her ally." Finally, he had maintained that King Constantine had violated the Greek Constitution in disagreeing "twice on the same question" with a government chosen by the people. Nevertheless, in the Boulé on November 3, he said, "I admit that the Crown has a right to disagree with a responsible government if he thinks that the latter is not in accord with the national will." Yet when elections were called to ascertain whether the people of Greece did or did not accord with his policy of thrusting Greece into the

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war, he refused to take part in the elections or to permit any member of his party to take part in them.

After dismissing his prime minister on October 5, King Constantine stated that if, in the elections of December 21, which were to be held on the naked question of war or peace, the people were once more to select Venizelos and his party to conduct the affairs of Greece, he, the sovereign, would gladly accept the judgment of his people on a clearly formulated point, would call Venizelos to power again and stifle his objections to going to war under conditions which he firmly believed most hazardous. Of this the Greek monarch apprised Mr. Venizelos himself. Despite this assurance, Venizelos remained unmoved in his decision not to tempt a popular verdict on his policy. He gave as his reason for this attitude that he feared the elections would not be fairly conducted; but as he had claimed (with reason) that on June 13 they had not been fairly conducted either, and yet he had carried the country by a large majority, his position in this instance must seem open to doubt.

The opponents of Venizelos believed the Cre-

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tan's attitude dictated by very astute political motives. They claimed that he avoided seeking the judgment of the electorate on the question of war or peace since, as long as the people had not pronounced unequivocally on that point, he could continue to assert that they favored war, because they had elected his party to office on June 13, when no plain question of war or peace was before them.¹ Venizelos's opponents also maintained that in a choice between war and peace the Greek people would choose peace. They eagerly invited an expression of popular will on that head. There is reason to believe that those who took this view were correct, and that Venizelos himself was better aware of it than any one else. Certainly my own observation led me to the conclusion that, while the sympathy of the Greeks with the Entente at this period was still very marked despite the intrigues with Bulgaria that had come to light, it was a purely theoretical sympathy which did not extend to risking for the third time in four years the trials and hardships of war. I am convinced, too, that the real strength of King Constantine lay and still lies in

¹ In this connection compare Italian opinion on the Greek sentiment about going to war. Appendix 5.

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the fact that he voices more nearly than any one else in Greece the real feeling of the Greek people, and that, as this feeling is not one in favor of war, what is King Constantine's strength is Venizelos's weakness.

It is for this reason that the declarations King Constantine made through me on December 4 are of such far-reaching significance. It is not alone that he talked with great earnestness, thumping the table soundly with his clenched fist to emphasize his conclusions. A man may be earnest and mistaken. What was most impressive was the coolness of his judgment, the almost detached point of view from which he regarded the situation. He was evidently profoundly convinced of the accuracy of his statement of the feelings of the Greek people; but convinced, not by enthusiasm, as is always the case with Venizelos, but by intellectual persuasion. Once in the course of the hour's talk he broke away from the subject uppermost in his mind to interject:

"I dare say you think I am pretty cold-blooded. Well, in this I *am* cold-blooded. War is a cold-blooded business. I know what war is, and the man who in war lets sentiment run away with

his clear judgment is lost. The same is true even of nations. Our situation is exceedingly difficult. We are between two fires. If we want to save ourselves, we have got to be cold-blooded."

"I am especially glad," King Constantine began the conversation, "to talk for America, for America will understand Greece's position. We are both neutrals together and determined, if it is humanly possible, not to court destruction by permitting ourselves to be drawn into the frightful vortex of the present European conflict. We are both trying by every honorable means to guard our own sovereignty, to protect our own people, and to stand up for our own national interests without sacrificing that neutrality which we recognize as our only salvation. America is more protected from immediate danger by the distance which separates her from the field of battle. We, too, thought that once; but the battle-field shifted and may shift again, and what is happening in Greece to-day may happen in America or Holland or any other neutral country to-morrow, if the precedent now sought to be established in the case of Greece once be fixed.

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“The fundamental cause of the entire threatening attitude of the Entente toward Greece to-day and the painful situation of my country, is the Entente’s own assumption, without the slightest reason for it, that Greece is ready to betray the Entente to Germany at the first favorable opportunity. Is it reasonable to suppose such a thing? Three separate times, when conditions have been advantageous, Greece has expressed her willingness to join forces with the Entente. From the very outset of hostilities in the near East, Greece’s neutrality has been stretched to the utmost to accommodate the powers of the Entente, for whom she has always felt the keenest sympathy and the deepest gratitude. The Dardanelles operations were directed from Greek islands occupied by Allied troops. When Serbia was endangered by a combined Austro-German and Bulgarian attack, Allied troops landed without opposition on Greek soil, whence with the second city of Greece as a base, they prosecuted not only unmolested, but aided in every way consistent with any sort of neutrality, the fruitless and long-delayed campaign to rescue their ally. Finally, I myself have given

my personal word that Greek troops will never be used to attack the French and British forces in Macedonia, merely in order to allay unjustified suspicions. Yet, despite all these evidences of good faith on the part of Greece, the Entente now demands, in a form which is virtually an ultimatum, that the Greek troops be withdrawn from Saloniki,—and that means from all Macedonia,—leaving our population unprotected against the raids of Bulgarian *comitadjis* or against all the horrors of war which have already laid Belgium a waste, should the Allies be driven back within our frontiers. Just suppose the Germans were in a position to demand of your country to concede the use of Boston as the base of an attack on Canada—what would you say? And if all your military experience and the advice of your general staff told you that such a landing was doomed to failure because made with inadequate force, and you realized that British troops in Canada would pursue the retreating Germans across New England, destroying as they went, would you accept the prospect without a struggle?"

"But has not your Majesty the German as-

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surance that the integrity of Greek territory will be respected?" I ventured.

"Of course, and the Entente's assurance, too!"

"And similar assurances from Bulgaria?" I asked.

"Germany has given assurances for herself and her allies. But that does not prevent Germano-Bulgarian armies, as a measure of military necessity, pursuing the retiring French and British into Greece, fighting in Greece, and turning Greece into a second Poland. I have that assurance also. That the Greek frontiers be re-erected after the war does not rebuild our towns or compensate my people for months—perhaps years—spent in living in misery as fugitives from their own land, when their country, which is not at war, has nothing to gain by risking devastation. Why, the Entente treats me as if I were the nigger king of a central African tribe to whom the sufferings of my own people were a matter of indifference! I have been through three wars and I know what war is and I don't want any more if it can be honorably avoided. My people don't want any more, either, and if they and I can help it, we shall not have any

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more." The Greek sovereign smote the desk
with his fist to drive in each sentence.

To clear up the confusion of the political situation in Greece, I put a question squarely to the monarch.

"Then your Majesty does not believe that Venizelos's intervention policy really expressed the will of the Greek people?"

"I know it did not. When the people reëlected Venizelos they elected him, not his policy; the great mass of the people of Greece did not and do not yet understand anything about Venizelos's foreign policy. They like him and they elected him, but it would be the maddest folly to assume that, because they voted for a man personally popular, they therefore voted to throw the country into the whirlpool of a European war. They did no such thing. War is the last thing they want; ask them, and they will tell you so. It is said that I have exceeded the Constitution. What I have done is simply to apply the Constitution. The Constitution gives me the power to dissolve the chamber in order to prevent just such disasters as the following of Venizelos's policy would have proved at this

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juncture. My duty under the Constitution was to exercise that power. I did exercise it and I shall continue to exercise it as long as it is necessary to save my people from destruction.

“Another thing I want to make clear: it is said that Venizelos, with my assent, invited the Allied troops to come to Saloniki. Nothing could be more untrue. Venizelos may have expressed his personal opinion that if the Allied troops landed in Saloniki, Greece would not resist—how could she resist? But that Venizelos ever, as the responsible head of the Greek Government, formally invited foreign troops to enter Greek territory is wholly untrue.”

One other thing I wanted to know. I asked it frankly.

“Your Majesty believes the Allied Balkan expedition doomed to failure?”

“Certainly,” replied the king, “it is doomed to failure if undertaken with no more men than are there now or than are on their way there. I told Lord Kitchener so, and he agreed with me. Great Britain does not seem disposed to send an adequate force, and France cannot do the job alone. The minimum army that can hope to

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accomplish anything in the Balkans is four hundred thousand men. As that number is not being sent, that is my proof that it is Greece who must suffer and Greece who must pay for the failure of the Allied Balkan venture. If the Entente will assure me that when they are driven back into Greek territory they will consider the Balkan game up and that they will reëmbark and leave Greece, I shall guarantee with my whole army to protect their retreat against Germans, Bulgarians, or anybody else, and give them time to embark without any danger. Then I would be legitimately protecting my frontiers, and it would not involve Greece in any further risks. More I cannot do. The Entente demand too much. They are trying to drive Greece out of neutrality; they come into Greek territorial waters as if they were theirs; at Nauplia they destroy tanks of petroleum, intended for the extermination of locusts, on the excuse that they may be used by German submarines; they stop Greek ships, as they have done with American ships, too; they ruin Greek commerce; they want to seize our railways; and now they demand that I take away my troops which guard the Greek

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frontiers, leaving my country open to invasion or to any lawless incursion. I will not do it," he almost shouted, striking the table with his fist so that the ink-pot jumped. "I am willing to discuss any fair proposals; but two things I will not concede: Greece will maintain her sovereignty and her sovereign right to protect herself at need."

"And if that is not satisfactory—if coercive measures are used by the Entente?" I ventured.

"We shall protest to the whole world that our sovereign rights are violated. We shall resist passively, as long as we humanly can, being forced by any measures whatsoever into a course which we know will be prejudicial to the liberties and happiness of our people."

"And when you can't hold out any longer?" I asked.

King Constantine sat silent for a space. Two or three times he flung his whole body forward as if to say something startling, but seemed to think better of it. Finally, that sense of humor, which is his most striking characteristic, came to the top. He smiled, rather grimly. With a quick shrug of his shoulders, he replied as if he

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were brushing aside a question, not answering it.

"We shall have to demobilize our armies and await the march of events. What else can we do?" he said.

Absolutely frank and plain-spoken, as Constantine of Greece is always frank and plain-spoken, his statement threw the Entente governments into consternation. The veil of intrigue, politics, bargaining, and pretense was suddenly rent. Hating diplomacy, King Constantine spoke the truth; and the truth embarrassed the Entente diplomatists greatly.

Two days later I sought Premier Skouloudis. Of him I asked also a statement of the situation. Mr. H. Charles Woods speaks of the former Constantinople banker as "one of the best informed men in the Balkan peninsula." He did not strike me so. In sharp contrast with his sovereign, he gave an immediate impression of being too clever by half, of unpleasant wiliness. His declaration, however, in this instance was straightforward, which was not always the case with his public statements.

"Please tell the American people," he said, "that the Government of Greece has only two

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aims: to safeguard the sovereignty of Greece and not to leave neutrality, no matter by what reason we may be constrained to do so, or no matter what inducements or pressions may be brought to bear. I think I may say that the air which has been surcharged by misunderstandings for the past month is at last clearing. The Entente begins to understand that, while we are immovable on the two heads just stated, we are disposed in every other respect to give a material expression of the gratitude that every Greek feels toward France, Great Britain, and Russia, that dates from Navarino. Two points which have been a cause of recent friction are now in the way of amicable settlement. As far back as November 10, I suggested the inappropriateness of diplomatists who are not soldiers seeking to arrange the details of a situation, essentially military, of which they understood very little. I, therefore, proposed a conference composed of military experts on either side who should be authorized to study the necessities of the situation and to report thereon, giving the Government and the Entente diplomatists the benefit of their conclusions from which a settlement could then be

reached. To-day, finally, this proposition is accepted; Colonel Pallis of the general staff leaves for Saloniki to consult General Sarraill to this end. Respecting the railroads, the Government has never been unaware that the personnel is inadequate to handling the immense increase of traffic due to the military uses to which the railways are now put, but naturally we did not wish to surrender control of our own property; as Sarraill offers to assist in the operation of the railways, leaving Greek control unquestioned, our Government is only too glad to accept."

"What about hunting down Austro-German submarines in Greek territorial waters?" I asked.

"That touches our sovereignty," replied the premier. "We protest to the world, especially to America, who is also neutral, that we cannot sanction violations of our territory; but what can we do? We have only a small navy and a vast coast-line. We can only protest.

"What we want to avoid—what we shall avoid—is associating Greece in the uncertain outcome of the war. Had we joined the Allies last spring when we were urged to do so, to-day we should have to bear the bulk of the cost of the failure of

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the Gallipoli venture. Had we joined at the inception of the recent Austro-German and Bulgarian attack on Serbia, we should now be bearing a large part of the price in blood and devastation which followed the crushing of Serbia. By following the two principles I have stated as governing Greece's foreign policy, we have been saved these two disasters. We shall continue to follow them, for there is our only salvation."

In these two public declarations by the king and the prime minister of Greece the "i's" of the Entente policy in the near East had been dotted. A franker statement by the Entente than any heretofore given of their intentions in the Balkans became imperative. On December 8 the French minister to Greece, M. Guillemin, gave me such a declaration.

"It is self-evident," he said, among other things, "that where the prestige of the Allied forces and the moral effect upon our enemies of keeping a threatening base in the Balkans are both involved in the retention of Saloniki, our withdrawal now would serve no purpose."

Lord Kitchener and the military authorities of

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the Entente had lost. Mr. Venizelos and the Entente diplomatists had won. The policy of treating the Balkans as a political instead of a military question had received official sanction.

CHAPTER VIII

WHEELS WITHIN WHEELS

WHATEVER the official protestations of the Entente governments and their ministers in Athens that it was "not the intention of the Allied powers to constrain Greece to abandon her neutrality," as the British *communiqué* of November 19, 1915, stated, there has been very plainly no other aim to Allied diplomacy in the near East from the moment Turkey joined the Central empires. Bulgaria's disaffection only sharpened this purpose. Not only was the prestige of the Entente at stake, but the personal ambitions of the Allied ministers in Athens had been badly set back by their failure to secure this end. At Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay it was a matter of indifference what means were employed, so that the desired results were achieved. The French and British ministers, therefore, especially M. Guillemin, the former, were on their mettle. As I look through a

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number of his letters, the personal element looms far larger than anything else in his point of view. An exceedingly nervous man, overconfident of success from his arrival, impatient of contrarities, he inclined to take the Entente failures in the near East as shafts directed at him, individually. Never for a single moment did he recognize the Greeks' view of their own situation. He was rarely in contact with any Greeks save the followers of Venizelos, and governed his policy solely upon the assumption that Venizelos alone did, or ever could, represent the true opinion of the Greek people. Countless straws indicating to the observant a veering of Greek sentiment from unqualified support of the Entente, passed him unremarked.

The obligation of Greece to France for the aid of the French fleet in the Greek War of Independence seemed to be the principal lever France counted upon to move Greece to co-operation in the present war. Her diplomacy was that of a bill collector trying to collect the debt of Navarino. Ignoring the history of Greece during three thousand years, the French, who directed the Entente policy in the near East

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from the date of England's failure with Bulgaria, staked all on an appeal to the sentimentality of the Greeks, not to their practical sense. Venizelos was the Entente's man. A sentimentalist himself, he was willing to fling Greece into the vortex at any moment, on no conditions. The Entente view, therefore, was, Why treat with any one in Greece save Venizelos? Their plan, to aid or at need to force Venizelos back into power and then to collect the aid of Greece as one would collect a note overdue. All the Entente eggs were in the Venizelos basket.

In this the Italian and Russian ministers differed from their French and British colleagues.¹ By far the ablest of the Entente diplomatists in the near East, Count Bosdari and Prince Demidoff followed the trend of events in the Balkans carefully and were at once alive to the gradually shifting sentiment of the Greek people in respect of the Entente. Neither had the slightest faith in Venizelos; both realized fully that the Cretan was playing his own political game in Greece with Entente backing and at Entente expense.

"We need soldiers, not office-holders," was the

¹ For Italian opinion on the Allied policy in Greece, see Appendix 5.

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succinct expression of Italian and Russian diplomacy in Greece.

There were other and far subtler reasons for this division in the diplomatic ranks of the Entente—a division of which the Greek Government was probably better aware than the Allied governments, themselves. The British seizure of the disputed islands of Imbros and Tenedos and the Greek island of Lemnos at the mouth of the Dardanelles, on the eve of Venizelos's resignation in March, 1915—and with his tacit consent—was destined to play a far larger rôle in world affairs than any other one incident of the war in the Balkan field. Indeed, it was the moving cause of the Russian Revolution.

Just before Great Britain's seizure of these islands, Russia had vetoed the participation of King Constantine's army in the attack upon Constantinople. The moment Great Britain took possession of Imbros, Tenedos, and Lemnos, Russian diplomacy changed. Previously, she had opposed Greece's entry into the war, unwilling to set up a rival claimant, operating from a nearer base, upon the territory of a dismembered Ottoman Empire. But the three

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Greek islands are so placed that they can, if fortified, readily close the mouth of the Dardanelles and effectively shut Constantinople off from the Mediterranean.¹ In British hands, they constitute a key to Constantinople in English pockets. In the hands of weaker, poverty-stricken Greece, bound to Russia by ties of church and royal family, the three islands would be only a very remote menace, if any, to Russia's door upon the Southern seas.

It is quite possible that Great Britain's occupation of the three islands was in good faith, for merely temporary use in military operations against the Dardanelles, and that they would be returned to Greece or surrendered to Russia after the war. But the imperial Russian Government had misgivings on that head, and scarcely had Great Britain taken possession of the islands in question, than Russia withdrew her opposition to Greece's participation in the war. It was furthest from Russia's intentions, however, to support the coöperation of Greece offered by Mr. Venizelos—that on no conditions;

¹ So near is Imbros to the Dardanelles that a number of us were able to follow the Allied operations at the Dardanelles from the hills of the island with ease.

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if the Entente was successful, Venizelos was capable of ceding the comparatively uninhabited Imbros, Tenedos, and Lemnos to Great Britain in return for territories in Thrace, Albania, or Asia Minor where he could assure himself of an appreciable number of votes for his indefinite continuance in office as prime minister of Greece. King Constantine, on the other hand, had maintained from the very first—and maintains still—that the indisputable condition of Greece's participation in the war on the side of the Allies must be a written Entente guarantee of the integrity of Greece, *including the disputed islands*. Russia, therefore, from the hour of Great Britain's seizure of the three islands, adopted a pro-Greek diplomacy centered upon the support of King Constantine, not of Venizelos, as the sole means of saving the gates of Constantinople from the command of British guns.

The Italian motives were other, but the result identical. Nearer the field of diplomatic action, better acquainted with Greek psychology than any of the Entente powers, with a greater stake in the game perhaps even than Russia, and represented in Greece by an astute and accomplished

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diplomatist, the policy of Italy was far more openly and vigorously pro-Greek than that of Russia. The Italians also favored King Constantine, not Venizelos. For Venizelos dreamed a greater Greece—a Greece absorbing the bulk of Asia Minor, extending from Kaz Dagħ on the Gulf of Adramit at the north, indefinitely southward. Now the Italian ambitions centered first in the Dodecanese Islands—also Greek—of which Rhodes had been occupied in 1912, during the Tripolitan War; and then in the neighboring Lycian coast of Asia Minor, northward, in possible conflict with Venizelos's vision of a still greater Greece.

It is true, Venizelos had no pledge from the Entente that his schemes would ever be realized, even were Greece to join the Allies. But he had the pledge of interest: a greater Greece divided into a hundred islands and separated from half her possessions by the Ægean Sea, bankrupt and with no considerable navy, would be slight menace to British or French command of the Eastern Mediterranean. A strong Italy, ambitious, prosperous, and with a fleet carefully conserved to that end during the present war,

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would compete actively with France and England for control of the whole Mediterranean and preference in the markets of the near East. The desire of Venizelos to erect Greece into a big, loose, feeble empire, without strength and under his absolute control, appealed to French and British statesmen as an easy counterfoil to Italy's pretensions. King Constantine's declared intention to retain and consolidate the lesser empire his sword had won in 1912 and 1913 appealed to the Italians as apt to leave them a freer hand in Asia Minor.

Other still more practical considerations also moved Italy. A powerful Italy after the war must depend upon a maximum conservation of the Italian armed strength during the war. Should King Constantine's army not be joined to the Entente forces in the Balkans, her Allies were certain to call upon Italy to make up the deficit. Every Italian familiar with the situation in Greece—and few Italian statesmen or journalists are not—was well aware that Venizelos was in no position to furnish an army worthy of the name to be added to the Entente forces in Macedonia. An Entente support of

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Venizelos was bound to mean ultimately, therefore, a call upon Italy to send a hundred or so thousand men to Saloniki to take the place of the soldiers Venizelos could not supply without King Constantine's coöperation as commander-in-chief of the Greek army.

Clearer headed than his other colleagues, Count Bosdari, the Italian minister to Greece, was never for a moment taken in by Venizelos. He regarded the Cretan as a very wily politician seeking to profit by the Entente's need, to bulwark himself and his henchmen in control of Greece for years to come. That Venizelos would ever be of any real utility to the Allies did not appear to Count Bosdari as at all likely. On the other hand, he saw from the first that King Constantine's army could readily be secured to the Entente by a frank policy definitely eschewing interference in the internal politics of Greece and guaranteeing to Greece what was rightfully hers. The Italians, therefore, espoused this policy from the beginning and continued it, even in conflict with their own Allies, until the end of 1916.

Holding both doors to the Mediterranean, at

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Gibraltar and Egypt, dominating the central Mediterranean from Malta, and in possession of the keys to the Black Sea by her occupation of Imbros, Tenedos, and Lemnos, Great Britain was satisfied with her position in the Mediterranean. Not so France. The Italian plans of territorial expansion filled French statesmen with misgivings. The French control of Mediterranean trade seemed threatened. Greece, always devotedly French in ideals and associations, was proving recalcitrant. The whole situation in the near East was ground slipping from under the feet of the French.

The expedition to Saloniki had been undertaken partly for reasons of internal politics in France and partly to strengthen France's prestige in the Balkans. Its failure had greatly weakened French prestige in the whole near East. The failure must be retrieved. Like a gambler who continues to stake against a winning bank, the French insisted stubbornly that they must win in the end in Greece. Like a gambler, too, their capital of affection and respect among the Greeks disappeared with amazing rapidity with each new, desperate effort to

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regain what had been lost. "A policy of panic," as King Constantine put it.

How official the conception was, it is impossible to state; but that it was widespread among the French in Macedonia is indisputable. When the Greeks would not be "cajoled or coerced" out of neutrality, a plan of the conquest of Greece was born among the French in Saloniki or Athens and spread despite outward official discouragement. General Sarrail's armies were accomplishing nothing in Macedonia. Should they descend upon Greece through Thessaly, ostensibly to rescue the Greek people from a "pro-German tyrant," two ends would be served. Sarrail and his forces would be extricated from a difficult military position without an acknowledgment of error or defeat, and the lost French influence in Greece would be regained—by force, it is true. Venizelos could be established as a dictator and a sort of pro-consul of France in the near East. A republic could be erected under the French ægis, which would in reality be a French protectorate. The idea was alluring. I have heard it warmly supported by men of intelligence and political influence in France. Departing from two

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assumptions: first, that King Constantine is pro-German and therefore an enemy of France; and, second, that the Greek people desire passionately to join the Allies and are restrained from such a course only by the usurped power in the hands of their sovereign, a certain moral color could be given to the plan—the democratizing of an oppressed people, for example. Possibly it was for this reason that General Sarrail worked so actively in conjunction with the Venizelists to intimidate the voters of Macedonia into supporting the Cretan in the elections scheduled to take place in September, 1916, but, at Venizelos's own request, never held. The activity of Sarrail in Venizelos's campaign became generally known throughout Greece, where it worked rather against than in favor of the Cretan. The Greeks are suspicious and intolerant of foreign interference in their internal politics.

That General Sarrail did interfere there can be no doubt. On August 10, 1916, Pamicos Zymbrakakis, now a member of the revolutionary government, wrote Venizelos, then in Athens, of "a collaboration with the Entente powers and particularly with France who, at the psycho-

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logical moment, taking the initiative through Sarraïl, will lend us her assistance by an immediate consolidation of the new order of things"; and referred at even so early a date to a plan then germinating for a revolution against the constitutional government, backed by the bayonets of General Sarraïl. Zymbrakakis further refers to Sarraïl's feeling of "hatred against the crown" and asserts that the French commander "is of opinion that he will gladly participate in a plot the plans of which you [Venizelos] will lay." Mr. Eliakis, one of Venizelos's leading supporters and electoral workers, wrote the Cretan from Cozani on August 3, 1916: "Sarraïl's aide-de-camp, Mathieu ¹ . . . told me to arrange with him through the consul, all affairs relating to the elections. They intend first of all to employ Cretan police to terrorize the Mussulmans." Mr. P. Arguyeropoulos, of the revolutionary government, an ex-prefect of Saloniki under Venizelos, added his testimony to the electoral services of the French commander in another letter to his chief. "General Sarraïl, it appears," he writes, "has finally appreciated the necessity

¹ Vide supra.

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of close collaboration with us. Every day under my direction he takes measures useful to our interests." These letters, with many others found among the papers left by Mr. Venizelos when he fled from Athens, September 25, 1916, have all been published. I have seen the originals and many more such documents proving beyond any question the work of certain French officials in coöperation with the Venizelists, not alone in the Cretan's electoral campaign, but in his subsequent attempt to overthrow the constitutional government of Greece.

It was through these rocks and shoals of intrigue that each of the successive cabinets of the constitutional Government of Greece have been called to steer their ship of state since March, 1915. That they have succeeded in avoiding the threatening dangers is not so much the miracle as that they have succeeded in divining them. Yet every man in Greece has been as aware of each phase of this complicated puzzle of diplomacy and counter-diplomacy as the Entente ministers themselves, and far better informed thereon than the governments or people of the Entente countries, who have been given only one-sided reports

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by their diplomatic representatives in Athens, and only censored reports in their press. In Greece, however, while the Venizelist newspapers were seeking to implant the legend of King Constantine's pro-Germanism and to persuade the people that their only salvation from absolutism was to throw themselves into the arms of the Entente—and of Venizelos—the opposition press was as busy explaining the interest of Russia in supporting Venizelos against the king and the interest of Italy in opposing France's imperialism in the near East to the profit of her own ambitions.

The Greek, to the humblest bootblack who reads his paper propped up against his box as he cleans your shoes, was constrained to buy no pig in a poke. All there was to know of the motives of the Entente, of King Constantine, of Venizelos, he knew. His choice was free. And when, on December first, at the first signal of the revolution of which Venizelos had, in Zymbrakakis's phrase, "laid the plans," he chose his king and his country and rejected Venizelos and the Entente, who shall say that his choice was not that of a free man, exercising an inalienable right?

PART II
COERCION

CHAPTER IX

ENCROACHMENTS

THE first blockade, begun on November 17, ended in the unconditional capitulation of the Greek Government on December 11. The Greek troops, save a guard sufficient to maintain order, were to evacuate Saloniki, and a considerable proportion of them were to be released from active service and sent to their homes. The railway from Saloniki into Serbia was turned over to the French. Allied trawlers, mine layers, and destroyers in search of submarine bases cruised unmolested in Greek waters as if no provision of international law required a belligerent vessel to quit neutral waters within a fixed period.

The importance of the evacuation of Saloniki was much greater than appeared on the surface. Morally, Saloniki represented to the Greeks the fruit of their two victorious wars against Turks and Bulgars. To deliver the second city of

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Greece into the hands even of friends was a great blow to their pride and their national spirit. Like the Entente note of August 3, 1915, ceding Cavalla to Bulgaria, the Entente memorandum of November 25 left a distinct feeling of resentment among the Greeks, whose military coöperation the Entente were still seeking to secure. From a practical standpoint, the evacuation was still more significant. Saloniki is the central point of mobilization and the supply base for the whole Greek army concentrated in Macedonia. With its evacuation, the Greek troops were divided into two unconnected forces, one to the east of Saloniki, with the inadequate open roadstead of Cavalla as a port; the other to the west, with Vodena as a center, supplies being sent overland through Thessaly. It is important to realize that neither of these dispositions of troops was or could be practical from a military point of view. In both instances, transport was extremely difficult, the long retention of any considerable force impossible. In a word, the Entente requirements necessitated, sooner or later, the complete evacuation of Macedonia by the Greek army. It was precisely for this reason

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that the Greek staff opposed so strenuously the acceptance of the Allied demands.

It should be added also that the presence of the Greek army on either wing of the Allied forces constituted virtually their sole protection from a flank attack by the Bulgarians, concentrated in Macedonia from the conclusion of the French retreat from Serbia on December 15 until General Sarrail had completed the fortification of Saloniki as an entrenched camp. In their new exposed positions on the two wings of the Allied forces, the Greeks were in direct contact with the prospective invaders of their soil. At the same time their communications, from one wing to the other and between both wings and headquarters at Athens, were so destroyed by the enforced evacuation of their local base that they were necessarily at a very distinct disadvantage for defense of their frontiers from any invasion that might be attempted. In a word, they were thrust by the Allies into a precarious position of which General Sarrail held the key, with the hope that an overt act on the part of the forces of the Central empires would compel them not only to war with Bulgaria, but to enter upon hostilities

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under the supreme command of General Sarraïl, who controlled their only means of waging war successfully.

On December 19 the Greek elections were held. As the Venizelists did not participate, the ballot was extremely light—a fact which the Entente press hailed as indicative that Venizelos still controlled the country, since his opponents polled only a negligible percentage of possible votes. The army, however, was mobilized and therefore the bulk of the voters of the country were legally deprived of their franchise. As the sole contest was between factions of those unanimous in opposing Venizelos and his war policy, there was no particular reason for a heavy vote. Mr. Venizelos's manœuver in abstaining from elections which he had forced upon the country successfully prevented any expression of popular will against war. Mr. Venizelos, therefore, as well as the Entente powers, claimed that the people of Greece favored war and desired Venizelos himself to guide their country into hostilities on the side of the Allies. The propriety of reaching a positive conclusion of vital importance upon negative reasoning of this sort is open to

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question. It is significant as illustrating the growing unsoundness of the position of the Entente in active support of their champion, Venizelos, and the illogical lengths to which an unsuccessful diplomatic policy in the Balkans was leading Allied statesmen.

The day following the election the Greek evacuation of Saloniki began. General de Castelnau, chief of the French general staff, arrived in Macedonia to study the military situation of the Allied Orient armies. Later, on December 26, he visited Athens and talked at length with King Constantine. As in the case of Lord Kitchener, there was complete understanding between the two soldiers. General de Castelnau told me that he found the Greek sovereign cordially disposed to do all in his power to be of aid to the Allies, short of actual war. Constantine I expressed quite frankly to the French commander his doubt of the ability of the Allies to conquer the Central empires by force; but stated that he thought a definite conclusion of the war in the Allies' favor possible through a long economic and financial pressure. The Greek monarch asked General de Castelnau point-blank why the dilatory tactics of

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the Entente governments had permitted the failure of the Dardanelles enterprise and the Serbian disaster.

"No one denies that these unfortunate results are most regrettable," General de Castelnau replied. "It were very much to be desired that Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro were still intact and that to-day Russia could be supplied through the Dardanelles. But we have to see the war as a whole. It would be folly, which might jeopardize the final victory of which alone we have any right to think, to undertake any military action without the completest preparation and every assurance of success humanly possible to obtain. If the war material and the military forces required were not available, however painful inaction may prove, it were criminal to go off half-cock."

"Just so," King Constantine replied; "that is precisely what I have told the French and British ministers every time they have urged me to coöperate with the Entente in the war, when they have been unable themselves to guarantee a sufficient force to insure us all against disaster."

General de Castelnau did not visit Venizelos

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during his stay in Athens. To parry the effect of this upon the Cretan's followers, Venizelos's friends organized a popular manifestation in favor of the former premier on his saint's day, December 28. The demonstration was remarkably successful. Thousands of visitors called at the Cretan's house, and telegrams from Greeks all over the world poured in upon him. It was evident that whatever the Greek people might think of Venizelos's war policy his personal popularity was undimmed. This, too, served to strengthen the Entente diplomatists in their close alliance with the Cretan, and spurred their efforts to compass his return to power.

Meanwhile, the military and naval authorities of the Entente were sparing no opportunity to visit a resentment against the Skouloudis government, for its policy of neutrality at any price, upon the whole Greek state. The demonstration on Venizelos's saint's day was emphasized by a French occupation of the island of Castellorizo, one of the Greek islands in dispute with Turkey since the unsatisfactory Greco-Turkish settlement in 1914. On December 30, following a successful German air raid on Saloniki, General

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Sarrail ordered the arrest of all the consuls of the Central empires stationed in Saloniki, took forcible possession of their consulates, seized their official papers, and finally, with considerable ostentation, deported them and a great number of their nationals, who had been arrested at the same time. A score of Greek subjects were also arrested on charges of espionage and propaganda.

While the measure was not altogether a surprise to the Greek Government, and was one obviously dictated by military caution and to be anticipated from the moment it was decided that the Allied forces remain in Macedonia, the manner of conducting the arrests deeply wounded the Greek people. The Greek Government had been assured by the Entente ministers that the consuls of the Central empires would not be expelled without previous warning. No warning was given, however, and on January 2 the Norwegian consul was likewise arrested and deported, and the consuls of the Central empires and the Dutch consular officer at Mitylene, as well as a number of Greek residents of that island, were taken into custody and expelled from Greek

"THE GREEK EVACUATION OF SALONIKI BEGAN"



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territory. The protest of the Greek Government for these events was couched in no measured terms.

While irritating measures of this character, touching vitally the sovereignty of Greece, were being taken by the Entente military and naval authorities, a letter written by a member of the British naval mission in Greece, and found in a diplomatic pouch a German submarine had seized on the person of Colonel Napier, was made public in Berlin and its text telegraphed to Athens. The writer advocated the dethronement of King Constantine by the Allies and the erection of Greece into a republic, with Venizelos at its head. The letter was a personal one and reflected no tangible official opinion. Nevertheless, there was no doubt in the minds of the Greeks that it revealed a plan which had been seriously discussed in the Entente legations at Athens. General Sarraïl himself had been more frank than politic in his expressions along this line. The French minister to Greece was widely quoted as having declared of the Greeks that "the only way to handle these Orientals is by force." The recent course of the Allied military and naval authori-

ties gave color to this alleged statement. While Venizelos himself at that period publicly refused to consider a republic in Greece as either desirable or probable,¹ he permitted many of his followers to advocate, unrebuked, a revolution and a change of government. The Venizelist press, also under Entente supervision, conducted a bitter campaign against the Greek general staff with whose views the King was known to accord.

The blockade, which had formally ended on December 11, proved to be still virtually in operation. The streets of Athens were kept in semi-darkness by the lack of coal. Breadstuffs increased rapidly in price, and the people of Greece as well as the army were slowly pinched as by an invisible hand. On January 6 the supply of flour available for the Athenian bakeries was sufficient only for four days. A financial boycott by the Entente also made itself felt. The Skouloudis government was at its wits' end to maintain itself.

Convinced that these repressive measures on the part of the Entente could only be intended to force him out of neutrality, King Constantine

¹ See Appendix 6.

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felt that if his motives for remaining neutral were better understood, his sincerity would at once be appreciated, and public opinion would force an abandonment by the Entente of their policy of coercion. With this in view, the Greek monarch received one after another of the representatives of the foreign press to whom he explained his purpose with that engaging candor, that entire absence of any mental reservation, so characteristic of him. He felt that those who read his frank statements could not but appreciate and approve his attitude. It is a significant commentary upon public opinion in Europe in these war times that in not one country to whose people Constantine of Greece addressed himself directly through the public press did he find any sympathy with the stand he had taken to save his country from the horrors of war, or any real belief in the disinterestedness of his high purpose.

One of these statements explaining his attitude King Constantine communicated also to me for publication in America, since it elaborated the position previously taken in his declaration of December 4, that "Greece would not be cajoled or coerced out of neutrality." When he gave me a

résumé of this statement, made originally to Dr. Fries-Schwenzen, the correspondent of the *Lokal Anzeiger* of Berlin, he begged me to "make the people of the United States understand that I am no more pro-German than President Wilson," as he put it. "I am pro-Greek," he went on, "just as your President tries to be only pro-American. It is one of the saddest evidences of the blind hatreds and prejudices evoked by this war that people who should and in their sober senses do know better, insist upon imputing to others motives which they could never conceivably have entertained.

"Whether the Balkan question will be satisfactorily solved by this European war I do not know," King Constantine declared. "No one dares to predict that in this part of the world another bloody war will not break out before a solution can be reached of these most complicated questions of nationality. No one hopes more than I that such a disaster can be avoided. But, as I have so often said, our taking part in the present conflict is not a Balkan matter—it would merely engulf us in a world struggle. The first victims of such a war are naturally the smaller

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states having fewer resources within themselves. Our neutrality, therefore, is not a sign of weakness, but the fruit of a deliberate intention to husband our strength for later difficult times. That is why I cling to my policy of conserving the freedom and interest of my people without spilling their blood."

Respecting his attitude toward Germany and his brother-in-law, the Kaiser, the king said:

"I am absolutely free. I am bound by no personal interest. Wherefore I can say with a clear conscience that I have only the interest of my people before my eyes. . . . Besides, sentiment plays very little part in politics. I do not let myself be influenced by any sympathies, antipathies, or other feelings. I have the duty to look only after the interests of my people with all my ability."

CHAPTER X

KING CONSTANTINE SPEAKS HIS MIND

KING CONSTANTINE'S series of statements to the foreign press made no impression on the Entente policy in the near East. The coercion applied to Greece continued unabated. What was left of the Serbian army, broken, starving, exhausted, decimated by cholera, arrived at the Adriatic coast of Albania. Not a third of the original force that had borne the shock of the combined attack of Bulgarians, Austrians, and Germans remained. The failure of the Entente to send the 150,000 men to Macedonia as promised, the refusal of Great Britain to permit Serbia to attack the Bulgarians before their mobilization could be completed, the insistence of the Entente that Serbia make no separate peace, had done their work. As a fighting unit of any real military value, the Serbian army had ceased to exist.

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The Austrians were in close pursuit of the Serbs. The latter begged refuge of Italy. But the Italian Government, fearful of an epidemic of cholera, refused. The remaining allies, in tardy pity upon the lot of the Serbs, seized the Greek island of Corfu, and in open violation of the Hellenic Constitution as well as of the treaty of 1864, by which the Ionian Islands were ceded to Greece on the distinct condition that they remain forever neutral, the Serbian army was established on the island. The Greeks protested that the cholera was quite as dangerous to the civil population of Greece as to the Italians. Their protest was ignored. The French took possession of Emperor William's château, the Achilleon. They hoisted the French flag upon the building and turned it into a hospital.

Here, as in the seizure of the consulates of the Central empires in Saloniki, Mitylene, and elsewhere in Greece, Allied authorities expected to find proofs that enemy submarines were being supplied from Greece. They seem, however, to have been too credulous of an intelligence service whose activities were confined to mere unsubstantiated assertions. The "compromising doc-

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uments" so freely promised to the press on each occasion of seizure, were not forthcoming. Nevertheless, the Venizelist press of Athens, under the direct supervision of a member of the British legation charged with that work, printed the most fantastic stories and the bitterest attacks upon King Constantine. The British and French press were only slightly less intemperate in their arraignment of the Greek monarch, on grounds for which no shadow of evidence existed; not the slightest tendency to fair play toward the Greeks or the Greek sovereign was shown by the newspapers of either country. The "Echo de Paris" even suppressed a personal statement of King Constantine, by which the Greek monarch sought to place his side of the case before the French public.

The blockade, for which no reason was ever assigned, was literally starving the Greeks. Factories were closed for lack of coal and thousands of laborers were thrown out of work. The claim of the Venizelist newspapers that the Cretan's dismissal from the premiership in March had been "unconstitutional" furnished the clue to these coercive measures: the Entente was seek-

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ing to compel the return of Venizelos to power, and through that means to add the Greek army to the Entente forces in Macedonia. The assurances contained in the British Legation's *communiqué* of November 19, 1915, that "it is not the intention of the Allied powers to constrain Greece to abandon her neutrality" were shown to have been mere paper words marking a subtler policy of undeclared, but effective, hostility to every other régime in Greece save that of the Allies' man, Venizelos. This "unconstitutionality" thesis was an afterthought. Venizelos himself had first accepted the Constitution of the Zaïmis cabinet, and then had overthrown it, forcing the dissolution of the Boulé and new elections. It was only when he became convinced that elections would spell his defeat that he recalled the existence of the Constitution, article XCIX of which he had violated in his invitation to a foreign army to land on Greek soil, without a special law.

The forced evacuation of Saloniki by the Greek troops; the taking possession by the Allies of the Greek railways and telegraphs in Macedonia and the Ægean islands; the Allied seizure of Milo,

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Castellorizo, and Corfu on top of their previous occupation of Imbros, Lemnos, Tenedos, and Mitylene; the press campaign in England and France against King Constantine and his government; the continual blockade of Greece with no reason given for its maintenance—these things deeply angered the Greeks and did more to engender hostility against the Entente than all the rather too obvious and fruitless propaganda of Baron von Schenck, the German agent in Athens.

The climax of an intolerable situation was reached when General Sarrail ordered his troops to destroy the steel bridge over the Struma River near Demir Hissar. The bridge constituted the only line of communication between the Greek forces in eastern Macedonia and their staff commander, General Moscopoulos, whose headquarters were still in Saloniki. It was also the only land means of transporting supplies to the Greek soldiers in that sector. The open roadstead of Cavalla offered very limited facilities for an organized commissary service. The bridge, too, had cost a great deal of money. Its destruction for military purposes was scarcely necessary in view of the fact that the Greek army on the

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Allies' right wing had once before protected General Sarrail's force from a flank attack and were still in a position to do so again at need. So long as the Greeks did not evacuate eastern Macedonia, the Bulgarians could not descend into that sector without encountering a resistance from the Greeks whose mobilization was being continued solely to meet such an emergency. On the other hand, the evacuation of eastern Macedonia—of which no one in Greece then dreamed—would have required weeks, owing to the limited harbor facilities of Cavalla. There would therefore have been time a-plenty to destroy the Demir Hissar bridge before any such evacuation could be completed.

The reason for General Sarrail's act was precisely that which had motivated the other drastic measures he had taken toward the Greeks. His intelligence service was largely composed of active adherents of Venizelos. The Entente legations in Athens secured the information they furnished General Sarrail from Mr. Venizelos himself, with whom they were in constant conference, and from his partizans. Both Mr. Venizelos and his followers wished to force the retirement of the Skou-

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loudis government, in the belief that King Constantine would be compelled to recall the Cretan to power and thus renew the contact of Venizelos' followers with the public treasury. Whatever advice these interested parties could give the Entente officials to inspire repressive measures upon the Skouloudis government—and incidentally upon all of Greece—was given with a will. The interest of the Entente was enlisted by the assurance that once Venizelos was returned to power, Greece would promptly be unconditionally joined to the Entente and an army of 250,000 men added to the Allies, who were in dire need of such an increase of their force.

King Constantine was as well aware of these intrigues and their motive as every one else in Greece. He had tried to clear the atmosphere by a frank statement of his intentions. When he found that this was misinterpreted, he made a number of more detailed explanations of the reasons for his attitude, to representatives of the foreign press. Neither were these received in any greater spirit of fairness to the Greek monarch. On January 13, therefore, when the news of the destruction of the Demir Hissar bridge

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reached him, implying subtly as the act did that the Greek troops east of the Struma River were a menace instead of a protection to General Sarrail's army, King Constantine sent for me to come to the palace.

He was very deeply moved by the trend of events in Greece and especially by the whole hostile attitude of the Allies toward his government, which he knew to be founded on no tenable grounds. He told me that he wished to express through the American press his profound indignation at "the unheard-of high-handedness of the recent action of the Allies toward Greece." With scarcely suppressed rage he recited one by one a bill of wrongs committed by the Allied forces in Macedonia. Beginning with the unfulfilled promise to send 150,000 men to the rescue of Serbia, which had almost induced Greece to share the tragic fate of her ally—a fate escaped only by the caution of the Greek general staff in delaying action until it could be seen how much of a force France and England would really send—he took up detail after detail of systematic mistreatment of the Greeks by the Entente. The pillage of the Greek churches in Macedonia

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of invaluable icons for which a few cents were left on the altar by the Allied soldiers who took them; the forced evacuation of Greek peasants from their homes to make room for Allied camps and earthworks; the destruction of whole villages between the warring lines; the Allied assumption of military control of Greece's second city; the Allied exercise of police powers in Greek waters; the imprisonment of Greeks upon charges of espionage with no opportunity given them to defend themselves or to face their accusers—an unending catalogue of what the indignant monarch called “the Allies’ encroachments on the sovereignty of Greece, culminating in the occupation of Corfu and the destruction of the Demir Hissar bridge.”

Probably no such arraignment of the conduct of civilized powers by the ruler of a free country as that I listened to from King Constantine has ever been made in history. He knew every wrong to every individual peasant, every insult flung at a veteran of Kilgis or Janina, every occasion upon which Allied aviators had dropped bombs as if by accident upon Greek camps—and he felt these things far more than all the abuse

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and ridicule of his own person that had been published in the Entente press—with the permission of the government censors.

“It is the merest cant,” he thundered, “for England and France to talk about Germany’s violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg after what they themselves have done and are doing here. I have tried every way I know how to get fair play from the British and French press and a fair hearing by the British and French public. No sooner has a British newspaper attacked Greece with the most amazing perversions of fact and misrepresentations of motives than I have called its correspondent and given him face to face a full statement of Greece’s position. I have given the frankest statement to the French press through one of the newspapers most bitterly attacking Greece. Its publication was not permitted by the French censor. The only forum of public opinion open to me is America. The situation is far too vital for me to care a snap about royal dignity in the matter of interviews when the very life of Greece as an independent country is at stake. I shall appeal to America again and again, if necessary,

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for that fair hearing denied me by the Allied countries.

“Just look at a list of Greek territory already occupied by Allied troops—Lemnos, Imbros, Mytilene, Castelloriza, Corfu, Saloniki, including the Chalcidic peninsula, and a large part of Macedonia. In proportion to all Greece it is as if that part of the United States won from Mexico after the Mexican war were occupied by foreign troops—and not so much as by your leave! What does it matter that they promise to pay when the war is over for the damage done? They cannot pay for the sufferings of my people driven out of their homes! They plead military necessity. It was under the constraint of military necessity that Germany invaded Belgium and occupied Luxemburg. It is no use claiming that the neutrality of Greece is not guaranteed by the powers violating it, as was the case with Belgium; for the neutrality of Corfu *is* guaranteed by Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, and yet that has made no difference in their action. And what about that plea of military necessity? Where is the military necessity to destroy the Demir Hissar bridge .

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which cost a million and a half drachmæ and which is the only practicable route by which my troops in eastern Macedonia can be revictualled? The bridge was mined and could have been blown up at a moment's notice at the approach of the enemy. It is admitted that no enemies were anywhere near the bridge, and there was no indication that they were coming. What military reason, therefore, was there to blow up the bridge now, except to starve out the Greek troops around Serres and Drama? Where is the necessity of the occupation of Corfu? If Greece is an ally of Serbia, so is Italy, and the transportation from Albania to Italy is simpler than to Corfu. Is it that the Italians refuse to accept the Serbs, fearing the spread of cholera? Why should the Allies think the Greeks want to be endangered by a cholera epidemic any more than the Italians? They say that they are occupying Castelloriza, Corfu, and other points in the search for submarine bases. The British Legation in Athens has a standing offer of two thousand pounds—a great fortune to any Greek fisherman—for information leading to the detection of submarine bases, but it has never yet received any about a

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submarine base in Greece; no one has ever yet seen any submarine in Greek waters, and there is no evidence whatever of hostile submarines being supplied from Greece.¹

“The history of the Allied Balkan politics records one crass mistake after another; and now, out of pique over the failure of their every Balkan calculation, they try to take out on Greece the result of their own stupidity. We warned them that the Gallipoli enterprise was bound to fail; that negotiations with Bulgaria would be fruitless; that the Austrians and Germans would certainly crush Serbia. They would not believe us; and now because all we said proved true, like angry, unreasonable children, the Entente turn upon Greece. They have deliberately thrown away every advantage they ever had of Greek sympathy. At the beginning of the war eighty per cent. of the Greeks were favorable to the Entente; to-day not forty—no, not twenty per cent. would turn a hand to aid the Allies.”

¹ “The charges [that German submarines are supplied from Greece] against the government continued, though no foundation for them was ever in any way brought to light. And that constituted one of the principal causes of the irritation which grew up against the Entente governments.”—“Gazette de Lausanne” (Francophile); No. 209, 1916.

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“Why does n’t your Majesty demobilize?” I ventured to suggest.

“Perhaps I shall,” he replied, candidly, “but I don’t feel that I can afford to disarm before the fate of Saloniki is decided. The Allies evacuated Gallipoli after a year. One day they may change their minds about Saloniki, leaving the place at the mercy of the first comer. Saloniki is Greek, and I propose that it shall remain Greek.”

“But does your Majesty believe,” I persisted, “that the Greek mobilization can continue the year, perhaps the two years, the war may last; and will the Allies continue to furnish money for a Greek army that does not intend to aid them?”

“They want Greece to remain mobilized because they still believe we can be persuaded to join them. They are badly mistaken.”

One question had haunted me since I first met King Constantine. I knew—I had good reason to know—that he was in no sense pro-German. But to what extent had he been impressed by the military successes of the Germans so far in the war; how far was he moved in his attitude by

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fear of a complete German victory? I asked the question point-blank.

"Does your Majesty believe Germany can be victorious?"

"That depends on what is meant by victorious. If you mean she will take London, Paris, and Petrograd, probably not. But I believe the Germans can defend themselves where they are for a very long time. If economic exhaustion does not force Germany to sue for peace, I believe it will be most difficult, if not impossible, to conquer her, militarily."

"Then what does your Majesty think will be the outcome of the war?"

"A draw—don't you?" he said, leaning forward suddenly and looking me squarely in the eye. For a moment a sort of panic seized me. I wondered if it could really be true. Then I remembered the men of France as I had seen them on their own battle line—not as they were in that far Macedonian land—so brave, so sure, so modest, so strong.

"No, Sir," I said, quietly. "I do not."

CHAPTER XI

THE QUESTION OF GOOD FAITH

NEITHER the French nor British Governments had any intention of permitting King Constantine's arraignment of their policy in the near East to reach the American public to whom it was addressed, could that be prevented. The Greek sovereign's appeal for fair play to the people of the United States filled the chancelleries of London and Paris with consternation.

Before cabling my message to America I communicated the content of King Constantine's statement to M. Guillemin, the French minister to Greece, with whom I was on most cordial terms. He rebuked me as a friend of France for transmitting a statement which he characterized as "German propaganda" and at once telegraphed his government in cipher to have my message stopped by the censor. When I learned that this had been done, I sent a duplicate cablegram over England—as all messages from

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Greece to the United States must pass either through France or England and be subject to the Allied censorship—and I took the matter up with Sir Francis Elliot, the British minister to Greece.

“Nothing is gained,” I told the English diplomatist, “by suppressing one side of a case. The Allies have dozens of correspondents in Greece who flood the Entente and even the American press with their side of what is happening in the near East. I believe that King Constantine is entitled to fair play, and I shall see that he gets it. If this message is stopped as a cablegram, it will arrive by post later. You cannot keep the truth down. You had better let it go through.”

Sir Francis seemed to agree with me and telegraphed to his government his belief that the statement should pass. The British censors thought otherwise, however. The message was also held in London. I finally informed M. Guillemin that unless the message was passed, I should telegraph it to Berlin to be forwarded by wireless or, if necessary, would take it to New York in person, thus avoiding all censorships.

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After six days of holding the message, Premier Briand decided at last that it would be more politic to let it go; but he made it a condition that a semi-official reply from the French Government be published simultaneously.

I accepted this compromise. The reply was prepared. A week after it had been given me by the King of the Hellenes, his statement was published by permission of the Allies, their counter-statement printed side by side with the Greek monarch's words. The counter-statement in substance declared that "the Allies only went to Saloniki to succor Serbia at Greece's invitation"; as for the occupation of Greek territory with which King Constantine had charged the Entente, the statement asserted, "There is no question of occupation, but of temporary use of certain portions." It is worthy of remark that the "temporary use" of some portions has already lasted two and a half years and shows signs of constant extension rather than cessation.

The French statement further set forth that the Greek Government "tried by every means to take part in the Gallipoli enterprise"—an assertion scarcely an accurate summary of the nego-

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tiations between Greece and the Entente in April, 1915, as shown by the facts I have already brought out. In this connection a letter from ex-Minister Apostolos Alexandris to Venizelos written during the negotiations of April, 1915, and published in the "Bulletin Hellenique" of December 31, 1916, shows plainly enough that both Mr. Venizelos and his lieutenant were in a position to know that the Entente, from the first, were not disposed to accept Greece's proposals to join the Gallipoli expedition upon a basis of the recognition of Greece as an ally and a guarantee of her integrity. Besides these points, M. Briand's unofficial reply to King Constantine's declarations makes no attempt to reveal what military necessity—presumably the basis of all censorship—had dictated the Entente's efforts to suppress altogether King Constantine's statement of his side of the case.

Meanwhile, however, the French and British ministers had themselves drafted a reply to King Constantine, which they proposed to give me for publication. It was chiefly a bitter complaint of the work of Baron von Schenck, the head of the German propaganda in Greece, charging

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that any pro-German activity was inconsistent with Greece's promised "benevolent neutrality." The French and British ministers also asserted that German submarines were supplied from the Greek coasts and islands, and that the Greek Government took no steps to prevent this breach of benevolence toward the Entente.

Though I have no proof of it, and though the British naval attaché in Athens told King Constantine that he also had no proof of it, it is quite possible that German submarines have been supplied from Greece. As the British have controlled with an iron hand the distribution of every gallon of benzine imported into Greece—not a gallon being allowed to be sold without a written permit issued by the British legation—the supplying of German submarines from Greece seems to reflect rather upon the efficiency of the British control than upon the Greeks. By demanding, in their memorandum of November 26, 1915, the right to search Greek waters for enemy submarines and their bases, the Entente would appear to have relieved the Greeks of the responsibility of policing their own coasts. I have been informed by British officers who reside on the

west coast of Ireland that German submarines have been supplied from that coast, and that the submarine that sank the *Lusitania* was so supplied. It would seem to be no easy matter to control the supplying of submarines, even in the thickly populated British Isles, and with Great Britain at war. How much less in the sparsely populated islands of the Greek archipelago!

As for Baron Schenck's other activities, it is undoubtedly true that he subsidized certain Athenian newspapers; that he paid for the singing of couplets ridiculing the Entente upon the stage of certain Greek reviews. I dare say he supplied certain minor politicians in Greece with funds. But for all this, the German influence in Greece remained negligible. Even to-day, when the Entente has employed such drastic methods of coercion against the Greek people, it has made them only less favorable to the Entente cause; it has not made them pro-German.

The fact of the matter is that the German influence in the near East had swept on toward Constantinople and had not encountered Greece in its path. For this reason if for no other—precisely because the German influence had extended

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widely in the Ottoman Empire—it had little hold in Greece. The Greeks bear an age-long rancor against the Turks; an influence dominant in Turkey would be hostilely regarded in Greece. On the whole, the best statement of the character and extent of the German operations in Greece is perhaps that which Baron von Schenck himself made me the day he was expelled from Hellenic soil by the Entente. I had asked him if he was satisfied with his labors in Greece.

“Up to a certain point,” he replied. “Thanks to the able assistance rendered me by the Allies, the results have far exceeded my greatest expectations. You would be surprised if you could see my budget; the whole world would be astounded if it could realize how much has been done with so little. If the Allies continue to make such crass blunders as they have made in the last few days, I cheerfully leave my work in their hands.”

To the impartial observer in Greece the extent of the German propaganda appears to have been greatly exaggerated by three classes of persons, for three reasons: by those in charge of the Anglo-French propaganda and secret police, so

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as to secure greater credit for their work and to obtain from the British and French taxpayers vast sums of money devoted largely to wine, women, and automobiles; by the British and French diplomatists to account for the failure of their policy in the near East; and finally by the Venizelists to account for their inability to deliver the country to the Entente, as they had set out to do.

The statement prepared by Sir Francis Elliot and M. Guillemin in reply to King Constantine's indictment ends with one significant declaration: "The whole question between the Entente and Greece is one of good faith. If Greece loyally keeps her agreements, she will not suffer."

So far, every demand made of Greece by the Entente, save that of leaving neutrality to support Serbia, has been loyally granted. In what spirit was this very practical benevolence met by France and England?

On January 17, 1916, General Sarrail took the supreme command of the Allied Orient armies. The event was the signal for constant friction between Allied and Greek forces in Macedonia. Two days later certain Greeks were arrested in

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Athens, charged with being in the pay of the Entente to furnish them with the few remaining secrets of the Greek staff and the Greek plans for defending the territory left them by the Allied occupation of Central Macedonia. On January 20, the Allies placed a net at the mouth of the Greek harbor of Volo and it became necessary for Greek ships to have the permission of the Allied naval authorities to enter the port. On January 28, the Greek fort of Karabournou, at the mouth of the Gulf of Saloniki, was forcibly seized by General Sarraill, and the Greek garrison disarmed and conducted to Saloniki under guard. The following day the German consul at Canea, Crete, was arrested, together with several Greeks, and deported by the Allies. On February 2, a German aviator, whose machine alighted within Greek lines in eastern Macedonia and whom the Greek Colonel Orphanidis was preparing to intern, was taken by force by a French detachment and made a prisoner of war of the French. On February 17, the consular officers of the Central empires in the island of Chios were likewise deported, a number of Greeks being arrested there as well. Incident

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followed incident of this nature, precisely as when the Germans made similar arrests in Luxemburg, during the early days of the war. In each instance the man arrested had neither hearing nor appeal. His own, the Greek, government was unable to protect him, and any unsubstantiated denouncement to the Anglo-French secret police by a creditor or a personal enemy was sufficient to condemn him to forcible banishment from his home and country, without trial.

Meanwhile, to parry the very profound effect of the forcible occupation of Fort Karabournou, the French and British ministers officially informed the Greek premier on February 5 that the Allies would take possession of no more Greek territory and that "whatever might be done in the future would, as in the past, be under the pressure of military necessity," adding, however, that "the withdrawal of the Greek troops from Macedonia would leave the Allied powers indifferent."

General Sarraill's defensive fortifications of Saloniki were completed. His force had been gradually increased to some 200,000 men. Preparations were under way for a spring offensive

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against Bulgaria. To clear the ground, the Entente ministers' statement to Mr. Skouloudis was cast out to warn the Greeks by implication that before the Allied conquest of their enemy, Bulgaria, began, they could either join the Allied armies or demobilize and leave eastern Macedonia undefended against a Bulgarian attack. As an official Entente *communiqué* put it, in diplomatic language, "It is the opinion of the Entente governments that it depends upon Greece in conformance with her interests and the evolution of future events whether it is desirable to retain the Greek army mobilized."

In the face of the prospect of a successful Allied campaign against Bulgaria, the Greeks began to waver in their neutrality. Prince Nicholas, King Constantine's brother, addressed a long conciliatory letter to M. Emile Hebrard, of the Paris "Temps," in which he reviewed in detail the relations between Greece and the Entente, laying particular stress on the fact that King Constantine had never declared he was unwilling to leave neutrality under any circumstances:

Doubt has been expressed in the French and British

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press of the good faith and sincerity of our King, his government and the sentiments of the Hellenic people towards the Allied troops. . . . No suspicion could more deeply wound the national pride of the Hellenic people than distrust of their traditional hospitality, and doubt of the word of their sovereign.

The condition imposed by King Constantine upon his coöperation with the Entente—the sending to the Balkans of a sufficient Allied force to conduct a successful campaign—was by the end of February in the way of fulfilment. The moment was at hand when a single friendly gesture from France or England to the Greek sovereign would have added 250,000 Greeks to their army in Macedonia, bringing the total force for an offensive to 450,000 not counting the Serbs, who could be reckoned at about 80,000 more. It would have meant the conquest of Bulgaria, the cutting of the line from Berlin to Turkey, the opening of a southern, ice-free door into Russia, perhaps also the fall of Constantinople and the ending of the war in 1916. But the Entente diplomatists in Greece were lost in a maze of local politics. They were absorbed in fighting Venizelos's battles, intriguing with Venizelos's supporters and writing editorials for the Venizelist



THE FRENCH LAYING OUT THEIR CAMP AT ZEITENLIK NEAR SALONIKI. TENTS OF BRITISH CAMP IN DISTANCE.

THE QUESTION OF GOOD FAITH

newspapers. In London and Paris, statesmen were occupied with other and more pressing problems than the attitude of Greece; they depended upon their diplomatic representatives to direct the Entente policy in the near East, and Mr. Venizelos had the diplomatic representatives of the Entente in his pocket.

Then, suddenly, the German attack upon Verdun began, and seemed at first to succeed. Troops from Saloniki were shipped back to France to meet the emergency. The Entente Balkan offensive became evidently impracticable. The Greeks stiffened in their conviction that neutrality was wisest for the present. The Entente's opportunity came—and passed.

CHAPTER XII

VENIZELOS ATTACKS HIS KING

ON February 7, 1916, I wrote General Sarraïl, suggesting that he visit King Constantine in person and seek to dissipate by a face to face discussion some of the friction accumulating so rapidly. Just before departing from Saloniki at the end of December, I had had a long talk with General Sarraïl. He had recited the minor difficulties and annoyances put in his way by the Greek officers stationed in Saloniki, and had reviewed the handicaps under which he was working, both in respect to the staffs in London and Paris and to his relations with the Greek Government. Evidently, his situation was not brilliant. A study of the character of the country, the roads, the bridges, the passes, the mountains, had convinced him that a minimum of half a million men was essential to any promising offensive. At the beginning of 1916 he had about one quarter that number, and there were no indications that he would ever receive the full quota from France

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and England. In a word, the sole prospect of bringing his armies up to the required strength lay in securing the coöperation of the Greeks.

“That,” he said gloomily, “is in the hands of the diplomatists. But you may tell King Constantine one thing from me: I am a radical in politics, it is true, and I know that my socialistic views have been exploited against me with the king. But you may say to him that I am first and foremost a soldier of France. He is a soldier, a commanding officer victorious in two wars. Say to him that whenever he may decide to join us in the war, Maurice Sarrail, soldier of France, will be glad to serve under the orders of Constantine I, soldier of Greece.”

I conveyed the message to King Constantine. Sarrail’s visit to Athens was the result.

On February 18, the officers of the new Boulé were received in audience by the sovereign and pronounced a discourse in which the monarch was lauded for having saved the country, under the powers conferred upon him by the Constitution, at a most critical juncture, from the horrors of war that had overtaken other small states taking part in the general European conflict. There

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was no doubt that this statement expressed the feeling of the whole country, even of all save the most fanatic of the Venizelists. But it was an unfortunate preparation for Sarrail's visit and for the success of his purpose to try to convince the commander-in-chief of the Greek armies that the military as well as political interests of Greece counseled a departure from neutrality.

General Sarrail's arrival in the capital on February 21 was the signal for a demonstration of every jot of feeling of affection for France which the unhappy train of diplomatic events and military failures in the near East had left burning in the hearts of the Greeks. Plainly, there was still a great deal of sympathy left alive, for the French commander's reception was a cordial one both with the people of Athens and with King Constantine. The two soldiers understood one another from the first moment. Both brusque, both plain-spoken, both wholly frank, the foundations were at once laid for a wider understanding and coöperation of the dual forces in Macedonia, which did not preclude a junction of the two armies in a common military emprise at the appropriate moment. The result of the in-

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terview on the whole was mutual confidence; King Constantine repeating to General Sarrail the personal assurance he had already given Lord Kitchener, M. Denys Cochin, and General de Castelnau; and Sarrail explaining on his part the difficulties under which he was laboring and the military considerations that had impelled him to certain seemingly harsh measures.

If the conference was not to bear early fruit in a military accord between the two commanders, looking to Greece's entry into the war upon that purely military basis which King Constantine had advised from the start, those who had favored another basis of understanding must at once be active to prevent a favorable outcome of the interview.

There were, evidently, two classes of persons who would be directly hit by a military accord between King Constantine and General Sarrail: the Entente diplomatists, whom such an arrangement would exhibit as ineffective in their negotiations; and the Venizelists, whom it would deprive of the spoils of victory in the shape of public office. I do not include the pro-Germans, as that class was never very numerous or

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very powerful in Greece, albeit active far in excess of its numbers and importance. To the Venizelists, however, a direct military understanding between the king and the French general, without the Cretan leader as intermediary, spelled disaster to their entire political organization, which could no more live without office in Greece than a similar political organization can live without office in the United States.

There occurred at this juncture, therefore, the first of a series of phenomena which continue to occur hereafter on every occasion when it appears at all likely that King Constantine may reach an agreement with the Entente through other means than through Venizelos: the Venizelists became active, shifting their previous ground to meet the altered circumstances.

Following a long conference with the French and British ministers, five days after the departure of General Sarraïl, Venizelos announced out of a clear sky and in complete contradiction of his former refusal to recognize the constitutionality of the Boulé elected on December 19, or of the elections by which it had been chosen, that he would himself stand for the Boulé in a by-election

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to be held on May 8. Metelin was chosen by the Cretan, though eastern Macedonia and Chios also held by-elections at the same time, because Mytilene (Lesbos) was then occupied as an Allied naval base, and the influence of the Allied authorities in the island could be counted upon to aid him in the election. Also, the voters of the island of Lesbos, like those of most of the territory fallen to Greek rule after the Turkish war, had none of the fixed political convictions of the Greeks of old Greece, and were consequently the readier to follow the star of political adventure. During his premiership Venizelos had bound the Lesbians, as well as the inhabitants of all the newly acquired territory, to his political fortunes by the creation of a vast number of well-paid offices in new Greece, the recipients of which became at once his ardent supporters and political organizers. Upon this practical foundation rested and still rests the power of Venizelos in Greece.

The effect of Venizelos's change of front was to consolidate instantly all elements opposed to the conservative government under Premier Skouloudis. A complete lack of political instinct

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and a certain furtiveness of policy in Stephan Skouloudis had succeeded in increasing the normal Venizelist strength throughout the country by an appreciable number of political malcontents. To these might be added the bulk of the refugees from Thrace and Asia Minor who had congregated in Greece to await the outcome of the war. Venizelos's program of a still greater Greece naturally appealed to them, since it meant the incorporation of their homes in the Greek state. There were several hundreds of thousands of these refugees throughout the country, mostly without resources. Many of these eagerly sought and obtained well paid employment in the Venizelist organization. Indeed, later, when Venizelos attempted to organize his followers into an army, it was largely upon this element, not upon the genuine Greek population, that he drew for the nondescript, undisciplined force he succeeded in gathering together. Their enlistment with the revolutionary "army" was like their allegiance to the Venizelist cause, a question of bread. Their sole alternative was to join Venizelos or starve. They joined Venizelos.

In addition to these refugees, a small but very

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well-to-do group of Egyptian Greeks filled the best hotels of Athens. By association and for business reasons thoroughly pro-English, they contributed heavily to the well-filled Venizelist coffers, in the hope of receiving honors or contracts at the hands of the Cretan when he should again become prime minister of Greece. Even the American minister made no secret of his Venizelist sympathies, not only while the Cretan remained in Athens, but after he had left the capital on a mission of undisguised sedition.¹

The popular strength resisting this heterogeneous opposition to the existing Government was composed of the Greeks of old Greece,—peasant proprietors, solid business men, skilled artisans, and the professional classes,—the kind of people who make up the conservative element in any country. The former had everything to gain and nothing to lose by war; the latter, everything to lose and nothing to gain. King Constantine's problem, to move the conservative element to accept and support war, was not only an essential one if the country was to be united in its coöperation with the Allies, but a very difficult one, requiring every assistance of under-

¹ See Appendix 3.

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standing and latitude from the Entente authorities themselves. His was not a sentimental, but an actual, problem. The Entente, true to their policy of sentimentality in the near East, not only failed to appreciate the magnitude of the task, but put every possible difficulty in King Constantine's way.

To prepare the ground for emerging from neutrality, the king called General Moscopoulos, in command of the Greek forces in Macedonia, from Saloniki to go over with him the kind of military coöperation desired of Greece by the Entente. In nominal fulfilment of the Entente's desire for a demobilization of the Greek Macedonian forces, a fourth of the men and officers were granted leave of absence to return to their homes, ostensibly for spring planting. They were still held, however, in the national service and subject to a moment's call. General Dousmanis, chief of the Greek staff, elaborated a plan of concentration of the Greek troops that would place the Greek army at the strategical point where it could be of most assistance to the Allies. This he altered from day to day with the shifting of the Allied or their enemies' forces.

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The British military attaché, Sir Thomas Cunningham, who had worked with General Dousmanis to this end, was recalled "for being too closely connected with the Greek staff"!

To prepare public opinion for ultimate Greek coöperation with the Entente, some of the king's closest advisers undertook to inspire the government press to play up every incursion of Bulgarian troops beyond the Greek frontiers, every raid of *comitadjis* into Greek territory, and every incident between the Greek and Bulgarian frontier guards.¹

When this work was well under way, General Sir Bryan Mahon, the British commanding officer in Saloniki, visited Athens; and in several talks with the king, his closest adviser, Prince Nicholas, and the English Princess Alice of Battenberg, an exceedingly clever woman, with a very clear view of the situation, he assisted King Constantine to persuade the less warlike of his supporters by furnishing him with further arguments in the shape of details of the Entente force, equipment,

¹ Thus on March 11 a great stir was made in the government organs over the arrest by the Bulgars of a Greek soldier who had inadvertently crossed the frontier; and three Greek regiments were rushed to Drama to be ready should this incident be fixed upon as the spark necessary to set the war-fire alight.

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and impregnable military position at Saloniki. At the same time General Mahon advised the Greek monarch that the question of an Allied offensive in Macedonia was up for discussion, and would probably be settled by the Allied war council then in session in Paris.

While King Constantine was thus employed in laying the ground for joining the Entente, every circumstance seemed to be working against that end. The Allies in Saloniki seized and occupied the Greek fort at Dova Tepe, northeast of Lake Doiran, one of the most important Greek frontier strongholds. Following the occupation of Fort Karabournou, this seizure created an unhappy impression in the military circle of Athens. The westward extension of the Allied lines across the Vardar River brought their positions into a country infested with malaria, and Sarraïl was forced to send shipload after shipload of his force to France for convalescence in another climate. To outward appearances also, albeit the French were holding at Verdun, the German attack was taxing their resources to the utmost. It was scarcely possible to dream of an Allied offensive, necessarily largely dependent upon the

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French, in Macedonia. King Constantine might be as ready as he pleased to join the Allies; there was no prospect of accomplishing more by such a course than to increase the expense of maintaining the Allied Orient armies on a war-footing to no immediate practical end. For such negligible service as that King Constantine was never prepared to risk throwing his country into war.

The two classes of those in Athens who were opposed to a military accord between the king and General Sarraïl, moreover, were as busily at work as the sovereign himself. On the part of the Entente diplomatists, the Anglo-French secret police, operating from the respective legations, continued to inspire arrests of Austrians, Germans, and Greeks, whom they charged with espionage. An insignificant incident at Candia, in Crete, gave the British naval authorities an excuse to seize Suda Bay, the best naval base in the eastern Mediterranean, to secure possession of which had been the underlying motive of years of international intrigue by which the island of Crete had been kept from joining the Greek parent state.¹ Shortly afterward the

¹ Former French minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Gabriel Han-

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Greek port of Argostoli, on the Ionian coast, was also seized as a base for the Allied naval operations. These encroachments upon Greece left no little irritation in the popular mind. But inside the government circles a more important matter was the financial difficulties in which the country now found itself from prolonged mobilization. Roughly, the mobilization of the Greek army was running the Government to some \$180,000 per diem. The Greek deficit for 1915 had been in the neighborhood of \$36,000,000. By the end of March, 1916, it had reached \$75,000,000. Greece was almost at the end of her financial string. The Entente ministers in Athens welcomed this new difficulty of the Skouloudis government as an additional lever to force otaux, nourished no illusions as to England's intentions toward "Crete with her greatly coveted port, Souda Bay."

"It is no mystery for any one that England harbored in respect of the near Eastern question, views not exactly in conformance with those of her partners."

"It were impossible to overlook a fact of such considerable importance as the journey of Messrs. Asquith and Winston Churchill and their meeting in the island of Malta with General Kitchener, and the announcement of the reinforcement of the British garrisons in Egypt, Malta, and Gibraltar. Those who are familiar with Mediterranean politics have a right to ask whether this has not something to do with 'protecting' Souda Bay. The fate of Crete will be decided as a consequence . . . The crux of the situation was in Crete."

"La Guerre des Balkans et l'Europe," pp. 24, 28, 193, 295.

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the return of Venizelos to power. To that end they tightened the purse-strings of their governments at home and confidently waited the issue. The only result of this attitude, however, was to force the resignation of Minister of Finance Dragoumis, an able man of the highest character and former premier of Greece.

Meanwhile Venizelos and his followers were still more active, since to them it was a matter of political life or death. No sooner had Venizelos announced his change of policy and his reëntury into the political arena than he established a personal organ in Athens, the weekly "Herald," and planned a series of political meetings intended to complete the Entente ministers' work of overthrowing the Skouloudis cabinet by attacking its motives and those of the king from press and platform.

On April 2 the first number of the "Herald" appeared. It contained a long and veiled editorial from the pen of Venizelos in which the patriotism of his sovereign was assailed. The secrecy with which the plan of making an open fight upon King Constantine was guarded is characteristic of the Cretan's methods. Though

he had promised me an advance copy of the editorial in question, I was told to follow him from the theater without joining him until, in a dark square, I was bidden mount into a closed carriage with him. We then drove together to the office where the "Herald" was being printed. Here, while Venizelos sat, screened from prying eyes, in one corner of the vehicle and I in another, a proof copy of the paper was thrust into the carriage by one of the Cretan's adherents. The carriage then sought a secluded spot, where Venizelos read the proofs by the light of a street lamp. Finally he gave them to me, subsequently dropping me in a deserted side street, far from either his house or my hotel. The whole performance had the air of a conspiracy, which, indeed, it was, or at least its beginning.

A short time previously I had had a long talk with Venizelos and he had gone over with me again his relations with King Constantine, stating categorically his thesis that "under the constitution the King of the Hellenes is merely the highest functionary of the state, paid like any other functionary to perform services of which the limits are plainly set by the Constitution."

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He charged the sovereign with violation of the Constitution, and when I quoted those articles which seemed to confer upon King Constantine the power he had exercised, Venizelos replied, "King Constantine's father was elected—hired, if you please—to be a sort of hereditary presiding officer of the Greek democracy, without other than social responsibilities."

Unfortunately, half a dozen articles of the Greek Constitution do not bear out this thesis.¹ Possibly it was for this practical reason that Venizelos's editorial in the "Herald" was a general review of what he termed "the shipwreck of our national aspirations," and that greater stress was laid on what Greece might have reaped by joining the Entente in the way of territorial aggrandizement than was placed upon the constitutionality of King Constantine's course. He attacked the royal attitude only in his summing up of the danger to Greece of a German victory and a greater Bulgaria. "Politicians who do not see this inevitable danger," he wrote, "are blind, and unhappy are the monarchs who follow such advisors; unhappier still the countries

¹ See appendix 2.

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whose sovereigns are victims of such counsel."

The significance of the publication of this attack on the king lay in the fact that it revealed an intent to render Constantine I, despite his undoubted popularity, personally responsible for the failure of Greece to secure vast territorial advantages by Constantine's refusal to exploit the Entente's need of military assistance in the near East. It demonstrated that an attack on the throne could be made with impunity and that fear of the Entente would prevent retaliatory measures being taken by the constitutional government against those evidently preparing revolution. It emboldened the followers of Venizelos to every form of charge against the motives and person of the sovereign of Greece. Had not this first, feeble step been taken with success, Venizelos's formation of a revolutionary government under the ægis of the Allies at Saloniki would have been impossible, and the uprising of December 1, 1916, could not have been conceived. Above all, it revealed to the timid among the followers of Venizelos that, with the bayonets of Sarraïl to support them, and the guns of the Allied fleet to cover them, they could plot in security what revolution they liked.

CHAPTER XIII

THE TRANSPORT OF THE SERBS

KING CONSTANTINE declined to take any public notice of Venizelos's attacks upon his policy. To me he simply said:

"Arguments cannot alter the attitude of Greece. It is based on facts; only new facts can change it. If the material situation in the Balkans so shifts that the interests of Greece appear in another light than that of to-day, no one, least of all I, has ever said that Greece will not adapt her attitude to the altered circumstances. Further talking and writing serve only to confuse the issue."

The change in the material situation in the Balkans to which King Constantine had reference was that upon which he had laid much stress from the beginning; namely, that the Entente at last decide to take their Balkan operations seriously and send sufficient force and war material to Macedonia to prosecute a successful

offensive campaign. But the Greek sovereign might say what he pleased about confusion to the issue by talking and writing; neither Venizelos nor his followers proposed for a moment to refrain. Emboldened by the success with which he had opened his first attack upon the throne in the "Herald," Venizelos at once began a series of public meetings also, with the purpose of arraigning the Skouloudis cabinet and at the same time covertly undermining Constantine I as head of the Greek army, the well-spring of that sovereign's vast popularity with the Greek people. To this end the Cretan adopted the contention that the Greek monarch's policy was nothing less than an assertion of the doctrine of the divine right of kings.

"Here in Greece," he said to me, "we are confronted with the question of whether we have a democracy presided over by a king, or whether at this hour in our history we must subscribe to the doctrine of the divine right of kings. The moment has come when the position of the highest functionary, which every King of the Hellenes ought to occupy, must be so strictly defined that it will be forever impossible to raise again the

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question of the divine right of kings in Greece.”

Whether any one save Venizelos himself had ever raised the question of the divine right of kings in Greece is seriously open to doubt. Certainly, seven years previously, during the Revolution of 1909, he had had in his own hands the opportunity to alter the fundamental law of Greece in any sense he liked. The people clamored for a constitutional assembly, and Venizelos literally shouted them down in the great meeting in Constitution Square. At that time King George was just the figurehead that the Cretan now desired to see upon the throne of Hellas; and Venizelos then, conserving in the crown every reactionary power laid down in the first Greek charter, had wielded in the name of the king an absolute authority. What had upset his political calculations of seven years before was the accession to the Hellenic throne of a man capable and willing to discharge in his own name and on his own responsibility the powers conferred upon the King of the Hellenes—powers that Venizelos had carefully kept in the Constitution with a view to administering them himself.

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It was precisely this exercise of his constitutional rights by King Constantine which had been the undoing of Venizelos's ambitions. The Cretan's reasoning was, therefore, that the powers vested in the crown were proper powers when in the hands of a weak sovereign, improper ones in the hands of a capable ruler. The lack of logic in this attitude did not trouble him.

"It has never been my habit," he wrote General Corakas some months later, "to base my calculations on purely logical and historical grounds, but rather upon the principle of psychological reactions, of general impressions, however vague they may be, and upon the law of force and of domination which is stronger than all laws written or unwritten."¹

Nevertheless, he did not advocate the establishment of a republic in Greece. "The habits of ages of slavery through which the Greek people have passed," he said, "are still too strong. The conscious exercise of the responsibilities and privileges of a republic cannot spring into being in a moment with any people." In a word, Venizelos quietly proposed a dictatorship for Greece, with himself as dictator.

¹ Appendix 6.

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To attain this end, he must first overthrow the Skouloudis government and return to power as prime minister of Greece. He accordingly attacked, in the "Herald" and in the public meetings which began at once, both the Government and the elections by which the Government had secured its majority in the Boulé—those elections of December 19, 1915, in which he had refused to allow any of his followers to take part. He called them a "burlesque of the free exercise of the right of suffrage," a "farcical formality," and a "sinister comedy." "The present Government of Greece," he declared to me, "is therefore in no wise representative." He referred to his partizans as "a majority of the Greek people," and on the whole, having refused to participate in the last elections, he now made a great clamor for new elections, which he felt confident he could carry.

All of this internal uproar interfered greatly with King Constantine's purpose of preparing the way for an ultimate military accord with General Sarraill. That of course was exactly the aim of the Venizelists, who redoubled their efforts to confuse the issue when General Sarraill decided

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to call what remained of the Serbian army from Corfu to Saloniki to take part in the general hostilities. At the time, there were in Saloniki, roughly, some 80,000 French and 120,000 British. A Serbian army of 75,000 would bring the total available force in Macedonia up to 275,000 men, albeit by no means as many bayonets. With 250,000 Greeks, however, King Constantine figured that the required half-million would be certain, and that a Balkan offensive with at least some chance of success could be undertaken.

Lest this result should be achieved and their hopes of return to power (and proximity to the treasury) be dashed, the followers of Venizelos were forced to find some way to embroil the situation in Greece before the transport of the Serbs to Macedonia could be effected.

The occasion required presented itself in the very problem of the means of transporting the Serbs from Corfu. Rested after the incredible fatigues of their retreat through Albania, refitted, the "third ban" (those too old or too worn to be of any fighting value) weeded out, the 75,000 remaining of an original Serbian army of 300,000 was at last in shape to begin a third effort

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to rid their native soil of the invader. Meanwhile, however, owing to the activity of the German submarines in the Mediterranean, water transport was becoming exceedingly perilous. The Allied fleet seemed unable to cope with the problem with any definite result, and the loss of vessels every few days presaged ill for the Serbian army, should it be necessary to transport it by sea.

All of this the Serbs brought to the attention of their greater Allies. They pointed out that their reduced numbers were a result of the failure of France and England, in fulfilment of a definite promise, to send the necessary 150,000 men to their rescue in November, 1915. They recalled the fact that they had twice since the beginning of the European War been offered favorable terms for a separate peace by Austria-Hungary, and that twice their greater Allies had prevented acceptance by making promises that had not been fulfilled. They declared that they were willing to fight to the last man, but that they could see no reason why they should drown as the Montenegrins had drowned, because the power that claimed to rule the wave seemed unable to

rule the deep. In the representations of the Serbs were combined a resentment for the Entente policy of friendship towards Bulgaria, anger over the needless sacrifice that had been made of them by the Entente's dilatory tactics in the near East, and some rancor still remaining from the way they had been deprived of an outlet on the sea by the greater powers during the negotiations following the wars of 1912 and 1913.

There was so much justice in the observations of the Serbs that the Entente Governments were disposed to do what they could to content their unhappy allies. A glance at the map revealed a railroad across Greece from Patras to the Piræus and from the Piræus by way of Athens to Saloniki, with only a brief gap near Ekaterina still under construction. It is doubtful if the Allied military authorities considered for a moment what it would mean to the Greeks to have their railway system tied up for two months or more for military purposes. The Greeks had already accepted so many demands, had borne with forbearance so much that was contrary to international law as well as to the Greek Constitution, that the Allied diplomatists in Greece

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scarcely expected any opposition to one more infraction of Article XCIX of the Greek charter. Nor, indeed, in all probability, would there have been any except for the stir the Venizelists made over the matter, and the manner in which the question was broached by the Entente to the Greek Government.

On April 12, the Entente ministers in Athens announced their intention to transport the Serbian army across Greece, exactly as on August 3, 1915, they had announced their intention to give eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria, or as they had announced their intention on December 27, 1915, to employ Corfu as a refitment camp for the broken Serbian armies. Only a complete ignorance or a supreme indifference to the psychology of the Greeks could have dictated a further continuation of this method of diplomatic procedure. Easily persuaded, the Greeks are with difficulty driven. It was so in this instance.

There were, however, other elements in the situation. The Allied occupation of Suda Bay and Argostoli as naval bases left a considerable uneasiness in the minds of the Greeks as to the extent to which the Allies' pretensions to the use

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of Greek territory outside Macedonia might go. So deep was this feeling that Sir Francis Elliot was forced to make a public statement to the effect that the Entente "were asking of Greece no more than military necessity required." The Greeks could not see, besides, why the fact that the greater powers had treated the Serbs shabbily should cause hardship to be visited upon Hellas, or why Greece should suffer to make up for the deficiencies in the Allied operations against German submarines.

But the deciding cause of the Skouloudis government's refusal to countenance the transport of the Serbs across Greece was the fear that the presence in and about Athens of so large a force of Serbs would be seized by the Venizelists as the moment to effect a *coup d'état*, overturning the constitutional government, perhaps even dethroning King Constantine. Already there were in Athens a large number of Serbian refugees who had exhibited a lively interest in Venizelos's campaign for the entry of Greece into the war in fulfilment of the Greco-Serbian alliance, as Venizelos interpreted that document. Having lost everything, they were in a mood to undertake

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anything. Their presence in the Greek capital had long been a source of ill ease to the Government.

It was generally known in Athens, also, that the Venizelists at this time were arming themselves and storing in their homes ammunition obtained largely from France. No concealment was made of the fact. The Entente's announcement of their intention to transport the Serbian army across Greece became known at a moment when the Venizelist attack upon the Skouloudis government was at its height and abuse of King Constantine was bitterest. So much partizan feeling had already been engendered that imagination, run riot as is so often the case in the near East, predicted the most fantastic events for the hour when the Serbs should reach Athens.

Moreover, the Greek staff declared that, with the roadbeds of the Greek railways in their ill-kept state and a lack of rolling stock due to General Sarraïl's seizure of all the rolling stock waiting in Saloniki the completion of the Athens-Saloniki railway, it would require nearer three than two months to move the Serbian army across the country. During this time not only would

virtually all regular traffic in Greece be suspended, but the Greek army, a large part of which was still mobilized and scattered over the entire country, would be left without communications with its various bases of supplies. On paper the question of the transport of the Serbs appeared easy enough to those discussing it in London and Paris; in practice, it was almost impossible, fraught as it was with complications in the internal life of Greece.

At this crisis, the Boulé, which alone could pass the law required by the Constitution to permit a foreign army to traverse Greek soil, adjourned. On April 25, Sir Francis Elliot and M. Guillemin waited upon King Constantine, and a stormy interview resulted. The Greek monarch's position was simplicity itself. He sincerely believed that the very sovereignty of Greece was at stake in this matter. He had reason to know that the Venizelists were planning a *coup d'état* with the assistance of the Serbs, and while he had no doubt on the score of how such an attempt would end, he felt that he not only had no right to risk an abortive revolution with perhaps fighting in the streets of Athens itself, but that it was his duty

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as head of the state and commander-in-chief of the Hellenic armies to avoid, by every means in his power, such a threatening prospect for the peace of his country. This view he exposed to the two diplomatists, refusing at the same time, categorically, to consent to the transport of the Serbs.

The British and French ministers were equally stubborn, declaring that the Entente would transport the Serbian army across the country with or without the consent of King Constantine and his ministers. The conference ended with no conclusion reached. That same night, as if in support of the king's contention, an attempt was made to blow up the Bulgarian legation in Athens by two bombs which, upon examination, were found to be regular Serbian army bombs, made in England.

While the discussion of the land transport of the Serbs continued, the water transport was under way. Venizelos and his followers took up the Serbian side and further embittered feeling in Greece by attacking King Constantine on this new count, despite the fact that this time the Greek sovereign stood unquestionably on the side

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of the Constitution. There was one element of possible conciliation: Rear Admiral Hubert S. Cardale, the acting head of the British naval mission in Greece, who had fought with the Serbs during the second Austrian invasion and stood exceedingly well with them,¹ and who, during some five years of residence in Greece, had been able to remain on excellent terms with both King Constantine and Venizelos. It is possible that he might have arranged a matter now embroiled far out of proportion to its real significance. Just as a short time before the British military attaché in Athens had been recalled for being on cordial terms of coöperation with the Greek staff, so now Admiral Cardale was also recalled. The British policy in Greece seemed dictated not by the circumstances but merely by extreme reaction from the British policy pursued in Bulgaria. Any one in the least able to appreciate the point of view of the Greek Government was considered suspicious and at once got rid of.

In all of these negotiations the Greek view of the situation was ignored as of no consequence.

¹ He was decorated for distinguished bravery with the Order of Crni Gjorgje, a Serbian order corresponding to the Victoria Cross.

THE TRANSPORT OF THE SERBS

That Greece was at peace and straining every nerve to remain at peace was never even considered. That King Constantine was seeking to keep his country united against a violent attempt from within the state to disrupt it—an attempt countenanced and supported by the Entente—was regarded as mere stubbornness on the part of the Greek sovereign. The only thing that counted was that the plans of the Entente should not be interfered with by Greece's neutrality or any effort of the Greeks toward national self-preservation. It is this that gives the matter of the transport of the Serbs its significance. The Serbian army arrived in Saloniki by water safely enough. But the fact that the Greek Government had dared to refuse a demand of the Entente was regarded as setting a dangerous precedent. The policy of Great Britain and France,—for in all of this neither Russia nor Italy shared,—it was felt, must be altered at once so that in future no opposition to the Entente's wishes could develop. To do this, Venizelos must be returned to power once more, whatever the Greek people might desire and whatever means might be necessary to employ to accom-

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plish that end. And Venizelos's continuance in power must be secured by such measures of Allied control in Greece as to eliminate the expression of any adverse sentiment.

In a word, as King Constantine had foreseen, the sovereignty of the Greek people was indeed at stake.

CHAPTER XIV

FORT RUPEL

THE by-elections in Chios, Lesbos, and eastern Macedonia early in May resulted, as had been expected, in a complete victory for the Venizelists: Elephtherios Venizelos himself was elected, without opposition, in Lesbos. Even in eastern Macedonia, part of which Venizelos, when prime minister, had tried to turn over to Bulgaria, Constantine Jordanou, a Venizelist, carried the country by a small majority. Throughout newer Greece, come under Greek rule only since the Turkish war of 1912, Venizelos's policy of further increasing the size of Greece by accretions in Asia Minor and Thrace appealed to the people. Many of them had relatives, property, or interests in Asia Minor and Thrace. They wished to see their friends and families freed of Turkish rule; what might happen to Greece as a result of so large an increase in alien population—an annexation of territory extensively inhabited by

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Mussulmans as well as by Greeks—was a matter of indifference. A Cretan himself, but a short time in touch with any of the life or ideals of Old Greece, Venizelos understood only this point of view; he never appreciated that of the Greeks proper. It was, therefore, among the newer Greeks that he counted and still counts his supporters.

But while eager enough to see Greece vastly increased in size through a general Allied victory, the inhabitants of the islands and eastern Macedonia shared the reluctance of the inhabitants of Old Greece to accomplish this result by their own unaided efforts. When, therefore, immediately following elections in which the majority of the voters had supported Venizelos's policy of a still greater Greece, the Bulgarians began preparations to invade eastern Macedonia, the inhabitants of eastern Macedonia were less pleased with the prospect.

Meanwhile, the least conspicuous and most effective of the Entente pressures put upon the Skouloudis government, to force its resignation, was having a marked effect. The financial situation of the country was exceedingly precarious,

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and the refusal by France and England to let the Skouloudis cabinet obtain any monies abroad put the Government in a desperate case. For this reason during the by-elections, while the Venizelists disposed of unlimited funds, lavishly spent, the conservatives were unable to meet the ordinary campaign expenses, which are, in Greece, proportionately greater even than in the United States. The payments due the army had been in arrears for some time, and the sums which the families of mobilized men should have received had never been paid since the mobilization had begun. Cut off from the possibility of securing money from abroad, Finance Minister Rhallys, therefore, executed an arrangement with the National Bank of Greece for a loan of one hundred fifteen million drachmæ (some \$23,000,000) calculated to produce a hundred million drachmæ for the Government's use. Thirty million of this amount was to be obtained by an additional issue of paper currency which the specie reserve of Greece fully justified, but which the indebtedness of Greece rendered, possibly, a risky financial operation. The Greek Government, however, had no choice.

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The proposed convention with the National Bank upset the financial interests in France and England at once. Both countries had financed Greece for years and both realized fully the advantages which their financial hold on the country gave them in development of their trade with Greece as well as, in times like the present, when financial pressure could be brought to bend the Greek Government to meet the political wishes of the two larger powers. The Entente members of the International Financial Commission, therefore, fought the conclusion of the projected arrangement with the National Bank with every means. Nevertheless, the convention was signed. The prospect of its ratification, and the consequent escape for Greece from their financial grip, hastened the decision of France and England to employ drastic measures in dealing with Greece.

The water transport of the Serbs was well on the way to completion. The Entente diplomats had lost their fight to force the Skouloudis cabinet to permit a transport by land. Politically, this was a check to the Allies in Greece; financially, the convention between the Skouloudis government and the National Bank was

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another check. Militarily, the failure of the Serbian adventure and almost eight months' inactivity of General Sarrail's army in Macedonia were also prejudicial to Entente prestige in the near East. Every consideration pointed to some sweeping change of policy on the part of the Entente to regain the lost ground.

Two courses were possible: to cease supporting Venizelos and the politicians and reach an agreement with King Constantine and the Greek general staff for the military coöperation of Greece with the Allies; or to seek by force to turn out the Skouloudis government, demand new elections and provide Venizelos with every support to enable him to win them. The results in Chios, Lesbos, and eastern Macedonia convinced the Entente diplomatists that Venizelos would sweep the country. They therefore chose the latter course.

From the moment General Sarrail assumed supreme command of the Allied Orient armies and the Greeks completed their evacuation of Saloniki, General Moscopoulos, the Greek commander in Macedonia, had urged the French to extend their lines to the east of the Struma River

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and to take effective control of the Greek points of strategic importance in that sector.¹ He explained repeatedly that the Greeks, cut off from their base of supplies at Saloniki, partially demobilized at the insistence of the Allies, and dependent upon an open roadstead as a port, were in no position to resist successfully a strong attack from the north. Instead of extending his line, however, General Sarrail had further emphasized the isolation of the Greeks by destroying the Demir Hissar bridge, two and a half miles south of the Greek Fort Rupel, on the east bank of the Struma. Thus Fort Rupel was as effectually cut off as if it had been located in Bulgarian territory. All the military embarrassments under which his troops labored, and which King Constantine had exposed to Lord Kitchener, were ignored. The statement of the French and British ministers that "the withdrawal of the Greek troops from Macedonia would leave the

¹ One thing is astounding: several months ago both French and Greek officers pointed out to General Sarrail the importance of Fort Rupel and his advantage in taking possession of it. It is rather difficult to understand why this advice was not followed, the army at Saloniki being plenty large enough to permit this slight extension of the Allied front and numerous other points having already been previously occupied.—"Gazette de Lausanne," No. 218, 1916.

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Allied powers indifferent" seemed to be the keynote of the Entente policy toward the Greek forces in eastern Macedonia. At bottom the intention was undoubtedly so to weaken the position of the Greeks in this sector that any effort to resist a Bulgarian advance single-handed would be fruitless and the Greeks, to defend their own territory from invasion, would be forced to join the Allies.

Whether or not this was a deliberate, thought-out policy on the part of the Entente, counting for its success on the Greek fear of the Bulgars and hostility to them, is not material. Certainly Mr. Venizelos, in discussing an apocryphal declaration alleged to have been made by the Greek monarch to the correspondent of the "Berliner Tageblatt," of his conviction that "the Bulgarians will evacuate the Greek territory when they shall have driven their enemies out of Greece," showed that he believed his king could not stand against the anti-Bulgarian sentiment in Greece, and that a Bulgarian invasion would force the Greek monarch to join the Allies whether militarily prudent or not. No one seems, however, to have counted the possible cost to the Allied arms of

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this attempt to thrust the King of the Hellenes into a corner, whence his only escape would be in the Entente camp, should it fail. Yet the entire policy of trying to force Greece into war through the weakness instead of by the strength of her military position ran counter to all that Constantine had frankly said to Lord Kitchener and General Sarraïl.

Every logic pointed to a retirement of the Greeks before a Bulgarian advance. Two months previously Venizelos had declared to me, "I know that the orders have gone forth that if hostile armies enter the land we so recently conquered, the Greek forces must withdraw and permit the scene of our most glorious victories to become the battle-ground of strangers." Precisely that took place on May 26. The Bulgarians appeared before Fort Rupel and demanded its evacuation by the Greek troops, offering a written guarantee that the fort with all its contents would be restored after the war, that private property would be protected, and that the territory temporarily occupied would be evacuated later. Prime Minister Skouloudis accepted the offer, entering a formal protest against an act

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of hostility, which his government communicated to the Entente ministers. Fort Rupel was promptly abandoned by the Greek troops, who first rendered its guns useless; the Bulgarians occupied the stronghold, precisely as the Allies had occupied Fort Karabournou and Fort Dova Tepe. In speaking of the Government's action, Premier Skouloudis characterized it as the only practical course open to Greece.

Resistance, after the condition of helplessness to which our armies in eastern Macedonia have been reduced by the disposition the Entente have demanded of them, would have been ridiculous. The best we could do was to secure certain written guarantees, which were given us only on condition that we would not attempt resistance. Had we resisted, we should have been forced into war and I fail to see what we should have gained by it.

The Venizelists seized the opportunity to organize anti-Bulgarian meetings and to try to inflame public feeling to war pitch. The French minister in Athens consulted his government and General Sarraïl, and six days later made it plain to Prime Minister Skouloudis that the surrender of Fort Rupel would be taken by the French and British governments as the ostensible reason for the adoption of a still more drastic policy in deal-

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ing with Greece. M. Guillemin informed the Greek premier that the Entente considered the surrender of Fort Rupel a violation of Greece's promised "benevolent neutrality." He stated that General Sarraïl would take whatever measures the military situation created by this act of the Greeks required, without previous warning. On June 3, General Sarraïl declared martial law in all parts of Greece occupied by the Entente. On June 6, Sir Francis Elliot told the Greek Government that "if the German and Bulgarian advance into Greek territory continued unresisted, the consequences to the Greek Government would be most serious." The advance, however, seemed to halt at Fort Rupel and the bridgehead of Demir Hissar, as Sir Francis himself admitted. Nevertheless, on June 6, an undeclared blockade of the Greek ports began with great rigor, and every effort of the Greek Government to obtain from the Entente an explanation of the blockade or a statement of the terms upon which it would be raised proved unavailing.

The Venizelists were more communicative. They asserted, evidently with the knowledge of

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the Entente, that the blockade was to force the resignation of the Skouloudis cabinet, the dissolution of the Boulé and new elections, which the Venizelists counted upon carrying. Their pro-war propaganda at this moment was at its height. In reply to it, King Constantine, admitting the impossibility of defending eastern Macedonia with the force he was permitted to retain and under the military conditions prevailing in that section, ordered on June 8, the demobilization of 150,000 men. At the same time the French fleet occupied the island of Thassos, off Cavalla; but no Entente force was sent across the Struma to prevent any further Bulgarian advance southward, and no effort was made to replace the retiring Greeks in eastern Macedonia by Allied troops.

On June 12, six days after the beginning of the blockade, the Government decided to order a complete demobilization. The Venizelist pro-war propaganda, violent as all newspaper polemics in Greece are, inspired an equal anti-Venizelist propaganda on the part of the government organs. Charges and countercharges resulted finally in an attempt to assassinate King Con-

stantine by a mad Venizelist who cried that the applause of which the Greek sovereign had just been the recipient at a function in the Stadium was "paid for by Baron von Schenck." The attempt was followed by a counter-demonstration against the Venizelists in which a number of Venizelist newspaper offices were stoned. To the blockade the Entente added a further turn of the financial screw by ruling Greek loans off the London and Paris stock exchanges. The position of the Skouloudis government was plainly untenable. The king sent to Ægina, where Mr. Zaïmis was spending the summer, and requested the former premier to consult with him concerning the formation of a new cabinet.

At this moment a curious circumstance reveals the position occupied by the entire Entente policy in the near East. Neither the Greek sovereign nor his government had been able up to that moment to ascertain in what form the Entente would make the demands conditional upon lifting the blockade. But Mr. Venizelos and his followers were in no such ignorance. No sooner had the king sent a destroyer to fetch Mr. Zaïmis than Mr. E. Repoulis, one of Venizelos's right-hand

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men, wrote the Cretan a hasty note acquainting him with the fact, and urging the delivery of the Entente note at once, before the Skouloudis cabinet could resign and Mr. Zaïmis, whose friendship for the Entente was well known, could be installed as premier. Mr. Repoulis wrote quite as if not the Entente, but Mr. Venizelos himself, were the author of the Entente ultimatum and were directing the diplomatic action of the Allies. His thought was plainly not to see certain guarantees obtained for the Entente, but to draw out of the embarrassing position of the Skouloudis government the maximum advantage for Venizelos and his partizans. As far as Repoulis and Venizelos were concerned, the Entente did not figure in the situation, save as a mere instrument to the forwarding of the political fortunes of Venizelos and his followers. Thanks to the prompt action of Venizelos, on Mr. Repoulis's representations, the Entente ultimatum was presented the following day, June 21, before King Constantine could constitute a cabinet whose character would render the presentation of any ultimatum superfluous.

CHAPTER XV

THE FIRST ULTIMATUM

THE presentation of the Entente ultimatum of June 21 was so hurried by the fears of the Venizelists that a cabinet acceptable to the Entente would be formed before the document could be delivered, that Vice Admiral Moreau's fleet, which was to make a demonstration off the Piræus simultaneously with the presentation of the ultimatum, had not yet arrived when the note was left at the ministry for foreign affairs. The Skouloudis cabinet, however, had resigned that morning, and Alexander Zaïmis was not yet able to form a new ministry. The note was therefore returned to the ministers who had left it. These circumstances of haste in the action served to convince the doubting how much the demands themselves were a matter of internal politics of Greece rather than of that consistent foreign policy of high ideals dictating the course of

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the Entente powers elsewhere in their world struggle.

The demands proper were preceded by a sort of preamble stating that "the three guaranteeing Powers do not require Greece to leave her neutrality. They have, however, certain complaints against the Greek Government, whose attitude is not one of loyal neutrality." To this followed an indictment of the Skouloudis cabinet for every action in which it failed to show positive and practical favor toward the Entente, however much the action complained of may have been a direct result of the previous course adopted by the Allies themselves. Of this preamble, King Constantine said, "It is useless to discuss the demands themselves, when the reasons given for them in the document are devoid of truth from beginning to end." The actual demands constituted, in the opinion of Deputy Agamemnon Schlieman, former Greek minister to Washington, "an abdication of the sovereignty of our own country."

They were:

1. Real and complete demobilization of the Greek army which must, with the least possible delay, be put upon a peace footing.

2. The immediate replacing of the present Greek

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cabinet by a business cabinet having no political color and offering all necessary guarantees for the application of benevolent neutrality toward the Allied Powers and sincere consultation of the national wishes.

3. The immediate dissolution of the Boulé followed by new elections after the period required by the Constitution and after a general demobilization has restored the electoral body to normal conditions.

4. The replacement of certain police functionaries whose attitude, inspired by foreign influence, has facilitated attempts against peaceful citizens as well as insults against the Allied Legations and those under their jurisdiction.

Nothing would be gained by seeking to deny that the four demands constituted a very grave interference in the internal affairs of Greece in behalf of Venizelos and his party. The Greek Constitution was to be applicable only where convenient: the cabinet, which constitutionally must be responsible to the people and whose term had not expired, was to be dismissed; elections were to be held within the constitutional period, only if the demobilization had "restored the electoral body to normal conditions"—in fine, only if it were evident that Venizelos could carry the country; otherwise, the Constitution was to be suspended and elections were not to be held. The success of the Venizelists in the elections might depend upon having a Venizelist chief of

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police in office, therefore this also was required.

The latter point recalls Sir Edward Grey's protest to Count Mensdorff against the Austrian demands upon the Serbian Government on July 23, 1914, which were the moving cause of the European War. Sir Edward Grey said:

I have never seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officers who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia.¹

Quite as effectively as Austria with regard to Serbia, the Entente proposed to require the appointment of a chief of police, Colonel Zymbrakakis, devoted to the interests of Venizelos; and the fourth clause of the ultimatum of June 21 subsequently proved but a forerunner to a demand of complete police control made in due form and put into execution less than four months later. All that Great Britain complained of in Austria's attitude toward Serbia two years previously, Great Britain was now im-

¹ Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24, 1914. British Blue Book No. 5.

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posing upon Greece, with a fleet off the Piræus to back her—all, and more besides.

The ground upon which it is claimed that the Entente has a right to intervene in the internal affairs of Greece is principally the Treaty of London of 1864 between France, Great Britain, and Russia on one hand and Greece on the other. The treaty is the one by which the Ionian Islands were united with Greece. Its first article reads in part:

Greece, within the limits determined by the arrangement concluded between the three courts and the Ottoman Porte, shall form a monarchical State, independent and constitutional, under the sovereignty of His Majesty King George and under the guarantee of the Powers.

The independence of Greece is plainly recognized; it is difficult to see how a guarantee of independence can well abolish it. As for the "constitutionality" of Greece, it was after all the Greeks themselves who "making use of their sovereignty,"¹ proclaimed in a decree of the National Hellenic Assembly on March 30, 1863, Prince William of Denmark "Constitutional King of the Hellenes."² The three powers,

¹ Yellow Book 1862, p. 90.

² Yellow Book, 1863, p. 100.

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called guarantors, merely recognized in the phrasing of their treaty this exercise of the sovereignty residing in the Greek people. Finally, the Greek Constitution itself states the matter quite clearly:

“Article XXI. All authorities emanate from the nation and are exercised in the manner laid down in the Constitution.”

They are not, evidently, exercised in the manner laid down by the Entente ultimatum of June 21, 1916. As for the Constitution of 1832, which is also invoked to prove the right of the three protecting powers to intervene in the internal affairs of Greece in behalf of constitutional government,—though that instrument was duly superseded in turn by the Constitutions of 1844 and 1864, and the latter further revised in 1911 without consulting the protecting powers,—there is a certain unconscious irony in any reference to it as a charter of democracy for the Hellenic people. It was imposed upon the newly freed Greeks by Great Britain, France, and Russia. The Greeks wanted an instrument far more liberal. As Professor Hayes puts it,¹ “the Great Powers, how-

¹ Prof. Carlton J. H. Hayes: “Political and Social History of Modern Europe,” Vol. II, p. 499.

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ever, could hardly sanction republicanism and nationalism in the case of the Greeks, while at the same time liberalism and nationalism were under the ban in Europe."

One further point in respect to this ultimatum was raised by Deputy Agamemnon Schlieman, in a statement which he gave me at this time.

How can the foreign naval and military occupation of over half of Greece and martial law under foreign control throughout Macedonia be taken as constituting the normal conditions of the electoral body under which there can be the "sincere consultation of the national wishes" which the ultimatum itself demands? It is as absurd to say that fair elections can be held in Greece under these circumstances as to claim that elections held in Luxemburg under the heel of Prussian soldiery could represent the real will of the people of that country.

Generally speaking, opinion in Athens was less opposed to the demands contained in the ultimatum than to the use to which the Entente, and particularly the Venizelists, proposed to put them. There was still sufficient friendly feeling toward the Entente, even in those who objected most bitterly to the demands of the ultimatum, to concede to the three self-styled "powers guarantors" whatever they desired short of Greece's participation in the war or, the equivalent, the

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imposition of Venizelos as dictator of Greece.

What aroused the indignation of the Greeks was the conviction that the Entente were not impartially supporting constitutional government in Greece—constitutional government had never been endangered; but that the Entente had a definite stake in the game; that the Allies were definitely interested in behalf of their man Venizelos¹ in insisting upon elections at this time, and that the interest of the Entente powers in the internal administration of Greece did not accord with the will of the majority of the country, unquestionably opposed to Greece's entry into hostilities.² The repeated declarations of the Entente diplomatists that the Allies were not seeking to force Greece to leave neutrality were held in Greece to be sheer hypocrisy, for home consumption, in the face of the Entente's open support of Venizelos, whose declared program was to join the Greek to the Allied armies.

¹ M. Philippe Secretan, correspondent of the Francophile "Gazette de Lausanne": "As a matter of fact, the great Cretan [Venizelos] was no stranger to the execution of the Allied man-œuvre, whose success it is not impossible may have in large measure been due to him." Quoted in "The Entente and Greece," Maj. Michael Passaris; p. 75.

² See Arnaldo Fraccoroli's statement, Appendix 5.

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Mr. Zaïmis took the helm of the Government and formed a cabinet in which he placed three pronounced Ententists. Colonel Zymbrakakis was named chief of police as the Entente desired. A general demobilization decree was signed, the demobilization to be completed by the end of July. The Allied ministers indicated 144 members of the police force of Athens whose dismissal they required in order that the Anglo-French secret police in Greece, already a formidable organization, might be in effective control of the policing of the country. On July 3, following this earnest of the execution of the Allied demands, the blockade which had endured almost a month, was formally raised, albeit the Allied naval control of foodstuffs reaching Greece from abroad still kept the people on very short rations. American wheat ships bound for Greece were held indefinitely at Gibraltar and Malta on one excuse or another. Cable orders of food supplies from the United States were delayed, garbled or held by the British censors. Venizelist ship-owners or importers were favored; the opponents of the Cretan were handicapped in every activity of foreign trade.



SARRAIL'S CRETAN POLICE
"To terrorize the Mussulmans"

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Six months previously Venizelos had proclaimed any new elections unconstitutional, standing stubbornly on those of June 13, 1915, as the only legal expression of the will of the people. Two months later he changed this attitude and himself stood for office and was elected to a Boulé, which he still pronounced illegal. Following the Entente ultimatum, however, he took the stand that new elections were entirely constitutional, even when imposed by an armed demand of foreign powers, and that still further elections must be held. In this complicated reasoning, the Entente ministers in Athens followed the Cretan blindly. But one step further was necessary to demonstrate the control Venizelos exercised over the policy of the Entente in the near East. When, the last of August, after forty days of hard campaigning, the Cretan became convinced that the people of Greece were opposed to his war program, he again shifted ground and demanded that the Entente waive their requirement of an immediate election, embodied at his instance in the ultimatum of June 21. They did so.

From the moment of Premier Zaïmis's prompt

execution of the demands of the Entente ultimatum, all the attention of the Venizelists as well as of the Entente was directed to the success of Venizelos in the approaching elections. In this the French military authorities in Macedonia gave Venizelos every assistance, taking active part in the campaign under the Cretan's direction. I have already quoted parts of several letters from Venizelos's supporters and workers to their chief, from which the active foreign influence in the elections is evident. These Venizelist agents were furnished with special military passes by the French authorities; they conducted their business in French army automobiles. The Cretan police, of whom some two hundred were in the service of the Allies, were to be employed, in Mr. Eliakis's phrase, "to terrorize the Mussulmans." Eliakis writes his chief from Cozani that he had traveled with two groups of these bravos bound for Florina and Vodena. "The chief of the French secret service at Vodena accompanied them," he informs Venizelos. "He told me that he had been transferred with a view to terrorizing the Mussulmans of Kharatzova." Pamicos Zymbrakakis reports to his chief in the same sense.

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“Undoubtedly we have need of work,” he says, “fanatic work, perhaps even terrifying work, to coral the Mussulmans and the Jews.” Eliakis’s letters to Venizelos reveal him plotting wholesale arrests in coöperation with the French consul and assisted by “Cretans of the French police, with native guides. Thus the arrests can be easily effected by night,” he adds.

Completely protected by the changes in the police of Athens demanded by the Entente’s ultimatum, the Anglo-French secret police increased its numbers of unsavory operatives. There was a striking contrast between the Italian and the Anglo-French secret police organizations in Greece. The former were inconspicuous and efficient, while the court and police records of Athens revealed the latter to include ex-convicts, professional gamblers, white-slavers, and individuals of a class even lower than that usually drawn upon for work of this character. In addition there were women of loose morals, imported from France or Italy, who could be seen nightly in the company of the responsible directors of the Anglo-French secret police in the best restaurants

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and theaters of Athens, to the disgust not only of the Greeks, but of the respectable British and French residents of Greece. At its height this work cost the British taxpayer, alone, between four and five thousand pounds a month, according to one of the Allied diplomatists in Athens, in a position to know the extent and character of the operations of this sinister organization. While much of the money went into jewels and finery for French prostitutes and the expenses of joy-riding automobiles, the work of the organization itself was conducted in close co-operation with the Venizelists, and the whole authority of its unrestrained power was at the disposition of Venizelos for his electoral campaign.

Yet it availed very little. Neither General Sarraill's Cretan policemen nor the lavish employees of the Anglo-French secret police served to move the Greek voter, except to a certain extent in opposition to, rather than in compliance with, the effort made to influence him in favor of war. The Greeks are intensely individual, passionately independent. External pressure only succeeded in driving them closer in their

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allegiance to their democratic king, further away from the politician who was seeking to force them by a dictator's means. The process of decision was by no means immediate. It was some three months before even Venizelos realized that his chosen political method of employing foreign force and foreign money would no more succeed in making the Greeks favor war than Baron von Schenck's employment of German money had succeeded in making them favor Germany. At bottom, the Greeks were still devoted to France, despite every pressure and annoyance put upon them by the French. But at bottom, also, they were still devoted to peace.

Venizelos's weakness lay in the fact that he tried to impose his own enthusiasm for war upon the Greek people and to imbue them with his own limitless ambition for territorial aggrandizement. When he failed he placed the blame upon the German propagandists, upon the general staff, upon King Constantine, even upon the Entente for not supporting him sufficiently. He called the Greek sovereign "blinded by prejudice." But the strength of Constantine I with the Hellenic people lay in his own essential democracy.

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It lay in the fact that while Venizelos was trying by every means to force public opinion, King Constantine was merely interpreting it, as it had crystallized in the minds of the people themselves. The people of Greece loved and trusted their sovereign because he stood for what they stood for. They mistrusted Venizelos because he did not.

And while Venizelos, in the two months following the presentation of the Entente ultimatum of June 21, was trying to undermine the king and take power into his own hands in Greece, King Constantine was once more quietly at work on the business of clearing up all the misunderstandings, the false springs of action, and the stubborn pursuit of an unsuccessful policy that had upset every calculation of the Allies in the near East, with a view to a frank military coöperation of Greece with the Entente on a basis of mutual self-respect and independence.

To this end, on July 3, as soon as the details of the execution of the terms of the Entente ultimatum had been arranged, he sent his brothers, Princes Nicholas and Andrew, to Petrograd and London, respectively, on special mission. His brother, Prince George, was already in Paris,

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prepared to work to the same end. It would have been difficult to have found three men in Greece better equipped for the tasks they had in hand. By ties of marriage, friendship, and long association, each of the princes was bound to the country in which he was to try, in conjunction with King Constantine, to clear up the whole near Eastern situation to the advantage of the Entente and of Greece.

CHAPTER XVI

THE BULGARIAN INVASION

ON August 17, in compliance with the Allied ultimatum of June 21, the Greek staff withdrew its troops from eighteen Greek villages between the Florina-Vodena line and the Serbian frontier, to make way for the Serbian forces lately arrived in Saloniki. Though General Sarrail had been in Saloniki eleven months, neither his force nor his equipment was yet in shape for offensive action. He lacked men, mountain transport, and mountain artillery. Of the force with which he had planned to begin an attack six months previously a startling percentage had been invalided home with malaria. The French in France, occupied still with the defense of Verdun, could spare no more men. The increase of activity of the German submarines in the Mediterranean had so limited the vessels available for transport to Macedonia that it was all the Allies could do to keep their Macedonian armies provided with food

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and other supplies, much less ship new troops and pack mules for mountain transport.

The Greeks themselves were on short rations and could let the Allies have little in the way of foodstuffs. The Entente with singular short-sightedness had decreed, on August 8, that the wheat and flour imported into Greece monthly should be limited to 36,000 tons, the corn to 3000, sugar to 2000, coal to 25,000, rice to 17,000 tons. No coffee was permitted at all. This was not enough to feed the Greeks, far less to allow the Greeks to sell their surplus to the Allied Orient armies. There was, therefore, no possibility of an offensive by General Sarraïl for the moment. But these conditions, created by the Allies themselves always in their pursuit of a political rather than a military policy in the near East, in no sense prevented the Bulgarians and Germans not so much from attacking Saloniki, carefully and heavily fortified for defense, but from cutting it off on both sides and rendering General Sarraïl's position uncomfortable, when not actually dangerous.

The contempt which the Allied military authorities displayed at this juncture for the Greek

staff was their undoing. Instead of amicably arranging the time and terms of the Greek demobilization, they demanded it in a period requiring the most rapid possible action by the Greek staff. When, therefore, the Greeks evacuated the eighteen villages in the Florina-Vodena sector, the Serbs were not ready to occupy them, and the Bulgarians quietly advanced their lines in a wide arc to the west of Saloniki, cutting Sarraïl off from any possibility of stretching his communications westward to join the Italian outposts thrust eastward from Valona.

Meanwhile, both General Moscopoulos and Prime Minister Zaïmis, the former directly, the latter through the Entente legations in Athens, called to the attention of the Allies the danger to General Sarraïl of a hasty withdrawal of the Greek troops from eastern Macedonia, and urged that Sarraïl occupy Drama, Serres, and Cavalla as the Greeks retired, or that the Greek demobilization be postponed until such time as Sarraïl should be able and ready to take up the positions evacuated. The Greek staff instanced the case of Fort Rupel as an example of what might happen with Serres, Drama, and Cavalla, and drew

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a similar lesson from the Bulgarian occupation of the Florina-Vodena sector.

Neither General Sarraïl nor the Allied ministers in Athens would listen to these suggestions. The Greeks must get out at once; what happened afterwards was the Entente's business. On August 20, consequently, the Greek staff ordered the three divisions holding the line below Fort Rupel to retire on Cavalla. The Bulgarians followed closely on their heels, taking up the abandoned positions. At the same time, the Bulgarian right wing, west of Florina, now in Bulgarian hands, advanced in a broad semi-circular swing through Castoria to Cozani, evidently with the idea of driving the Serbs and the newly arrived Russians back upon Saloniki.

On August 24, the Allied ministers in Athens, alarmed by this Bulgarian advance, asked Premier Zaïmis how far the Greek Government intended to permit it to proceed without resistance. The prime minister replied that the Entente's ultimatum had demanded a complete demobilization of the Greek army. A complete demobilization, he pointed out, was scarcely consonant with an effective resistance to an invasion

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of Greece. A complete demobilization had been insisted upon. They should have it.

There is every reason to believe, on the other hand, that the Allies anticipated precisely what did happen in eastern Macedonia. On February 5, French Minister Guillemain told me that the Entente "relied on King Constantine's declaration that in case of an attack upon the Allies in Macedonia, the Greek troops would be ordered to withdraw and leave the combatants a free field," as he expressed it. Then M. Guillemain was trying to justify the French occupation of Fort Karabournou. Now, however, the Entente were evidently still relying upon King Constantine's withdrawal of his troops before the Bulgarian advance to have a decisive favorable effect on Venizelos's candidacy in the approaching elections. The feeling in Greece against the Bulgarians ran high. A Bulgarian advance into the territory Greece had conquered from Tsar Ferdinand's soldiers in 1913 could not fail to embarrass King Constantine and strengthen Venizelos, especially if the latter exploited the fact for electoral purposes. He did. The Venizelist organs raised an immense clamor that the

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Greek staff had sold the country to the Bulgars, that King Constantine had a secret agreement with Tsar Ferdinand, that Cavalla was to be turned over to Bulgaria without the compensations which Venizelos had proposed to obtain for a similar delivery of Cavalla to Bulgaria twenty months previously; and finally, of course, that the only way to save Greek soil from being sullied by the hated enemy was to return Venizelos to power and thus to join Greece to the Entente. The fact that the Entente had refused to occupy the soil in question was ignored. Nor did any of the Venizelists seem in the least disturbed by the facility with which the Cretan first proposed to cede Cavalla, Drama, and Serres to Bulgaria and then went into rages of patriotism over the thought that a Bulgarian should ever dare set foot in that district.

To advance the arguments of the Venizelists, the Entente ministers in Athens suddenly affected a supreme indifference to a Bulgarian occupation of Greek eastern Macedonia, Florina, and Castoria, claiming that as Saloniki was supplied from the sea, a Bulgarian advance could in no wise endanger the Allied line of communications.

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The fury with which the Entente press subsequently charged the Greek staff with bad faith in permitting the Bulgars to occupy Cavalla is in sharp contrast to this purely political stand taken by the Entente diplomatists to forward Venizelos's political game. General Moscopoulos, however, pricked the bubble of this contention by demonstrating that if the Bulgars' westward swing were successful, a few cannon on the slopes of Mt. Olympus could close the entrance of the Gulf of Saloniki, while the Germano-Bulgarian armies would catch General Sarraill and his force in a giant pincers whence escape would be cut off.

To add to the Government's embarrassment, the Italians landed at Khimarra on the Ionian coast, thrusting their line some forty miles into Greek territory, ignoring the formal assurances given Greece on February 20 that Italy would not violate Greek frontiers. With the average Greek, whose parents or friends may have been killed in the Bulgarian massacres at Doxato during the Balkan wars, Bulgaria is the great pressing danger hung over Greece. Upon this feeling Venizelos was playing in his campaign. But to

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the thoughtful Greek, not Bulgaria, but Italy was and is the great peril, especially since the secret agreement of Italy with the Entente, on April 25, 1915, preceding Italy's entry into the war. The first landing of Italian troops on Corfu raised a storm of public feeling in Greece, beside which the opinion created by the French seizure of the island was dwarfed. To this act, the Skouloudis cabinet had replied by seating in the Boulé the representatives from that part of Epirus still in dispute with Italy. Now, Italy countered by landing her soldiers on Greek soil, protected from reprisals by the Allied ultimatum of June 21, requiring the demobilization of the Greek army.

Once the leader of the anti-Italian party in Greece, Venizelos now held his peace as to their encroachments; now the leader of the anti-Bulgarian party in Greece, he forgot his effort twenty months before to cede part of Greece to Bulgaria. This equivocal policy failed to take with the Greek public, despite every effort of the Entente diplomatists to forward it, every activity of the Entente-subsidized newspapers to carry it through; despite, also, the coöperation with Gen-

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eral Sarraïl's officers of the Venizelist electoral workers and the Cretan police in French pay and the money spent and the pressure exercised by the Anglo-French secret police. It was evident the Venizelists were not sweeping the country with their pro-war propaganda, as had been expected. Both the Venizelists and the Entente ministers in Athens were in despair. The Cretan's campaign for war was not advancing, and it was useless to close one's eyes to the fact. New means to make it successful must be found without delay. Venizelos, therefore, set about devising that plot which, as his friend Pamicos Zymbrakakis had written a fortnight before, General Sarraïl was ready to forward.

Meanwhile, King Constantine was engaged on more far-reaching matters. On July 30 I had telegraphed, on information given me by King Constantine himself, that Rumania would enter the war on the side of the Entente before a month was out. A week later, certain of the Allied ministers in Athens confirmed this forecast. It was with precisely this in view that the Greek monarch had sent his brothers to England and Russia—that they might arrange a coöperation between

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Greece and Rumania, on the latter's entry into the war, by which the two armies could attack Bulgaria from both sides and pierce the German line to Constantinople. Even more keenly now than the preceding February the king realized that it would be a difficult matter to swing the people of Greece to war, while Venizelos continued to clamor for war as a political slogan rather than as a well considered plan of national action. He knew that when war was declared, if the arrangement were successful, the Venizelists would cry victory and that those opposed to Venizelos's political ambitions would be inclined to hold back on this account. Once more, therefore, he set patiently about to mend the breaks in public sentiment which the Entente ultimatum of June 21 had created.

Now, however, the task was more difficult than it had been six months previous. Again he called General Moscopoulos to Athens to convince the staff and the officers of the army that successful coöperation with General Sarrail's force was still a possibility. He attended General Manoussoyannakis's funeral, at Patras, in person, and aroused a great wave of patriotic enthusiasm.

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Because the Entente had conceived a mistrust of General Dousmanis, chief of the Greek general staff, and Colonel Metaxas, the ablest tactician of the Greek army, King Constantine voluntarily granted the former leave of absence and changed the latter's post so that neither remained in a directing position in the Greek staff. More, he replaced General Dousmanis by General Moscopoulos, an ardent Ententist who, as head of the third army corps at Saloniki, had been on the closest terms of amity and coöperation with General Sarrail. Everything was being done to put the Greek military organization in shape to work with the Allied armies. When General Dousmanis left his office as chief of staff, he turned over to his successor the series of plans, brought up to the minute, for Greece's active coöperation with the Allied armies upon which he had worked since the outbreak of the European War, that Greece might be ready at a moment's notice to work effectively with the Entente.

The principal instrument upon which King Constantine counted to secure a large contingent of soldiers at the first remobilization call, however, was the national organization known as the

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"League of Reservists," formed after the Balkan wars among their veterans, to look after the families of such of the soldiers as had lost their lives in these wars; to assist needy comrades to secure work; to maintain them while incapacitated and bury them suitably when they died. As there are no pensions in Greece, the organization was a useful adjunct to the military establishment. During the ten months of mobilized inactivity the League of Reservists had grown in extent and strength by assisting the families of mobilized men who had not the means to support their families on the cent a day paid the Greek common soldier in the service of his country. After demobilization King Constantine, as honorary president of the league, encouraged its work with a view to using it to inspire a sentiment for war when the moment should come that Greece's entry into the war could be made with a reasonable promise of a successful issue. To this end, also, he even planned a sort of swing around the circle in all the leading cities of Greece to urge a full response to mobilization orders should they come. He was only prevented from carrying out the plan by a re-

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opening of the sinus in his back, which had troubled him since the spring of 1915.

All of this was deadly business for one of King Constantine's temperament, used to the simpler method of command. I find him admirable in it, displaying the scrupulous patience of the impatient man with astonishing skill and effectiveness. Never once did he lose that sense of humor for which he is remarkable, or his cheerful confidence in the eventual success of his plan. Venizelos charges him with stepping down from his throne to lead a political party. Perhaps this is true. It is certain that to accomplish the end he had in view—the conservation of what he believed the vital interest of his country—King Constantine would not have hesitated not only to step down from his throne, but to renounce his crown entirely, if need were.

Both Princes Nicholas and Andrew have informed me that their reception by the Entente authorities in Petrograd and London was in the nature of that accorded to Mr. Britling when he desired to volunteer his services to his country after the Battle of the Marne. King Constantine's offer was regarded with suspicion. Prince



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Andrew, in London, was lectured like a school-boy on what the Greek sovereign ought and ought not to do by a high permanent official of the Foreign Office, who had never been in the near East and knew nothing of the situation in Greece save what he had learned from interested Venizelist sources. In Russia, Prince Nicholas fared better, as the Imperial Government, still playing to secure an open Dardanelles, instead of having the straits closed by British guns on Imbros, Tenedos, and Lemnos, had need of Greece to carry out that plan. In general, however, the negotiations were quite as unsatisfactory as Serbia's negotiations with her Allies for permission, in September, 1915, to fall upon Bulgaria before Bulgarian mobilization could be completed. There seemed to be no tendency to base a large scheme of decisive military operations upon Rumania's entry into hostilities. Rumania was to come in and carry out her own plans of conquest haphazard, without regard to the possibilities of coördinated military action.

Meanwhile, the Bulgarian advance toward Cavalla continued, the Greeks withdrawing upon the city, transporting their own war material

with them. On August 26, despite the written assurance given by the Central empires that the Greek cities of Drama, Serres, and Cavalla would not be occupied, the former two were entered by Bulgarian troops, and the Bulgars, seizing heights around Cavalla, were in position to take possession of that city whenever they liked. This advance of the Bulgars came most appropriately for the Venizelists. His followers had planned a mass meeting to take place in Athens the following day, the anniversary of the revolution of 1909, with the idea of reminding the Greek sovereign of the events of seven years before, and in a certain sense as a threat of what Venizelos could do if he chose. The meeting had been widely advertised and well prepared. It was attended by an immense crowd, which assembled under the windows of the house recently purchased by the Cretan in Athens' leading residential street.

The mass meeting was to be a test of the results achieved by Venizelos's electoral campaign for the past six weeks, a trying out of the strength of the Venizelist war party. As such, it showed the Cretan very strong indeed, probably 40,000 men

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gathering in the streets surrounding his residence. But it also revealed that there was by no means that unanimity for war which the Venizelists had led the Entente to believe would be the effect of the Cretan's campaign. In his speech, carefully prepared in advance and read from the written text, Venizelos seemed throughout to be preparing the way for another revolution like that of 1909. In the form of an address direct to the monarch, to be adopted as a resolution and presented by a committee of the meeting to King Constantine, Venizelos publicly tells his sovereign:

You are the prey of advisers of a purely military outlook and of oligarchical ideas, who have persuaded you that Germany must be victorious and who, trading upon your admiration of the Germans whose victory you believe in and have desired, hope by Germany's victory to be able to set aside the liberal constitution of Greece and to concentrate in the royal hands the power of absolutism. As a result of these warped ideas, instead of an extension of the territory of Greece to Asia Minor, Thrace and Cyprus, we see to-day Macedonia invaded by the Bulgars, military supplies worth tens of thousands of dollars surrendered to the invaders, and north Epirus in danger of being permanently lost. We, the people, by this demonstration, declare that we disapprove the course recently followed, and insist upon the dismissal from around the king's person of his present sinister advisers. The interjection of the king's name into the electoral contest constitutes an

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internal revolution against the liberal party. The national unity has been destroyed by thrusting the royal prestige into politics.

Each statement was a cry from the heart for the Venizelists, astutely conceived to place the sovereign in the wrong. King Constantine had believed, not in the victory of the Germans, but at most that the war would result in a draw, as he had declared to me on December 4, 1915. In speaking to General de Castelnau on December 26, he had gone further and said that while he believed it impossible to defeat the German army militarily, he could readily understand the defeat of Germany by the economic and financial pressure of the Allies. As for Thrace and Asia Minor, neither had yet been conquered by the Allies; nor had Venizelos himself as prime minister been able to secure any definite assurance of tangible concessions in these fields. The "sinister advisers" to whom the Cretan referred were General Dousmanis, Venizelos's own choice as chief of the general staff, and Colonel Metaxas, both of whom the king had already relieved of staff service. Dr. George Streit was probably also meant, a distinguished international jurist,

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member for Greece of the International Court of Arbitration, who had been Venizelos's minister for foreign affairs when the European War broke out. He held no public office at the moment, and was merely a childhood friend of King Constantine, and a devoted patriot. In fine, the only advisers whom Venizelos considered proper about the Greek sovereign were his own followers. Premier Zaïmis, in his own phrase, he "tolerated."

As for the interjection of the King's personality into the electoral campaign, it is considered in Greece, not without reason, that Venizelos's publication of his two memoranda to his sovereign, of January 11 and 17, 1915, had been the first interjection of the personality of the king into Greek politics. At the moment of Venizelos's speaking, King Constantine was engaged solely in the business, his as constitutional commander-in-chief of the army, of seeking to hold the army ready, even in demobilization, for instant action on the side of the Entente should Rumania enter the war.

The most striking inconsistency of Venizelos's attitude at this juncture was revealed in the declaration which he made me for publication just

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before his speech to the crowd under his balcony.

"Can you conceive," he said to me, speaking of the Bulgarian advance on Cavalla, "anything more criminal militarily than the action of the general staff in demobilizing three army corps and leaving their entire artillery and other supplies behind to fall into the hands of the Bulgarians!" In view, however, of the fact that it was precisely the Entente, in close coöperation with Venizelos himself, who demanded not only the demobilization of the three army corps in question, but their demobilization in so brief a delay that any considerable transport of war material was impossible, Venizelos's statement appears extraordinary, to say the least.

The conclusion of the Cretan's address was equally significant. In the first place, as leader of one of the political parties of Greece, he formally recognized the Zaïmis cabinet as a cabinet of full powers, not the purely business cabinet upon which the Entente ultimatum of June 21 had insisted. In the second place, after attacking the Greek sovereign in the most open fashion, charging him with sympathy for the Central em-

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pires, and implying that the monarch's course was intended to nullify the Constitution and turn Greece into a despotism, he seemed to lack the assurance of sufficient strength to go further and inspire revolutionary action among his hearers, without the material aid of Entente bayonets to back him.

The reason for this strange inconclusion to the Cretan's otherwise inflammatory address lay in a circumstance of which few were cognizant at the moment.¹ Venizelos had arranged with Captain de Roquefeuille, the French naval attaché and head of the French secret police, for a fleet of some thirty odd French and British ships of war to appear off the Piræus simultaneously with the meeting in Athens of August 27. It was expected that, in the consternation so formidable a demonstration of Allied naval forces must inevitably produce in the minds of the Government and the opponents of Venizelos, the latter, with his followers already in mass beneath his

¹ "Everywhere the Venizelists can be seen working furiously to bring about an uprising. They are distributing arms and money, and in certain houses of Athens they are installing machine guns. The police watch this go on but dare not interfere." Major Michael Passaris, "L'Entente et la Grece," p. 82.

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balcony, would have only to suggest a march to the palace to repeat the *coup d'état* of 1909 and impose his will upon his sovereign. Under the guns of the Allied squadron, resistance would scarcely be attempted, and with one bold stroke Greece could thus suddenly be swung into line with the Entente.

Certainly Venizelos himself had all the nervousness of a man planning a critical step during the hour I spent with him just preceding his speech. The air was charged with possibilities which every one present felt were not materializing.

"If we, the people," Venizelos concluded his speech, "are not heard in these our resolutions—we shall be forced to take counsel as to what it is best to do to minimize the ruin which awaits us." ¹

It was late in the evening. The Allied fleet had not arrived. Had Venizelos believed for a moment that he really expressed the views of the

¹ The text of the portions of Venizelos' speech here given is a translation of a summary furnished the foreign press by his secretary, during its delivery, which I checked up with Mr. Venizelos himself. A Greek text with English translation was subsequently published by The Anglo-Hellenic League, in which very considerable alterations had been made from the address as pronounced.

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majority of the Greek people, or even of the majority of the people of Athens, the arrival of the Allied squadron would not have been necessary to the success of whatever plan he had in mind. As in 1909, the crowd would have marched to the palace and King Constantine would have been forced to yield as his father, seven years before, had been forced to yield. But, as Professor Hayes has said,¹ "the son who succeeded King George was adored by the nation as the successful leader of the Greek army in the Balkan war." Without other support than his own followers, Venizelos was forced to end his address in anticlimax. Disappointed, puzzled, uncertain as to what it was expected to do, the crowd before the Cretan's house dispersed no wiser than it had come.

¹ Prof. Carlton J. H. Hayes: "Political and Social History of Modern Europe," Vol. II, p. 517.

CHAPTER XVII

“THE WARRIOR KING UNSHEATHES HIS SWORD”

THE day following Venizelos's speech to the people of Athens, Rumania's entry into the war was known in Greece. The anti-Venizelists accepted the challenge of the Venizelist meeting, so long announced and so well prepared, and at the last moment decided to give a counter demonstration the following afternoon. Handicapped by lack of funds, divided among themselves, out of spirit with the prevailing feeling of the moment when Rumania's abandonment of neutrality was announced, it was generally supposed that the loyalist demonstration would amount to very little. The speakers were not popular orators, as is Venizelos, used to swaying vast assemblages. There was no special inducement for an audience to congregate—save the name of the king. Venizelos had attacked the *koumbaros*, as the Greek soldier calls his sovereign. The Greeks who had fought under the “*koumbaros*” must

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show the world that they still followed his leadership, no less for peace than for war.

To those of us who still believed Venizelos the dominating political factor in Greece, the meeting of August 28, 1916, was an eye-opener. It seemed incredible that so many thousands of enthusiastic men should fill the street in front of Minister Rhallys's house and stand for hours while the aged ex-premier discoursed in a voice that could not be heard a dozen yards. Virtually every man a reservist, when they marched down Stadium Street to the demonstration they fell naturally into line and stepped out with the swing of soldiers, chanting the "Aitos,"¹ the spirited words of which, "the warrior king unsheathes his sword," seemed strangely out of keeping with the ostensible purpose of the meeting. In this gathering an element was present which the Venizelist meeting had lacked—the small farmers of Attica and Bœotia, in their gray smocks dusty from the road; they had walked into town, starting before daybreak in order not to miss the demonstration. While the Venizelists were celebrating the anniversary of the revolution of 1909, this

¹ "Ho Aitos"—The Eagle, referring to the double-headed eagle of Byzance.

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second crowd celebrated nothing but their devotion to the soldier-sovereign. The "Chronos," a newspaper catering principally to the reservists, published that morning a picture of King Constantine. Many of the demonstrators cut the picture out and pinned it on their coats as a symbol, almost as an icon, to show their feeling. If the Venizelist meeting had included 40,000 men, this second meeting was scarcely less vast, and had been gathered within a few hours. Had there been any doubt in the mind of King Constantine that the reservists of Greece would rush to the colors at his call, the meeting of August 28 dispelled it. His fear that the bitter Venizelist campaign had split the fighting forces of Greece into two opposing camps, and thus had impaired the strength of the army needed should Greece go to war, disappeared in an instant.

The two meetings did more, however. In his speech from his balcony, Venizelos had said of the Zaïmis business cabinet: "The Liberal party are prepared to invest this cabinet of affairs with their own political authority." In other words, by accepting the Zaïmis government as endowed with political responsibility, despite the Entente

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ultimatum of June 21, Venizelos made it possible for Premier Zaïmis to undertake the responsibility of conducting war, should the anti-Venizelists also consent. Only the acquiescence of the Allies was further necessary, since it had been by their demand that the Government of Greece under Premier Zaïmis had been deprived of its constitutional functions. In this sense, therefore, the two meetings admirably served the purpose of King Constantine, whose preparations to undertake a Balkan campaign in conjunction with Rumania were now completed.

In another respect also the significance of the two meetings was immense. The second meeting in particular demonstrated not only to the Venizelists, but to the Allied ministers in Athens, that five weeks of hard campaigning by the Venizelists had accomplished little or nothing; that the political method the Cretan had employed of attacking his sovereign had only increased the strength of the king. Had there been any cool head directing the Entente policy in the near East, now was plainly the moment for a complete change of front. It was evident that if Venizelos could not carry overwhelmingly an industrial

center like Athens, he must be defeated in the rural districts of old Greece, always conservative. For myself, I may say frankly that up to this hour I had believed Venizelos the strongest man in Greece, certain to carry the approaching elections by an appreciable majority. Nor was it easy for me to admit the error of this judgment. But the demonstration of August 28 would have convinced a blind man. From that moment I realized that, whether wisely or unwisely, Venizelos had misplayed his cards. The Venizelist policy was doomed; unless King Constantine could succeed in reaching an agreement with the Entente, Greece would never range herself on the side of the Allies.

It was with this in mind that, after the loyalist meeting, I had a long conversation with Sir Francis Elliot. I knew that the king's only reluctance to joining the Allies at this juncture was based on uncertainty as to whether at this moment he could obtain a full military showing by a call of the Greeks to the colors. It seemed to me that the meeting of August 28 had definitely disposed of this objection. I knew, moreover, that King Constantine had worked long and

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carefully with the idea of Greece's entry into the war in conjunction with Rumania. The moment had arrived. It is true that the negotiations of Princes George and Andrew had not proceeded very successfully and that Rumania, instead of projecting an attack on Bulgaria in coöperation with Greece, had begun an offensive in the opposite direction, attacking Austria-Hungary in Transylvania. Nothing of this situation, however, was irreparable; a shift of front could be effected very readily the moment Greece's entry into the war was decided. Prince Nicholas, who had succeeded somewhat better with the Russian Government than his brothers with the French and British cabinets, was ready to leave Petrograd at once for Bukharest with this purpose. It seemed worth while, therefore, for the Entente to attempt a final understanding with King Constantine, and for King Constantine to accept by far the best chance that had yet been offered him of a successful campaign in the Balkans. These considerations I laid before the British minister. He agreed, albeit he had little hope King Constantine would change his attitude. I asked about a guarantee of the integrity of Greece.

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Sir Francis Elliot said that he felt sure the Allied governments would now make no difficulties on that score.

The same evening I motored to Tatoy, where I saw Mr. Zaïmis, the prime minister. Always an Ententist, he agreed that the moment had come to strike. The king had just been operated upon again in the sinus in his back, and the doctors forbade any one seeing him that evening. I, therefore, wrote King Constantine a personal letter which it would scarcely be proper for me to reproduce without permission, but in which I tried to convey my own conviction that an understanding between Greece and the Entente was a practical possibility. The following day, still suffering from the operation but as keen as ever, he received me. We talked the matter over thoroughly. He said quite frankly that he had sent his brothers to London and Petrograd to try to accomplish some more effective coöperation with the Allied governments than seemed possible through a local diplomatic representation, evidently more devoted to forwarding the interests of a single political faction

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in Greece than to advancing the military situation of the Allies in the near East.

“You know as well as anybody,” he said, “for I have told you so many times, that there has never been any question that Greece would not make war could she see her definite, certain advantage in doing so. To say that I am pledged not to make war is nonsense. Only one thing has ever moved me: that has been the good of my country. And up to now, the situation has not revealed a sufficient certainty of advantage to be gained by Greece, to compensate for the risks and unquestionable cost in lives and property bound to follow our entry into the war.” He went on to explain that it was by no means advantage in the way of territorial aggrandizement to which he had reference—Greece could not be bribed to go to war—but advantage in the shape of such military dispositions on the part of the Entente as would create a reasonable chance of success in the Balkans in favor of the Allied powers, including Greece. Simply to join the Allies for moral effect and to accomplish nothing by it, he declared, would not assist, but handicap

the Entente, and would bring a definite loss to Greece, uncompensated by a corresponding improvement in the position of the Greeks, in Greece or anywhere else.

“Take one element of the situation, for example,” he went on—“an element of which no one seems to think at all. There are in the Ottoman Empire over a million women and children, as well as men, of our blood, whose lives would not be worth a moment’s purchase the day Greece decided to join the Allies. It is not at all the simple choice for us that it was for Rumania. Every phase must be weighed most carefully. Undoubtedly the presence of Bulgars on Greek territory and Rumania’s entry into the war greatly complicate the situation. These can be regarded as new elements which may alter the premises upon which Greece’s policy has hitherto been based—and, I am convinced, reasonably based. I do not say that this is not the case. But I do say that whoever would not be most unjust toward Greece must understand that there are more elements to be considered in our case than are generally thought of—or even than are generally known.” More than this as to his fu-

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ture action King Constantine would not give out for publication at the time. But personally he agreed heartily that the moment had come for action, and he expressed his readiness to take the initiative.

Upon one point, however, he was very decided indeed. "There is to be no bargaining Greece away to anybody, either now or at the peace conference," he said. "There is to be no partition of my country—I won't have it! I make no other condition whatsoever, but I want that one thing plainly understood. The integrity of Greece has got to be guaranteed. Tell your Entente friends that. Under the Constitution I am responsible for declaring war. I shall not take that responsibility without an assurance that we shall not lose even in victory."

I told him that I had every reason to believe that this guarantee would be given.

"All right," he replied. "I am not quite so sure, myself; but I shall take your word for it that you know. Now how do you think it had better be done?" he asked. "Through my brothers in Paris, London, and Petrograd—or through one of the Entente ministers here?"

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To me it seemed better that the proposal of the military coöperation of Greece be made as formally as possible. I told him so. The king was of the same opinion, especially since his brothers had had rather a cold reception on their mission abroad.

"Very well," King Constantine said, finally. "Will you tell Elliot to ask for an audience at once? He's the dean of the Entente diplomats, and it had better be done through him. Besides," he laughed in his kindly way, "it will be a diplomatic feather in his cap—and he has been here a long time, and deserves it. We'll give him the credit."

As I was leaving, the king referred again to his one essential condition of the integrity of Greece, and to his constitutional mandate to declare war, if war were to be declared. "It is not a question of my deciding what we ought to do under the circumstances as they are to-day," he said very seriously. "It is a question for all the Greeks—in Thrace and Asia Minor as well as in Greece itself—to reach a decision upon, after maturely weighing the frightful price that must be paid in the event of war. In such a crisis,"

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he concluded, "we want the voice of the soul of Hellas to dictate the future of our race."

I returned to Sir Francis Elliot at once. He was delighted, but still somewhat skeptical. I conveyed to him the king's insistence on a guarantee of the integrity of Greece as an essential condition. "That will be all right, I am sure," he said. "But do you believe he will do it?" he asked.

"Yes," I replied, "I do."

Sir Francis sighed.

"It will add ten years to my life if he does," he said.

We talked of the possible governmental changes necessary to the constitution of a cabinet for war, Sir Francis urging that the king call Venizelos to power. I told him frankly that I thought there was little chance of that, but that I believed the king would accept a cabinet with a minority representation of Venizelists, including the Cretan himself if Venizelos could bring himself to accept a minor post. There was talk of Nicholas Caloguyeropoulos as a war premier—an Ententist long a resident of France. But all of this was more or less discussion. That

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night, also, I told Mr. Droppers, the American minister, precisely what was on foot, for the information of the Government of the United States. I learned later that Mr. Droppers went at once to Mr. Venizelos with the whole story.

The British minister's audience was fixed for September 1; M. Guillemin, the French minister, saw the Greek sovereign August 31, the day following my own conversation with the king. Their talk did not forward matters. M. Guillemin always irritated King Constantine who, suffering now from his operation, was inclined to dislike more than ever the French minister's labored subtleties. Sir Francis was to be received at eleven o'clock Friday morning, the first. To be certain, I went to Tatoy myself at half-past nine and remained with the king until the British minister was announced. The king was not only unchanged, but himself had worked out a tentative cabinet shift, and set his staff to estimating what would be required to equip the Greek army in the shortest possible time. He wanted Mr. Zaïmis to remain as premier if possible; but in case he would not accept the responsibility, the King was considering a purely war

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cabinet under Admiral Coundouriotis or General Moscopoulos. At my question about a Venizelist representation, he replied that he expected Venizelos would, as a minority leader, accept a share in the responsibility of conducting the war, and either himself sit in the cabinet or permit three of his friends to represent him in it.

"He must take his part of the responsibility for this business," the king said. "It will not do to have his crowd standing out, trying to break up the army and making things difficult by criticizing the Government. He has been crying for war for the past year; now we are to have it, he must put his shoulder to the wheel with the rest and help out."

When Colonel Levidis announced the British minister, I said to the king:

"Your Majesty will broach the subject, of course—otherwise Sir Francis will talk about the weather. I have no official capacity, and so he is n't supposed to know anything through me. I'm just a butter-in."

"I understand," the king replied, laughing. "It will be all right. How about the integrity of

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Greece?" he called after me, as I was going out the door.

"Sir Francis says he is sure there will be no difficulty," I replied.

On the way out I passed the British minister. He interrogated me with a glance. I nodded. His face lit up with satisfaction.

An hour later I saw him at the British legation.

"I come as a journalist," I said, "to learn if you have anything to say about your audience with King Constantine this morning."

"Nothing for publication," he said, smiling.

At that moment the head of the British secret police ran up the stairs two steps at a time, evidently greatly excited.

"The French fleet has arrived off the Piræus," he cried.

Sir Francis Elliot went a dead white. He turned and walked slowly up the stairway without a word.

Once more Elephtherios Venizelos had played his trump at the right moment for his own game—and the wrong one for the Entente.

PART III
STARVATION

CHAPTER XVIII

THE SECOND ULTIMATUM

FROM the hour of the arrival of the Allied fleet under Admiral Dartige du Fournet off the Piræus, on September 1, 1916, the history of Greece moves with the rapidity of a cinematograph reel. The implied menace of so formidable a naval display, even had it not been known to have been planned in conjunction with an attempt at revolution within the country, would have been sufficient to put an end to any further negotiations between Greece and the Entente for the latter's participation in the war. To the Greeks, readily led, but hardly driven, a military coöperation, spontaneously conceived before the fleet arrived, became well-nigh impossible under the threat of the French admiral's cannon.

It is my conviction that the British minister was not party to this latest blunder of the Entente in the near East; but it was exceedingly

difficult to persuade King Constantine that between my conversation with him on August 29, and his audience with Sir Francis Elliot on September 1, the latter had not quietly sent for the fleet with a view to upsetting the sovereign's plan of joining the Allies, by aiding a Venizelist *coup d'état*. This suspicion was further strengthened by the revolt of certain officers, including the commander, of the Greek 11th Division stationed at Saloniki. While only a small proportion of the command deserted the Greek flag to accept foreign pay on August 30, the fact that General Sarraïl had actively assisted the revolt, received into his forces the deserting officers and men, and caused the imprisonment of 176 who were unwilling to join in a seditious movement, left a very sore feeling toward the French general among the Greeks, especially among the very officers who would be called upon to fight under his supreme command in case Greece joined the Allies.

The movement in Saloniki was led by Venizelists, as part of the general uprising which had been planned for August 27, but which had failed to materialize when the Allied squadron did not appear. It constituted, of course, a direct blow

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at King Constantine's hold over his soldiers, as their commander-in-chief. It was calculated to overturn the entire discipline of the Greek army, thus demonstrating to the Entente that the Greek monarch's proffered military coöperation was of doubtful value—unless brought about by Venizelos. Its failure should have demonstrated the contrary.

To those of the British and French legations in Athens who were acquainted in advance with the arrival of Admiral Dartige du Fournet's fleet, an entirely different mission for the Allied warships had been played up by the Cretan and his followers. A campaign in France and England had long been in progress against Baron Adolf von Schenck zu Schweinsberg, the head of the German propaganda in Greece. Rather an insignificant figure in fact, the baron had been raised to a pinnacle of diabolical cunning and almost superhuman influence by the more sensational British and French newspapers. The ground thus prepared at home for drastic action against the German agents in Greece, it was comparatively simple for Venizelos to suggest the sending of a strong naval force to Salamis in

order that, under the protection of its guns, the Anglo-French secret police might proceed in safety to the forcible seizure and deportation from neutral soil, not only of Schenck and his particular band of German agents, but also of every Greek whose activity Venizelos found inimical to his political campaign.

It is characteristic of the political astigmatism of the British and French representatives in Athens, and indeed of Venizelos himself, that so much importance could be predicated to the activities of the German propagandists in Greece. As a matter of fact, in Greece even more than in the United States, the German method of procedure had succeeded actually in alienating rather than acquiring sympathy for the Central empires. Similarly, however, the out-Germaning of the Germans by the Anglo-French secret police had a like result, the greater in extent because at this juncture the latter organization was now plainly so much stronger, more widely extended, and more lavishly supplied with funds than Schenck's had been. On the whole, the heads of the Anglo-French secret police in Greece seem to have been singularly naïve, nibbling the bait of

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personal notoriety held out to them by the Venizelists, and blindly playing the Cretan's game to the prejudice of the greater stake for the entire cause of the Entente, the active coöperation of Greece with the Allies, carrying with it a force of 250,000 trained men to be added to the Allied Orient armies. The diplomacy of two years went by the board at this crisis, that the head of the British secret police might have what he termed "the best time of his life."

No time was lost after the arrival of the Allied squadron in putting this program into execution. The same night, the French flag was hoisted on the four German and three Austrian merchantmen interned since the beginning of the war in the neutral waters of Keratsina Bay, and the officers and men aboard them were arrested and taken to one of the Allied warships as prisoners. At the same time, officers of the Allied squadron took possession of the Greek Government's wireless plant. The following afternoon, the British and French ministers presented Premier Zaïmis a formal demand in these terms:

By instruction of their governments, the undersigned have the honor to bring the following to the knowledge of the Hellenic Government:

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(1) The two Allied Governments, knowing from sure sources that their enemies are kept informed in various ways, and notably by the Hellenic telegraph, demand the control of the posts, the telegraphs, and the wire-less telegraph.

(2) Enemy agents of corruption and espionage must immediately leave Greece, not to return until after the end of hostilities.

(3) Necessary steps will be taken against Greek subjects who may have been guilty of the acts of corruption and espionage above mentioned.

The Russian and Italian ministers could not bring themselves to sign a document of this extraordinary character. Certainly the Government of the United States has had far more cause to initiate drastic action against "enemy agents of corruption and espionage" in Mexico during the past two years than Great Britain and France had to take such action against Greece. It has not, however, appeared altogether compatible with the independence of Mexico as a sovereign state that any such action be even contemplated. Indeed, it is significant that no attempt was made in this second Entente ultimatum to justify it on grounds of international or any other kind of law. Perhaps it was just as well that no justification was attempted. The "sure sources" were not set forth, and the British and French governments

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remained sole judges of their alleged sureness. The test of the guilt of the persons against whom "necessary steps" were to be taken appeared to be the mere denunciation of the Anglo-French secret police; whatever was to be done, would be done without trial. Neither the principles of international law nor the guarantees of the Greek constitution were to prevail against this demand.

The Greek sovereign's immediate acceptance of its drastic terms constitutes at this juncture the best possible evidence that his proposal of September 1 to join the Allies was the expression of a sincere purpose from which he did not propose to be easily turned, however great the provocation to revoke it. And, indeed, I know that during the long period from his first conversation with me on that head until his offer had been finally rejected on November 19, the King of the Hellenes did not cease, even when the defeat of Rumania was assured, by every means to seek to find some combination acceptable to Great Britain and France, by which the Hellenic armies as a whole could take their place beside the Allies. As a matter of fact, while he was well aware that the ultimatum of September 2 would only em-

barrass him in his effort to swing Greece to the side of the Allies, and regretted it on that account, he did not regard it as of any great significance in view of the fact that he expected hourly to take similar measures himself, as a loyal ally of the Entente. One thing alone preoccupied him at this period, when I saw and talked with him frequently: whether or not the Allied governments were dealing honestly by his proposal of coöperation and meeting him on his own ground of complete frankness.

A similar feeling of mistrust was constantly stimulated in the minds of the Entente ministers by their Venizelist advisers. During the negotiations which followed, Sir Francis Elliot frequently asked me if I were sure former ministers Streit, Stratos, and Schlieman, and the others assisting King Constantine in his task of swinging Greece to war, were sincere. Their sincerity, however, should have been plain, since Dr. Streit was actively aiding King Constantine to draft the messages confirming his proposals, sent subsequently through his brothers to the governments of Great Britain, Russia, and France, while Messrs. Stratos and Schlieman sacrificed their

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entire political standing with the conservative party, which was in favor of peace, to form the new party—the king's party, it was called—in favor of war.

The unqualified and immediate acceptance of the ultimatum failed to spare Athens and the Piræus one of the most astounding performances of the war. The heads of the Anglo-French secret police had not got the fleet to Greece themselves to retire into the background. No disposition was shown to await the action of the legally constituted Greek authorities to fulfil the terms of the second demand of the ultimatum, despite Premier Zaïmis's recognized pro-Entente sympathies. Instead, several cars, one in particular known in true melodramatic style as "the black car" loaded with professional gunmen armed to the teeth, and under the personal direction of a British officer in uniform, undertook to arrest such of the alleged "foreign agents" as they desired, without legal warrant or other authority than that lent by the guns of the Allied squadron off the Piræus. Representatives of two great nations with whom inviolability of domicile and the right of trial by jury have been the ripe

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fruit of civilization, openly ignored both fundamental rights in a friendly, neutral country. Homes were entered by force, "arrests" were made at the point of a revolver, and the persons so arrested were overpowered and taken into custody without trial, while the gunmen employed in this ugly business rifled, on their own account, the houses entered, of jewels and valuables. On the authority of a member of one of the legations concerned in the affair, I learned that three of the hired gunmen engaged in it were killed. A veritable reign of terror was begun which shocked not only the Greeks, aghast at such conduct on the part of British and French, but the British and French nationals resident in Greece, who were witnesses of it. The English especially, both within the British legation and without it, registered a very sharp protest against methods of this German sort. As a result, after some seventy-two hours of lawlessness, the illegal arrests were stopped.

While the Venizelists hastened to defend this amazing business, especially since certain of their political opponents were among the Greeks sought by the Anglo-French secret police, King



Chie
Princess Adrien of Greece
Princess of Battenberg
Athens 1916.

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Constantine and all other Greeks were outraged and incensed by it. Princess Alice of Battenberg, the English wife of the king's brother, Prince Andrew, was very plain-spoken indeed in her denunciation of the conduct of her countrymen.

"Not even in the worst days in Russia," she said, "have such things been countenanced. That it is we, the English, supposed to be the protecting power of Greece, guarantors of the constitutional liberties of the Hellenic people, who are doing it is infamous! I am certain that the people at home would not tolerate it a moment if they knew what is going on."

Naturally, this whole business did not make the Greek sovereign's self-set task of joining the Allies, already difficult enough, any the easier. Yet with signal tenacity of purpose he continued his efforts to get all of his officers and men in hand to be ready at the call. Admiral Coundouriotis, the admiral of the Greek fleet, was set to consulting with Admiral Palmer, the new head of the British naval mission in Greece, touching Greek coöperation by sea with the Allies. Premier Zaïmis was not only busily engaged elabo-

rating the details of the proposed arrangement, in frequent conference with the Entente ministers, but took steps to secure to his cabinet that political recognition from the party leaders in Greece essential to carrying the necessary war appropriations through the Boulé. No sooner had King Constantine decided on offering Greece's coöperation with the Entente than Mr. Zaïmis sent to Venizelos to ascertain precisely what he meant by his phrase, "The liberal party are prepared to invest this cabinet of affairs with their own political authority." He found that statement to be in fact somewhat more sweeping than the Cretan's real intentions. A condition was placed upon Venizelos's recognition of the Zaïmis cabinet as a responsible ministry; namely, that the elections now imminent be postponed.

It was of course an admission of the complete failure of Venizelos's whole electoral campaign, to impose which upon Greece the Cretan had on June 21 inspired an ultimatum from his Entente backers. It revealed for the first time the growing weakness of Venizelos, and betrayed that Venizelos himself was aware he was losing

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ground. It constituted still another step in the maze of the Cretan's shifting policy—his first refusal to participate in the elections of December 19, 1915; then his standing for election himself to a Boulé which he declared unconstitutional; and finally, after claiming that the only legal elections were those by which he had been given a majority on June 13, 1915, demanding new elections a year later, in direct contradiction to his previous position. He now insisted that these new elections be postponed. It is of little consequence that the reader fail to follow this rapidly altering policy—no one in Greece was able to follow it, either.

Mr. Zaïmis had other things on his mind besides the political tergiversations of Venizelos. He was willing to postpone the elections if the Entente ministers consented to it. At the instance of Venizelos, they did so, thus nullifying their ultimatum of June 21, the corner-stone of which had been the demand for new elections. On the satisfactory arrangement of this feature, Venizelos agreed to give the support of the liberal party to the Zaïmis cabinet. Similarly approached by Mr. Zaïmis, Messrs. Gounaris and

Rhallys, the leaders of two factions of the conservatives, promised a like support of the Zaïmis government. The stage was set for the final act of Greece's neutrality. Not a single important voice was now raised against Greece's joining the Allies. Queen Sophie, herself, the Kaiser's sister, speaking of the imminent change in the policy of Greece, exclaimed "How can it be otherwise!" Baron von Schenck, with whom I talked on the day of his expulsion from Greece, declared flatly that Greece's entry into the war was inevitable. The Austrian and German ministers were so persuaded of this that they telegraphed their home governments advising that the United States be sounded about representing their interests in Greece in the event of war, and began their preparations to leave Athens.

On September 6, receiving the officers of the 11th Division who, in the revolt at Saloniki on August 30, had remained loyal to the Greek flag, King Constantine drove home the lesson of discipline in the organization of an army. In a stirring speech he praised those who had remained faithful to their oath, concluding with the state-

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ment that "with such officers and men we are ready to face any enemy!"

Thus foreshadowing an early declaration of war, the commander-in-chief of the Greek army gave the keynote for an immense military enthusiasm, whose widespread sincerity assured the king, and might also have served to convince the Entente ministers, had they known how to interpret events, that the military brotherhood of every veteran of Kilkis and Janina was ready to leap to the colors the moment King Constantine gave the word. It is beyond question that, had the cabinets of London and Paris shown themselves capable of rapid decision at this juncture, had they been free to accept an arrangement with Greece on the basis of a guarantee of the integrity of that country, Greece's entry into the war on the side of the Entente would have been a settled fact within a few days.

CHAPTER XIX

A CABINET FORMED FOR WAR

THE only people in Athens who appeared unaware of the trend of events early in September, 1916, were the British and French legations and the British and French newspaper correspondents. The latter, used to securing all their information from Venizelist sources, either could not or did not take the trouble to work up new relationships which would enable them to follow what was afoot. They continued to fill the London and Paris dailies with increasingly bitter attacks on King Constantine, treating him as an enemy to the Allies, while definite, binding proposals for the active coöperation of Greece with the Entente were actually under the consideration of their governments. One thing which the Greek sovereign never understood was why the British and French governments, both exercising a rigid censorship on all newspapers, far from quieting this clamor during the discussion of Greece's entry into the war, seemed rather

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to stimulate it. Every fact about the practical aid which Greece up to that time had furnished the Allies was either summarily suppressed, or distorted so as to show that the aid in question had been rendered by Mr. Venizelos, against the opposition of the King of the Hellenes.

An example of this press campaign against King Constantine lay in the interpretation given his speech to the loyal officers of the 11th Division, on September 6. Obviously, after a disaffection, however trifling, in the ranks of his army, the commander-in-chief might be expected to take some action. His army plainly would be of very little use, either to him or to his future allies, if every soldier were freely permitted to decide the foreign policy of Greece for himself and to govern his loyalty to his oath as a soldier accordingly. King Constantine's phrase about readiness "to face any enemy" was very evidently calculated to hearten his men against a campaign in which the redoubtable military force of Germany was engaged—a force whose prowess every Balkan had reason to take seriously since the terrible disaster to Serbia and Montenegro. This was actually the effect upon the Greek officers

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and men of King Constantine's words; yet the London and Paris newspapers would not so have it. According to them, a discourse on discipline, similar to that made to every squad of recruits to the United States army, was nothing short of a flagrant example of the Prussian militarism of Constantine I. In their columns King Constantine was a rabid militarist one day, and a cowardly pacifist, afraid to fight Germany, the next; but every day he was hostile to the Entente, despicable, and ruled completely by his wife, the Kaiser's sister.

This sort of propaganda did not relieve the Greek sovereign of any of his fear that the British and French governments were again, as in August, 1915, playing a double game with him in their negotiations for Greece's entry into hostilities. Moreover, as a propaganda, it demonstrated that the Venizelists back of it were by no means so ready to stand behind the Zaïmis cabinet as the Cretan's public declarations might lead one to suppose. To those watching the rapid progress of events in Athens at this juncture, Venizelos's acceptance of the Zaïmis cabinet, as one endowed with political functions, appeared sus-

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piciously out of drawing with his previous attitude. Not even the Cretan's desire to have the elections postponed could altogether account for his acquiescence in the consummation of military coöperation between King Constantine and the Entente without himself as *deus ex machina*. A surprise, therefore, was generally awaited.

It came on September 9. During the daily evening conference of the Entente diplomatists at the French legation, several shots were fired into the air in front of the building, and a cry raised of "Long live the King!" Those responsible immediately fled. No damage of any kind was done.

The stir which M. Guillemain, the French minister, made over this so-called "incident" seemed to every dispassionate observer wholly out of proportion to the importance of the incident itself. He sent at once to the admiral of the Allied fleet and requested a legation guard of armed marines. He demanded instant apologies from the prime minister of Greece, and the condign punishment of the Greek officer in charge of the soldiers normally acting as sentries before the legation. Had the legation building been riddled by a

dozen bullets, he could scarcely have been more exigent.

The "incident" was hailed in the British and French press as well as the Venizelist newspapers of Athens as "an attack on the French legation." It smacked, however, of a motion picture scenario. There was no logical reason for a demonstration against the French at this time. All the loyalists and the officers and soldiers of the Greek army were solidly behind King Constantine in his plan to join the Entente—certainly not to attack the Entente. The only dissatisfied fraction of the population of the capital was the Venizelist element. Judicial investigation ultimately demonstrated that precisely this element had been responsible for the "incident," conceived with the idea of embroiling the Zaïmis cabinet with the Entente, thus putting an end to King Constantine's negotiations to join the Allies. The stage managers of the alleged attack were shown to have chosen the French instead of the British legation, counting on professional jealousy to move M. Guillemin to seize the occasion to block the negotiations, for the success of which his British colleague would obtain the credit. What-

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ever his faults, M. Guillemin is scarcely the man to be influenced by such considerations. His action, however, had the desired effect of blocking the negotiations.

It was only long afterwards that the hearing of the case in court brought evidence to light indicating that the signal for the firing had been given from a window of the French legation itself. The Russian minister's chauffeur, an eyewitness to the occurrence, deposed his impression that the man directing the affair was an employee of the French legation, while other evidence was adduced to the effect that the revolvers used in the firing were returned afterwards to the office of the British secret police. When, during the examination, the magistrate charged with the case questioned M. Guillemin, the French minister asked him to whom the investigation pointed as the instigator of the business.

"To your Excellency," the magistrate replied, dryly.

Puerile enough in itself, the effect of the "incident" was dire and far-reaching. The Venizelists at once spread broadcast the fiction that the League of Reservists had plotted murder. Evi-

dently fearing the electoral strength and loyalty to their commander-in-chief of these veterans whom Constantine I had twice led to victory, the Cretan and his followers planned to break up their organization. That at the same time the king's means of securing a full mobilization in the shortest possible time, should Greece join the Allies, would also be destroyed, only made the Venizelists the more anxious for the dissolution of the League of Reservists. They desired nothing less than that Greece should join the Allies under the auspices of the king. In this instance, as in so many others, any suggestion from Venizelos prevailed with the British and French ministers over practical considerations of direct advantage to the Entente. Following the "incident" of the French legation, they therefore demanded that the meeting places of the League of Reservists be closed.

The demand was accepted, albeit neither Mr. Zaïmis nor the king could in the least understand this persistent policy on the part of British and French ministers of making the arrangements for Greece's effective military support of the Allies always more difficult by constant new de-

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mands. Immediately following the "incident" Premier Zaïmis expressed in person the regret of the Greek Government. King Constantine sent the grand marshal of the court, Count Mercati, to convey his own chagrin at the occurrence. The officer in charge of the Greek guard was duly punished. But none of these things satisfied M. Guillemin. On September 10, a platoon of French marines was landed at the Piræus and marched with bayonets fixed to the French legation; another was sent to the French school, the headquarters of the French secret police. The tricolor was raised on both buildings with all the circumstance which might have marked the establishment of two French fortresses in the ancient city. Less temperamental than his French colleague, the British minister found these precautions a bit theatrical and wholly needless. He refused either to ask for or to accept a legation guard.

The "incident" would have proved of only minor significance after all, save for one fact. Premier Zaïmis ordered the Greek police to make a rigid investigation of the affair and to report to him at once. The revelations of the investi-

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gation, afterwards confirmed in court during the trial of the culprits, showed that the notorious Cretan bandit, Paul Gyparis, a follower of Venizelos and an employee of the French secret police, had hired ten gunmen to carry out the comedy, which had been planned in the Venizelist headquarters and in the office of the French secret police. Its primary purpose was to enable the French minister to establish a strong force of armed marines at his legation, within two hundred yards of King Constantine's palace. The interest of the Venizelists in the matter was the closing of the meeting places of the League of Reservists.

No sooner had the premier learned these details than he laid before his sovereign his conviction that the negotiations he was trying to conduct with the British minister for Greece's departure from neutrality could not under the circumstances be sincere on the part of the Allied diplomatists. A singularly direct and upright man, Mr. Zaïmis was profoundly wounded at what he could scarcely help regarding as the duplicity of the French which, in his esteem for France, he found out of keeping with the high cause for

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which France was fighting the world war. He therefore begged the Greek monarch to release him from his mandate as premier.

The King was reluctant to accept Mr. Zaïmis's resignation and urged him to remain. The British minister was equally upset and added his plea to that of the sovereign. Mr. Zaïmis frankly said that had M. Guillemin been willing to make a formal disavowal of the whole intrigue and to display a willingness to continue negotiations in a spirit of candor, he would consent to remain. M. Guillemin could not bring himself to go so far, however, and King Constantine was therefore forced to seek another premier and another cabinet and to recommence his efforts to reach an understanding with the Entente from the beginning.

To the Venizelists this was a triumph. Each new cabinet overthrown made it more difficult to secure a capable premier without having recourse to Venizelos. But it was disheartening business for the Greek monarch; and the Entente, far from aiding him, seemed to put every possible obstacle in his way—probably likewise with the hope of forcing the return of Venizelos.

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
To complicate matters further the Bulgarian forces, camped on the hills commanding Cavalla, suddenly decided to enter the city, in defiance of their written pledge. On September 10, Colonel Hadjopoulos, commanding that part of the Greek fourth army corps stationed in the city, telegraphed the minister of war in Athens:

“The fourth Greek army corps at Cavalla wishes to surrender at once to the British. The Bulgarians threaten to bombard the city to-morrow, Monday.”

Owing to the Allied control of the telegraph, his message was necessarily transmitted by way of Saloniki, through the British admiral, who in turn telegraphed the Greek staff in reply:

“Do you wish me to permit the Greek troops to embark on Greek ships?” On the receipt of this enquiry General Callaris, the minister of war, replied through the British military attaché in Athens:

“Fourth army corps—Cavalla. Transport yourselves immediately with all your effective and, if possible, all supplies to Volo, arranging transport with British admiral. Embark preferably on Greek ships, but if none are available, on



GREEK ARTILLERY AT CAVALLA

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ships of any other nationality. The civil authorities and police must remain at Cavalla.”

It was only when too late to set matters right that the British military attaché admitted to the chief of the Greek staff that there had been an undue delay in the delivery of these peremptory orders owing, he explained, to formalities between the Allied military and naval authorities. Meanwhile, however, the British naval officer in command proposed to transport Colonel Hadjopoulos and his troops to Saloniki. Hadjopoulos's orders had not come. The experience of certain officers of the 11th Division who had been imprisoned in Saloniki for refusing to join the Allies, counseled the Greek commander against any such disposition of his troops. Some 3400 men and 80 officers had already been taken to Thassos by the French, where they were held as prisoners.¹ Both men and officers of that contingent have since informed me that every possible pressure was put upon them, during their stay with the French on Thassos, to induce them to desert their flag and join General Sarrail's

¹ Col. Christodoulos, who afterwards joined Sarrail's army, stated, in an interview in the Venizelist "Elephtheros Typos": "We were treated as enemies" by the French on Thassos.

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forces. It was evidently fearing precisely this that Colonel Hadjopoulos made the decision he did. First he proposed, in his turn, the transport of his troops to Volo, or the Piræus, or any other Greek port not under the martial law administered by General Sarraïl. He could obtain no assurance that he and his men would not be sent to Saloniki.¹ The delay allowed by the Bulgarians came to an end. Rather than risk the disintegration of his command under Allied pressure at Saloniki, he surrendered 70 officers and 800 men to the Bulgarians. Meanwhile the French commander on Thassos announced his intention to ship all the Greek soldiers who would not enlist with the Allies to some Greek island as prisoners, putting the officers who refused to volunteer to join Sarraïl back on shore and *deliver them over to the Germans*. Only upon the insistence of Colonel

¹ "The army corps commander [Colonel Hadjopoulos] was just embarking on a small English vessel when suddenly its captain, in spite of the understanding reached with the Entente agents, demanded to know in what quality he embarked. At the same moment, two revolutionary officers, Major Stavrinos and Lieutenant Vacas, covered him with their revolvers and cried out: 'Join the Saloniki movement or you can't come aboard!' Exasperated, the colonel refused and returned ashore." Major Passaris: "L'Entente et la Grece," p. 85.

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Christodoulos, himself an ardent Ententist and a volunteer for Saloniki, was it finally decided to send officers and men to Volo as Colonel Hadjopoulos had suggested and as General Callaris had ordered. Of the 80 officers, 72 declared that they would remain loyal to king and country and were ultimately transported to Volo.

Great capital has been made of this action in the British and French press, with a view to showing the hostility of the Greek army officers to the Allies. But it is more than probable that had the British admiral acted promptly, without injecting the question of joining the Allies into the matter of transporting the Greek troops from Cavalla, Colonel Hadjopoulos and his force would now be safely in Greece instead of in Silesia. As in the case of the surrender of Fort Rupel, the Allied military authorities seem to have taken the chance that when faced with the choice of joining General Sarrail's army or giving way before the Bulgars, the Greeks would choose the former. On every occasion, however, the Greeks have seen through this intention and rather than be tricked into a course they have not deliberately chosen, have

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chosen a course nullifying the Entente's calculations.

In general it may be remarked that if it was an error from the beginning to attempt to coerce the Greeks, it was doubly so to try to outwit them. Familiar through five centuries with the oriental duplicity of the Turk, the transparent subtleties of British and French diplomacy in the near East appeared to them childish, and frequently achieved just the opposite of what was intended.

Nevertheless, the surrender of Colonel Hadjopoulos's force to the Bulgars raised a great hue and cry throughout Greece. Not the least of those enraged by the event was King Constantine. I saw him for a moment just after the news reached him. His is, on occasions, the language of a soldier, as forcible and picturesque as that of any trooper. This was such an occasion. Colonel Hadjopoulos, the Germans, the Bulgars, General Sarraïl, the British admiral, and a few others—all came in for an impartial display of verbal fireworks which I have seldom seen equaled. What annoyed him most was that the incident, like that of the alleged attack on the French legation, gave a handle to those opposing

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the arrangements which he was bending every energy to complete with the Entente. A high permanent official of the Greek Government, who is both an ardent Ententist and a Venizelist, at this juncture expressed the general sentiment in Greece:

"I hope the Entente now sees," he said, "where the policy of trying to force matters leads. The moral effect of Greece's joining the Allies would unquestionably be to shorten the war by many months. But without an unpolitical figure like Zaïmis to conduct the negotiations, there is scarcely a ghost of a chance that the matter can be arranged.

"God knows nobody in Greece has opposed our entry into the war for the last fortnight. If we do not enter, the responsibility must fall upon those who have been too impatient to await the end of a legitimate discussion of details."

Not without difficulty was King Constantine able to secure another Ententist, Mr. Nicholas Dimitricopoulos, to take up Mr. Zaïmis's task. The new premier's first act was to consult the Allied ministers as to the constitution of his cabinet and the powers it should exercise. Declar-

ing himself frankly in favor of war, he desired two things to make his ground sure: the same political recognition that had been accorded the Zaïmis cabinet and, that there might be no question of the popular verdict for war, immediate compliance with the provision of the Allied ultimatum of June 21 regarding the holding of new elections.

This was far from suiting the book of the Venizelists. Now as anxious to put off elections as he had previously been ready to insist upon them, the Cretan concentrated all his influence against an Allied recognition of Mr. Dimitricopoulos as prime minister. He succeeded, and the British and French ministers, despite Mr. Dimitricopoulos's candid war program, vetoed the selection of him as head of the new government. It is a little difficult to see just how they expected a premier to bind Greece in an alliance for war while denying him the power to bind Greece to anything. I doubt if the two diplomatists considered this, however. It is probable that they hoped by refusing to recognize Mr. Dimitricopoulos to force the king at last to turn to Venizelos. To make this more certain, they let it be known that the

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Entente would not recognize as premier former prime ministers Gounaris, Rhallys, or Skouloudis, or ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. George Streit, or even the leader of "the king's party" for war, ex-Minister of Marine Nicholas Stratos.

In the face of this wholesale embargo on the political talent of Greece, King Constantine was in a quandary. His problem was two-fold: to satisfy the Allied diplomatists and at the same time to find a man of sufficient political standing to be able to manage the Boulé. For the latter purpose, Venizelos was out of the question, as the Boulé was almost unanimous against him—and the Entente would not permit new elections by which another Boulé could be chosen. Yet a declaration of war without the support of the Boulé would be unquestionably a denial of every principle of democracy. Had King Constantine been willing, as Venizelos evidently was, to set up a virtual dictatorship, no doubt he could have managed it; but the Greek monarch clung tenaciously to constitutional rule and could not be persuaded to overstep the constitutional limits of his power.

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The British and French ministers treated this problem of practical democracy as if the elected representatives of the Greek people were of no earthly consequence. The king, therefore, decided that the next premier he chose should form a cabinet to take care of this phase of the situation, whether its membership pleased the Entente or not. He selected Nicholas Caloguyeropoulos to continue the negotiations for Greece's joining the Entente. Caloguyeropoulos was an ardent Francophile, a doctor of laws of Paris, and long a resident of Marseilles, with close business and personal ties in England. To handle the *Boulé*, the King suggested that the anti-war party in that body be given a minority representation in the ministry, but that the majority be pledged in advance to reach an alliance with the Allies. Three of the ministers, Lysander Kaf-tanzhoglo, Demitrios Vocotopoulos, and Lucas Ruphos, were therefore chosen from the number of the deputies opposed to war; the remainder of the cabinet, also members of parliament, were ready to follow Premier Caloguyeropoulos in joining the Entente. As deputies, all were directly responsible to their electors, constituting

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thereby a cabinet responsible to the people without necessitating the fiction of securing the endorsement of the various party leaders. It was significant that all three ministers opposed to war were men with whom the word of the king would have been sufficient to change their attitude when the moment for action arrived.

What was of more significance than anything else, however, was the action of King Constantine himself at this juncture. The moment he secured Nicholas Dimitricopoulos to form a war cabinet, he did not even await the completion of the ministry. At once he telegraphed his brothers, the Princes George, Nicholas, and Andrew, then in Paris, Petrograd, and London, to give the governments of the three powers his personal word that his one purpose was active military co-operation with the Allies in a campaign against Bulgaria, and in his name, as constitutional commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces of Greece, to offer formally the full assistance of Greece, on the terms already outlined to Sir Francis Elliot, that is, on the basis of a guarantee of the integrity of Hellas.

I have myself seen the original message, and

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it is beyond dispute that by it King Constantine intended to and did bind himself definitely to the cause of the Entente. There could be no turning back. The governments of Great Britain, France, and Russia had only to accept the offer to conclude the arrangements for Greece's entry into the war on the side of the Allies.

CHAPTER XX

VENIZELOS DECLARES REVOLUTION

PRINCE NICHOLAS has described to me the delight of the Russian Government with King Constantine's proposal. They suggested, however, that the proposal be made officially through the prime minister and cabinet of Greece. Prince Nicholas so telegraphed his brother. This was precisely what King Constantine desired to do, but was prevented by the delays in forming a cabinet satisfactory to the Entente ministers in Athens. The Caloguyeropoulos cabinet was sworn in on September 16. Its first act was to draft a formal proposal of alliance between Greece and the Entente which was forwarded to London, Paris, and Petrograd on September 18. The same day that this was done, King Constantine called to the palace Demitrios Kalopothakis, the editor of the "Embros," the leading independent newspaper of Greece, and requested him to begin a campaign favoring war, in the

columns of the "Embros," thus facilitating the Caloguyeropoulos cabinet in its effort to secure the support of sufficient deputies in the Boulé to provide for a vote of war credits.

The Venizelists were ignorant of none of these steps toward a complete understanding between King Constantine and the Allies. The success of the negotiations meant to them merely that, in the event of war, Venizelos would not be in a position to distribute offices and army contracts to his followers. They saw their dreams of wealth and power fade. Backs to the wall, they fought with every weapon the consummation of the king's plans.

In this, the British and French journalists in Athens were of the greatest aid to the Cretan. Taking their cue from the Venizelist press, they flooded London, Paris, and Petrograd with articles impeaching the sincerity of the Greek monarch's attitude and arraigning the Caloguyeropoulos cabinet as pro-German, because of the presence in it of three minority members opposed to war. Every spoken or published word of these three men in criticism of the Entente was dug out by Venizelos and turned over to the press

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representatives of the Entente countries, to be telegraphed abroad as indicating the hostility to the Allies of the entire Caloguyeropoulos cabinet, While the chancelleries of London, Paris, and Petrograd were aware how far King Constantine had gone toward joining the Allied forces, they kept their knowledge secret. At the same time they permitted the press to spread broadcast the impression that the attitude of the Greek sovereign was precisely the contrary.

This impression was also reflected in the United States. Certain New York dailies have arrangements for republishing despatches to certain London newspapers. Thus those from Greece are innocently handed out to the American public, ignorant of the springs of intrigue beneath them. To aid in his press propaganda against the coöperation of Greece and the Entente without his intermediation, Venizelos established a new daily in Athens, the "Elephtheros Typos." Its presses were ordered in New York and paid for with French money, to the tune of \$14,000; its editor, previously a needy refugee from Constantinople, suddenly blossomed forth arrayed like the lily of the field. Venizelos him-

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self, who had come from Crete seven years before with holes in the seat of his trousers, and whose entire salary, during his continuous period of office-holding, would not total \$20,000, suddenly purchased a house on Athens's most fashionable residence street, which was valued at \$160,000.

Against a treasure chest of these proportions Premier Caloguyeropoulos, like every political figure in modern Greek history, save Venizelos, a man of modest means, struggled at a handicap to present the truth about his cabinet. He made little headway. Caloguyeropoulos was a pro-German; the "Embros," supporting the king's war policy, was in the pay of Baron von Schenck (long since unable to pay anybody); King Constantine was playing for time until Rumania could be crushed—thus the chorus of the Venizelist faithful was dinned into the ears of the British and French public. And all that time, King Constantine, his cards on the table, was waiting replies from London, Paris, and Petrograd to his offer to join the Allies.

The formal proposal made by Foreign Minister Carapanos on September 18 was somewhat more comprehensive than the king's informal

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one. In brief, the conditions were: a guarantee of the integrity of Greece; that the Greek army should be put upon such a footing, in respect to equipment and munitions, as to be able to wage effective war, as war had developed during the past two years, before being called upon to take active part in the hostilities; and finally,—as an observation, not as a condition,—that no disposition should be made of Thrace or Asia Minor after the war without consulting Greece as one of the powers to decide the fate of these provinces. In communicating to me these terms, Premier Caloguyeropoulos said:

All that is really essential is what King Constantine has already told you, namely, the guarantee of the integrity of Greece. That our army shall be properly equipped is as much to the interest of the Allies as it is to ours. We are ready to enter the war with our bare fists if need be, but it is to nobody's advantage that we declare war unprepared. As for Thrace and Asia Minor—we ask no promises of concessions; but owing to the large proportion of Greeks inhabiting this territory we think that Greece should be party to any discussion of its final disposition. I may add that, for the sake of the millions of Greeks who still live in the Ottoman Empire, we suggested that the negotiations remain confidential until an agreement should be reached. M. Briand, however, objected to this, and we have accordingly waived it.

Of the campaign in the foreign press against

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King Constantine and the new cabinet, the premier said:

I can't understand it! Nothing could be more unjust to King Constantine than these persistent assertions that he is pro-German. He is pro-Greek and only pro-Greek. He is the last man in Greece to be moved by any prejudice of ready made opinion, whatsoever.

At the same time Premier Caloguyeropoulos sent the Bulgarian Government a peremptory note demanding the liberation of Colonel Hadjopoulos and his men, then held as prisoners at Phillippopolis. This demand was calculated to serve as a basis of a declaration of war the moment the Entente powers accepted King Constantine's proposals. The acceptance seemed far away, however, the Allied governments continuing to embarrass negotiations by obstinately refusing to recognize the existence of the Caloguyeropoulos cabinet.

Their attitude was time gained for the Venizelists, who were in a panic at the rapidity with which the preparations for leaving neutrality were proceeding. At the behest of Venizelos, emissaries, charged to stir up a revolt against King Constantine and his government, left

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Athens for Crete and the out islands. For this treasonable purpose the islands were chosen instead of the mainland of Greece, because their populations had so recently become Greek citizens that they were as yet unimbued with any abiding sense of civic consciousness. During the ninety years that the predecessors of Venizelos had been building up in continental Greece a democratic state founded upon the responsibility of citizenship, some half million denizens of the out islands, of whom Venizelos was one, had known only revolution as means of political action. It was, therefore, natural enough that in their failure to halt King Constantine's negotiations with the Allied powers by constitutional means, Venizelos and his followers should turn to the lawless method of armed revolt.

It was impossible for any one in Athens at this time to remain long ignorant of the preparations for revolution. On September 20, I asked Venizelos point blank whether it was true that he planned to go to Saloniki to place himself at the head of the movement he was organizing to split the Kingdom of Greece into two hostile camps.

"It would be unwise for me to answer you

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now," he said. "I must wait a brief time yet to see what the Government purposes to do, before deciding what course it would be best to take in the event Greece does not enter the war. As I said on August 27, if the King will not hear the voice of the people, we must ourselves decide what it is best to do. I do not know what it will be, but a long continuation of the present situation is intolerable." He very frankly voiced a fear that the Serbs might, after the war, retain a part of Greek Macedonia, and that the Allies might hold Saloniki; and he expressed the opinion that it was necessary to take some drastic action to forestall these two possibilities.

While the Cretan was thus giving voice to sentiments scarcely flattering to the Allies, King Constantine personally attended the swearing in of the 1915 recruits to the garrison of Athens. As he had done to the officers of the 11th Division, he made a brief speech on discipline:

When a soldier does whatever he pleases and thinks he knows best what is good for his country, then woe betide such an army, and the country having such an army. People will tell you otherwise to mislead you; but you must not believe them, for they are merely exploiting patriotism for their own ends; they are traf-

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fickers of their Fatherland; they seek to commit grave offenses under the cloak of patriotism.

Here in a few words is the distinction between Venizelos and his sovereign.

Not only the king, but every one else in Greece agreed with Venizelos that a long continuance of the anomalous situation created by the refusal of the Entente ministers to recognize the Caloguyeropoulos government was intolerable. On September 21, Nicholas Politis, an ardent Ententist and supporter of Venizelos, and then under-secretary of foreign affairs, went to Sir Francis Elliot and assured him informally that the Caloguyeropoulos cabinet was honestly doing all in its power to bring Greece to the side of the Entente in the war, and sounded the British minister as to what changes in the cabinet would render its composition acceptable to Great Britain and France. I, myself, at King Constantine's suggestion, endeavored to secure from Sir Francis some statement of why his government persisted in its strange policy of boycotting a ministry pledged to carry out the very desire of all the Allies.

"I am authorized to give no assurances about

our attitude," Sir Francis replied. "I am waiting for instructions." Both the British and French ministers realized fully the Greek sovereign's problem in handling the Boulé, and the necessity which had prompted the inclusion in the Caloguyeropoulos cabinet of three ministers opposed to war; but neither was disposed to assist the king by counseling the governments of Great Britain and France either to recognize the cabinet as it stood or to indicate by what changes of personnel the cabinet could be made acceptable to the Allies. Ex-Minister of Marine Nicholas Stratos at this time was enthusiastically fighting, in the Athenian press, a battle for Greek intervention. A man of admitted ability, he was plainly indicated as a cabinet minister to replace one of those to whom the Entente objected. Sir Francis Elliot vetoed any suggestion of Stratos being used as a cabinet minister.

"The king is not bargaining Greece's entry into the war," Stratos declared to me on September 22. "He is merely being sensible enough not to enter until Greece is in a position to be of real value to the Allies. We have made our proposition to the Entente powers, in which we

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state what we require in the way of equipment, unless we would be of more trouble than assistance. The decision is up to them."

What took place in Rome at this time, a diplomatic history of the war alone will reveal. The impression in Athens was that Italy was at work against the acceptance of King Constantine's co-operation with the Allies. On September 23 the Venizelist newspaper, "Hestia," commonly inspired from the British legation, frankly stated that rather than see Greece in the war, Italy, herself, would furnish a contingent of troops for Balkan use equivalent to whatever Greece could offer. It is not improbable, however, that the tergiversation of the Allied governments in respect to the Caloguyeropoulos cabinet was merely to enable the agents of Venizelos to complete their preparations for revolution. Certainly revolution was not long delayed. Foreign Minister Carapanos's note, proposing the military operation of Greece with the Allies, still remained unanswered on the desks of the foreign ministers of Great Britain, France, and Russia, when, under the auspices of the British fleet, a revolt broke out in Crete.

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On September 24 a crisis was reached. King Constantine decided to alter the entire cabinet to please the Entente, making Admiral Coundouriotis, a devoted Venizelist and an uncompromising Ententist, prime minister. To this end he summoned Admiral Coundouriotis to the palace for the morning of September 25. I saw the admiral, myself, the evening before, and talked with him of his approaching interview with the king. He, as well as Sir Francis Elliot, was aware of the king's intentions. That evening, also, I had a long talk with King Constantine, who told me that he believed he had got at the bottom of the Entente's hesitation to accept Greece as an ally, and that he was very certain of a favorable reply to his proposal within a few days. It seemed virtually impossible that anything could now prevent an agreement between Greece and the Allies. Probably only one thing could have prevented it—and that thing happened in the small hours of September 25.

Accompanied by a guard of the Anglo-French secret police, and convoyed by a French destroyer, Venizelos, Admiral Coundouriotis and a dozen or more followers of the Cretan left

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Athens secretly for Crete to take part in the revolution against the constitutional government of Greece. I am certain that when I talked with Admiral Coundouriotis the previous evening, he had no knowledge of this plot. The adventure seems to have been undertaken on a moment's notice, inspired by information that the king's plan of united action with the Allies was on the eve of success, and by the knowledge that with its success Venizelos's ambitions and the hopes of his followers were permanently jeopardized. From Canea he issued a proclamation which was merely a somewhat more hysterical repetition of his cry that King Constantine "adopt his policy" and join the Entente. At the same time he called for volunteers to rally to him to fight the Bulgarians. In reply, Premier Caloguyeropoulos declared to me: "The sole question at issue is whether the Entente desires the coöperation of Greece with the king and the army, or whether they will only accept Greece on condition that Venizelos head the State." Former Greek Minister to the United States, Deputy Agamemnon Schlieman put it: "It is a choice between Greece as Greece, with our sovereign, our flag, and the

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Greek national spirit, or merely individual Greeks, representing no really national purpose, fighting under Venizelos at so much a day."

Venizelos knew as well as any one (indeed better) the efforts which had been made to compass the end which in his proclamation he counseled his sovereign to achieve. He could not have been ignorant that the step he had taken in inspiring insurrection among the inhabitants of new Greece would serve, more than anything else, to render impossible an effective coöperation between Greece and the Allies. Yet, such is the character of the man, that while clamoring for action which others were quietly working to bring about, he was by his own course making it impossible.

CHAPTER XXI

THE ENTENTE REFUSES GREECE AS AN ALLY

THE departure of Venizelos changed nothing in King Constantine's purpose to join the Allies; but it altered materially the attitude of the Allied powers toward Greece. They had never really wished to work with the King of the Hellenes, because Constantine I was devoted heart and soul to the interests of his own country, not to the interests of the Entente. Venizelos, on the other hand, was literally their man, wholly amenable to the desires of Great Britain and France. In his desperate effort to persuade the Entente not to treat with King Constantine, Venizelos unquestionably made promises which he must have known were far in excess of his ability to perform. Undoubtedly also he expected by his vast claims to induce both Great Britain and France to finance his revolution on a very large scale. In this at least he was successful. It was probable also that Great Britain and France were thor-

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oughly taken in by the confidence with which the Cretan spoke of the success of his movement and, preferring to secure without condition the co-operation of part of the Greek army through Venizelos, rather than secure the entire army by accepting King Constantine's terms, the Entente deliberately chose to foster the revolution in Greece.

In one of his speeches Venizelos spoke of obtaining for General Sarraïl an army of one hundred thousand men, presumably by stimulating desertions from the regular army. For this purpose money was necessary, and money was given him. A soldier in the Greek army receives one cent a day when on active service; Venizelos offered five times as much, together with a cash bonus of \$5, paid to the soldier on his joining the Venizelist movement, as well as the necessary travel expenses to Saloniki. A sergeant in the Greek army is paid seven cents a day; with Venizelos he received 50 cents, and a much greater possibility of rapid promotion was held out to him. A second lieutenant in the Greek army receives \$6; with Venizelos his pay was \$15.50. A first lieutenant jumped from \$7.50 to \$17.50 by join-

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ing the Venizelists; a captain from \$8 to \$22.50, with a bonus, in the case of higher officers, anywhere from \$20 to \$100—sometimes more. In this “recruiting” work the Anglo-French secret police were exceedingly active, and the British and French legations brought pressure to bear upon the Greek Government to prevent the exaction of any penalty upon those thus induced to desert their country’s flag.

The military organization of Greece naturally took steps to prevent desertions from the Greek army; but it is only just to the Greeks to say that such desertions were comparatively few. In six months’ time, despite these inducements to join Venizelos’s forces, the Cretan had obtained less than 12,000 men out of the Greek army of 250,000; less than 200 officers out of 3500 then upon active service in the Greek army, and about one hundred policemen whom he enrolled as officers of his contingent.¹

The Cretan’s manœuver at first was to declare that his movement had no revolutionary character. But on his arrival in Saloniki he threw off this mask and in a public address referred

¹ See Appendix.

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to the constitutional government of Greece as a "demented monarchy allied with political corruption." The effect of this and similar declarations was to alienate still more of his followers among the thinking people of Greece. His adherents in Saloniki were, with scarcely an exception, recipients of salaries as officers of the "provisional government" occupying posts the duties of which were nominal. In Athens the much-heralded Balkan offensive was referred to as the "offensive against the ten million drachmæ"—that sum being the first loan made to the Venizelist government by the Entente. The prime minister of constitutional Greece receives \$160 a month. Venizelos and his coadjutors, Admiral Coundouriotis and General Danglis, drew salaries of \$2400 a month.

The British and French ministers in Athens quietly made clear to King Constantine what would be their attitude toward the constitutional government of Greece, now that they hoped to secure what they desired of Greece through Venizelos. The very day of the Cretan's departure from Athens, it was informally conveyed to King Constantine that the Entente expected of

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him a declaration in principle of his readiness to leave neutrality without conditions, and the formation of a national ministry in which the Venizelists should be largely represented; in default of this, they implied that an Allied control of the Greek customs and the confiscation of the funds belonging to the Greek Government, then on deposit in the banks of France and England, might be added to the Allied control of the Greek telegraphs, telephones, posts, wireless, railways, and police, which they were already exercising.

To ascertain how much coöperation Venizelos would give a national cabinet formed for war, King Constantine caused the Cretan to be sounded while he was yet in Crete. Three questions were asked:

(1) Does Venizelos insist upon the premier-ship? (2) Will he support a war cabinet? (3) Will he or some of his followers accept a minority representation in such a cabinet, thus sharing the responsibility of conducting the war?

To the first and third questions Venizelos's reply was negative; but he agreed to support a war cabinet.

This was far from satisfactory to the king.

Venizelos and his followers, if they remained aloof from the conduct of the war, would be in position to visit upon the conservative party the entire blame should disaster follow the Greek entry into hostilities. Having remained outside the conduct of the campaign, they would be free to criticize everything which might be done. On the whole, the king felt that as long as Venizelos refused to return to Athens and take up his place in the life of the state as a citizen, the leader of a political party accepting the full responsibility of such leadership, the Cretan would remain a menace of revolution at any moment, a source of essential weakness to a nation at war which it would be the height of risk to tolerate in a national crisis. He knew his former first minister too well to dream for a moment that, given an opportunity by some reverse to the national arms to effect a *coup d'état* and seize the supreme power, the Cretan would be deterred by any considerations of patriotism. He believed that a man who would deliberately, as a political manœuvre, set about splitting the country into two hostile camps on the eve of its entrance into a life-and-death struggle, was capable of any

course for the furtherance of his own ambitions.

At the same time the Greek monarch was causing Venizelos to be sounded, he conferred with every man of military and political importance in Greece on the same subject. The advice given was summed up by General Moscopoulos, chief of staff, in a report favoring an early departure from neutrality. I attended a cabinet meeting on September 27, which was held solely with this in view. On receipt of these substantiations of his own judgment, King Constantine, relying on the assurances he had already had, both from his brothers in Petrograd and London and from the Greek minister in Paris just before Venizelos's departure, of the favorable reception given his proposal to join the Allies, definitely decided to discount the formal acceptance of his offer of military coöperation, and to set about making preparations to that end at once.

As a first essential step, he charged Nicholas Stratos to handle the Boulé for war. But Sir Francis Elliot promptly nullified this disposition as much as possible by refusing to countenance Stratos as war minister, the post to which he was destined in the war cabinet then under discus-

sion. As a military measure, the king likewise called certain as yet untrained reserves to the colors to receive their military instruction; but the British and French ministers vetoed this also, as a violation of the ultimatum of June 21. As for the navy, in the early hours of the morning of September 27, certain Venizelists, aided by the Anglo-French secret police, forcibly seized the Greek second-class cruiser *Hydra* and took it to join the Allied squadron anchored in Keratsina Bay, thus greatly upsetting the organization of the entire Hellenic navy.

Despite these rebuffs in military, political, and naval fields, King Constantine persisted in his determination to form a war cabinet acceptable to the Entente, and to leave neutrality before matters should become worse with Rumania. To this end, on September 29, he drafted telegrams which he proposed to send to King George, President Poincaré, and Emperor Nicholas of Russia on the occasion of completing his alliance with them, and called his brother Prince Andrew home from England to take his place with the colors.

Then suddenly, out of a clear sky, came a tele-

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gram from the Greek minister in Paris reciting an informal conversation with Premier Briand on the subject of Foreign Minister Carapanos's proposals of alliance. Couched in discreet language, as personal advice and not an official communication, the French premier's message to the Greek sovereign was to the effect that, owing to the engagements already entered into among the Allies, it was impossible to negotiate openly with Greece for her acceptance as a full ally; but that if King Constantine were to assume the entire responsibility of declaring war on Bulgaria, Great Britain and France would then be in a position to insist to their Allies upon the admission of Greece to the combination on an equitable footing. Nothing was guaranteed; nothing even promised. Vague allusions to Greece's "legitimate aspirations" were calculated to dazzle but not convince. France and Great Britain were ready to declare their intention to assist Greece in the peace conference to push her claims to territorial expansion—but no more. *There was not one word about the condition which the Greek monarch had laid down as essential to any discussion, namely, a guarantee of the integrity of*

Greece. Premier Briand further explained that he had delayed a formal reply to the proposals of the Caloguyeropoulos cabinet in the hope that King Constantine would himself take the initiative and, by declaring war on Bulgaria without any arrangement with the Entente, place the Allies in the presence of a *fait accompli*. He stated that he still hoped the Greek sovereign would decide to do this; but that in any case a formal reply to the proposals of the Caloguyeropoulos cabinet would be forthcoming in due season.

It is impossible that Premier Briand could have been so ignorant of the character of King Constantine as to suppose for a moment that such subtleties as he suggested would appeal to the soldier sovereign. Direct and plain spoken to a fault himself, Constantine I is not the man to play the rôle in any such evident intrigue among the Allies as that the French statesman cast him for. He had made a straightforward proposal; he expected a straightforward answer. The revelation of lack of team work among the Allied powers which he obtained instead might have served a man less personally frank as a warning

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that he was not being fairly dealt with; Constantine of Greece merely dismissed the whole Briand proposal as childish. Viewing the situation with military eyes he said simply: "Why should I declare war until I am ready to make war? Let them help us to get ready for war, and I shall declare war when we are prepared to push it through. To make a futile gesture of hostility without following it up with appropriate action is ridiculous. Certainly the Allies are not going to make any such reply as this to our formal proposals. We have, therefore, merely to get our house in order and to wait their official reply."

In this view of the attitude of the Allies, reasonable as it might appear, the Greek monarch was not sustained by the more astute politicians of Greece. A high-placed permanent official, a strong partizan of Greek coöperation with the Entente, summed up the policy of Great Britain and France in far other terms:

The continuous series of attacks on Greece in the London and Paris press have long given evidence that the Entente Powers are not seriously treating with us for our coöperation in the Balkan battlefield. Consider the facts: the day the king advised the British minister of his intention to leave neutrality, an Allied

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fleet arrived at Salamis and the unauthorized arrests by the Anglo-French secret police began. When Mr. Zaïmis had almost completed negotiations for Greece's joining the Allies, the incident of the "attack" on the French legation suddenly occurred and Mr. Zaïmis resigned in consequence. Mr. Dimitricopoulos, who openly stated that he was in favor of Greece's immediate departure from neutrality on the side of the Allies, was found by the Entente ministers unacceptable as premier. The first act of Mr. Caloguyeropoulos was to declare categorically Greece's acceptance in principle of an entry into the war on the side of the Allies—and at once the Allied ministers refused to recognize his cabinet. From August 29, when the king expressed his willingness to leave neutrality, he has acquiesced in every desire of the Entente Powers. Yet meanwhile and while the British and French Governments have actually been treating with the king for his coöperation, the press in both countries, subject to censorship as it is, has conducted the bitterest kind of campaign against the sincerity of the king's intentions.

Venizelos declared on September 20 that he would take no steps calculated to divide the country until he could see what the Greek government proposed to do; yet a week after the government's formal proposals were submitted to the Allied chancelleries, he left, with the knowledge and assistance of the Allied ministers, to head the insurrection he had inaugurated in Crete.

What is the clue to this seeming double game toward Greece? The explanation is obvious. The Italians and Russians have always opposed Greece's coöperation in the war, the former because they want Greek North Epirus—possibly Corfu, also; the latter because they want Greek Thrace, opposite Constantinople. As for Great Britain and France, their interest is to conserve a great Greece as a buffer to Russia as a

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Mediterranean power. But they mistrust King Constantine, believing him pro-German despite his repeated assurances and definite acts to the contrary. They therefore seem to have decided upon a course of keeping Greece as great as possible, while lessening in every way the prestige of the Greek monarch. A dispassionate observer would conclude that the Entente Powers are working to establish Venizelos—the imperialist advocate of a greater Greece—in complete control of the country, rather than to obtain the military co-operation of Greece in the war.

It will only be upon the failure of the Venizelist movement—which now seems inevitable—that the Allies will accept Greece to their number, with King Constantine to head the Greek armies. It is not we who are delaying Greece's entry into the war, but the Entente Powers themselves.

At the same time that M. Briand's message reached King Constantine, the British naval authorities quietly, without declaring a blockade, set about stopping and retaining at Gibraltar or Malta all foodstuffs or coal vessels bound for Greece. Admiral Dartige du Fournet also, on this occasion, gave birth to the first of a large family of notes addressed to the Greek Government in which simply as "commanding the Allied forces of the Mediterranean," he demanded the expulsion within five days of a number of persons, including Greek subjects, a list of whom he appended to his note.

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Just what other authority than the guns of his battleships the admiral of a friendly fleet might have for issuing orders to a sovereign government did not appear in the note, nor did it seem to trouble the champions of the liberties of small states. Before the prescribed delay had expired, the Allied ministers in Athens instructed their control officers to stop the sending of any official cipher messages between the Greek Government and its representatives abroad, save those addressed to Allied countries. It was thus impossible for the Greek Government to communicate with its diplomatic representative in Washington, save with the full knowledge of the Allies and governed by their interested censorship. It is a significant matter, this; for much of the mistaken impression of events in the near East during the months which followed was spread in the United States through a propaganda to which the constitutional government of Greece had not even the physical means of replying. It was evident at once from these various measures taken by the Allied governments that pressure was to be put upon Greece to induce King Constantine to

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accept M. Briand's suggestion of making war at once, prepared or unprepared.

Nor was Venizelos idle. From Crete, where fully a third of his countrymen retired to the mountains and refused to recognize his revolutionary authority, he proceeded to Chios and Lesbos, in each of which islands he made speeches of an increasingly inflammatory character, evoking shouts of "Down with the king!" from his audiences. On his arrival at Saloniki he at once set about the formation of a "provisional government," consisting of himself and two figureheads, Admiral Coundouriotis and General Danglis. The campaign to recruit the army of 100,000 men he had promised the Allies began immediately. At the same time, he bent all his energies to secure for his "provisional government" official recognition from the Entente powers and the United States and, more important still, to obtain a large loan from the Allies, that with money in his coffers he might hold his followers together.

To add to the confusion of the situation, early in October, 1916, while King Constantine still awaited an official reply to his government's of-

ficial proposal of coöperation with the Entente, the Italians took a hand in embroiling matters by advancing from Santa Quaranta, on the coast of Greek Epirus just opposite Corfu, to Arguero-castro and toward Janina. This was by no means in the direction of the Austrians and Bulgars, but rather toward the heart of old Greece. Plainly the Italians, knowing the plans of their Allies in regard to the Venizelist revolution, feared that France and Great Britain might promise the "provisional government" concessions which would upset Italian ambitions in the near East. It is not improbable that their surmise was correct.

While all these events, and especially the Italian advance, disturbed the Greeks greatly, none of them in the least affected the equanimity of the Greek monarch. Rumania was faring badly at the hands of Generals von Mackensen and von Falkenhayn. King Constantine, always the soldier, felt that as affairs in Rumania grew worse, the Allies would realize the folly of playing at internal politics in Greece on the chance of obtaining an army through Venizelos, and would accept his proposal to furnish them

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an army already trained and organized and lacking only certain equipment, which any force Venizelos might raise would lack still more. With this in view he planned a general mobilization for October 8. He changed none of his preparations to join the Allies on account of M. Briand's suggestion. On the contrary, through Dr. Streit he urged the Athenian press to moderation in dealing with Venizelos, and set about the formation of a cabinet which the Allies would recognize, and to which the formal reply of the Entente to his proposal could be delivered.

The Caloguyeropoulos cabinet resigned on October 3. Though it failed of its mission to bring Greece into the war, it would scarcely be fair to charge the failure either to King Constantine or to Prime Minister Caloguyeropoulos. The testimony of Nicholas Politis on this point is precious. Under Mr. Caloguyeropoulos he had striven without avail to persuade Sir Francis Elliot that the Government was honestly in favor of leaving neutrality on the side of the Entente. Together with another Ententist in the ministry for foreign affairs of Greece, Mr. George Caradjas, he had done all he could to convince the

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Allied diplomatists that they were committing the greatest political blunder of the war in boycotting the Caloguyeropoulos cabinet. When Sir Francis and M. Guillemin remained obdurate, he finally gave up his attempt and went to Saloniki, where he joined Venizelos as minister for foreign affairs of the "provisional government." His judgment may therefore be taken as somewhat more than impartial toward the policy of the Allies. He made the following statement:¹

The Caloguyeropoulos ministry was in favor of intervention. The Hellenic Government, led by Mr. Caloguyeropoulos, submitted to the Entente legations Greece's proposals for an immediate participation in the war, and King Constantine approved this course of the Government. Neither the fact that Mr. Caloguyeropoulos had been known throughout his political life as an ardent friend of France, nor that he was assisted in the ministry by such Francophiles as Mr. Carapanos and others, moved the Entente to change their views about his cabinet. Once having pronounced the whole ministry pro-German, the Entente ministers dared not admit their error.

¹ Elephtheros Typos (Venizelist), November 9, 1916.

CHAPTER XXII

THE SEIZURE OF THE GREEK FLEET

AFTER some difficulty, the distinguished savant, Professor Spyridon Lambros, accepted the premiership and formed a cabinet which the Allied ministers recognized, although they accompanied the recognition with an admonition that the new government was to exercise only the nominal powers provided by the ultimatum of June 21. The Lambros government was to be as constitutionally unable to conduct war as the Caloguyeropoulos cabinet had been. A general mobilization in compliance with Premier Briand's suggestion was, therefore, out of the question. Simultaneously with their recognition of the new cabinet, moreover, the British and French ministers telegraphed their respective governments the advice to reply to King Constantine's proposal of alliance in the following sense:

That while the form in which the proposal is made is not acceptable, and the question of the Bulgarian

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occupation of Greek soil is to be regarded as a purely Greek matter in which the Allied Powers are not concerned,¹ nevertheless, should Greece voluntarily leave neutrality, declare war on Bulgaria and decree a general mobilization, the Allies would be disposed to furnish every assistance to drive Greece's enemy from her territory, as well as to give other material proofs of the benevolent interest of the Allies in the welfare of Greece.

To this promising suggestion, a qualifying clause was added:

It is understood, however, that these diplomatic assurances are not in any way to interfere with the instructions already given the admiral of the Allied fleet to assure by all necessary measures the safety of the Allied Orient armies.

The vital question, therefore, in determining King Constantine's action was to ascertain precisely what instructions had been given Admiral Dartige du Fournet, and to what extent they might nullify "these diplomatic assurances." But before any revealing event could occur, Prince Andrew arrived from London and made his report upon opinion in Great Britain toward King Constantine's proposal of military coöperation with the Allies. Exceedingly plain spoken,

¹ This is rather astonishing in view of the stir which had been made in London and Paris over the Bulgarian occupation of Fort Rupel and Cavalla.

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the king's brother minced no words. He brought with him a sheaf of cuttings from British newspapers, all assailing the Greek monarch in more or less violent terms.

"There's a censorship in England," he said, "and nothing is published without the consent of the Government. Look at this stuff they have let be spread all over the world, while they had your proposition under consideration! If they are playing fair with you, they have a queer way of showing it."

The King called a crown council at once, and put everything before that assembly of former prime ministers of Greece. He explained his abiding intention to join the Allies if he could do so on terms not prejudicial to the integrity and reasonable security of his country; he suggested that it would be inappropriate to discuss at this time, and before victory, the illusory territorial compensations to which M. Briand referred in his message; he reported his effort to decree a partial mobilization a fortnight previously, and the veto the British and French ministers in Athens had put upon that project; he expressed his conviction that, in view of the re-

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verses in Rumania, the Allies must shortly make a formal reply to his offer and, finally, he stated that on receipt of a favorable reply, he was ready to execute his function as head of the Hellenic state by declaring war on Bulgaria at once. The crown council approved this program in full.

While this council was sitting, discussing thus frankly the king's plans to join the Allies, a note from Admiral Dartige du Fournet was waiting at the ministry for foreign affairs that was to put an end once and for all to any question of what the Admiral's special instructions were in respect to Greece. He demanded the surrender to him by the following noon, October 11, of the entire Greek light flotilla of six torpedo boats, fourteen destroyers, the flagship of the flotilla, the *Canaris*, the protected cruiser *Helli*, the two Greek submarines, and even the unarmed despatch vessel *Coriolanus*, sole means of communication between the Piræus and the Greek naval arsenal at Salamis. The only reason given for the demand was "the safety of the Allied fleet." Of the Greek navy only the two battleships, the *Lemnos*¹ and the *Kilkis*,² and the armored cruiser

¹ Ex-Mississippi, U. S. N.

² Ex-Idaho, U. S. N.

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Georgios Averoff, were to remain under the Greek flag. Some 1500 Greek sailors were to be set ashore on twelve hours' notice, exiled from the ships which they had manned, in 1912, to victory over the hated Turk.

It is impossible to picture the effect of this demand upon the Greeks without reducing it to terms of the effect a similar demand by Great Britain, France, and Russia would have upon the people of the United States. Indeed, in Greece the effect was probably greater, for the Greeks are a maritime people, and their great pride was their little navy. The Allied ministers in Athens claimed knowledge of a plot on the part of certain Greek naval officers to take the Greek fleet to Constantinople and to deliver it over to the Turks. There is something altogether too fantastic about this story to inspire belief. The explanation commonly credited in Athens is more reasonable. The "recruits" to the Venizelist movement from the out islands were not materializing. With the guns of the Greek fleet to persuade the inhabitants of the islands to enlist in his embryo army, as yet merely a handful in size, the Cretan felt that he could accomplish

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something. Indeed later, in a public statement given on December 30, 1916, Venizelos frankly confessed that only by means of the fleet could he establish his control of the islands he had claimed were spontaneous adherents of his revolutionary government.¹

A second thing we want of the Entente is the Greek navy, which the Entente seized from the royalist marine. A nationalist battleship sailing among the Greek islands and into the ports of old Greece would be more *effective in stamping out royalist sentiment* than would years of talk. We have told the people of the islands that we and the Entente are in firm accord; but the islanders ask, "Where is the Greek fleet?"

Another crown council was hastily called, and discussed the Admiral's demand until four in the morning. Then only did the insistence of King Constantine that whatever the Allies wanted be accorded them, prevail against the advice to resist. "It does not matter," said the Greek sovereign over and over again. "Soon we shall all be allies together, and our fleet will be returned to us."

I was aboard the flagship *Canaris* the following morning when Admiral Ipitidis had the crews piped to quarters and read the order of the day

¹ See Appendix.

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addressed to the commanders of the Greek ships of war:

“Constrained by the mighty of the earth, in grief we order you to abandon your ships before midday, accompanied by your men.”

When the order had been read the admiral announced that, by order of King Constantine, commander-in-chief of the naval forces of Greece, every man who wished to remain with his ship, and so to join the Allies, was free to do so. While he was speaking, the men stood rigid. The tears streamed down the faces of many. I saw even one Englishman, a member of the British naval mission to Greece, who was crying just as were his Greek comrades. When the admiral had finished his announcement, there was a pause. Not a man stepped out of line to remain with the ships when they should pass into the hands of the French.

At a signal, the blue and white flag of Hellas was lowered on all the ships and rolled up and given to the commander. The first officer went below and unscrewed from the wall the portrait of King Constantine that hangs in the ward room of every vessel in the Greek navy. The chaplain

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took down the sacred icon before which in every Greek ship burns the lamp of faith. At this juncture a French cutter came alongside the flagship and a French officer asked why the Greek flag was being lowered. The officer of the watch replied shortly, "The admiral's orders." The French cutter shoved off and returned to its flagship, which stood by, cleared for action, and covering the tiny Greek fleet with guns set for a broadside. At the opposite end of the little bay, another Allied warship was anchored, likewise cleared for action, with her great guns also trained menacingly on the Greek flotilla.

An hour before the time set for delivery, the crews of every vessel of those to be surrendered took to the boats, each commander the last to leave his ship, the flag rolled up under his arm. They were put ashore at Scaramanga, opposite the arsenal, where the men gathered in silent groups to watch the fate of their ships, their sea chests piled about them. On the stroke of noon, the French arrived with destroyers and tugs and took possession of the deserted fleet.

The French were in bad temper, and exceedingly nervous. Evidently they had expected one

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of two things—either that at the command to leave their vessels the great majority of the Greek sailors would remain on board and join the Allied squadron, or that some loyalist officer would seek to destroy his vessel rather than give it up. It is a striking evidence of the devotion and discipline of the Greek navy that neither happened. Twenty-four hours before, eighty per cent. of the Greek navy had been profoundly pro-English and eager to fight beside the Allies. The Greek navy is British trained. During the war with Turkey Admiral Cardale, a British officer, had served with that very light flotilla, and most of the men had served under him and felt the greatest affection for him. But their desire to fight beside the Allies was as free Greeks, on their own ships, under their own flag, and the command of their own king, not as outsiders—volunteers or insurgents. This is as true of the army as of the navy. It is that feeling of loyalty to Greece more than anything else that the Allies have never understood in dealing with the Greeks. And that, more than anything else, is why they have failed in all their diplomacy in Greece.

The deserted ships were speedily towed out

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from their anchorage and moored where the Allied fleet surrounded them. From the shore, the Greek sailors in silence watched the boats as, one by one, they were taken away. As the *Canaris* was towed out, one of them plucked the ribbon from his hat and tore it into shreds. It bore in gold letters the name of his ship—*Canaris*.

"The *Canaris* is no more," he said, a quick sob catching his voice.

Aboard the *Lemnos* I watched the sad procession with one of the officers of the battleship. There were tears on his cheeks, too. When the last ship had gone, he waved his arm at seven huge Allied battleships, at one end of the bay, and three at the other. Any one of these could have destroyed the entire Greek flotilla with a few shots. A swarm of Allied destroyers completely hemmed in the pitiful little Greek fleet as it had lain hugging the shore under the shadow of the arsenal.

"My God!" he cried bitterly, "what could we ever have done to them! Why do they think they have to take away our honor, too!"

That evening, when the sailors of the fleet reached Athens, an immense demonstration



"One element of possible conciliation"

REAR ADMIRAL HUBERT CARDALE, R.H.N.
Acting Head of the British Naval Mission in Greece

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sprang into being, spontaneously. The sailors were joined by thousands of others and together they all marched through the streets carrying a Hellenic flag. Before a rifle range on Stadium Street an American flag was displayed. They plucked it from the wall and placed it beside the white and blue of Greece and swept along behind the two colors, to the American legation. The leaders of the crowd were petty officers and plain seamen of the Greek navy, who spoke the English they had learned from their British training officers. They felt somehow that because two of their battleships had once been American, the United States, too, might have something to say about their forcible sequestration by warring powers. They wanted to tell the American minister about it, and beg his mediation with the Allies to get their ships back.

It was a simple, childish idea, and the men who conceived it were imbued with the childlike feeling that they had been wronged, and that America, the great champion of the weak, could set their wrong right again. But the legation was closed. From the Athenian Club across the street, Mr. Droppers, the minister, watched the

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profoundly moving demonstration without revealing his presence, although he admitted that it was a very orderly demonstration. Ultimately, the crowd went elsewhere, discouraged, but still bearing the American and Greek flags before them. The following morning a committee waited upon Mr. Droppers and presented him a set of resolutions, asking that the President of the United States take cognizance of the extraordinary circumstance that three great powers had combined by the threat of force to seize almost the entire navy of a small, neutral state. This was but one of the many manifestations of the heartsoreness of the Greeks. Everywhere I saw Greek sailors whom I knew, and knew to have been passionately in favor of joining the Allies, who had been Venizelists, as well; they had changed. Not a man of them but was deeply resentful toward the British and French, and incredibly bitter toward Venizelos, whom they held responsible for deceiving the Allies as to the intentions of the Greek navy.

The same day that the Greek light flotilla was seized by Admiral Dartige du Fournet, the Allied consuls in Crete formally recognized the

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“provisional government” in the island, and Venizelos formed a “cabinet” in Saloniki. Twelve ministerial portfolios, with no duties to speak of attached, were confided to obscure politicians and newspaper editors who had conducted the Venizelist propaganda. If there were no duties for these “ministers” to perform, there were nevertheless salaries to draw. Constitutional Greece has but nine cabinet ministers, drawing each \$160 per month; the “provisional government” boasted twelve administrators with nothing to administrate, each drawing \$1600 per month for the service—a difference, counting the salaries of Venizelos and his two coadjutors, of \$300,520 per annum, the price in ministerial salaries alone of the Saloniki government, in excess of the cost of maintaining the government of constitutional Greece.

The following day Admiral Dartige du Fournet presented a supplementary note, requiring that the guns of the *Lemnos*, *Kilkis*, and *Georgios Averoff* be rendered useless by delivering up their breech-blocks; and that their crews be reduced to one third strength; and that all the batteries defending the Piræus be surrendered to

French gunners. He demanded, further, full maritime and military jurisdiction over the port of the Piræus and, finally, complete control of the police and of the administration of the Athens-Saloniki railway. These demands were based on "the protection of the flanks of the Allied Orient armies at Saloniki." Naturally, such an excuse struck the Greek people as grotesque. To any Greek, or indeed, to any one familiar with Greek history, the idea of an army in Macedonia in peril from the attack of an inferior force from Thessaly, is ridiculous. There are but two passes to the north: the Vale of Tempe, which could be held by a single machine gun against an army corps, and the Petras defile, over the western slopes of Mt. Olympus, through which Xerxes invaded Thessaly, and which a battery of field artillery could readily defend against an invading army.

It was therefore necessary to seek another and likelier reason for these latest requirements of the admiral in command of the Allied squadron. It appeared from the note itself in the shape of the demand for the complete control of the Greek police. Since Venizelos's departure, the Allied

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diplomatic authorities in Athens had been increasingly active in stimulating the "recruiting of volunteers" to the Venizelist army. The French minister had even, on one occasion, furnished an armed guard of French marines to conduct a few cadets and Greek policemen through the streets of Athens to the Piræus, to embark for Saloniki, with the idea of thus impressing the Athenians with the official sanction given by the Allies to desertion from the Greek service to join Sarraïl's forces. The Anglo-French secret police conducted regular bureaus of "recruitment." Every evening when the streets of Athens were most crowded, an automobile of the Anglo-French secret police whirled through Stadium Street at terrific speed, bearing on their way to join Venizelos a few soldiers, already half drunk on the money paid them to risk their skins fighting for the Allies. As the same high permanent official already quoted put it: "A dispassionate observer would conclude that the Entente powers are bending every energy to establish Venizelos in complete control of Greece, not to secure the military coöperation of Greece in the war." It was precisely this inter-

pretation which the people of Athens put upon the French admiral's latest demands.

King Constantine was anxious to avoid any untoward incident which might give rise to further oppressive measures of control. He therefore turned the dispossessed sailors of the fleet into soldiers, and set them to policing Athens and the Piræus. To crystallize the spirit of discipline and *esprit de corps* among the sailors in this new function, he reviewed them in person on October 16.

Tens of thousands of men, women, and children gathered in the Champs de Mars to witness the ceremony. Admiral Damianos, minister of marine, read a royal order of the day addressed to "officers, petty officers, and sailors," and conceived in the exalted style of Greek public addresses:

In these days there is bitterness still upon your lips; each hour new wounds drain all hearts—those hearts that in pride saw of old but one Greece, honored and victorious. In these days my government has been constrained to order you to quit those ships aboard which you brought liberty to our enslaved brothers.

You have come here with souls bleeding and with tears in your eyes, but without one single defection from your ranks, to take your place beside your king. I thank you and I congratulate you, my faithful sailors

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—not as king and commander-in-chief of the navy, but in the name of the Fatherland which you adore, and for which you have given so much in sacrifice.

I pray that our dearest vow may speedily be fulfilled, and that the blessed hour may be at hand when you shall again take aboard your ships the sacred icons, that have watched over you in the past and that shall watch over you in the future, and the glorious flags, that they may once more float to the breeze of Hellenic seas and bring consolation and hope to every Hellenic heart, for king and country.

It seems difficult to believe that this oratorical flight, so Greek in its character, was hailed in France and England as proof positive of King Constantine's hostility to the Entente and his scarcely concealed efforts to incite his people to attack the Allies! Certainly the Greeks assembled in the Champs de Mars did not think so. To them, it was a mere call upon their loyalty, and they responded as one man. Scarcely had the review of the sailors ended when King Constantine, on horseback, rode unaccompanied into the crowd surrounding the great military exercise field. Neither aide nor orderly rode with him. Not a plain-clothes man was anywhere near. With a single gesture, he commanded his entourage to remain where they were, and gave himself up to his people.

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They greeted him as one of themselves, but with a certain reverence, too. They pressed about him, striving to touch his person with eager hands—to touch his saddle or even the horse that bore him. They clung to his stirrup and let themselves be dragged along as he rode slowly back and forth through the crowd. Now and then he spied a soldier whom he had known at Saloniki or Janina, and called him by name, asking after the wife and babies; now and then he sharply commanded the pressing multitude to give way to let through some mother with a child in arms or some old woman, whose shoulder he bent down to pat affectionately.

“The *koumbaros!* the *koumbaros!*” was the cry in every mouth. “Long live the *koumbaros!*”

Not since Napoleon’s time has any ruler in the world gone so freely and so blithely among his people as Constantine I on that day. The crowd was full of men who had been Venizelists—would again be Venizelists, if Venizelos should succeed; and Venizelos himself, their leader, was now arrayed in revolution against the man who rode among them. Months of the bitterest denunciation from press and platform had fired hatreds

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in the breasts of these quick-hating people that might easily have found expression in the stroke of a dagger or a pistol shot. Not a hand was raised save in blessing. And the man who had dared to shout "Down with the king!" at that moment would have been literally torn to pieces by the crowd.

That is what the Greek people think of their sovereign!

Princess Alice of Battenberg summed up the Greek attitude toward King Constantine in a few words:

He is a brave and inspired soldier, who has led the Greek people to victory; and they adore him for it. Even those who to-day are in insurrection against the crown, will return to loyal allegiance the moment the foreign influence is lifted from them. The people of Greece almost worship their king, and the great mistake our people¹ have made has been to assume the contrary and to protect and foster a revolution against him. Had they spent a quarter of the time and goodwill seeking to come to an understanding with him that they have spent in helping to build up a revolutionary movement directed against him, none of the sad events of the last few months would have occurred, and he and they long since would have been working in perfect harmony.

¹ The English. Princess Alice is an Englishwoman.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE VENIZELIST INVASION OF OLD GREECE

ON October 13, I had had a long talk with King Constantine. He was fully cognizant of the blow the French admiral's seizure of the Greek fleet had dealt his hopes of an arrangement with the Allies, and by no means ignorant of their preference for dealing with Venizelos rather than with the constitutional government of Greece. He asked me frankly, with that directness so characteristic of him, what was wrong. I answered him as frankly.

"They do not trust you, Sire," I said. "They say that they are afraid that your armies will attack Sarraïl's forces in the rear and catch him between the Greeks and the Bulgarians."

"They must have lost their heads," he rejoined. "Any one who knows the lay of the land knows that that is militarily impossible. However, do you think it would help to dissipate that impres-

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sion if I offered to withdraw all my troops, in excess of peace strength, from Thessaly?"

I told him I thought it would, and informed Sir Francis Elliot of the king's intention. On the evening of King Constantine's review of his sailors, however, the French admiral seized the occasion to land several platoons of marines with machine guns, and march them to Athens. The ostensible excuse was that the Greek monarch's address to the dispossessed crews of the Greek warships was of so inflammatory a nature as to endanger the general peace, and that the marines were debarked to assist the Greek police in maintaining order. It was indeed with great difficulty that order was maintained following this landing of foreign troops upon neutral soil, so great was the resentment of the Greeks against a step which they, not without reason it must be admitted, considered wholly unnecessary.

The landing force occupied first the municipal theater, where a cordon of Greek marines blocked the surrounding streets to prevent any hostile manifestation. Later, the Greek Government offered them various buildings where they could be comfortably housed. But the French admiral

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insisted upon quartering his men in the Zappeion exposition building, where there was neither water nor any other provision for meeting the needs of so large a force. The Zappeion building, however, had the advantage of being within three hundred yards of King Constantine's palace, on the opposite side from the French legation, where another contingent of French marines was already quartered. The Greek sovereign was thus surrounded on two sides by an armed foreign force.

The patrols of the French marines through the streets of Athens, far from impressing the population with the might of the Allies, as was evidently one of the intentions of the landing, rendered both the marines themselves and those who had sent them ashore ridiculous. For the Greek Government was not ignorant that the moving purpose of landing the troops was probably to provoke some sort of a hostile demonstration which could be seized upon by the French admiral as an occasion for taking charge of the Greek capital in force. To avoid such a contingency, the strictest guard of the streets of the city was kept by the Greeks. Whenever a

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French patrol of thirty men passed through the streets on its ostensible mission of maintaining order, a Greek cavalry patrol of four times the strength guarded it on all sides, to prevent any hothead from doing something to precipitate a conflict. It is indicative of the point of hysteria to which the British and French in Athens had worked themselves, that few saw the humor of a situation in which the Greeks were compelled to call out a large military force to guard the guards set by the French admiral to maintain order in a perfectly calm city. The same high Greek official previously quoted said in regard to this matter:

Far from promoting quiet, the mere presence of foreign troops in Athens and the Piræus is the greatest possible incentive to trouble. It is precisely as if a detachment of Japanese marines had been landed in New York to assist the local police at the time of the activities of the gunmen—and we feel just that way about it. What is worse, if we concentrate troops in Athens to prevent trouble, the British and French ministers will say that we are preparing to attack them; if we don't they will say that we are incapable of keeping order. . . . With a mammoth foreign fleet threatening the Piræus and a thousand odd marines quartered in our capital, it is doubtful if either Greece or many Greeks can now be induced to join the Allies.

King Constantine was not of this opinion. He

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called Sir Francis Elliot to the palace to inform him of his intention, as a convincing proof of good faith, to withdraw all the Greek troops over peace strength from Thessaly to the Greek provinces bordering on the Gulf of Corinth, thus disposing of any even chimeric possibility of danger to General Sarrail's rear. No sooner had he done this than General Bousquier, the French military attaché, presented a formal *demand* on the part of France and Great Britain that these troops be withdrawn from Thessaly, not merely to Ætolia, Lokris, Phokis, Attica, and Bœotia as the Greek monarch had proposed, but to the Peloponnesus, where the Allied fleet could hold them virtually imprisoned on an island. At the same time, the Allied police control officer informed the editors of all save the Venizelist newspapers that the French would thereafter exercise a censorship of the press, in violation of the fundamental law of Greece. Regarding these manœuvres of the Entente, King Constantine expressed himself pointedly.

"My brother realizes that it is reasonable that Sarrail's flank should be protected against even the vaguest possibility of attack," Prince Andrew

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told me. "While he has given his word that the Allied troops will not be attacked, and while it is militarily impossible for our army to march against Sarraïl's, still the king has been ready to and has offered of his own accord to withdraw the bulk of his troops from Thessaly, in order to set any latent fears at rest, and as an earnest of his sincerity in dealing with the Entente. Instead of accepting this in the frank spirit in which it is offered, the Entente now demand that the king so dispose of two army corps as practically to lock them up in a concentration camp.

"Sir Francis seems to have indicated the real purpose of all this business when he asked the king if it were not possible to call Venizelos back as prime minister. The king replied: 'You executed Casement as a traitor because he merely tried to separate Ireland from England. Venizelos has actually—though I believe only temporarily—separated Crete, some of the Ægean islands and part of Macedonia from the rest of Greece. After all, Ireland is not England; but the inhabitants of Crete, the Ægean islands and Macedonia are Greeks. Great Britain can no

more expect me to make Venizelos premier than England could have made Casement viceroy of Ireland.' ”

In substantiation of this impression that Great Britain and France were working solely to impose Venizelos upon Greece as a sort of dictator and pro-consul for the Allied powers at whatever cost, came certain unquestionable information which I received at this juncture from a member of one of the Allied legations. He came to me of his own accord, and spoke with complete candor.

“I think we are blindly going from injustice to worse,” he said, “because no one in Paris or London has the courage to admit that Venizelos has been a bad venture, and that we should throw him over and reach an understanding with the king. On the contrary, we are going to dethrone the king—perhaps not at once, but ultimately. I know, and I think the Government knows, that the king has been right all along—about the Dardanelles, about Serbia, Saloniki, Rumania, Venizelos, and everything else. And we have been wrong. But we feel that to admit it now would mean the fall of every Allied gov-

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ernment, and upset the whole conduct of the war. We dare not risk the effect of that upon the neutrals. Therefore King Constantine must give way. It is unjust, if you like, but it is going to be done. You can tell him so, if you wish."

I did. At once King Constantine sent for each of the Entente ministers in turn, and once again went openly and loyally over the same ground he had already covered with generals Kitchener, de Castelnau, Sarraill, Mahon, and with M. Denys Cochin. Following the first of these conversations, the king decreed the reduction of the Greek forces under arms from 60,000 to 34,000. The end of Rumania was already in sight. Though the dilatory tactics of the Entente in treating with the Greek monarch's offer of coöperation had now made such coöperation of little practical value, King Constantine did not withdraw his offer, to which as yet he had had no formal reply.

Italian and Russian counsel prevailed in the Allied conference then being held at Boulogne, where the entire Balkan situation was threshed out. As a result, the representatives of the Al-

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lied powers decided not to recognize the Venizelist "provisional government," which an Italian diplomat described as having been of more embarrassment than assistance to the Allies. Even M. Guillemain spoke warmly of the "loyal declarations by the Greek sovereign of his sentiments toward the Entente." Nicholas Stratos, the leader of the "king's party" for war in Greece declared: "Now that the irritations due to the mutual distrust of one another on the part of King Constantine and the Entente are out of the way, we can go to work negotiating Greece's joining the Allies as a nation and a people, not in the Venizelos fashion, as individuals." Most significant of all, the representatives in Athens of Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria made definite overtures to the United States to take charge of their interests in Greece should Greece leave neutrality. Once more all seemed happily arranged, but those who had followed events before began to question what new action Venizelos would take to prevent the final consummation of an understanding between the Greek king and the Allies.

They had not long to wait. Scarcely had King

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Constantine ended his conversations with the British, French, Russian, and Italian ministers and Admiral Dartige du Fournet, when, on October 28, a battalion of Venizelist troops crossed the Alacmon river and marched southward in an attempt to effect a surprise attack upon Thessaly. At the Niseli bridge, a guard of twelve loyal *evzones*¹ of Queen Sophie's regiment stood off 600 Venizelists, many of whom were also *evzones*. When the attackers saw that those who held the bridge were of the same corps, they refused to continue the engagement, and it was only by fording the river at another point and flanking the guards at the bridge that the invasion was successfully launched with a loss of a number of men for the invaders. What might have been the opening gun of civil war in Greece had been fired by the revolutionaries. It was Venizelos's retort to the decision of the Boulogne conference.

Since the "provisional government" had been established in Saloniki, by tacit consent the Alacmon river had marked the southern frontier of its sphere of influence. Now this frontier had

¹Greek light infantry, wearing the fustanella or skirt, the historic costume of the Greek wars of independence. They are regarded as the most intrepid soldiers in the Balkans.

been crossed. Already the population of Macedonia had been treated with the utmost cruelty by Venizelist "recruiting" officers, seeking to fill the ranks of his so-called "anti-Bulgarian army." The career of one Lefkis, a lieutenant in the Venizelist army, is an extraordinary record of brutalities committed in the Chalcidic peninsula. Ex-Deputy Khalkirikis, of that district, had left his home and taken to the mountains with 1500 men, as in the days of the Turkish domination, to combat this conscription levied by force of Venizelist arms, with the knowledge and connivance of the French military authorities.¹ Many fugitives from the Chalcidic peninsula had crossed to the mainland in small boats, with the few possessions left to them, and recounted the horrors of the Venizelist occupation of the Chalcidic. When, therefore, Major Bartzoukas and his "anti-Bulgarians" crossed the Alacmon and marched upon Ekaterina, the civil population fled before him in terror.

The railways and telegraphs of Greece were in the control of the French. Major Mitsas, the loyal officer commanding the tiny garrison of

¹ See Appendix 4.



"WHAT WAS LEFT OF THE IRISH BRIGADE WAS OF SOME USE"

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Ekaterina, telegraphed his headquarters at Larissa to request reinforcements and report that the Venizelist "anti-Bulgarian" army was proving itself an anti-Greek army and descending in force upon Thessaly. The French control officers in charge of the Greek telegraphs delayed his message until the revolutionists, a battalion strong, were before Ekaterina. The news, however, ran through the country like wildfire and reached Colonel Trikoupis, in command at Larissa, almost as quickly as if the French had not delayed Major Mitsas's despatch. Nothing was gained by the action of the French control officers, save to reveal very clearly the Allied attitude toward the constitutional Greek Government.

Colonel Trikoupis lost no time. He sent a battalion with machine guns and mountain artillery to cross the shepherds' paths over Mount Olympus and take the revolutionists in the rear. At the same time, he asked permission of the Allied railway control officers to send reinforcements north in trains. Though Sir Francis Elliot assured King Constantine that this permission to use his own railways to defend his own

country would be granted, it was not. The king had already, in compliance with his offer, begun the southward transportation of his troops from Thessaly, and despite the sudden invasion of the Venizelists, he did not halt the work.

Fortunately for Greece, Colonel Trikoupis had not depended upon the railways to reinforce the loyal garrison of Ekaterina, now occupying the foothills west of that town. His troops crossed the Meluna heights, joined Major Mitsas at Kolokouri, and took possession of Condouriotissa and Keramidi. Within a week of the crossing of the Alacmon river by the "anti-Bulgarian" army, Major Bartzoukas and his Venizelist revolutionists were surrounded on all sides but the sea. Had the Greek navy still been in Greek hands, the entire revolutionary force could have been captured or destroyed.

King Constantine's orders to Colonel Trikoupis were: "Spill no Greek blood. We are brothers all, even those who, misguided, fight against the State." The loyal commander, therefore, merely informed the Venizelists that they were encircled and covered by artillery, and awaited developments. Major Bartzoukas tele-

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graphed General Sarraïl to come to his rescue. On November 5, a detachment of French arrived post haste and occupied the town, the railway station, and the roads leading southward. The Venizelist invasion of Greece was over.

On the failure of their enterprise, the Venizelists claimed that they had only moved southward to seize the railway at Ekaterina, the northernmost point to which trains were run from Athens, and thus ensure that those desiring to leave Athens to join the Venizelist movement should not be stopped. But on the arrival of the Venizelists in Ekaterina, before they were aware that their manœuver had failed, they boasted loudly that all Thessaly was Venizelist, that the Thessalians were only waiting the signal to throw off "the yoke of the tyrant" (Constantine I) and join the "anti-Bulgarian" army. They declared openly that they proposed to march upon Athens and dethrone King Constantine and asserted that the whole of Thessaly would rise to join them as they went. Captain Alexander Zannos, a member of the "provisional government" committee, stated to me that the first aim of the Venizelos government was not to fight the Bulgarians, but

to dethrone the king and conquer Hellas. Even the French officer in command of the detachment sent to the rescue of Major Bartzoukas mildly remarked that he supposed "the only way out of the muddle was to run King Constantine and his family out of Greece." Evidently, however, he knew very little about the actual situation in Greece.

As I had just come through Thessaly on my way to join the Venizelist army, I knew how hollow were the boasts of the Venizelists that all of northern Greece was for the Cretan. Even in Ekaterina itself, a Macedonian town, the invading troops received a sullen welcome from the local population. One thing also was made evident in the descent of the Venizelists toward Thessaly—that many of the men enrolled in the "anti-Bulgarian" army remained unwillingly, and as soon as they approached open country, in easy touch with old Greece, they were off over the mountains to their homes. The week that Major Bartzoukas's force spent at Ekaterina cost him a fifth of his effective in desertions.

There was no discipline, no organization among the Venizelist troops. Everybody gave orders,

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and none obeyed them. The men, too, who had honestly enlisted to fight the Bulgars were shocked and disillusioned by this attempt at civil war in Greece itself. "These other men are our brothers," a Venizelist *evzone* said to me, speaking of the loyalists. "I did n't volunteer to fight them; I volunteered to fight the Bulgars." Colonel Trikoupis voiced a similar sentiment. "Nothing would please me better," he declared, "than to fight the Bulgars beside my old comrades with whom I studied nine years in a military school in France. But I will not fight for Venizelos or under Venizelos. I will fight for my country, under my king, or I shall not fight. You will find most Greeks feel the same way."

CHAPTER XXIV

ADMIRAL DARTIGE DU FOURNET IN CONTROL

WHILE the revolutionary attempt to invade old Greece was meeting a decisive check at the hands of the constitutional Government, events were marching rapidly toward disaster both in Athens and Saloniki. In the Macedonian capital the Venizelists renewed and further embittered their attacks on King Constantine, emboldened by like attacks which they read daily in the British and French press. "L'Opinion," a subsidized French daily published in Saloniki, gave the keynote of abuse. Of King Constantine's assurance to the Allies that he had no intention of attacking General Sarraill's rear:

A lie in form and substance, which would not deceive even His Simpleness, the crown prince—who will soon, we hope, be no more than the nephew of his uncle.^{1 2}

Suppose even that the king this time has not lied, and that order reigns in Athens. . . .³

¹ The Kaiser.

² "L'Opinion," Oct. 20, 1916.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1916.

Of the Greek sovereign himself:

A comedy king, who does not know how to do anything but talk.¹ . . . King Constantine who, to-day, bears the just burden of his infamies and of the retaliations to his repeated treasons.²

And finally, as an ingenuous statement of the aim of the ambitious Cretan:

It is probable that Mr. Venizelos and his collaborators will shortly be able to transfer to Athens the seat of their government, which will no longer be provisional, but definitive.³

Not one, but every Venizelist organ in Macedonia, was engaged in this sort of thing. The members of the "provisional government" with whom I talked at Ekaterina were even more violent in speech than these printed fulminations. While Venizelos was being pictured in the House of Commons by Sir Robert Cecil as a patriot sacrificing his ambitions to fight his country's enemies with neither rancor nor sinister purposes toward his sovereign, in Athens no less than in Saloniki a propaganda was at work to dethrone King Constantine and put Venizelos in his place as president of a nominal republic.

¹ And this from Venizelos "L'Opinion," Oct. 20, 1916.

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1916.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1916.

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Under this influence the commander of the Allied fleet, now permanently established in Keratsina Bay, off the Piræus, promptly fell. He was assiduously courted by the Venizelists. Save on the rare occasions when he saw the king to formulate some new demand, he was in touch only with those who were now openly plotting the overthrow of the truly democratic Greek monarchy. If he was misled by the information presented to him to prove that King Constantine's popularity with the Greek people was fictitious, the blame may perhaps rest better upon the Anglo-French secret police, which had long since ceased to be (if, indeed, it ever had been) an organization to advise the Allied governments of actual conditions in Greece, and had become an organization of Venizelist propaganda.

An example of the character of their work was offered at this period. A series of letters, purporting to have been written by government Deputy Kalimasiotis, and tending to reveal a vast plot to supply German submarines with fuel oil from Greece, was published in the Venizelist press, and reproduced in London, Paris, and New York. The publication of these alleged letters

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came just after two small Greek vessels, the *Angheliki* and the *Kiki Isaia*, had been sunk, presumably by German submarines, and within gunshot of the nets protecting the Allied fleet in Keratsina Bay from submarine attack. The fact that hostile submarines could with impunity approach so closely the anchorage of the Allied war-ships was in itself disconcerting; the charge that they were supplied from Greece set the Entente naval authorities by the ears. Acting on the assumption drawn from the pretended correspondence of Deputy Kalimasiotis, Admiral Dartige du Fournet announced his intention of employing the Hellenic light flotilla, heretofore merely sequestered, to combat hostile submarines, and promptly hoisted the French flag on the ships he had seized less than a month before.

From the point of view of international law the sequestration of the Hellenic navy was by no means justifiable, it is true; but to hoist the French flag on the ships so sequestered and to use them while the nation to which they belonged still remained neutral created an entirely new precedent in the maintenance of "the freedom of

the seas." It was one which could be possible only because Greece was small and the Allies big enough and strong enough to enforce any decision they might make. The Kalimasiotis letters proved to be, and were admitted by the Allied diplomatists to be, impudent forgeries; but as a pretext for employing the Hellenic navy in the Allies' warfare they had served their purpose. If wrong had been done on the strength of them, no attempt was made to right it.

The admiral's action was taken on November 7. It fanned into flame again all the resentment of the Greeks over their cavalier treatment at the hands of the Allies that King Constantine had been at such pains to quiet. Fortunately, however, French Deputy Benazet arrived in Athens at this juncture and had a long conversation with the Greek monarch. He was convinced at once of the king's honesty and sincerity, as every man not wholly hypnotized by the Venizelists always was, and set about unofficially trying to find a solution to the whole fabric of needless friction which Venizelos and his followers had woven to separate the Greek sovereign and the Allies. The formula he found was to reëstablish

a relationship of confidence between the Entente and King Constantine. When he suggested this to M. Guillemin, the latter cried:

“Are you trying to ruin me?”

“I am trying to serve France for once in a way,” Deputy Benazet is reported as replying dryly.

M. Benazet’s talk with the king hinged on the extraordinary suspicions that the Allied governments continued to harbor against King Constantine despite the fact that the latter still kept open his offer of military coöperation with the Allies. He appealed to the Greek sovereign to make a still further sacrifice to convince the Entente of his sincerity, and admitted that it was no fault of Constantine I that his sincerity was still in question. To drive this appeal home, the British and French ministers, on November 9, issued a *communiqué* calling the attention of Premier Lambros to “the state of public opinion in Paris and London where, after the evidence of the good-will of the Allied governments recently given in the Ekaterina affair, it is not understood why no efficacious measures have been taken by the Greek Government to end the

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agitation kept up in quarters hostile to the Entente."

The king was well aware that the Entente's "evidence of good-will" in the Ekaterina affair had been dictated solely by a desire to save the Venizelist invaders from capture by the loyal troops, not to save old Greece from an invasion of which it had never been in danger. Neither was he ignorant that what "public opinion" in respect to Greece there was in London and Paris had been manufactured by the governments of both countries to save their own political skins, following the failure of their policy in the near East. He realized indeed that in England at least the press campaign against him had been conducted really rather to force Sir Edward Grey out of office than for any reasons relating to Greece. Though in no sense taken in by the patent chicane of this *communiqué*, King Constantine was so eager to reach an understanding with the Allies that he passed it by and offered to meet Deputy Benazet half-way in any conciliatory action he might suggest. M. Benazet's proposal was in substance as follows: the Greek Government had immediate need of its

armament, largely to parry any attempt at attack from the revolutionists. Should an arrangement for the military coöperation between Greece and the Allies be reached later, this armament could readily be replaced by the Entente before Greece would be called upon to engage in actual hostilities. General Sarraïl was in desperate straits for lack of certain equipment, notably mountain artillery. If, therefore, the Allies were willing to guarantee constitutional Greece against the possibility of any attack by the revolutionists, what prevented King Constantine, as commander-in-chief of the Hellenic armies, from lending the Allies some part of the equipment they required? To reinforce his suggested plan, Deputy Benazet pointed out to the Greek monarch that such an act of magnanimity on his part would undoubtedly, once for all, dispose of any further suspicions maintained by the Allied governments.

It is an earnest of the singleness of King Constantine's purpose to work in harmony with the Allied powers that he finally agreed to think the suggestion over and to do what he could to forward a better understanding between himself

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and the Entente. Deputy Benazet, on his part, was to seek quite unofficially to obtain the erection of a neutral zone between Macedonia and old Greece, across which the French themselves should see that no revolutionary influence could pass to thrust Greece into civil war. In all of this negotiation the Greek monarch recommended Deputy Benazet to the utmost discretion, however, pointing out that the recent manœuvres of the Allies in Greece had succeeded in creating in Hellas what Baron von Schenck had failed to accomplish in two years of work—an active sentiment of hostility to the Allied powers, which would have to be handled with great tact.

To aid in realizing this friendly understanding, General Roques, the new chief of the French staff, arrived from Saloniki, where he had been visiting the Allied Macedonian front, and conferred with King Constantine on the military details of the proposed arrangement. He increased the desire of the Allies from a few mountain batteries to virtually the entire equipment of the Hellenic army, as well as to the use and control of the automobile road from Itea, on the Gulf of Corinth, to Bralo, and of the Athens-

Saloniki railway from Bralo to Saloniki, as a possible line of retreat for Sarrail's forces. Also, he treated the matter as all settled, despite King Constantine's reminder that it was not only far from settled, but would require time and very adroit handling to carry through even part of the program as originally conceived.

The French contention that the Greek sovereign exercised the powers of an absolute monarch, able to impose his decisions upon the Hellenic people at any moment, besides being contrary to the case, here set the French themselves on a false route. They were willing enough to profit by this alleged absolutism of Constantine I when it was to their advantage, and they sought to do so now. Proceeding from the assumption that the Greek monarch wielded at least the same dictatorial powers of which they had had evidence in Venizelos's method of handling his followers, they expected King Constantine to order the surrender of Greece's armament to the Allies without further ado. The Greek sovereign's power with the Hellenic people, however, lies in his reflecting, not dictating, their will. He not only could not do all that was expected of him,

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but would not. As a high permanent Greek official put it, "It is difficult to conceive of any government consenting to surrender the arms and munitions of the Greek army to anybody." Whatever King Constantine's benevolence toward the Entente might be, here he was face to face with the fact that the arms of the Greek people belong to the Greek people. They had bought them with their own money, by privation and sacrifice. Inhabiting a land only of recent years adequately policed, each man regarded his rifle as a part of himself. It might be stored in the arsenal, but it was his personal property, ticketed with his own name and mobilization-number. He had used it in two wars and carried it through ten months of mobilization. When he went to the arsenal, he expected to find it there waiting him. For all his love of the *koumbaros*, not even the *koumbaros* could lend, much less sell, the Greek reservist's rifle.

One thing, however, King Constantine did do as an earnest of his desire to promote a better understanding with the Allies. On November 11, as commander-in-chief of the army, he decreed that the officers of constitutional Greece who de-

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sired to join the Allies at Saloniki would be free to resign from their rank in the army and leave Athens. The effect of this concession was far from what might have been expected. The Allies took it as a sign of weakness, not of sincerity, on the part of the Greek sovereign, and at once Admiral Dartige du Fournet presented the Hellenic Government with a demand in form for the immediate surrender to the Allies of ten batteries of mountain artillery and the delivery "within the shortest possible delay" of the following war material:

Sixteen batteries of field artillery, with 1000 rounds of ammunition for each gun; 16 [that is, 6 in addition to the 10 already mentioned] batteries of mountain artillery, with 1000 rounds for each gun; 40,000 Manlicher rifles, with 8,800,000 rounds of rifle ammunition; 140 machine-guns, with a proportionate quantity of ammunition; and 50 military trucks.

Save in the matter of machine-guns and rifles, this was virtually the entire available equipment of the Hellenic army. Once the admiral's demand were complied with, the Greeks, with a revolution on their hands and two formidable foreign armies within their frontiers, would be as helpless as the Belgians under German rule.

As justification of his amazing demand, the French admiral began his note by laying great stress upon the fact that "the Entente powers have recognized formally the right of Greece to remain neutral in the present conflict." Just why the right of Greece, any more than that of Holland or Switzerland, to remain neutral should require recognition did not appear from this interesting document. The admiral went on, most appropriately, to recite a few, a very few, examples of the benevolence toward the Entente of the neutrality hitherto maintained by Greece. "Nevertheless," he added, "the delivery to the Bulgarians of Fort Rupel and Cavalla and especially the abandonment in those places of important war material has upset the equilibrium to the profit of the Entente's enemies in a manner of very grave import." He did not attempt to explain why it had taken the Allies almost six months to discover the upsetting of equilibrium to which he referred, or why the Allied military authorities in Macedonia had consistently turned a deaf ear to repeated urgings by General Moscopoulos and Premier Zaïmis to upset the equilibrium in their own favor and occupy

that part of eastern Macedonia subsequently seized by the Bulgarians.

On the whole, the admiral's reasoning was as transparent as it was specious. As a final slap in the face of Greek pride, he reiterated a previous offer to pay for the Greek light flotilla, which he had seized, and now offered to pay for the war material he was demanding. To cap the tact of his note, he added:

The material must be delivered at the Athens station of the Thessalian railway, whence I shall send it to Saloniki; and I demand that an officer, appointed by the minister, be sent to me that the details of execution of these measures may be arranged with him.

Admiral Dartige du Fournet's note reminded the Lambros cabinet of nothing so much as the methods of the Turkish pashas of the days before the war of independence. There was not the faintest possibility that any such astonishing ultimatum would be accepted by the Greek people, whether or not the king wished to accept it. I talked to many Greeks in every walk of life in the fortnight which intervened between the presentation of the admiral's demand and his short-lived effort to enforce its compliance. I

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found no one who did not express a determination to lay down his life at once in defense of what remained of the sovereignty of Greece rather than accede to what every one regarded as this final indignity heaped upon a long-suffering people.

At first the alternative to acceptance was presented as a blockade of Greece and the starvation of the Greek people. Prince Nicholas summed up the situation thus:

In the crisis confronting Greece to-day, when the Entente Powers have demanded the virtual disarming of the Greek people, no statement of fact can reach the world at large save by permission of the Entente. On the other hand, the British and French press is filled with accounts of what has taken place in Greece which give only one side; no statement of the Greek case has yet been presented, or in the nature of things can be presented, until after the war, when Greece may have ceased to exist.

Nevertheless, our situation is so pitiable, the Entente handling of affairs of Greece has been so blind to the interests of the Entente Powers themselves,¹ that it seems to me some hasty statement of a few of the facts should be given light at once.

We are confronted with this alternative: to turn

¹ Cf. Mr. George Renwick, correspondent of the "Daily Chronicle" of London: "The errors and lack of imagination and knowledge of the Entente diplomats are responsible for nearly all the genuine opposition to the abandonment of neutrality which exists in the country. "War Wanderings," p. 243.

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over to one of the belligerents arms and munitions belonging to our army with which to fight the other belligerent, thus forcing us into the war whether we will or no; or to suffer measures of pression including the stoppage of our supplies from such neutral countries as the United States, amounting in a short time to the starvation of our people. We have this choice: declare war or starve. We have no other.

It is as if the British Government were to say to the United States, "If you will not fight at once, you must give up all the arms and ammunitions in your arsenals, strip your army of its equipment, and turn it over to us so that we may fight the Germans with your weapons."

Greece is small and the United States is large; but principle is not a matter of size. That is precisely the principle upon which the demands of the Entente have been made upon us.

The most significant point brought out by King Constantine's brother was the fact that no impartial statement of the real feeling of the Greek people in the matter of the surrender of their arms was permitted to filter out to the world at large. And not only were the United States and the other neutrals kept in ignorance of what was going on, but the people of Great Britain and France as well. Between November 16 and December 1, I sent twenty messages containing in one form or another the information that insistence upon disarming Greece would meet with

resistance from the Greek people. Every such message was stopped by the Allied censors. No one was permitted to tell the people of the United States, or of France or England either, what the admiral's demands meant, nor the inevitable outcome of persisting in them, evident from the first to any intelligent observer in Greece at the time.

To the Venizelists, the admiral's demand was the very desire of their hearts. They, too, were well aware that no Government of Greece would or could yield to this last exigency on the part of the Entente, and they were delighted with the prospect of an unavoidable conflict between the King of the Hellenes and the Allied powers. They felt certain that a dethronement of the Greek monarch must result from such a clash, and they at once set about perfecting their arrangements to take full advantage of whatever the outcome might prove. "This moment must not take us by surprise," as Pamicos Zymbrakakis wrote Venizelos, "but quite the contrary, it must find us prepared and ready to create a *de facto* situation, in collaboration with the Entente Powers, and especially with France. . . ."

I am unable to bring myself to believe that

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Admiral Dartige du Fournet was a conscient party to the Venizelist plot to effect a *coup d'état* in conjunction with his demand and his eventual attempt to force the surrender of the armament of Greece. It is undoubtedly true that the motive of the demand was the necessity for supplying such force as Venizelos had been able to gather in Saloniki with an equipment which the force itself was too insignificant to justify the Allies in going to the trouble to furnish. It seemed, and still seems to me, despite what Mr. Venizelos wrote his adherents in Athens,¹ fairly evident that the Venizelists would not have taken so much pains at this juncture to persuade the French admiral of their strength in Athens had they and he been really working in concert.

Beginning with the day of the presentation of the demand, the entire Venizelist organization in Athens and the Piræus set themselves to convince the admiral that he had only to remain firm in his insistence to see the king weaken at the last moment and tamely give up the arms required. The first step to this end was to persuade the

¹ Appendix 6.

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French sailor that the Venizelists themselves were the masters of public opinion in Greece, and could dictate the king's course to him when the moment for action should come. As Venizelos expressed it when writing to General Corakas on November 7: "What remains, after all, of this famous king, who is still your king? Not even the shadow of himself! His authority has been reduced to shreds by one concession after another. His war teeth have been pulled one by one."

To convince the admiral of his power in Athens as well as in Saloniki, Venizelos sent a number of his trusted agents to the capital with unlimited funds. Demonstrations in favor of France and Great Britain, and even of Venizelos, were organized and protected, directed often by the French and British legations. Never were the Anglo-French secret police so active, all to persuade the commander of their own fleet of what they had reason to know was not so—that he could, without a struggle, take Greek arms from the sons of those who had fought at Karpenisi and died at Missolonghi. A hired clique accompanied the admiral's every visit to the capital with cheers for France. I recall one "demonstration"

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on a day of rain, when every demonstrator was supplied with overshoes and an umbrella, rarities in Greece, by the thoughtful Venizelist stage-managers. There was nothing subtle about this fictitious enthusiasm for the Entente at a moment when the admiral's demand hung over the Greek people. The heads of the Anglo-French secret police earned their money in full view of the audience, leading the cheers and prompting the "demonstrators" in their lines. Whether the French admiral knew that a revolution was being plotted in his shadow or not, it would be difficult to believe that his own secret service was not aware of it, and actually aiding it as actively as they could.

On November 19, Admiral Dartige du Fournet had a long talk with King Constantine, making a number of minor supplementary demands in keeping with his comprehensive formal note of three days before. The Greek sovereign made his position clear to the French sailor, explaining that even had he wished to lend the Allies, as a mark of good-will, certain batteries of mountain artillery, compliance with any such sweeping demands as the admiral's was out of the question.

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The admiral, however, was obdurate. Had he not been the recipient of one ovation after another at the hands of the people of Athens and the Piræus? He smiled jovially over the king's earnest words when I talked with him, and left the palace with the impression that he knew more about the feelings of the Greek people than did King Constantine.

After this interview King Constantine said to me: "I am still perfectly willing to carry out the proposal made by the Caloguyeropoulos cabinet to join the Allies on the basis of a guarantee of the integrity of Greece, though the opportunity for an effective military coöperation with Rumania is now gone, and little would be gained, either by the Allies or by us, through Greece's coming in at the beginning of winter, when no sort of a campaign can be reasonably undertaken in Macedonia. But as for giving up the arms of my people as the admiral demands, he must be mad! I could not do it if I wanted to; and, as a Greek myself, I would not do it if I could."

But even this possibility of arrangement was precluded by a personal message from Premier Briand which M. Guillemin delivered to King

Constantine the same day. The French prime minister began his communication with a tribute to the candor and sincerity with which the Greek monarch had dealt with the Entente. He recognized for the second time that the King of the Hellenes had honestly offered to join the Allies without the shadow of a thought of betrayal or chicane in his proposal, and admitted that there was no reason to suppose that King Constantine personally desired to assist the enemies of the Entente. This complete profession of faith in the Greek sovereign on M. Briand's part is the more significant in view of the mass of matter to the contrary against which his Government's censorship had not raised a finger. This matter had been freely published in Paris, and spread broadcast over the world, while any account of King Constantine's action and attitude which agreed with M. Briand's own statement of them was promptly suppressed by the Allied censors.

The French premier went on to review the events leading to the position in which Greece and the Allies found themselves, and to suggest various remedies calculated to relieve the tension; but he made no promise that anything King

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Constantine could do would really lessen the pressure then being applied to Greece, and offered no guarantee that the measures of control of food-supply, railways, telephones, posts, telegraphs, shipping, and police of Greece, then being exercised by the Allies, would not be increased in the future. He stated finally that the only solution of the situation as it then stood was not in Greece's loyally becoming an ally of the Entente, as the Greek monarch had proposed, but in King Constantine's recalling Venizelos to power and placing the Government of Greece entirely in the hands of the Cretan.

The French statesman indulged in no vagaries about the constitutionality of the course he proposed, no nonsense about the sovereign will of the Greek people. The Briand cabinet was judge of what the Greek people wanted. King Constantine could execute its orders or take the consequences.

King Constantine informed M. Guillemain that he was ready to take any consequences his refusal to recall Venizelos might entail. Not he alone, but the Hellenic people, regarded the Cretan as a traitor, and he would not recall him to power un-

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der pressure of any will save that of the people of Greece.

So efficacious were the receptions and demonstrations staged for Admiral Dartige du Fournet by the Venizelists that they seemed to convince him not only that there would be no trouble about compliance with his demand for the surrender of the armament of Greece, but that he was already master of Hellas. It is difficult to conceive of any other reasoning which could justify in his own eyes his order of November 19, addressed to the envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and Turkey, summoning them to leave the neutral country to which they were accredited by nine o'clock of the morning of November 22. The action has one precedent of which I know in history: General Tscheppé von Wildenbrück's famous order to French Minister Mollard to quit the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg about which there was so much indignation in France and England in the first days of the war.

Long since without any sort of communication with their respective governments, and conse-

quently of little practical use to their countries, the four diplomatists in question were little loath to leave Greece. In Entente circles in Athens the admiral's order was hailed as if it had been the news of a great Allied victory. It was freely prophesied that, once the diplomatic representatives of the Central empires were gone, all would be plain sailing for Venizelos and the Entente in Greece. It was characteristic of the superficiality of most of the political dispositions taken by the Allied governments in the near East that the possibility that the attitude of the Hellenic people was dictated by a natural and rudimentary patriotism, not by German propaganda, was never for a moment considered. The Greek was not supposed to have an opinion of his own; if he did not, as did Venizelos, indorse every phase of the Entente's shifting policy in the near East, he must be a recipient of German money, supporting Germany's cause.

The ministers of the Central empires left Greece without incident. Their departure, naturally, made no change whatever in the attitude of the Greek Government or the Greek people, since that attitude was dictated by Hellenic, not

Germanic, sentiment.¹ Neither did their departure make any decrease in the activity of German submarines in the eastern Mediterranean, since the submarines were not supplied from Greece, but, in all probability, from Dalmatia, Bulgaria, and Constantinople, as every Allied naval officer of intelligence was frank to admit.

Save as a needless offense to Greece's independent sovereignty, the departure of the representatives of the Central empires left King Constantine cold. He had other troubles on his hands. On November 20 he called a crown council and laid before it M. Briand's suggestion that Venizelos be recalled to rule Greece, reporting the reply he had made the French minister. The assembly of all the former premiers of Greece unanimously approved their sovereign's stand. The king then laid before the council a plan for a recognized war cabinet, to be formed in case the Allied governments, recognizing their false step in demanding the recall of Venizelos,

¹ Even George Renwick, special correspondent of the London "Daily Chronicle," by no means an admirer of the Greek sovereign and a strong partisan of Venizelos, says of King Constantine: "I think that, however much he admires the Germans, he is more pro-Greek than pro-German." "War Wanderings," p. 248.

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were to accept the Greek monarch's proposal of military coöperation with the Allies, which King Constantine insisted be still held open. This was also approved. On the head of any surrender of the arms of Greece to the Allies or anybody else, the crown council pronounced a definitely negative judgment.

On November 21, therefore, Premier Lambros replied directly to Admiral Dartige du Fournet in a note to which was appended a comparative list to show that the Allies, in taking possession of the Greek fleet, the arsenal, the fortifications of the Piræus, Saloniki, Fort Dova Tepe, and Fort Karabournou had already received of Greece far more in the way of arms and munitions than all the Bulgars had obtained in taking Fort Rupel, Serres, Drama, and Cavalla.

Disposing thus finally of the French admiral's claim that any military equilibrium in the near East had been upset by the Bulgarian seizure of certain Greek munitions, Premier Lambros went on to inform the admiral that Hellenic public opinion rendered the surrender of the arms of Greece utterly impossible, and to rejoin to the admiral's demand "a very categorical refusal,



George Duke of Sparta
1917.

GEORGE, DUKE OF SPARTA
Heir apparent to the throne of Greece

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while nourishing the hope that you will recognize that the refusal is based upon good grounds." At the same time Foreign Minister Zolocostas advised the Entente diplomatists in Athens of the decision of the Hellenic Government. The public announcement in Athens that the Government had formally refused to accede to the admiral's demand was the signal for a popular demonstration for King Constantine that might well have given the Allied ministers something to think about.

So far no definite threat had been made by the Allies of what would happen to Greece in event of refusal to the admiral's demand, and no precise date had been set for compliance with it. On November 24, however, Admiral Dartige du Fournet, applauded and encouraged by Venizelists and the Venizelist press, set any doubts on the latter subject at rest. He wrote in reply to Premier Lambros's note:

I find it difficult to admit that public opinion, in a country as enlightened as Greece, can regard as insupportable the idea of ceding to Powers for which Greece affirms a benevolent neutrality arms and munitions not in the hands of her army, but completely unused, in her arsenals . . .

Referring, therefore, to my previous note of Novem-

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ber 16, I have the honor to confirm to the royal Hellenic government that, *as a proof of its good-will*, I demand ten batteries of mountain artillery not later than December 1, the date of the delivery of the rest of the war material demanded not to be later than December 15.

It is easy to understand that not only the Hellenic Government, but the Greek people, considered the admiral's reasoning fatuous. On the same basis the Allies might just as well have demanded the surrender of the arms of Switzerland or Holland or, at that time, of the United States. "If my demand is not complied with," the admiral concluded, "I shall be obliged to take, after December 1, whatever measures the situation may require."

Meanwhile, the undeclared blockade of Greece, which the Allies had quietly put into effect on September 30, was already telling upon the population of the country. Venizelos and his followers regarded the evident symptoms of popular dissatisfaction with undisguised delight. The Cretan had written his chief representative in Athens, General Corakas, on November 7:

The specter of hunger and of suffering is already abroad throughout old Greece, and will become still more terrible, so soon as a new and very efficacious

blockade shall be established. The soul of the people is already at the last limit of human endurance ; so near is this that one last blow—which is imminent—will suffice to finish it.

It never seemed to occur to Venizelos, or indeed to the British and French ministers to Greece, that the effect of the intolerable tyranny of Allied police control, of slow starvation through Allied food-control, of industrial throttling resultant upon their control of railways and telegraphs, of constant threat of invading revolutionists, and finally, as a last straw, of the admiral's stupefying demand for surrender of the defensive arms of Greece, might prove a boomerang falling upon the Venizelists, even upon the Allied powers, great as they were and real as was the fundamental affection of the Hellenic people for France. Starting from a fixed idea that King Constantine held the Greeks in unwilling subjection only by force of arms, Venizelos and the Allies saw all things through glass of that shade. The actual fact to the contrary, as patent to any disinterested observer as is the Acropolis, escaped them as completely as if it did not exist. It required a dire experience to drive home to them the falsity of their assump-

tion. They had not long to wait that experience.

The day following the admiral's fixing of December 1 as the date for delivery of the arms, the whole of Greece was in ferment over the prospect. In Thessaly, where, in compliance with King Constantine's promise to withdraw his force in excess of peace strength, artillery was being shipped southward, the population stopped the trains, dragged the guns from the cars, and, the women pulling on the ropes as well as the men, they hid their precious cannon in the hills. Telegrams poured in on the king and Premier Lambros stating that, were the arms of Greece to be surrendered, the Hellenic people would exact instant punishment of those who had consented to the surrender. The sailors dispossessed of the Greek fleet, those sailors who so short a time before had been strikingly pro-English in their sentiments, petitioned their commander-in-chief in these terms:

Your sailors, who have been driven from their glorious ships, who have been subjected to contempt and humiliation from which their hearts still bleed, abandoned their ships only because you wished it. To-day our guns and our cannon, so lately covered with laurels for having brought back the sweet light of liberty to so many millions of our brothers, are demanded. We

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shall not permit that a hand be laid upon them under any circumstance. All of your sailors, without exception, have decided to give the last drop of our [sic] blood for the defense of the honor of the arms of Greece. Give them not up! They shall be taken only by those who tread upon the dead bodies of the last of us!

Heroics, if you please, but there cannot be the slightest question that precisely this feeling inspired nine out of every ten among the Greeks. It was not difficult to ascertain this feeling despite the hysterical tone of the Venizelist press, which claimed daily that talk of resistance was mere futile "bluff," as the Franco-Venizelist organ "*Le Messager d'Athènes*" termed it. One had only to walk about the streets and talk to people at random to discover a sentiment comparable to that which moved the members of "The Boston Tea Party." The Venizelist press only served to deceive the admiral and the British and French ministers. In an editorial entitled "Bluff or Menace," every statement of which was a childish falsification of facts, the "*Messenger*" referred to the incontestable manifestations of popular determination to resist the surrender of arms as "the most pitiful comedy ever played at the expense of a people and their sacred inter-

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ests"; and in another article, on November 29, it conjured the Allies to "redeem by pitiless punishments your indefensible weakness toward those who have deceived you and Greece." The French admiral and the Allied diplomatists took this purely political froth seriously. Their credulity cost the lives of many Frenchmen.

In the dilemma created by an almost unanimous national sentiment against surrender of arms, and the blindness of the British and French ministers to the existence of this sentiment, the Lambros government, on November 27, appealed to the neutral powers for sympathy in the situation which a formal note exposed. Mr. Zolostas wrote:

The right of might has been set up against every legitimate protest of Greece. The royal government desires that the neutrals take into consideration that the spirit of conciliation and equity which it has shown has not been able to spare the Hellenic people the grave vicissitudes through which their Fatherland is passing at this moment. We are not strong enough to avoid them, for they are the inevitable result of Greece's geographical position and of the conflict in interests of great belligerent Powers.

It is significant that my despatch transmitting the bare text of this official document to the press

of one of the neutral countries to which it was directed was suppressed by the Allied censorship. When I expressed surprise at this policy of hiding the truth to one of my friends, a member of one of the Allied legations, he replied:

“It may be unwise, as you say. But you can make up your mind to one thing: we do not propose to let anything go out of Greece that does not suit our book.”¹ It is difficult even yet to see how it suited the book of the Allies to keep the people of France and England in blank ignorance of a situation which, in its working out, needlessly cost so many lives, Allied and Greek alike.

¹ Cf. M. Gabriel Hanotaux, *La Guerre dans les Balkans et l'Europe*, p. 357: “We know very well that European public opinion is being twisted about by a well staged bluff, and that things are not altogether—if indeed at all—what they seem.”

CHAPTER XXV

THE BATTLE OF ATHENS

ON November 27, King Constantine, convinced that the people of England and France and possibly even their governments were in ignorance of the actual situation in Greece, sent a telegram to Premier Briand through his brother, Prince George, reviewing the situation in its entirety. Covering thirty-four type-written pages, the Greek monarch's message constitutes one of the ablest documents of the war. In it he refers to the four distinct occasions upon which he has been willing and ready to join Greece with the Allies, and calls attention to the fact that he had not even then received a direct reply to his last offer. He destroys with categorical and circumstantial denials the whole artificial fabric of his pro-Germanism that had been woven at such trouble in England, France, and the United States, declaring that neither Greece nor he personally had any agreement,

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understanding, or treaty whatsoever with the Germans as to the course of Greece in the war. He takes up the charge that German submarines have been supplied from Greece, and quotes Admiral Palmer, the head of the British naval mission in Greece, as stating that there was no evidence to show that German submarines had ever been so supplied, or that the Greeks were cognizant of the operations of the German submarines. In reply to loose assertions that Greek officers had furnished information or assistance of any kind to the Germans, he enters a sweeping denial, meeting every point raised in this connection by sensational British and French journalists. As to his alleged violation of the Greek Constitution in dismissing Venizelos from the premiership in October, 1915, he states that, had the Cretan stood for election on December 19, 1915, and been chosen by the Hellenic people, he would gladly have called him to form a government as he had previously called him following the elections of June 13, 1915, and that he had so advised Venizelos himself.

Probably had Premier Briand been willing to publish this message all the misunderstanding

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still subsisting in respect of Greece would have disappeared, and the case of King Constantine would have appeared for the first time in the light of candor, even despite the efforts of the Anglo-French press to make the Greek sovereign out a German agent. Certainly, had the facts been brought to light at that juncture the events of December 1 and 2 could scarcely have occurred. Nor would it have been necessary for King Constantine to issue in May, 1917, a formal statement denying the grotesque assertions published in all seriousness by "Le Temps" of Paris, on April 11, 1917, which by their very absurdity betray the weakness of the whole Allied diplomacy in the near East.¹

¹ "His Majesty the King, having read in the newspaper 'Le Temps' No. 20,367 under date of April 11, an article entitled *The Record of the King of Greece*, categorically denies in the most formal manner the views attributed to him in this article. His Majesty has never until now had any knowledge whatsoever of the German or other publications mentioned in said article, according to which he is alleged to have expressed a hope of the success of the arms of one of the belligerents or to have expressed himself in hostile fashion towards one of the belligerents or spoken in any way whatsoever in the sense of said opinions attributed to him.

"It is equally false that His Majesty has ever received from any sovereign of the group enemy to the Entente any telegrams, note or counsel of any kind on the subject of the policy he should follow 'to maintain his throne.'"

"Finally, His Majesty the King disclaims, for his part, every

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On November 27, also, Admiral Dartige du Fournet made his last call upon King Constantine. His visit brought no alteration in a situation big with the menace of death. In the course of his conversation with the Greek sovereign he expressed concern for the safety of certain Venizelist merchants who feared a looting of their shops in the event of actual hostilities. The king promised that their shops should be protected, and, that there might be no question of what he had promised, directed Count Mercati, the grand marshal of his court, to write the admiral in the following sense. I quote the letter in its essential part, as it has since been claimed that by it King Constantine gave an assurance that the admiral's landing force would meet no resistance:

Neither the persons nor the private houses nor the shops of the Venizelists are in danger, for both the allegation in said article according to which it appears that he or his government ever harbored hostile intentions towards the Entente.

"On the order of His Majesty the King, the marshal of the royal court begs His Excellency the French Minister to be good enough to transmit to the government of the French Republic the above declarations which have been made for the purpose of disposing of any misunderstandings which may have been created in the minds of the people of France."

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police and the military authorities, with a view to assuring the maintenance of public order, will exercise the strictest surveillance and will guarantee their security.

It is understood that these high assurances are given *only on the formal condition* that neither the secret police employed by the Allied Powers nor the forces to be landed will proceed to the arrest, imprisonment, or deportation of Hellenic subjects, and on a like understanding that the Venizelists shall abstain from any activity calculated to inspire reprisals.

Not only is no assurance given that a landing force will not meet with resistance, but the admiral's intention to land a force is here plainly recognized both by King Constantine and the admiral. The latter's subsequent contention that he was "ambushed" by the Greek sovereign must therefore seem rather futile.

He had plenty of other grounds for knowing that his landing party would meet with desperate resistance, however. Every press telegram sent from Greece passed through the hands of Admiral Dartige de Fournet's own control officers in the Athens telegraph office. The sole reason for the existence of this censorship was to acquaint the admiral of any information which might be gleaned from press and private despatches sent over Greek wires. On November

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21 such a telegram announced in advance that the Greek Government's formal reply to the admiral's demand would be a "categorical refusal"; on November 24 another such message read, "Resistance expected"; on November 25:

"The Greek Government claims that even if it could have considered the delivery of the arms before, it certainly cannot now. . . . The population of Tournavo are forcibly preventing the southward shipment of the artillery stationed there, fearing that it might be given up to the Allies."

On November 27 another reference was made in a press telegram to "resistance to the Entente's seizure of the arms"; on November 29 a despatch repeated the crown council's "support of the Government's decision that it is impossible to surrender the arms"; the same date still another despatch quoted the Greek chief of staff, Colonel Stratigos, as saying:

The arms of Greece will not be surrendered. . . . The rifles demanded are, as they were ninety years ago at the time of our struggle for liberty, largely in the hands of the Greek people, who will know how to use them, now as then, in defense of the independence of Greece. The world is probably ignorant of our situation, but we are ready to fight until civilization cries down what is taking place in Greece to-day.

On November 30 another message asserted:

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“The determination to resist any debarkment is incontestable. . . . Bloodshed to-morrow most probable.” The same day King Constantine himself was quoted in a telegram as declaring, “While no attack on the Allies is even thought of, the armament of Greece will not be surrendered, nor will any one be permitted to seize the armament by force.” Finally, on the eve of the admiral’s landing, a telegram was sent saying: “All arrangements have already been completed to resist any effort to take the arms.” Every one of the above messages was passed upon by the French admiral’s own control officers. *Every one was stopped by the control officers*; yet every one spoke the literal truth which, had the admiral believed it, would have saved the lives of many gallant Frenchmen.

It is, however, unnecessary to go further into the matter of what Admiral Dartige du Fournet had indirect reason to expect in landing his troops on the neutral soil of Greece. The testimony of his official orders issued to the landing force is conclusive. These orders, signed by “the Captain commanding the 1st corps of debarcation of squadron A, Pugliesi-Conti,” were taken among

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the effects of a captured French officer during the battle on December 1. Order No. 12 makes general provisions for a serious land expedition, with supplies for two days' fighting. The munitions distributed are: "b/. The armament: 96 cartridges and 8 blank cartridges." The sanitary service is especially provided for:

The wounded¹ will be either, according to circumstances, sent aboard the *Provence*, to be redistributed to the ships to which they belong, or put in hospital at the Russian hospital in the Piræus, under the usual conditions.

Even the maps to be employed are indicated with precision:

b/. *Maps Used.*

The troops operating in the Piræus will employ the $\frac{1}{12500}$ maps on blue print paper which will be distributed to them.

The troops operating in the open country will use the $\frac{1}{2500}$ map mounted on linen, which will be distributed to them.

Eventually for operations inside Athens, the plan mounted on linen will be used, which will be distributed.

Besides, the map divided into squares for artillery fire will be that of $\frac{1}{2500}$ distributed for this purpose to the battalion commanders, to the aviators, and to the ships designated to do the firing.

¹ The word *evacués* is here used in distinction from the word *malades*, also used, but to refer to the sick.

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The admiral and the Allied governments have since sought to give the impression that the landing force, while engaged in a peaceful demonstration, was treacherously attacked by the Greeks. Minute preparations are here seen for an expedition in which fighting is expected and wounded are to be cared for. A naval bombardment of an open city, filled with women and children, is foreseen. Order No. 13, dated November 28, and marked SECRET in red letters, defined the object of the landing party:

General objective of the corps of debarcation:

The corps of debarcation must establish itself *by force if necessary* in the positions the occupation of which by our troops constitutes a menace to Athens.

The positions to be occupied are:

(1) The whole of the Nymphs, Pnyx and Philopapos hills, dominating Athens;

(2) The Zappeion *and its vicinity*. . . .

The buildings to be seized are:

(a) A powder magazine (marked A on the annexed map);

(b) The buildings belonging to the Greek engineer corps, called Rouf (point B);

(c) A cartridge factory (point C on map).

Besides, the corps of debarcation must militarily occupy the Piræus.

Scarcely a peaceable demonstration! It will be noted that in the vicinity of the Zappeion,



"THE ROLLING STOCK WAITING IN SALONIKI THE COMPLETION OF THE ATHENS-SALONIKI
RAILWAY"

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within 400 yards of it, in fact, is King Constantine's palace. One final touch is that, according to this secret order, a detachment designated as the "first special group" is to bivouac in the municipal theater, in the heart of the city! It is difficult to see how, with these preparations for every contingency, either the admiral himself or his Government could cry that their force had been "treacherously led into an ambush" by King Constantine.

On November 29, when there seemed to be no prospect of adjusting the difficulties between the French admiral and the Greek Government, King Constantine, as constitutional commander-in-chief of the Greek armies, called for volunteers to defend the arms of Greece against any attempt to seize them by force. From dawn of November 30 thousands upon thousands of men streamed in from every point within a day's journey of the Hellenic capital. Not a man was called to the colors; all who came, came of their own free will. At the various barracks peasants' smocks were exchanged for the uniforms that had done service at Kilkis and Janina; shepherds' crooks gave way to the familiar rifle that each

man had carried through two wars. Every kind of conveyance was used to bring the men of Greece to the side of their king: donkeys, two-wheeled carts, cabs, oxen-driven farm-wagons. Thousands walked, carrying flags and singing route songs. Had the French minister but glanced out of his window during the day, he would have seen the street before his legation black with men on their way to lay down their lives in a fight against four of the greatest military powers of the world to defend their little stock of worn and faithful guns.

But no one looked, no one heeded. The Venizelist press cried "Bluff" in the face of this almost unanimous demonstration of the will of a liberty-loving people, and the British and French ministers believed this cheap printed folly rather than their own eyes. It was not until that afternoon that some of the British correspondents came to me, saying that matters looked serious.

"Of course," I said. "They have looked serious for a week, but you would not see it."

"But the king is mad," they rejoined. "He cannot fight England, France, Russia, and Italy

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combined. He will listen to you; tell him he is digging his own grave."

"So far as I know," I replied, "King Constantine does not mean to fight anybody if he can help it. If your men remain on their war-ships, where they belong, there will be no fight. If they land and march on Athens, there will be more of a fight than they look for. How would you feel if a big Spanish force landed at Tilbury and marched on London? You have been telling the British public for weeks that King Constantine is supported only by a handful of pro-Germans in his court. Look at that endless line of men going to *volunteer* to fight for him! Tell your public that!"

In the afternoon of November 30, Foreign Minister Zolocostas personally took the Greek Government's final official word aboard the *Provence*:

The royal Government has examined with great care the arguments put forward in support of your demands, particularly the argument that our arms which are now unemployed are to be used to combat for the freedom of the soil watered most generously by Hellenic blood. The royal Government is, however, convinced that the arms of Greece are not destined to remain forever in her arsenal, for which reason they must always

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be ready eventually to arm Greek soldiers the day that Greece, who more than any one else is jealous of her rights and patriotic duties toward the soil conquered by Hellenic sacrifice and blood, may be constrained to protect the inalienable rights she has acquired. Nor would she in future, and in case of imminent danger, be in a position to do this, were she to put her arms and munitions at your disposal, even under the condition of restitution which you propose. This viewpoint, unanimously adopted in concert with the national will, is derived from those glorious traditions which make the Greek people one with their arms and cannon, as well as from the feeling that in the near future they may be necessary to their defense. This conviction and this sentiment, aside from the motives already set forth in my letter of November 22, render unacceptable your demand, and oblige the royal Government again to refuse.

Late that evening, also, the Greek sovereign sent Count Mercati aboard the *Provence* as his personal representative to give the admiral one last warning that any effort to seize the arms of Greece by force must end in disaster. The admiral's reply was to issue a formal *communiqué*, through the French Government news agency, the "Radio":

Many friends of the Entente foresee as probable serious troubles in the streets of Athens, and the vice-admiral, commander-in-chief, receives daily numerous communications on this head. He believes he should declare that these fears happily appear to him unjusti-

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fied, and that the peaceful inhabitants of the capital may be reassured.

Guarantees, the sincerity and value of which cannot be called into question, have been furnished him; and besides, he will himself take the necessary measures should the instigators of trouble, who are known to him, take the risk in spite of everything of disturbing the public peace.

The Greek Government, too, issued a *communiqué*, but not quite so truculent:

The Government, in accordance with the will of the sovereign, recommends to the people of Greece the wisdom of calmness and the avoidance of all excitement in giving expression to national feelings, or of hasty action inconsistent with the high ideals of the Greek people, that perfect order may be maintained and no difficulties provoked; that the situation may be saved and greater evils conjured, the nation thus being enabled to face every pressure calculated to wound national feelings.

Aboard the *Provence* a council of war was held. General Bousquier, the French military attaché, who had had a long conversation that afternoon with King Constantine, and to whom the Greek sovereign had declared that the arms of Greece would be defended, come what might, strongly urged the abandonment of the expedition. Even the Anglo-French secret police is reported as having counseled a moderate course.

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But Admiral Dartige du Fournet was immovable. Somewhat earlier he had declared his purpose to a number of newspaper men aboard the *Provence*:

I shall cede nothing of my demands and tolerate no resistance. I shall take such measures against the Government as may be necessary to compel compliance with my demands.

And he added a few words of praise for the frank attitude and friendly disposition of King Constantine. On this declaration he now stood.

Toward three o'clock in the morning King Constantine realized that any arrangement was impossible. He placed the former war minister, General Callaris, commander-in-chief of the first army corps, a very serious and capable officer decidedly friendly to France, in charge of the defense of the barracks and military buildings of Athens and the entire military operations. In sharp contrast to the admiral's declarations to the newspaper men, the king's orders were concise and absolute: the Greeks were not to fire first under any circumstances. They were not to fire at all unless fired upon. In case of attack, they were to use the stocks of their guns to

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beat off those who desired to pass beyond the lines being militarily guarded. Artillery was not to be called into use in any circumstances, save in event of an effort to storm certain specified points. When possible, the Greeks were to surround the invading troops and, without firing upon them, to hold them in the impossibility of active hostility.

For some days the admiral had been conducting extensive reconnaissances of the environs of Athens. Aëroplanes had circled above the city, automobiles bearing officers on observation duty had crisscrossed the surrounding country, maps had been prepared, some of which were captured during the fighting, showing the various Greek barracks and especially the king's palace, in colors. Every preparation had been made for striking a rapid, successful blow at the military prestige of the Greek commander-in-chief. Certainly it appeared from his declarations, after the failure of the expedition, that the admiral expected very efficacious aid from the Venizelists within the city. Generally speaking, his plan seems to have been to engage all the loyal troops at points on the outskirts of the city or in quar-

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ters distant from the center, denuding the city of proper defenders. While the Greek forces were thus engaged, the Venizelists within the town were to rise, assemble at given meeting-points, where a goodly stock of ammunition for the arms already distributed to them was stored, and by simultaneous action, at a given signal in various commanding positions in the city, to paralyze any effort at organized resistance or the return of the troops from without the city to put down the rebellion. In this way, with a comparatively small number of men, a rapid *coup d'état* could be effected, the king's palace, even, be surprised, and King Constantine made prisoner. The admiral then, himself personally on the ground with his landing party, could step in to give his aid, in the words of Pamicos Zymbrakakis writing to Venizelos, "by an immediate consolidation of the new order of things." King Constantine would be deposed. Venizelos would be called back to rule Greece. The Allies would secure through their henchman the use of the entire Greek army for their Balkan operations, and the problem of the near East would be solved.

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On any other assumption the presence of the admiral with his landing party, the use of so insignificant an attacking force, and finally the serene confidence of the admiral in the success of his manœuvre, are inexplicable. With this in view, toward nine o'clock on the morning of December 1, Admiral Dartige du Fournet disembarked some 3000 French, British, and Italian marines, and marched them upon the Hellenic capital.

When I went to the Piræus early in the morning to witness the landing, the French had already taken complete military possession of that city. On the way I saw a few Greek sentries on the road, meager Greek outposts on Nymphs, Pnyx and Philopappos hills overlooking the city, a few soldiers patrolling the Acropolis, and no more. The admiral's three battalions marched, the first upon the Greek Government powder-magazine, the second upon the Greek engineers' barracks at Rouf, and the third battalion, together with two companies of British marines and a band, straight for the Zappeion, where some 1000 French marines were already quartered. As the columns advanced, they picked

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up and made prisoners the Greek outposts which they encountered, calling into operation the king's formal condition in Count Mercati's note to the admiral that the forces to be landed would not proceed "to the arrest, imprisonment, or deportation of Hellenic subjects."

According to the Greek general staff, the first shot was fired by the Italian contingent at General Papoulas and a few officers in the neighborhood of Rouf. It is, however, of little consequence when the first shot was fired, since a general engagement began almost at once at all points toward which the invaders were advancing. The French fired upon a Greek outpost guarding the powder-magazine, who were retiring unresisting before the French advance. It is claimed that these shots were fired with blank-cartridges by the French merely to intimidate the Greeks. How the Greeks were expected to know that blank-cartridges were being used in rifles pointed and fired at them is not made clear. At all events, the Allied detachment attacking the powder-magazine was almost six times as great as the Greek guard, and at first the latter retired; but when Allied machine-guns were brought into

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play, the Greeks charged and dispersed the invaders, shutting up almost half this contingent in the powder-magazine, virtually prisoners.

The seventy Greek soldiers I had seen at rest on Philopappos Hill were assailed by three Allied companies. Here there was no question of blank-cartridges. The attack was made before the Greeks could form to defend themselves. Losing several killed and wounded, they retired, leaving the French marines in possession of the heights. Similarly the Greek guard on Nymphs Hill were charged and routed. The Greek wireless plant was seized. The third Allied battalion proceeded without serious opposition to the Zappeion, where it reinforced the detachment already there.

Once in possession of the points the admiral's orders had directed them to seize, the Allied forces did not cease their fire, however. As I returned from the Piræus by way of Rouf, across the fields toward Nymphs and Philopappos hills, a hot fusillade was in progress from every point the Allies occupied. At Rouf I found them holding the engineers' barracks, but to no purpose, since they were completely surrounded

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inside the building, and virtually prisoners. They were keeping up a hot fire, nevertheless, and the civilian inhabitants of this crowded quarter, about their normal business, were forced to scuttle quickly from the shelter of one building to that of another to avoid drawing an indiscriminate rain of bullets. The fields between Rouf and the Nymphs Hill were dotted with French marines calmly retracing their steps toward the port. I stopped one and questioned him. He shrugged his shoulders.

"This is an idiotic business," he said. "Why should we be fighting the Greeks?" Another French marine and a Greek civilian came up. The second marine was asking the way to the Piræus. I interpreted. The Greek replied courteously:

"I am going that way. Tell them to follow me. I'll show them."

The last I saw of them, the three were marching across the fields in company, as if their respective countrymen were not fighting one another a hundred yards away. I began to feel that the French marine was right. It was an idiotic business.

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As I climbed Philopappos Hill, the French were firing furiously in the direction of the city; it was difficult for me to see at what. No sentry challenged me, and the flank of the detachment occupying the hill was completely exposed toward the south and the Piræus-Athens road. From the height one could see people going through the streets of Athens as if nothing were occurring: women carrying market-baskets; boys standing on the corners looking up at the fighting, open-mouthed. Here and there a gray-beard guarded a cross street as an improvised policeman, a shot-gun slung on his back. A Greek Red Cross ambulance drove up to the foot of the hill, and four stretcher-bearers got out and mounted the rise. They took a wounded Frenchman and two wounded Greeks, lying in the shelter of separate rocks on the hillside, bore them down the slope to the ambulance, and drove away with them.

As I descended the hill I found behind every wall, in every gully, in the yard of every house, little khaki-clad Greek soldiers, rifles in hand, standing guard, but not firing. The French on the hill were entirely surrounded, and did not

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know it. A Greek soldier jerked his thumb back over his shoulder at the French, conspicuous in their white breeches—all of whom, in range of less than a hundred yards, could have been picked off in ten minutes by the Greeks below—and grinned amiably. A Greek officer crept up to where I stood above a ravine filled with Greek soldiers.

“Oh, that’s all right,” he said quickly, as if apologizing for the careless disposition of the French force. “Our orders are not to fire. They are safe enough.”

Passing around by the Zappeion, I found the same situation. From the huge, barn-like structure the French kept up a grueling fire. But lying in the streets below the curb, and among the bushes of the garden surrounding the building, were Greek soldiers making a cordon around the entire edifice. The admiral and his men were as much prisoners in the Zappeion as if they had been forced to surrender. Every time a sortie was attempted, a return fire was opened upon them and they were forced to retire again within the protecting walls of the exposition.

The whole landing party was at stalemate.

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The French had taken the initiative and seized what they intended to seize, but they could not get out again. Certain British troops, I learned, were similarly shut up within the mud walls of the cemetery. Some Italians were equally prisoners in the Italian archæological school. Failing a revolution within the city itself, the admiral and his forces were helpless. I asked a Greek general staff officer the meaning of the whole manœuvre.

“We have established the fact of an armed attack with hostile intent upon an open city,” he replied. “What measures will be taken now will depend entirely upon the admiral himself.” He further stated that some of the Venizelist Greek employees of the Anglo-French secret police had been firing from windows on ununiformed men going to the barracks to volunteer for service. Both in the Rouf and in the south Acropolis quarters I had seen firing upon civilians from windows, and had myself been fired upon. But I was unable to establish by whom the firing was done.

In Athens proper, at noon, it looked very unlikely that any attempt at an uprising would be

made. The calculations of the Venizelists had badly miscarried. The admiral had been victorious only in a way to bind him hand and foot. The city had not been denuded of troops, as squads of Greek marines were patrolling the streets. Order was being rigidly maintained. French and British officers engaged in the control of the posts and telegraphs went about in uniform, unmolested. A British naval officer came from the Piræus to tea at the British legation. He knew nothing of the fighting. In the train with him were two Greek infantry officers. The train was fired upon by the British from Nymphs Hill, to the utter bewilderment of the naval officer. At the Athens station one of the Greek officers summoned two Greek marines.

"Where are you going?" the Greek officer asked the Englishman.

"To the legation," he answered.

"Better have a guard," the Greek replied. He gave an order to the two marines. "They will see you safely there," he added, and, saluting, walked off.

Throughout the city it was like that. Toward two o'clock the firing died down and ceased.

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Premier Lambros got into telephone communication with the admiral, still a prisoner in the Zappeion, and an armistice was declared. Shortly after two o'clock I was leaning over the terrace atop my hotel, below which the whole city lay spread out like a map. Just underneath the Boulé was serving as barracks for the Greek sailors policing the city. A sentry walked up and down before the gate. Suddenly, a shot was fired from somewhere. The sentry dropped his rifle and fell, killed. At the same moment M. Taigny, the French member of the International Financial Commission, was looking out of the window of the Athenian Club. He turned suddenly to some Greeks standing by.

"Some one is firing from the windows of the 'Nea Hellas' office!" he exclaimed. The "Nea Hellas" was a Venizelist organ, and from its windows, in the twinkling of an eye, two of the sailors in the Boulé inclosure were hit.

Simultaneously, in various parts of town, firing began, from windows and roofs of the houses purposely chosen and stocked with munitions by the Venizelists, upon the Greek patrols in the streets. The Greek soldiers lying behind the

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curb guarding the Zappeion were thus attacked in the back by a flank fire. At the noise of this renewed shooting the Allied troops, ignorant of the cause, again opened a fusillade, and the Greeks around the Zappeion were caught between two fires. A great many were killed.

With an armistice declared, the firing was so inexplicable that every one was confounded. The French and British prisoners in the Zappeion, believing the renewed conflict to indicate the arrival of reinforcements, endeavored to make a sortie. But unfortunately they chose the direction of the royal palace for their attempt. The Greeks, equally confused by being fired upon from behind, and seeing an attack directed against the palace, believed the armistice had been violated by the invaders and that an effort was being made to seize the king by force. Light artillery was therefore called into play for the first time, and the admiral's sortie was forced to return to cover.

I had gone to the palace the moment the firing began anew. The king sent Colonel Pierre Mano to order the Greek troops to cease firing at once, which was done. The prime minister

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was trying to get the French admiral by telephone, to ask the meaning of this renewed combat, after the declaration of an armistice. Eventually, he arranged for a meeting of the king and the Allied ministers at the palace at half-past five to discuss the situation. The firing began to die down again. Suddenly, without warning, just above the Acropolis, across the open city of Athens, with its streets refilling with crowds of the curious, with everywhere women and children and non-combatants, who had been given no time to leave, a steady, methodical fire of 5- and 12-inch shells from the guns of the fleet began to fall among the houses of the cradle of civilization. I have been under shell-fire frequently since the war began, but I could not believe the monstrous thing.

"Surely those are your guns!" I said to a Greek staff officer beside me. He raised his head with that quick negative gesture so characteristic of the Greeks.

"Must be the Allied fleet," he replied. "An open city!"

The king was in the garden, with a pair of binoculars, watching the shells as they cried on

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their way through the air like giant rockets. I went out and talked with him a moment. As one 5-inch shell passed just over a corner of the palace and, flashing between the Italian and Dutch legations, fell into a tiny laborer's cottage beyond, wrecking the building in a whirlpool of smoke and dust and flying splinters, King Constantine watched the house in silence.

"Vive la Belgique!" he said finally, quietly, as if to himself.

Inside the palace the premier was again at the telephone. The admiral disclaimed all responsibility for the bombardment. Princess Helen, King Constantine's eldest daughter, watched the falling shells from one of the windows. A shell dropped just below it, but, striking in the soft, wet ground, did not explode. She opened the window and looked out at it curiously as it lay harmless against the building. The queen came into the room where we sat, seeking any women servants of the palace to send to the cellars. When they demurred, she said: "I have already sent my daughter¹ to the

¹ Princess Catharine, three and a half years old, whose god-fathers are the army and navy of Greece.

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cellar. It is better to take no risks." A 12-inch shell fell in the palace garden and exploded. Huge, jagged pieces flew about, destroying trees and shrubbery. A piece two feet long, four inches wide, and with edges as sharp as a razor fell at King Constantine's feet. Count Mercati rushed out to the side of his chief, buckling on a revolver. God knows what he expected to do with so puny an instrument of war! The bombardment continued. In the barracks across from the Dutch legation shells fell monotonously, one after another. Occasionally one went wild among the newer apartment houses. Two huts were hit in a near-by field; in one an old woman and her grandchild were blown to bits. In another the shell passed through roof and walls, flashing harmless between a mother and her baby, sleeping on a trundle-bed.

Dusk was falling when the four Allied ministers reached the palace. The precision of the fleet's fire had been improved, and most of the shells were falling within or near the palace grounds, the bombardment evidently being directed at the royal residence, with its women and children, as well as the King of the Hellenes.

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When the diplomatists arrived, King Constantine remounted to his study to receive them. The bombardment still continued with methodical accuracy. As the four ministers entered the room where the king awaited them, a 12-inch shell went screaming by the windows.

“Are those your arguments, gentlemen?” the sovereign asked coolly.

CHAPTER XXVI

ANATHEMA!

To end the sad business of December 1, King Constantine agreed to deliver to Admiral Dartige du Fournet six batteries of mountain artillery. The Allied naval authorities had already seized two batteries of field artillery on Corfu, thus making the king's concession eight batteries in all. The admiral, on his part, still a prisoner with his men in the Zappeion, agreed to withdraw his troops on board his vessels, the Greek monarch offering to give them an escort aboard, to see that they arrived without incident. The terms were announced to the admiral by French Minister Guillemin; the admiral accepted. He was hardly in position to do otherwise.

The morning of December 2, the admiral and his staff and certain officers of the Anglo-French secret police returned to the Piræus and went aboard the *Provence*. Before leaving, Admiral

Dartige du Fournet called upon General Callaris and explained that he had had no intention of attacking the Greeks or of precipitating conflict. He asserted, also, that he had not ordered the bombardment of an open city filled with women and children. General Callaris explained, in reply, that his orders to his men were in no circumstances to fire first upon the invaders, and that he could only regret that the presence of armed troops upon neutral soil had given an impression—evidently, in view of the admiral's declaration, a mistaken one—that they were there with hostile intent. The admiral's statement to the newspaper correspondents that he would "take such measures against the Government necessary to compel compliance with his demands" was tactfully ignored in these formal amenities.

After noon an escort of Greek infantry accompanied the force shut up in the Zappeion, with all its material, to the harbor. The whole length of the road from Athens to the Piræus was guarded by the Greek sailors, whom, so short a time before, the admiral had forced to leave their beloved ships. As the French and British



GENERAL SARRAIL
Leaving his headquarters at the French School, Saloniki

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marines marched out of their prison, some of the men, less on their dignity than the officers, waved their hats and cheered the Greeks. The Greeks guarding the road grinned from ear to ear and presented arms. Queen Sophie took personal charge of the care of the wounded of both sides, those whom it was impossible to move being left in the Greek military hospital. I visited them myself, and found the Allied wounded excellently cared for. One, a French marine, Sebastien Dale, said:

“Our Greek comrades are very good to us. They take turns reading to us.” The “Greek comrades” were the Greek soldiers whom the French had wounded! Every day King Constantine sent an aide-de-camp to see that the care of the Allied wounded was the best Greece could give.

Prime Minister Lambros in person saw to the release of the Italian troops that had been surrounded in the Italian school. Some 150 British were at first missing, and the wildest rumors of their murder and mutilation were current in the English colony of Athens, some of them even finding their way into the British press through

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untrustworthy Piræus reports sent by correspondents who had fled Athens in the early hours of the fighting. Later they made their appearance, however, from the red-light district of Athens, where they had repaired when the armistice was declared.

The battle of Athens cost the Greeks 3 officers, 2 of them colonels, and 26 soldiers dead; 5 officers, 45 soldiers, 4 marines, and 7 civilians, among whom were women and one child, wounded. The bombardment, aside from the fighting, killed a woman and a baby and wounded a number of men civilians. The French lost 2 officers and 45 marines, killed; and 2 officers and 96 marines, wounded. The Allied dead were transferred in Greek army ambulances to the Russian hospital at the Piræus the moment the armistice was declared.

The arrangements for the Allied evacuation of Athens were completed during the night of December 1. Before their departure most of the members of the Anglo-French secret police quietly slipped out of town, and the Greeks for the first time in three months regained control of their own telegraphs, posts, railways, and police.

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To the disinterested observer the admiral's readiness to withdraw all of his troops from Athens, even the famous guard of the French legation and the hired gunmen of the Anglo-French secret police, was subject to one of two interpretations: either all of this occupation of Greece by foreign troops and agents in foreign pay had never been necessary at all, and had been established merely to exasperate the Greeks; or it was more than ever necessary at this particular juncture, when revolution had broken out in the heart of the Hellenic capital. If the admiral had ever had any reason to land marines "to assist in maintaining order," he now had tenfold that reason for keeping a certain force in Athens. Assuming that he had not previously acted merely out of bravado, to impose a disagreeable control upon a friendly and neutral people, his action in consenting now to withdraw every Allied marine from Athens was plainly either cowardice or a direct incitement and condoning of disorders. Cowardice is out of the question. It is therefore not only logical, but it is the only possible logic, that the British and French ministers, in agreeing to the withdrawal of the Allied troops at this

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moment, accepted a very large part of the responsibility of what might follow; and, indeed, invited precisely what did follow.

I have seen many revolutions in my time, in Russia, Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru. Revolutions as a general rule are not afternoon teas. It was amazing to me, therefore, to hear the outcry among the Allied diplomatists and in the American legation against the rapid effectiveness with which this abortive attempt at revolution was put down. It is true that in comparison with the draft riots in New York during the Civil War, or with the street fighting I saw in Russia in 1905, or even with the accounts I have had of eye-witnesses of the Dublin affair two years ago, this revolution in Athens was child's play, very speedily and mercifully dealt with. I do not know precisely how those who protested against its alleged cruelty would recommend that armed rebellion in the capital city of a country be handled; probably by putting salt on the tails of the revolutionists! The present war has given rise to many shining examples of hypocrisy; but I have yet to see the parallel of the self-righteousness with which the Greek Government has been

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criticized for its prompt, businesslike reëstablishment of order in the Greek capital following the events of December 1. It is worthy of record, however, that indignation over the events of December 2 among the Allies is an afterthought. At the time those who remained in Athens and who were not in hiding were inclined to accept what occurred rather as what might have been expected in the circumstances.

To say that feeling among the Greeks ran high against those who had fired upon their own compatriots from behind scarcely expresses the extent and depth of Greek sentiment. The point of view of the loyal Greeks was simplicity itself: an hostile, armed, foreign force had landed on Greek territory and marched on the ancient capital with the declared purpose of seizing the arms of the Hellenic people. While the Greeks as volunteer soldiers were engaged in defending their arms and their soil from invaders, a small band of conspirators, plotting to overthrow the constitutional Government of Greece, fired from the shelter of darkened rooms upon those who in the open were fighting the soldiers of three great powers. Once, therefore, the invaders

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were disposed of, every loyal Greek turned his attention to settling accounts with these "assassins," as they called the revolutionists.

It is necessary, also, in order truly to appreciate Greek feeling at this moment to remember that for six months the pressure of the Allied control officers had bound the hands of Greek justice and stifled the voice of Greek public opinion whenever either fell at cross purposes with the real or imaginary interests of the Allies and their protégés, the Venizelist revolutionaries. The Venizelist press had been free to rave at the constitutional sovereign of Greece in terms of unmeasured violence; to accuse him of treachery, treason, madness, and brutality; to abuse him with every epithet and attribute to him every ignoble motive, and these attacks had been widely reproduced in the press of the Allied countries and the United States. The Venizelist papers were free to print libel, forgeries, or doctored matter purporting to be the reproduction of official documents. In all of this "freedom of the press" the Entente powers had protected the Venizelists. On the other hand, the loyal press had been muzzled, intimidated, and coerced. De-

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spatches from Athens to local newspapers in the provinces were simply stopped by the officers of the Allied telegraphic control. Letters, the most private kind of letters, *within Greece*, were opened and censored by Allied officers not to conceal any news of vital military value, but to exasperate the loyal Greeks, and to serve the political ends of Venizelos and his followers; in a word, to help impose upon the Greeks a government they abhorred and a rule four fifths of them would rather give up their lives than accept. Any drunken bravo in a respectable café, annoying peaceable diners, had only to shout, "I belong to the Anglo-French secret police!" and the diners must accept his rowdyism with what grace they could. No Greek policeman dared to arrest the offender for fear of creating a diplomatic incident. A deserter from the Greek army in uniform could walk about the streets and preach desertion to his former comrades; he could not be punished because he was a Venizelist and, in the words of the French minister, "the Entente powers cannot remain indifferent to the lot of the friends of Venizelos."

These measures of pression were so omnipres-

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ent that they touched in some degree every man, woman, and child in Greece. The blockade alone, undeclared, but effective since September 30, was sufficient to exasperate the whole Hellenic people beyond bearing. Behind all these measures, which they considered tyranny, they saw the hand of Venizelos driving through to success his limitless ambition, backed by the bayonets and cannon of strangers. It may seem remarkable, but it is none the less true, that there was comparatively little rancor against the French and the British for these intolerable conditions of life. The Greeks looked upon the French and British as the victims of the Cretan's machinations, and their wrath fell upon the man whom they held responsible for all their trials—Venizelos himself.

For these reasons, then, the popular reckoning with the Venizelists might have been expected to prove much more severe than was actually the case. In the lower quarters of town, among the refugees from Asia Minor, Egypt, and Constantinople, who had acted as ward heelers and political gangmen for Venizelos in his campaign, I dare say the death-rate was high, but the vic-

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tims unwept. A great many Venizelists were marked men, not because any concerted plan had been made to mark down certain persons for punishment, but because during the six months of Allied protection of Venizelists, by their own insolence, tyranny over their neighbors, and boasts of what Venizelos (with the assistance of the Allies) was going to do to the constitutional Government of Greece, many of them had marked themselves for drastic treatment the moment opportunity offered.

The retirement of the Allied troops from Athens and the flight of the Anglo-French secret police furnished the opportunity. No time was lost in seizing it. While the admiral and his men were still in Athens, early in the morning of December 1, the hunt for the conspirators began. The houses from which shots had been fired upon the loyal troops were isolated and the men in them kept there by cordons of sailors. The sailors, who had lost a number of comrades by shots fired from windows while they kept guard in the streets during the fighting of the day before, had a few scores to settle on their own account. They settled them.

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The people of the Balkan States have no light hand in their quarrels. The Greeks are no exception to this general rule, the sinister heritage of centuries of Turkish domination. But in this instance there was a sort of terrifying, yet childish, gaiety, a startling light-heartedness in the way in which not the sailors alone, but civilians, men and even women, punished those whom they called traitors. I recall one sailor, kneeling on the doorway of the telegraph office, who conducted single-handed a veritable battle with several men shooting into the street from the windows of the Venizelist newspaper, the "Ethnos."

"For months they have done whatever they liked," he said in English, between shots. "They've blackguarded our king and betrayed our country and run to the Allies for protection even when they've been legally imprisoned. They have n't even gone to Saloniki to join that 'anti-Bulgarian' army they like so much to talk about,—they would have been safe there,—but they have stuck around here and made plots and incited riots and caused rows for which the Allies have blamed us and punished the whole of Greece. Yesterday, when we were fighting

for the honor of the nation, they shot us in the back, the dogs! Now it is their day of reckoning!" In his homely way my sailor friend expressed everybody's feeling. Premier Lambros declared to me:

Now that the external question is in the way of settlement, internal order will be rigorously imposed. All the houses in which individuals barricaded themselves yesterday and from which they fired upon the national forces as well as upon civilians, will be surrounded and the individuals who this morning, insist upon disturbing the public order, will be taken into custody by force if necessary and held for subsequent trial. No peaceable individual, whatever he has done, need fear he will not receive impartial justice. Only armed resistance to the reestablishment of public order endangers any man.

This program was carried out to the letter. Two machine-guns were trained on Venizelos's house, and some eighteen Cretans who had established themselves in their compatriot's residence were forced to surrender. I saw them taken to prison under a strong guard. They were not mistreated. Some of those taken in other places undoubtedly were roughly handled, however. In one instance, after several hours of siege of the top floor of a hotel opposite the post-office, in the course of which firing was lively on both

sides, those in the hotel were forced to give up. Before a guard of police could protect them from the mob, two men were badly beaten, but still able to walk off unaided when finally rescued. The presses of the Venizelist newspapers were generally wrecked. General Corakas, who for weeks had been Venizelos's "recruiting" agent in Athens, and who had directed the payment of five dollars a head to deserting soldiers, was summarily treated by soldiers whom his agents had approached without success. Mayor Benakis of Athens was reported to have been cruelly mistreated. I saw him, as he was being taken to jail, walking jauntily under a careful guard. He showed no signs then of having been roughly handled, though I believe that a short time before, in the process of his arrest, the crowd had been none too tender with him.

During the arrests there was a good deal of miscellaneous firing, mostly in the air, with a view to discourage any further spread of the revolutionary attempt. Cavalry patrols in the principal streets soon put an end to these demonstrations. Two notorious Venizelist workers were taken into custody, and found in possession

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of very large sums of money, evidently intended for some use connected with the plot to overthrow the Government. The total arrests on all counts numbered fewer than two hundred.

During the arrests, thirteen loyalist soldiers, six armed reservists and five unarmed civilians were killed by shots from houses occupied by Venizelist revolutionaries. Of the latter, three were killed and two wounded in the house-to-street fighting. A subsequent search of a number of houses, at some of which I was personally a witness, revealed large stores of ammunition gathered in the private residences of Venizelists, presumably for revolutionary purposes. In Venizelos's house alone were found 66 rifles, 6,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 49 revolvers with cartridges, 2,500 dynamite capsules with 40 yards of fuse, and 15 hand grenades.

Several employees of the British secret police made a sally from the annex of the legation in an effort to rescue some one under arrest, but were quickly forced to seek refuge again in the diplomatic character of the building. Two secretaries of the British legation were arrested, but speedily released upon establishing their

identity. Despite the removal of the formidable armed guard of French marines so long maintained at the French legation, the legation and its members suffered no inconvenience. Certain hotels and private houses were shot up by those who saw, or thought they saw, firing from the windows. An American business man of standing swears he saw firing from the offices of the French government news-agency, the "Radio." Former Premier Zaïmis declared that he saw firing from the windows of the British Eastern Telegraph Company office. An employee of the Dutch legation complained that his house was entered and searched. A Spanish insurance company alleged that its office safe was robbed during the troubles. Outside of these isolated instances, what disturbance there was, was among the Greeks. The foreign residents of Athens had little of which to complain. A high official of the Greek Government declared to me:

No one suspects the admiral or the members of the British and French legations of being aware of this plot to effect a *coup d'état* in connexion with the admiral's landing. They were undoubtedly victims of a conspiracy on the part of their Venizelist friends, which explains why the admiral, consistently misinformed by the Venizelists, refused to believe that the Government

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seriously meant to persist in its refusal to surrender the arms of Greece.

The idea of a revolution against King Constantine in Athens is absurd. The efforts of not more than a couple of hundred conspirators to overthrow the constitutional government only resulted in enraging the entire populace against the perpetrators, thus causing the regrettable incidents of this morning.

By evening Athens was again normal. It would have been impossible to guess that a foreign invasion and an unsuccessful revolution had both taken place within the space of thirty-six hours.

In the Piræus, however, there was less calm. Certain Venizelists who had the ear of Admiral Dartige du Fournet had rushed off to the *Provence* and filled the credulous sailor with a tale that the Greek army was marching against the French fleet. Just how the army was to advance across the waters of Keratsina Bay was not shown, but the admiral hastily landed a force in the port during the night of December 2, occupied and fortified the city hall, and sent an advance guard, under the Venizelist terrorist Paul Ghyparis, to seize and entrench Castello Hill, between Athens and the Piræus. The panic into which the British and French authori-

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ties were thrown by these unfounded rumors of an attack the very nature of which was absurd, constitutes a rather silly, but convincing, proof of the power of the Venizelists over the Allied diplomatic and naval officers. Captain de Roquefeuille, the French naval attaché and head of the French secret police, was in so ridiculous a panic that he told one of his colleagues that the blood of his wife and babies would be upon his head if he permitted them to remain in Athens, where they were certain to be murdered. One of the secretaries of the British legation implored the American minister to hoist the American flag over his private residence, to protect it. Several Allied diplomatists sent wives and children to the American legation for safety. Even the American minister himself, always in intimate touch with the Venizelists, was so moved by their fright that he urged me to take my wife to the Piræus where she might be out of danger. From the pulpit of the English church, the advice was given to all British nationals to flee Athens at once. Some of the most supercilious members of the British and French colonies, previously, under the guns of their fleet, insolently contemptuous

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of the Greeks, scurried out of town as secretly as possible, with a little, hastily-packed hand luggage.

By evening the whole ugly exhibition of poltroonery was at its height. People paid fabulous prices for cabs to take them to the Piræus. To add to the confusion, the report was confirmed that, as soon as the major part of the Allied nationals had left the city, the French admiral proposed to bombard it without further warning. Yet there was not the slightest reason for any of this display of fear, except mob panic. Life in Athens took its usual course. Cafés and moving-picture theaters were filled. The Italian minister and his staff, in sharp contrast with his less cool-headed colleagues, went about his usual pursuits and advised his nationals that a flight from Athens would be sheer folly.

All of this panic was the work of the defeated Venizelists, themselves in an agony of fear at the prospect of being tried and punished for their attempted revolution. So long immune from the processes of the law, thanks to the protection that they had enjoyed from the British and French ministers, they could not pay with cour-

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age the price of their failure to overturn the constitutional government. It was their panic which, communicated to the British and French nationals, failed only by a narrow margin of fixing upon a French officer the shame of again bombarding, this time in cold blood and without excuse, an open city filled with women and children. Only King Constantine's prompt action in sending one of his officers of highest rank aboard the *Provence* to calm the French admiral avoided disaster.

Meanwhile, to care for their nationals who had fled the capital, the British and French ministers requisitioned the Greek transatlantic steamer, *King Constantine*, aboard which all were quartered. They found themselves in peculiar case, as did, indeed, their diplomatic representatives. Should they return to Athens, it would be a tacit admission that they had been needlessly afraid. Few were willing to do this openly. In order, therefore, to justify their panic, it became necessary to assume the existence of real grounds for flight from the Greek capital. Every extravagant story was therefore spread and enlarged upon; the events of December 1 and 2 took on

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a fantastic character, amusing to those who had been abroad during both days; talk of murder, atrocity, and deep plottings that would do honor to the writer of a moving-picture scenario were recounted in whispers—and believed. These stories spread to the British and French press, and in London, Paris, and the United States the impression was generally current that Athens had witnessed and was still witnessing something like a Boxer siege of Peking. Meanwhile, those of us who remained in the Greek capital went about our business as dully as in times of world peace.

Against this wanton exaggeration and falsification of what had actually occurred, Premier Lambros protested to the foreign press.

It should not be forgotten that certain instances which we all regret had, after all, their origin in the rage of the people against those who, while Greece was defending herself, sought to stab her in the back by an attempt at revolution conceived, prepared and protected by the paid agents of the Entente Powers. The excesses, of which there were really few, were of course unjustifiable; but they were due to the exasperation of the populace and the army, which is merely the Greek people, not unnatural under the circumstances. Those who suffered were principally those against whom proof existed of a seditious plot. When the plot be-

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came generally known, public sentiment was inflamed, as is the case in any country. The Government could scarcely foresee these circumstances; but the moment order was restored, took steps to arrest and punish those guilty of any excess.

Mr. Droppers, the American minister, affected by the stories of the abuses which his Venizelist friends brought to him, undertook to voice a protest to the Greek Government against the treatment of the Venizelists. To this protest Foreign Minister Zolocostas formally replied:

The Government is decided to punish every person guilty of having committed illegal acts or exceeded instructions, and a severe investigation will be begun to this end so soon as acts of this nature are brought to the attention of the Government.

In this connexion the Foreign Minister considers it his duty to recall to your attention that by his note of November 28, he warned the neutral Powers of the tragic position in which the Greek nation had been placed as a result of the measures taken against Greece, and of the consequences which the French admiral's insistence upon obtaining the Greek war material might well have.

King Constantine also telegraphed a full and very just account of the events of December 1 and 2 to Prince George in Paris, for communication to Premier Briand, as well as to King George of England and the Czar of Russia. At

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the same time he asked these heads of state to see that Greece had at least fair play in the Allied press. His appeal was without avail.

Matters were still undecided when, on December 7, King Constantine told me that he was perfectly ready to meet the Allied ministers halfway in any arrangement they proposed; that he would accept disarmament, since the disarmament of the Greek army was virtually a fact already, but that the arms must remain in the country; that he would accept any Allied military control thought necessary to the protection of General Sarrail's flanks, but that the control must be loyally maintained for military purposes and not with the aim of conducting or favoring a rebellion against the constitutional government of Greece. He added that, even if the Allies were to require that all the Venizelists arrested for complicity with the revolutionary plot were released, he was prepared to use what influence he might have to obtain that, also; but on condition that the released Venizelists go to Saloniki and fight the Bulgarians, as they professed to desire to do, not remain in Athens to fight Greeks and promote civil war in a country at peace.

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This view of the King of the Hellenes was conveyed to the British and French ministers. Their reply was a formal declaration on December 8 of a blockade of the ports of Greece not under Venizelist control. No reason was given for the blockade, and no conditions were named compliance with which could secure the lifting of this measure of starvation.

At the same time that this announcement was made Admiral Dartige du Fournet lined up his squadron for a bombardment of Athens. Captain Joubert, of the French navy, privately warned a number of people to leave the city as a bombardment was imminent, but no formal notice was given. Only the prompt action of the Italian minister, Count Bosdari, succeeded in once more avoiding a catastrophe. The American minister is my authority for the statement that this was the third time within the week that the French admiral had been on the point of bombarding the Greek capital, each time without previous warning.

As the British naval authorities at Malta and Gibraltar had so held the supplies for Greece in check since September 30 that the average Greek

was at some pains to keep body and soul together, the formal declaration of a blockade came as nothing new. Since November 30 not a single ship had been permitted to make or leave the port of the Piræus. The Greeks were already almost desperate for food when this new oppressive measure went into effect. It was accompanied by a formal order to all Entente nationals to quit Greece by December 10. Even those who wished to remain, as, for example, the English governess of Princess Alice's children, were sternly ordered to embark aboard the *King Constantine* without delay. So needless and absurd was this order that it was difficult for the impartial observer not to conclude that the step was taken rather as justification of the undignified flight of British and French nationals a week previously, than for any good reason of national policy.

Such, at least, appeared to be the view of the Russian and Italian ministers, who refused to order their colonies to embark and openly pronounced the whole business a silly comedy. The Greek Government, also, formally protested to the United States, Holland, and Spain—the neu-

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tral nations having diplomatic representatives in Greece—not only against the inhumanity of the measure itself, but against its imposition without any assigned reason, or any conditions stated for its termination. The document read as follows:

Greece, at peace with the Entente Powers, never ceasing to give them the most extraordinary proofs of her firm desire to maintain with them the reciprocal ties of friendship, sees with painful surprise these same Powers have recourse to a measure toward Greece so manifestly contrary to international law and the principles of international justice and liberty. While awaiting explanations of the character and motives of the blockade, the Government cannot but formulate the liveliest and most legitimate protest against the application of such a measure to a friendly, neutral people.

At the same time King Constantine had long conferences with the British and Russian ministers in which he made clear to them the position he had already stated to me and offered to accept any arrangement on a military, not a political, basis. He declared categorically that he had no more intention of attacking or declaring war on the Allies now than when he had given the same assurance to Lord Kitchener, and that no act of his as commander-in-chief of the Greek armies had any other purpose than the legitimate defense

of Hellas from invasion by the Venizelists from the north, or by the Allies themselves from the sea: He said further that even if the Entente's chosen policy of starving the Greek nation into submission were to force him to try to open up communications with the Central empires, in order to secure the food his people required, he would not attack Sarrail's position at Saloniki, and as earnest of this, he declared his readiness to order the continuance of the southward shipment of his troops from Thessaly, suspended on December 1, so that even any remote possibility of danger to Sarrail's flank might be removed. With this candid declaration King Constantine hoped to alter the suspicious attitude of Great Britain and France and to reëstablish a frank relationship based on a better understanding of the sentiments animating the Greeks.

Count Bosdari was also exceedingly active to this end. His view was that the Greek monarch's proposal satisfied every military desire of the Allies. He regarded Venizelos as a handicap rather than an asset to the Entente and pointed out to his colleagues that the admiral's landing on December 1 and the abortive Venize-

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list revolution of December 2 had cost the Allies and their protégé, Venizelos, every possible hope of securing more "volunteers" from among the Greeks. As he put it, succinctly:

"You cannot expect the Greeks to fight against us one day, and with us the next."

But it was not that they had fought the Allied marines that affected Greek feeling at this moment. The Greeks bore no rancor for the invasion and took extraordinarily little pride in their successful resistance to the armed forces of three great powers. Ordinarily no more modest about their exploits than in the days of Homer, one might have expected cries of victory and a certain swagger. There was none of that. The tone of the press was rather apologetic:

It should now be clear to the Entente Powers that the Greek people support their sovereign. It is a pity it took bloodshed to establish this fact, but it was worth it from the point of view of both sides if it is now clear that no fundamental hostility to the Allies but merely patriotism and loyalty to our soldier king lay at the bottom of our resistance.

Unhappily, though it seems incredible that the events of December 1 should not have convinced even M. Guillemin of the fatuousness of his policy

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of supporting Venizelos, the British and French ministers seemed to have learned nothing from what occurred. Certainly, with their American colleague, they were virtually alone in their contention that Venizelos still represented the will of the majority of the Greek people. Almost every Venizelist who remained in Athens and who had clung to the Cretan in the honest belief that Venizelos represented real Greek opinion, admitted error quite frankly. It required the London "Times" to put the opposite case in a few words. Its correspondent in Athens, himself previously a Venizelist, followed the events of December 1 and 2 by a sober review of the actual situation as then revealed. He stated candidly that he, for one, was convinced that Venizelos no longer had the least chance of leading the Hellenic people. The "Times" published his article under a caption intimating that the correspondent had been forced to write it under duress, and then discharged him as correspondent on the ground that his dispatch was not consonant with the policy of his Britannic Majesty's Government.

This, indeed, appeared to be the course settled upon in London and Paris by both govern-

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ments. The Greek people had demonstrated that they would have none of Venizelos. Well —“the people be damned!” The Anglo-French secret police had fled Athens, but the directors had no intention of abandoning the huge sums they had previously dispensed or of exchanging the joys of a care-free life for the humdrum existence of the trenches. They, therefore, seized the island of Syra, whence they intended to continue their efforts to force Venizelos on the Greeks at any cost. “Le Miroir,” a French magazine, recounts the taking of this island:

A machine gun belonging to the British landing force, was pointed down the principal street; every attempt at resistance was forestalled, thanks to these rapid measures.¹

One after another the islands of Zante, Naxos, Ithaca, Tinos, Paros, Kea, and Santorin were similarly seized by Allied naval detachments, the constitutional officials arrested, leading citizens loyal to the constitution imprisoned, and Venizelist office holders established in a control of the islands maintained by Allied cannon. An official account of the occupation of Zante reads:

¹“Le Miroir,” December 31, 1916.

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Detachments of French marines have debarked at Zante and, under threat of bombardment, occupied different buildings and left a garrison.

The French naval officer occupying Kea, posted a proclamation stating:

As a result of the ambush of Athens, in the course of which Allied sailors were treacherously shot without warning by the Greeks, the French Government *as a first measure of pression*, has declared a blockade of Greece. . . . The application of this measure, dictated by the murderers of Athens themselves, will enormously strike at Greece from a material, commercial and industrial point of view. . . . From a feeling of justice, the French admiral regrets that the innocent must suffer the same as the guilty. . . .

On the whole, the proclamation reads quite like one of those the Germans posted in Belgium every few days in the early part of the war.

At the occupation of each of these islands in this summary way, the island's "adhesion to the national movement," was widely heralded in the British and French press and the claim set up in France and England that, because of these rapid accessions to the cause of the Cretan among the people of the Greek islands, Venizelos's "provisional government" should be recognized as the legal government of Greece. As the rigor of the blockade increased in the islands, always less sup-

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plied with food than the mainland, French and British boats loaded with breadstuffs would appear off one after another of those whose inhabitants were literally starving and offered to supply the people with all the food they desired if they would but desert allegiance to the constitutional government of Greece and join the Venizelist revolution. The Allied blockade of Greece made it impossible for the constitutional government to send relief to the islands thus starved into submission and the inhabitants knew it; but even so, in many instances the islanders replied:

“We have no need of food at the price of our loyalty to our king.”

Meanwhile, King Constantine, daily in touch with the sufferings of his people, was doing what he could to reach some sort of an understanding with the Allied powers. On December 12, the Greek Government, still in ignorance of the reason for the blockade, sent the Allied ministers a note in these terms:

The Government, supposing that the measures of pression exercised by the Powers are a consequence of the events of December 1, hereby proposes that a mixed commission of enquiry be named, in conformance with the provisions of The Hague convention, to establish

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the responsibility for the encounters provoked between the sailors of the Allied fleet and the troops of the kingdom. In case this commission should declare that the royal government is responsible for the events in question, *the Government is ready in advance to give the Powers any moral reparation whatsoever*, not affecting its honor, which the mixed commission may fix.

This proposal, so in keeping with the very international principles for which the powers addressed are waging a world war, was not even accorded the recognition of a reply. To the constitutional government's protest that the Allies were actively aiding the revolutionists in the Greek islands and on Eubœa "by terrorization to propagate sedition among the islanders, despite their sentiments of loyalty and devotion to the legal government," no reply was vouchsafed. The only reply of any kind to the representations of King Constantine and his Government was an ultimatum, delivered December 14, and reading in its essential parts:

The recent events in Athens have proved in an indisputable way that neither the king nor the Hellenic Government exercises sufficient authority over the Hellenic army to keep it from constituting a menace to the peace and security of the Allied troops in Macedonia.

Under these circumstances the Allied governments

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are obliged, with a view to assuring their forces against an attack, to demand the immediate removal of the troops enumerated in the technical note attached. These removals must begin within 24 hours and be completed as quickly as possible. On the other hand, all movements of troops toward the north must immediately cease.

In case the Hellenic Government should not accept these exigencies, the Allies will consider that such an attitude constitutes an act of hostility toward them.

The undersigned ministers have received orders to quit Greece with the personnel of their legations if, at the expiration of 24 hours from the delivery of the present note, they have not received the pure and simple acceptance of the royal government.

The blockade of the Greek coasts will continue until the Hellenic Government shall have given full reparation for the last attack, made without provocation by the Greek troops on the Allied troops at Athens, and until sufficient guarantees for the future have been furnished.

This astounding document, coolly declaring that the landing of an armed force upon neutral soil and an advance of that force with declared hostile intent upon the capital of a country at peace, furnished no provocation to resistance, is remarkable for many reasons. First it betrays the line that the British and French governments had decided to adopt toward the events of December 1, namely, that King Constantine's meager force still under arms constituted a press-

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ing danger to Sarraïl's armies, and that whatever measures of pression might be taken toward Greece were, consequently, of military necessity. Venizelos himself, on December 30,¹ placed the strength of the constitutional army of Greece at between 30,000 and 40,000 men, not bayonets. Sarraïl at this time had over 250,000 men at Saloniki, protected from any possibility of a Greek attack by a range of mountains passable only at two readily guarded points. Pretense that the Allied Orient armies were in any danger was, therefore, either an amazing confession of the weakness of the Macedonian forces or a transparent diplomatic subterfuge. While the Russian and Italian ministers had signed this note, the former, later and very reluctantly, withdrew from Athens aboard the *Abassieh*, and the latter refused to leave the Greek capital at all, declaring that he was representing his government, not acting for a moving-picture film.

"We either have diplomatic relations with the Greek Government," he said, "or we break them off. If we break off relations we leave Greece entirely. If we do not, there is no sense in

¹ See Appendix 6.

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negotiating over a distance of twenty miles."

The Greek reply to the ultimatum was in full accord with the assurances King Constantine had already given the British and Russian ministers that he was ready to meet the Allies more than half-way in reaching a frank understanding. The fact that the ultimatum required a blind acceptance of any reparation or guarantees the Allies might demand, left the very profound impression on the Hellenic people in general that the Austrian demands made of the Serbs in July, 1914, were mere child's play compared to this rough-shod method of handling international affairs. There was an unquestionable opposition to King Constantine's acceptance of the terms of the ultimatum, at least until the nature of the "reparations and guarantees" were defined. A party of growing importance in Greece maintained that Great Britain and France were trying to force Greece into war against the Allies and foresaw that sooner or later, either by the continuation of the blockade or by new demands impossible of fulfilment, the British and French chancelleries would succeed in this purpose. They therefore counseled the king to put him-

self at the head of the Greek people and fortify himself in the fastnesses of Thessaly, where he could probably resist the attack of the Allies for years. The "Chronos," an Athenian daily of popular circulation, put the matter squarely:

"War is no worse than starvation," it declared. "If the halter around our necks is tightened any further, let us have war and be done with this business."

It is interesting in this connection to read the opening phrase of the Allied ultimatum that "neither the king nor the Hellenic Government exercises sufficient authority over the Hellenic army to keep it from constituting a menace to the peace and security of the Allied troops in Macedonia." Undoubtedly the Allies had done all they could since June 21 to undermine King Constantine's authority over his army and to destroy the discipline of the Hellenic military and naval forces. But their statement, in this instance, was still premature. Had it not been for the iron authority of the commander-in-chief of the Greek forces on December 1, not a man of Admiral Dartige du Fournet's landing force would have returned to the Allied fleet, and the admiral

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himself would have been kept a prisoner. On the presentation of this latest ultimatum, had it not been for the immense influence in behalf of the Allies that King Constantine exercised and his complete moral ascendancy over the Hellenic army and the Hellenic people, the result of the ultimatum would not have been further concessions to the Entente, but the creation of a new and exceedingly difficult Allied front in Greece. The British and French governments had Constantine I, not Venizelos or their diplomatists, to thank for peace in Greece instead of a new conflict, which would have dragged out the European War to still greater length and, it may be, have made a German victory possible.

The Greek Government's acceptance of the ultimatum, wholly the work of King Constantine, was as "pure and simple" as any one not trying merely to pick a quarrel could require.

Desirous of giving once more a manifest proof of the sincere sentiments of friendship by which it has never ceased to be animated toward the Entente, the royal government accepts the demands contained therein.

At the same time, however, Foreign Minister Zalacostas expressed the hope that:

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The Powers will reconsider their declaration to continue the blockade of the Greek coasts and islands, which strains the relations between the Allies and Greece and makes an impression upon public opinion, and will be persuaded that the best guarantee against any future misunderstandings lies in the firm and very sincere desire of the Greek Government and the Greek people to see confirmed as quickly as possible their excellent traditional relations toward the four Powers, and a close friendship based upon reciprocal confidence.

While the Greek reply was on its way aboard the *Latouche-Treville*, Vice-admiral de Marilave, who had replaced Dartige du Fournet in command of the Allied squadron, cleared his decks for bombardment and notified the population of the Piræus "to close their doors and windows and seek refuge from every kind of projectile after 4 o'clock P. M."

"I deny," Admiral de Marilave added, "all responsibility for the measures to which I may be compelled to have recourse."

The population of Athens was not notified of this intention to bombard. No time was given in which to get the women, children, and other noncombatants out of the city. Only the arrival of Minister Zolocostas, with the Greek reply to the ultimatum, prevented the destruction

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of the ancient city, with its priceless monuments.

The Hellenic government immediately set about the transfer of troops demanded by General Sarraïl. The examination of those arrested on charge of complicity in the abortive revolution of December 1 and 2 moved as rapidly as the courts could act, King Constantine urging the judges to dispose of the business with all possible dispatch. In three weeks 268 persons were brought to court; 91 were released within a fortnight; 118 were still to be examined; 57 were convicted on suspended sentence, and 2 were under indictment. Nevertheless, the Allied ministers were greatly exercised over this handling of the sedition cases. Doubtless, they felt a certain sense of responsibility in the matter. Certainly those Venizelists who had remained true to the cause of the Cretan in Athens left them no peace with tales of the brutal treatment of the Venizelist prisoners. As a result, not only the British and French but the American minister visited the jails, only to find the Venizelists, according to Mr. Droppers, "as comfortable as could be expected and humanly treated."

In view not only of the loyalty with which the

Allied demands were being executed, but of the rapidity and fairness with which the revolutionists responsible for the bloodshed of December 2 were being tried, the Hellenic Government was at loss to understand the continued activity of the Anglo-French secret police in spreading disaffection throughout the Greek islands. The internal complications created by these manœuvres were set forth in a formal note on December 18, inviting the Allies to assist the Hellenic Government in reaching a solution of these difficulties:

The transfer of troops is being effected within the time allotted despite the difficulties made by the population. The judicial authorities handling the cases arising from the violent seditious movement of December 1 are proceeding with circumspection, confining their action to haling before regular tribunals only those directly implicated in the sedition. Calm reigns in the capital; the provinces are untroubled by revolt.

The Hellenic Government has a right, therefore, to expect to see the relations with the Entente in the way of a definite reëstablishment of reciprocal confidence. Nevertheless, the blockade of the coasts and islands of Greece continues, and an artificial extension of the revolutionary movement in the Cyclades islands, tolerated by the Allied fleet aided by certain disturbing elements¹ tends, contrary to the intent of the agreement respecting the neutral zone erected in Macedonia,

¹ The Anglo-French secret police.

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to alienate new portions of Greek territory from the legitimate government.

The Hellenic Government presumes that such action cannot be the intention of the Powers. It is persuaded that the Powers do not purpose to proceed to hostile acts toward Greece after having occupied a large part of the country and accomplished an enfeebling of its military strength. . . .

The present state of affairs begins to provoke the profoundest popular unrest. . . . Public opinion in the Allied countries continues to be misled by mendacious press reports emanating largely from Saloniki, while the official versions, the truth of which could easily be investigated by the Allied representatives in Athens, find no place in the Allied press. . . .

If anarchy be encouraged in this country, the Government can no longer regard with the same confidence its responsibilities in respect to the maintenance of that public tranquillity essential to security throughout the kingdom. The Government is firmly convinced that, as the Allies have frequently officially declared their disapproval of any subversive, anti-dynastic movement in Greece, and as it is no longer possible to question the distinction which is made by Greek opinion between Venizelism and sympathy with the Entente, a clearing up of the situation will not be difficult to accomplish. .

Undoubtedly a clearing up of the situation would not have been difficult had the British and French ministers shown any disposition to clear it up. They did not. Count Bosdari worked night and day to effect a *modus vivendi* short of war between the Greeks and his country's allies,

but he had no help from France or England. The blockade was no longer pinching; it was throttling Greece.

The Allies continued to put revolutionists ashore on the Greek islands and to protect them while they reduced the islanders to subjection, sometimes by methods of distinct brutality. The family of aged G. Daleggio, a Greek, sometime German consular agent at Syra, complained to the American legation that he had died as the result of ill treatment at the hands of the Venizelists occupying the island. The Holy Synod of Greece formally appealed to the pope, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Holy Synod of Russia against the encouragement given by the Allies to

a small political group which takes advantage of a foreign military occupation to terrorize the State and which, not hesitating before recruitment by force, has imprisoned and expelled priests and prelates who have remained faithful to their duty. . . .¹

"The Greek church," the appeal continues, "would sin in the sight of God and betray its mission were it

¹ The prelates of higher rank arrested by the revolutionists and still held imprisoned, so far as I have been able to learn, are: The Archbishops of Agathangelos, Drama, Cosani and the Metropolitan of Crete; the Bishops of Grevena, Photios, Syra and Paronaxia.

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to remain silent in the presence of the grave danger in which the people find themselves of dying of starvation. This so-called 'pacific blockade' not only is ruining our country materially and destroying every commercial, industrial and maritime activity, but it also threatens the inhuman and terrible destruction of a Christian population of men, women and children unable to bear arms, which even armies and navies at war are bound to spare.

With this declared attitude of the Greek Church, in concert with the whole Hellenic people, it was no strange thing on Christmas day to see the venerable Archbishop of Athens, Monseignor Theoclitos, mount on a cairn of stones in the center of a vast multitude, and pronounce the anathema of the church of Greece upon "the traitor, Venizelos," and all his followers. From early morning, tens of thousands of men, women, and even children assembled at the parade-ground of Athens to repeat the age-old ceremony of anathema against Venizelos. The Government had forbidden the demonstration, but its prohibition deterred no one. Before three o'clock Christmas afternoon, fully 60,000 people had gathered at the appointed spot.

As in the days of Alcibiades, each of those who came carried a stone which, cast into a pile,



THE ANATHEMA OF VENIZELOS
December 25, 1916

ANATHEMA!

erected a monument to the national hatred of him against whom the anathema was pronounced. Among the participants were not a few who had been followers of the Cretan until the revelations of the plot of December 1; there were delegates of Hellenes from the irridentist provinces of Asia Minor, who charged Venizelos with having, through his own ambition, "ruined the hope of realizing an united Hellenism." I saw one old woman, bent under a huge, rough rock brought from the stony land of her farm in Attica. As she cast her missile, she cried in a strident voice:

"We made him premier; but he was not content. He would make himself king. Anathema!" And she flung out her hand, the bony fingers outstretched in sign of the curse she called down upon the head of the Cretan.

The Archbishop of Athens voiced the feelings of the Greeks in few words, but telling:

"Accursed be Elephtherios Venizelos, who has imprisoned priests, who has plotted against his king and his country!"

Eight bishops, representing every district of old Greece, followed him in the same ceremony.

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Subsequently, not a village, not a hamlet of old Greece did not repeat the anathema of Venizelos on its own account. For months, Venizelos had insisted upon elections. In a way these spontaneous ceremonies were vastly more indicative than any elections could ever have been of the place to which the great Cretan had fallen in the esteem of his countrymen.

A week later, the laborers, always previously the ardent supporters of Venizelos, registered their separate judgment of "a revolutionary movement conducted by a small number of traitors which is being extended within the islands by the use of the specter of famine," which they presented to the American minister, Mr. Drop-pers, praying the President of the United States to end the blockade. Over three hundred labor-unions signed the appeal in which it was charged that:

The foodstuffs consigned to the food control committee of the country are seized by the very Powers maintaining the blockade and turned over, in contempt of all human justice, to those who have fomented and directed the revolutionary movement, at Saloniki.

On December 27 the hospitals of Athens were

forced to refuse further patients, as they were unable to feed them. The premier showed me his daily budget of telegrams from all over the country, a ghastly record of privation, hunger, and death. The Government once more requested the Allied powers to state the terms compliance with which would induce the raising of the blockade. In reply, on December 31 Count Bosdari, in behalf of the Allied ministers still aboard the *Abassieh*, out of sight of the famine stalking through the land, presented the final ultimatum of the Entente Powers.

It was sweeping and complete. "Moral reparations," including a public salute to the flag of the Allied nations were required, for the Greek defeat of the Allied landing force on December 1. The commander of the first army corps must be relieved of his command "unless the royal government can satisfy the Allied powers that this measure should be applied to another general officer upon whom the responsibility for the orders issued December 1 rests." As the king was plainly, albeit veiledly, indicated in this phrase, the Greeks keenly resented this imputation. Moreover, all the Venizelists, implicated

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in the abortive plot of December 1 and 2 were to be liberated immediately, without due process of law, and the property belonging to Venizelists destroyed during the two days was to be recompensed at the national expense. There was no mention of recompense for property destroyed by the Allied bombardment of Athens.

“The Powers guarantors inform the Hellenic Government that they reserve full liberty of action,” the ultimatum continued, “in case the government of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes gives new cause of complaint.”

This employment, for the first time, of the full, formal title of King Constantine indicated only too clearly that it was in respect to him, not his government, that these reservations were made. Neither did that gratuitous fling at the Greek sovereign render the ultimatum more acceptable to the Hellenic people. Under the head of guarantees, the document read:

The Greek forces in continental Greece and Eubœa and generally stationed outside the Peloponnessus must be reduced to the number of men strictly necessary to the maintenance of order and police protection. All armament and munitions in excess of that corresponding to this effective, must be transported to the Peloponnessus; likewise all the machine guns and

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artillery of the Greek army with their ammunition, so that once the transfer has taken place there will remain outside the Peloponnessus neither cannon, machine guns nor the material of mobilization. . . . The military situation thus established will be maintained so long as the Allies judge necessary [presumably even after the end of the European war] under the surveillance of special delegates they shall select and accredit for this purpose to the Greek authorities.

Every meeting and assemblage of reservists in Greece north of the Isthmus of Corinth, must be forbidden.

The demand for the release of the Venizelists without due process of law abdicated, far more clearly than ever Austria-Hungary had proposed in the case of Serbia, all authority of the Greek courts. Recalling that the reservists of Greece are merely the male population capable of bearing arms, the last requirement quoted above, abdicated the constitutional right of assembly in Greece as effectually as if the entire country had been put under foreign martial law.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE UNENDING BLOCKADE

THE effect of the demands of the Allied ultimatum on the Greek people was stupefying. That night hundreds paraded the streets crying: "Long live starvation! Down with the ultimatum!" As they marched, they carried pitiful, gaudy portraits of King Constantine, as if they were sacred icons or some sort of talismans against hunger. There could be no doubt that rather than accede to this final blow at their independence and sovereignty they were to the last man ready to fight, even against four great world powers. The situation created not so much, perhaps, by the demands as by the tone of the ultimatum, by the long, inflexible pressure of the blockade, and, above all, by the open aid the Allies had given and were still giving the revolutionaries, was so menacing that I sought the king at once to learn his purpose. I found him at Prince Nicholas's, consulting with his brother, as

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he often did before reaching a momentous decision. He seemed to have aged greatly in the past few weeks, to have aged years since I had seen him first in the summer of 1915. Yet he still kept that smiling cool-headedness which he had never lost, even in his moments of wrath, since the beginning of his country's trials.

He reviewed in detail the situation of Greece since the war first came to the near East, underlining step by step the immense, though unappreciated, concessions Greece had made to the Allies. His complaint was not so much of the blockade or even of the new Allied demands, as of what he termed "the determination of the British and French neither to understand the real state of affairs in Greece nor to permit any knowledge of it to reach the world at large." He gave me very plainly to understand that the crux of the whole situation lay in the Allies' espousal of the revolutionary movement in Greece, and their more or less frank efforts to promote civil war in his country. He ridiculed the idea that he had ever dreamed of attacking Sarraïl's flank.

"The French and the British do not seem to think I am much of a soldier," he said, laugh-

ingly. "But, believe me, I am more of a soldier than to attempt anything so mad as that, even if I wanted to, which I do not."

Recalling his lengthy message of November 27 to Premier Briand, he referred once more to his four offers to join the Allies in the war, all of which had been rejected, and asked with some asperity why the truth about these offers was always so carefully suppressed by the Allied governments, while unfounded reports of his alleged pro-Germanism were widely exploited in the British and French press. I asked him point-blank upon what Admiral Dartige du Fournet could possibly have based his report that the Greeks treacherously attacked him on December 1.

"You were there yourself," he replied. "Probably you saw more than any one else of the whole affair. Did you see anything that would substantiate such a claim?"

I was forced to admit that, on the contrary, I had seen the Greeks, in position to annihilate a good part of the admiral's force, withholding their fire, under orders.

"The Greeks merely defended their own," the

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monarch stated, "as any Englishman or Frenchman would have done in similar circumstances. No Greek either then or even now has any desire to fight the Allies. Neither a continuation of the blockade nor further coercive measures on the part of the Entente can induce me ever to declare war on France or England, and don't forget that under the Greek constitution I am the only man in Greece who can declare war. The Hellenic people to-day do not want war with anybody. They are ready to tighten their belts and starve, if need be, until the truth of the situation in Greece can penetrate to the statesmen and the people of England and France."

Again through the efforts of King Constantine the terms of this last ultimatum were accepted in full. The Government immediately took charge of the distribution of the small remaining stock of food-stuffs in Greece. Every grown person was allowed six and one half ounces of bread per day. King Constantine, as head of a family of six grown persons and two infants, drew his bread-card like any other citizen of Athens. At the same time, on January 5, 1917, Premier Lambros sent to the Allied conference that had been

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called in Rome a full statement of the situation in Greece, urging an early raising of the blockade, and guarantees from the Allies that the revolution in Greece would not be further extended through their influence. As a consequence of this able summary, on January 8 the Allied diplomatists presented a supplementary note, insisting upon a more formal acceptance of their last ultimatum than that they had already received, and took occasion at the same time to offer certain guarantees against any further encroachments of the revolutionists than those they had already sponsored:

The Allied Powers agree not to permit the withdrawal of the Greek troops to the Peloponnessus to be seized by the partisans of the provisional government as an opportunity to occupy by land or sea any part whatsoever of Greek territory thus deprived of all means of resistance. The Allied Powers likewise agree not to permit the authorities of the provisional government to establish themselves in any part of the territory of Greece now actually in possession of the royal government which they [the Allies] may be brought themselves to occupy temporarily for military reasons.

This was perfectly satisfactory to the Hellenic Government. Had it been as loyally executed as the engagements of Greece toward the Allies,

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there would have been no further difficulties between Greece and the Entente. After an all-night session of the crown council, in which King Constantine's conciliatory advice once more prevailed, Foreign Minister Zolocostas drew up the written and categorical acceptance of every demand contained in the Allied ultimatum of December 31, adding, however, a further plea in favor of lifting the blockade:

The government believes it its duty again to draw the attention of the Allied governments to the salutary influence upon the public opinion of the country, exasperated to the highest degree, that the cessation of a measure applied to a friendly and neutral country would have.

The Hellenic Government's appeal was fruitless. Even the Venizelist occupation of the loyal Greek islands did not cease. The blockade continued, absolute since November 30, and a practical prohibition of importation of the food-stuffs necessary to life, since September 30. The death-rate increased daily. In January, twenty-five dead were reported and certified to by physicians as due to starvation; in February, twenty-six; in March, forty-nine; in the first ten days of April, ten. Almost all were women or children.

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Most deaths were not reported at all, especially in out-of-the-way places. It is known, however, that by March, 1917, there had been four deaths from starvation on the island of Ithaca, one on St. Maura, five at Preveza, three at Messina, two on Cephalonia, and one on Eubœa. Taken as mere measures for the rest of Greece, these must indicate hundreds of deaths.

Worst of all, perhaps, was the suffering of the poorer classes, the dock laborers, factory hands, and unskilled workmen of all kinds, thrown out of employment by the shutting down of all business due to the lack of raw material, normally brought by sea, of coal, and of money to pay them. It was of little moment to them that the price of the necessities of life had leaped beyond the reach even of the well to do, since the poor had no money at all. First the bread was made of two thirds bran; then it was scarcely made at all. In the country districts the peasants lived upon roots and herbs, like animals; in the city a handful of olives kept body and soul together.

But what wounded the Hellenic people more than hunger was the continued attacks upon them and upon their king in the Allied press.

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The Venizelist press-bureau at Saloniki, with the cables free of censorship, while those of Athens were barred to all but favored news, filled the world with falsehood, with absurd charges, and ridiculous assertions. King Constantine was said to receive part of his salary from the French, British, and Russian governments, and was accused of base ingratitude because he did not therefore plunge his country into war. He was charged with maintaining a secret wireless station, in constant communication with Berlin, on Queen Olga's summer villa at Tatoy. Statements he had never dreamed of making were put in his mouth and published broadcast. He was alleged to have taken his orders on the best way to maintain his throne from his brother-in-law, the Emperor of Germany. Again and again the story of his "treacherous ambush" of the Allied forces on December 1 was repeated in the British and French press. The old tale that he had a secret agreement with Germany to the prejudice of the Allies was revived and reprinted with embellishments. There was not, and is not, one single word of truth in any of these grotesque stories.

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The constant repetition of these false statements in London, Paris, and the United States has done even more to embitter the Hellenic people than the ordeal of starvation inflicted upon them by the Allied powers. Starvation only succeeded in drawing them closer to their soldier-sovereign, the democratic monarch so truly of them, so very really a Greek of the Greeks, reflecting their will, working out in the most intimate touch with them the destiny they have conceived and borne untarnished in their souls through four hundred centuries. Therefore when the Venizelist propaganda at last unmasked its underlying purpose and counseled the Allies to dethrone King Constantine, in violation of their repeated promises not to disturb the constitutional government of Greece, the Greeks made desperate efforts to get the truth of their situation to the world. It was useless. Their denials of the fantastic imaginings of the Venizelist press-bureau were not published even when they could get them by the Allied censors.

On January 14, New Year's Day by the Greek calendar, I had my farewell audience of the big,

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bluff man his countrymen call their "*koumbaros*." A band of Greeks in their white fustanelles had come to the palace, as is the custom on New Year's day, to chant choruses in praise of king and country. When the ceremony was over, we walked together into his study, under the window of which one of the shells from the Allied fleet had fallen during the bombardment of the city on December 1.

"I am sorry you are leaving us," King Constantine said abruptly. "I do not believe that there is a man or woman in Greece who does not feel very profoundly what a great thing it has been for us during this most critical period in our national history to have an American correspondent here to tell the world with absolute impartiality the truth of what is taking place. They tell me, however, that a good many of your telegrams to the United States never get through the censors." The King laughed a little ruefully. "You have nothing on me," he added. "Neither do mine.

"I am afraid there is no way," he went on. "We might as well be in a dungeon here for all the touch we have with the rest of the world.

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The most ridiculous, the most outrageous nonsense about what is happening in Greece is published daily in the European press, presumably written by journalists who are not even on the spot to see the facts for themselves. And when my Government sends official denials of them, the European newspapers will not even publish the denials. Take this letter, for example. As you see, it is from ex-Mayor Bennakis, who was arrested on December 2 during the attempted Venizelist revolution. A French newspaper publishes a story that Bennakis was so badly mistreated that his right arm had to be amputated, and he was on the point of death. Far from having his arm amputated, he writes me a letter with it, as you see, expressing his gratitude for the kindness with which he has been treated, and assuring me that he is my 'most loyal and devoted subject.' Your minister, Mr. Droppers, personally investigated the treatment of those who were imprisoned on the charge of sedition as a result of the abortive revolution of December 1 and 2, and told me himself that he found them very comfortable. My Government therefore telegraphed the French press a denial of the Ben-

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nakis story as well as of any number of similar fabrications; but I have never heard of any of the denials being published.

“After all, all that we ask is fair play. But it seems almost hopeless to try to get the truth out of Greece to the rest of the world in the present circumstances. We have been sorely tried these last two years and we don’t pretend we have always been angels under the constant irritation of the ever-increasing Allied control of every little thing in our private life—letters, telegrams, police, everything. Why, do you know that my sister-in-law, Princess Alice of Battenberg, was permitted to receive a telegram of Christmas greetings from her mother in England only by courtesy of the British legation here!

“Moreover, by taking an active hand in our own internal politics, England and France especially have succeeded in alienating an admiration, a sympathy, and a devotion toward them on the part of the Greek people that at the beginning of the war was virtually an unanimous tradition. I am a soldier myself, and I know nothing about politics, but it seems to me that when you start with almost the whole of a coun-

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try passionately in your favor and end with it almost unanimously against you, you haven't succeeded very well. And I quite understand how those responsible for such a result seek to excuse themselves by exaggerating the difficulties they have had to contend with in Greece—by talking about Greek treachery and the immense, sinister organization of German propaganda that has foiled them at every turn, and so on. The only trouble with that is that they make us pay for the errors of their policy. The people of Greece are paying for them now in suffering and death from exposure and hunger, while France and England starve us out because they have made the mistake of assuming that their man, Venizelos, could deliver the Greek army and the Greek people to the Entente powers whenever they wanted to use Greece for their advantage, regardless of the interests of Greece as an independent nation.

“There are just two things about our desperate struggle to save ourselves from destruction that I am going to ask you to try to make clear to the people of America. The rest will have to come out some day. All the blockades and cen-

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sorships in the world cannot keep the truth down forever. Understand, I am not presuming to sit in judgment on the Entente powers. I appreciate that they have got other things to think about besides Greece. What I say is meant to help them do justice to themselves and to us, a small nation.

“The first point is this: we have two problems on our hands here in Greece, an internal one and an external one. The Entente powers have made the fundamental mistake of considering them both as one. They said to themselves: ‘Venizelos is the strongest man in Greece, and he is heart and soul with us. He can deliver the Greeks whenever he wants to. Let us back Venizelos, therefore, and when we need the Greek army, he will turn it over to us.’

“Well, they were wrong, as I think you have seen for yourself since you have been here. Venizelos was perhaps the strongest man in Greece, as they thought; but the moment he tried to turn over the Greek army to the Entente, as if we were a lot of mercenaries, he became the weakest man in Greece and the most despised. For in Greece no man delivers the Greeks.

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They decide their own destinies as a free people, and England, France, and Russia put together cannot change them, either by force of arms or by starvation. And they have tried both. As for Venizelos himself, you had a man once in your country, a very great man, who had even been Vice-president of the United States, who planned to split the country in two and set himself up as ruler in the part he separated from the rest."

"Your Majesty means Aaron Burr?" I asked.

"Precisely. But he only plotted to do a thing which he never accomplished. Venizelos, with the assistance of the Allied powers,—and he never could have done it without them,—has succeeded for the time being in the same kind of seditious enterprise. You called Aaron Burr a traitor. Well, that's what the Greek people call Venizelos.

"The impression has been spread broadcast that Venizelos stands in Greece for liberalism, and his opponents for absolutism, for militarism. It is just the other way round. Venizelos stands for whatever suits his own personal book; his idea of government is an absolute dictatorship, a sort

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of Mexican government, I take it. When he was premier he broke every man who dared to disagree with him in his own party. He never sought to express the will of the people; he imposed his will on the people. The Greek people will not stand that. They demand a constitutional government in which there is room for two parties, liberals and conservatives, each with a definite program, as in the United States or England or any other civilized country; not a personal government, where the only party division is into Venizelists and anti-Venizelists.

"That is one thing I wanted to stay. The other is about the effect of the so-called German propaganda in Greece. The Entente powers seem to have adopted the attitude that everybody who is not willing to fight on their side must be a pro-German. Nothing could be falser in respect to Greece. The present resentment against the Allies in Greece—and there is a good deal of it, especially since the blockade—is due to the Allies themselves, not to any German propaganda. The proof of it is that when the so-called German propaganda was at its height there was little or no hostility in Greece toward

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the Allies. It has only been since the diplomatic representatives of all the Central empires, and everybody else whom the Anglo-French secret police indicated as inimical to the Entente, have been expelled from Greece, and any German propaganda rendered virtually impossible, that there has grown up any popular feeling against the Entente.

“Part of this is due to the Entente’s identification of their greater cause with the personal ambitions of Venizelos; but a great deal has also been due to the very unfortunate handling of the Allied control in Greece. When you write a personal letter of no possible international significance to a friend or relative in Athens, and post it in Athens, and it is held a week, opened, and half its contents blacked out, it makes you pretty cross, not because it is unspeakable tyranny in a free country at peace with all the world, but because it is so silly. For, after all, if you want to plot with a man living in the same town, you don’t write him a letter; you put on your hat and go to see him. Half the people in Greece have been continually exasperated by just this sort of unintelligent control that has irri-

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tated them beyond any telling. But to say that they are pro-German because they dislike having their private letters opened, or their homes entered without any legal authority whatsoever, is childish. It is a vicious circle. The Entente takes exceptionally severe measures because they allege the Greeks are pro-German; the Greeks very naturally resent the measures thus taken, as would the Americans or anybody else. The Entente then turns around and says: 'You see, that proves that the Greeks are pro-German, as we suspected!'

"The fact of the matter is that there is less pro-German feeling in Greece than in the United States, Holland, or any of the Scandinavian countries. And there is far less anti-Entente propaganda in Greece even now than there is anti-Hellenic propaganda in England, France, and Russia. The whole feeling of the Greek people toward the Entente powers to-day is one of sorrow and disillusionment. They had heard so much of this war 'for the defense of little nations' that it has been a very great shock to them to be treated, as they feel, very badly, even cruelly, for no reason and to nobody's profit.

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And more than anything else, after all the Greek Government and Greek people have done to help the Entente powers since the very outbreak of the war, they deeply resent being called pro-German because they have not been willing to see their own country destroyed, as Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania have been destroyed.

“As I have tried repeatedly to point out to the Entente representatives, there can be only one certain guarantee of the safety of the Allied forces in the Balkans as far as the Greeks are concerned—that is mutual confidence. The assumption that every Greek is an enemy and not to be trusted is merely a standing challenge to every hothead to attempt something irreparable—irreparable for Greece as well as for the Entente.

“I have done everything I could to dissipate the mistrust of the powers; I have given every possible assurance and guarantee. Many of the military measures that have been demanded with such circumstance as measures of security I myself suggested with a view to tranquilizing the Allies, and I myself voluntarily offered to ex-

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ecute. My army, which any soldier knows could never conceivably have constituted a danger to the Allied forces in Macedonia, has been virtually put in jail in the Peloponnesus. My people have been disarmed, and are to-day powerless even against revolution; and they know from bitter experience that revolution is a possibility so long as the Entente powers continue to finance the openly declared revolutionary party under Venizelos. There is not enough food left in Greece to last a fortnight. Not the Belgians themselves under German rule have been rendered more helpless than are we in Greece to-day.

"Is n't it, therefore, time calmly to look at conditions in Greece as they are, to give over a policy dictated by panic, and to display a little of that high quality of faith which alone is the foundation of friendship?"

As I was leaving, I asked the Greek sovereign one more question.

"What will you do, sir, if they try to dethrone you?"

"I was born here," King Constantine replied. "I am a citizen of Athens. Do you know what

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Athens is called in Greek? ΔΗΜΟΣ ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ—the City of Athenians. Well, I, too, am one of those Athenians. No one can take that from me.”

EPILOGUE

WHEN I returned to New York, one Sunday I attended a meeting of Greeks in the Terrace Garden. A Greek who had known me in Athens dragged me from an obscure corner of the press-box, and before I knew it, Mr. Solon Vlastos, the chairman, had announced that a man who had come from Greece since the blockade would speak.

I said a few words to the audience in Greek, and they cheered themselves hoarse. As I was leaving the stage, Major Sioris mounted the steps and, taking my hand, kissed it. Turning to the audience he cried:

“I kiss the hand that has clasped that of the *koumbaros!*”

In the twinkling of an eye an hundred veterans of two wars pressed about me, to my intense embarrassment, to kiss my hand, their brown faces wet with tears.

Many people with whom I have talked since my return have said:

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"After all, suppose the Greeks have had a raw deal, what of it? The war is a big thing. The Allies are right on the big lines. Greece is only a little corner of the whole. Let it go!"

I am afraid I cannot quite see that. The Allies *are* right on the big lines, and because they are right, theirs is the victory; but only in so much as they are right. And somehow I believe that a wrong brings its own punishment. I believe that if the Allies had not been untrue to Serbia and unjust to Greece, their and our victory would have come sooner. For myself, I want to see the Allies right in all things great and small. Two wrongs do not make a right. Because the Germans were cruel to the Belgians does not justify the British and French in being harsh, to use no stronger term, with the Greeks.

The Greeks are a fine and loyal people. Had the Allies treated them as a fine and loyal people, I am certain they would have been fighting now beside the French, whom they have always loved, and whom they love even yet.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

VENIZELOS'S MEMORANDA TO KING CONSTANTINE

January 11, 1915.

SIRE:

I have already had the honor of submitting to Your Majesty the substance of a communication made me by the British minister at the order of Sir Edward Grey. By this communication Greece finds herself once more confronted with one of the most critical events of her national history. Until to-day our policy has consisted in the conserving of our neutrality, at least in so far as our engagement toward Serbia has not demanded our leaving it. But to-day we are called upon to take part in the war—no longer merely to discharge a moral duty, but in exchange for compensations which, realized, will constitute a great and powerful Greece such as even the most optimistic could not have imagined a few years ago.

To succeed in obtaining these great compensations, we shall undoubtedly have to confront great dangers. But after having studied the question deeply and at length, I have arrived at the conclusion that we ought to face these dangers. We should confront them principally because even in not taking part in the war, and in endeavoring to maintain our neutrality until the end of the war, we shall still be exposed to great risks.

If to-day we permit Serbia to be crushed by the new Austro-German invasion, will this invasion stop at our Macedonian frontiers or will it not naturally be attracted towards Saloniki? But even in supposing that this danger be averted, and admitting that Austria, content with the military crushing of Serbia, will not wish to establish herself in Macedonia, yet can we doubt that Bulgaria, invited by Austria, will not come forward to occupy Serbian Mace-

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donia? We should then come to the aid of Serbia if we do not wish to dishonor our engagements as an ally. But if, still indifferent to our own moral ruin, we remain passive we should thus be tolerating the breaking up of the equilibrium of the Balkans to the advantage of Bulgaria who, thus fortified, might either immediately or after some time, attack us while we were deprived of any ally and friend.

If, on the contrary, we had previously hastened to the succor of Serbia as to the accomplishment of an imperative duty, we should have been acting under circumstances much more unfavorable than if we went to her aid to-day. Because Serbia would already be crushed, and consequently our aid would be entirely useless, or at least not sufficiently useful; whereas, on the other hand, in refusing to-day the overtures of the Entente Powers, we should not receive, even in case of victory, any positive compensation assured for the aid we might have lent.

But it is necessary to examine the conditions under which we should have to participate in the struggle. Above all we ought to try to secure the coöperation not only of Rumania but of Bulgaria. If such a coöperation could be obtained and all the Christian states of the Balkans might make an alliance, not only would all danger of a local defeat be averted, but their participation would constitute an important reinforcement in the struggle undertaken by the Entente Powers; it would not even be exaggerated to say that this participation would exercise a considerable influence in favor of the domination of these Powers.

To achieve the successful issue of this plan I believe that important concessions must be made to Bulgaria. Up to this time we have not only refused to discuss this subject, but we have declared that we would oppose any important concessions being made to her by Serbia—concessions which might upset the equilibrium of the Balkans, established by the treaty of Bucharest. Our policy in this connection was always well defined up to the present time. But to-day things have obviously changed: at the moment when there rises before us the realization of our national aspirations in Asia Minor, we might make some sacrifice in

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the Balkans in order to assure the success of so great a policy.

We ought, above all, to withdraw our objections to concessions being made by Serbia to Bulgaria, even if these concessions extend to the right bank of the Vardar. But if these are not sufficient to attract Bulgaria to coöperate with her ancient allies, or at least to induce her to guard a benevolent neutrality, I should not hesitate—painful as the act would be—to advise the sacrifice of Cavalla to save Hellenism in Turkey and to assure the creation of a really great Greece comprising nearly all the countries where Hellenism has exercised her power during her long history through the centuries. This sacrifice would not be made as the price of the neutrality of Bulgaria, but as a compensation for her participation in the war with the other Allies.

If my judgment were accepted, it would be necessary, by intervention of the Entente Powers, to have the guarantee that Bulgaria would pledge herself to buy up the property of all inhabitants who wish to emigrate to Greece from the section which would be ceded to her. At the same time a commission would make it possible for the Greek population within the limits of Bulgaria to be exchanged against the Bulgarian population within the Greek boundaries; the property of these populations to be bought up by the respective states. This exchange and the purchase of the property would be made by commissions composed of five members, of whom England, France, Russia, Greece and Bulgaria should each name one; the execution of all these conditions to precede our actual surrender of Cavalla.

An ethnological segregation could thus definitely be accomplished and the idea of a Balkan confederation realized; in any case, an alliance of these states with mutual guarantees could be concluded which would permit them to devote themselves to the working out of their economic and other developments without being occupied almost exclusively from the beginning by the necessity of strengthening themselves in a military way. At the same time, as partial compensation for this concession, we should

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demand, in the event that Bulgaria should extend her territory beyond the Vardar, that the Doiran-Ghevgheli sector¹ be conceded to us in order to acquire, opposed to Bulgaria, a solid northern frontier—deprived as we should be of the excellent frontier which separates us from her on the east.

Unfortunately, owing to the Bulgarian greed, it is not at all certain that these concessions—considerable as they are—will satisfy Bulgaria and secure her coöperation. *But at least the aid of Rumania should be assured; without her, our entrance into the struggle becomes too perilous.*

It is unnecessary to add that we should ask of the Triple Entente a promise of the necessary funds to meet the expenses of the war, and to facilitate the purchase, at her markets, of the required military equipment.

My belief that we should accept the invitation given us to take part in the war is founded equally upon other considerations. Certainly in remaining impassive spectators of the struggle, we do not run merely the dangers I have just enumerated which the eventual crushing of Serbia would create for us. Even if the plan of a new attack on Serbia were abandoned, Austria and Germany, returning to the principal theaters of war,—Poland and Flanders—and emerging from them victorious, once victorious, would be able to impose precisely the changes in the Balkans I have just enumerated as being the possible consequences of the crushing of Serbia. Aside from this, the fact of their victory would carry with it a fatal blow to the independence of all little nations, without taking into consideration the immediate loss we should bear in the forfeiture of the islands. And, finally, for this reason also: that if the war should not end by a definite victory of one side over the other, but by a return to the order existing before the war, the extermination of Hellenism in Turkey would come swiftly and inevitably.

Turkey, emerging intact from a war which she has dared make on three great Powers, and emboldened by a feeling of security which her alliance with Germany would give

¹ This sector is part of the territory of Greece's ally, Serbia.

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her—an alliance which obviously would be maintained in the future, as it serves the ends of Germany—would complete systematically and without delay the work of the extermination of Hellenism in Turkey, hunting down, *en masse* and without restraint, these populations whose property she would confiscate.

In this task she would encounter no opposition from Germany; on the contrary, she would be encouraged by Germany in order that Asia Minor, which Germany covets for the future, may be rid of a claimant. The expulsion of thousands of Greeks living in Turkey would not only ruin them, but it would risk also involving all Greece in an economic catastrophe.

For all these reasons I conclude that, under the above conditions, our participation in the war is absolutely necessary. This participation in the war, as I said in the beginning, holds also grave dangers.

Opposed to the dangers to which we should be exposed in taking part in the war, there would predominate Hope—hope, founded, as I trust, on saving a great part of Hellenism in Turkey and of creating a great and powerful Greece. And even in the event that we fail, we should have an untroubled conscience in having fought to liberate our fellow countrymen who are still in bondage and who are exposed to the gravest dangers; in having fought also for the larger interests of humanity and the independence of small nations, which would be fatally imperiled by Germano-Turkish domination. And finally, even if we fail, we should keep the esteem and the friendship of strong nations, of those very nations who made Greece and who have, so many times since, aided and sustained her. Whereas our refusal to discharge our obligations of alliance with Serbia would not only destroy our moral existence as a nation and expose us to the dangers cited above, but such a refusal would leave us without friends and without credit in the future. Under such conditions our national development would become extremely perilous.

I am Your Majesty's most obedient subject,

EL. VENIZELOS.

CONSTANTINE I AND THE GREEK PEOPLE

January 17, 1915.

SIRE:

Your Majesty has already noted the answer of the Rumanian Government to our proposition concerning Serbia. This answer means, I take it, that Rumania will refuse us all military coöperation if Bulgaria does not participate. Even admitting that she is satisfied with an official declaration of neutrality on the part of Bulgaria in event of Greco-Rumanian coöperation with Serbia, it is improbable that a declaration of this kind can be obtained from Bulgaria. Moreover, the general staff itself does not seem to find an absolute guarantee of security in the Greco-Serbo-Rumanian coöperation so long as Bulgaria holds herself aloof, even after a declaration of neutrality, in the evident intention of violating this neutrality so soon as she finds it to her interest to do so.

This being the state of things, it is time, I think, to face resolutely the problem of the sacrifices necessary to obtain, if possible, a pan-Balkan alliance for a common participation in the war. An united action of the Balkan states would not only assure them, in any event, a local supremacy in the northern theater of war, but it would constitute also a considerable aid to the Powers of the Triple Entente—an aid which would suffice to turn the balance definitely in their favor in the terrible struggle which is taking place.¹

The ceding of Cavalla is certainly a very painful sacrifice and my whole being suffers profoundly in counseling it. But I do not hesitate to propose it *when I look upon the national compensations which will be assured to us* by this sacrifice. I have the conviction that the concessions in Asia Minor, concerning which Sir Edward Grey has made overtures, may, especially if we impose certain sacrifices re-

¹ These proposals were made before Italy's entry into the European conflict. Yet even the addition of Italy to the Allies did not "turn the balance definitely in their favor." It is doubtful if the creation of a Balkan block at this time would have accomplished as much as did Italy's entry, and certain that the possibility of friction between the Balkan States would have proved a constant source of weakness. As King Constantine put it: "Venizelos is a visionary. He lacks practical sense."

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garding Bulgaria upon ourselves, take on such dimensions that a Greece equally large and certainly no less rich will be added to the Greece that has been doubled by two victorious wars.

I believe that if we ask for the part of Asia Minor which, situated to the west of a line starting from Cape Phineka in the south, should follow the mountains of Al-Dag, Ristet-Dag, Carli-Dag, Anamas-Dag to reach Sultan-Dag, and which from there would end at Kaz-Dag in the gulf of Adramit (in case we are not given an outlet on the Sea of Marmora) there might be considerable probability of our request being accepted. The extent of this territory exceeds 125,000 square kilometers; thus it has the same area as Greece as she has been doubled as a result of two wars.

The part that we would cede (cazas of Sali-Chaban, Cavalla and Drama) has not a surface of over 2,000 square kilometres. It represents, consequently, in extent one sixtieth of probable compensations in Asia Minor without counting the compensation of Doiran-Ghevgheli, *which we shall also demand*.¹ It is true that from the point of view of wealth the value of the territory that we are to cede is very great and out of proportion to its size. But it is clear that it cannot be compared in wealth to that part of Asia Minor the cession of which we must work for. The matter of ceding Greek populations is certainly of the greatest importance. But if the Greek inhabitants of the portion ceded may be estimated at 30,000, that of the part of Asia Minor which we should receive in exchange can be reckoned at 800,000 souls; this is, therefore, twenty-five times superior to that which we would cede.

Moreover, as I have already exposed in my first memorandum, the cession of the district Drama-Cavalla will take place on the formal condition that the Bulgarian government buys up the property of all those who may desire to emigrate from the ceded territory. And I have no doubt that all of our compatriots, to the last one, after having sold their property, will emigrate to the New Greece which will

¹ Demand of Greece's own ally, Serbia.

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be established in Asia Minor to swell and strengthen the Hellenic population there.

Sire, under these circumstances I firmly believe that all hesitation should be put aside. It is doubtful—it is improbable that such an occasion as this which presents itself to us to-day will be offered again to Hellenism that she may render so complete her national restoration. If we do not participate in the war, whatever may be its issue, the Hellenism of Asia Minor will be definitely lost to us. Because if, on the one hand, the Powers of the Triple Entente gain the victory, they will share among themselves or with Italy both Asia Minor and the remainder of Turkey. If, on the other hand, Germany and Turkey are victorious, not only will the 200,000 Greeks already driven from Asia Minor have no longer any hope of returning to their homes, but the number of those who will be driven out later may take on alarming proportions. In any case the triumph of Germanism will assure for itself the absorption of the whole of Asia Minor.

Under these conditions, how could we let pass this opportunity furnished us by divine Providence to realize our most audacious national ideals? An opportunity offered us for the creation of a Greece absorbing nearly all the territory where Hellenism has predominated during its long and historic existence? A Greece acquiring stretches of most fertile land *assuring to us a preponderance in the Ægean Sea?*

Strangely enough the general staff does not seem to be greatly attracted by these considerations. They fear, so they say, on the one hand the difficulty of administering new territories of so vast an area, and on the other hand, that by taking part in the war we may exhaust ourselves more than the Bulgarians who will take advantage of our weakness after the war to attack us. None can be blind to the first difficulty. But I think that it should not lead us to abandon the realization of our national ideals on this unique occasion which presents itself to us to-day. Moreover, the total of the results realized by the Greek administration in Macedonia proves that, in spite of countless diffi-

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culties, this task is not beyond the force of Greece and Hellenism.

The second fear is less justifiable. The Balkan wars have shown that we do not exhaust ourselves any more rapidly than the Bulgars. It is true, however, that during a number of years, until we organize the whole of our military power on the base of the resources in men which the recruitment in Greater Greece will yield, we will find ourselves, in case of war in the Balkan peninsula, in the necessity of retaining a part of our forces in Asia Minor in order to prevent a local uprising there—an uprising which is not probable for, since the Ottoman Empire will have completely ceased to exist, our subjects will be perfect and law-abiding citizens. However, the armed force necessary to this end will be furnished very rapidly by the Hellenic population itself of Asia Minor. And then, it is easy to guard ourselves against any Bulgarian peril by establishing for this period a formal understanding with the Powers of the Triple Entente in virtue of which they will aid us in case Bulgaria should attack us in this interval.

In my opinion, even without such an understanding, we would have nothing to fear from Bulgaria after the successful issue of a war in which we should have taken part in common. Bulgaria herself would be occupied by the organization of the new provinces which she would have acquired. If she be blinded to the point of wishing to attack us, there is no doubt that Serbia has toward us an obligation of alliance and motives of gratitude.

It is to be noted, however, that the cession of Cavalla does not make it in any way certain that Bulgaria will consent to leave her neutrality to coöperate with us and the Serbs. It is probable that she may insist either upon obtaining these concessions in exchange merely for her neutrality, or that she may demand that this cession be made to her now before the end of the war and, consequently, whatever may be the issue of the war.

We cannot accept any of these conditions. If our participation in the war is checked in consequence of Bulgaria's attitude, we shall have kept unbroken the friendship and the sympathy of the Powers of the Triple Entente.

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And if we may not hope for such concessions as we might have obtained in exchange for participation in the war, we may at least expect with certainty that our interests will have the sympathetic support of these Powers and that we shall not be deprived of their financial aid after the war.

I should add, moreover, that the train of events, as well as the proposition that has been made to accord to us in Asia Minor large territorial concessions, demonstrates, without any doubt, that the vitality which new Greece has shown has attracted to her the confidence of certain Powers who look upon her as an important factor of reform in the Orient, while the Turkish Empire is in process of disintegration.

The support of these Powers will give us all the financial and diplomatic means of facing the difficulties inevitable in such a sudden aggrandizement. Greece, confident of this support, can follow courageously the new and admirable road that opens out before her. Fortunately, Your Majesty is in the full vigor of age, not only to create by his sword a greater Greece, but also to consolidate this military achievement by a perfect political organization of the new State and to transmit to Your heir, when the time comes, a finished work, superhumanly great and such as it has been given to few princes to accomplish.

I am Your Majesty's most humble servant,

EL. VENIZELOS.

APPENDIX 2

CERTAIN ARTICLES OF THE GREEK CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE 21. All authorities emanate from the nation and are exercised in the manner laid down in the Constitution.

ART. 22. The legislative power is exercised by the King and by the Chamber.

ART. 23. The right of proposing laws belongs to the Chamber and to the King, who exercises this right through his ministers.

ART. 31. The King appoints and dismisses his ministers.

ART. 32. The King is the supreme head of the State; the Commander of the military and naval forces. He declares war, contracts treaties of peace, alliance, and commerce; and communicates them to the Chamber with the necessary explanations as soon as the interests of the State allow. But commercial treaties and all treaties which contain concessions concerning which, according to other articles of the Constitution nothing can be decided without a law, or which impose personal burdens upon Greek citizens, have no validity without their ratification by the Chamber.

ART. 33. No cession or exchange of territory can be made without a law. The secret articles of any treaty may not invalidate the articles made public.

ART. 34. The King awards, in accordance with the law, all military and naval ranks and appoints and dismisses, likewise in pursuance of the law, all public officials, save when otherwise provided by law. . . .

ART. 99. No foreign army may be admitted to the Greek service without a special law, nor may it sojourn in or pass through the State.

APPENDIX 3

AN INTERVIEW WITH KING CONSTANTINE

From *The New York Times*, June 14, 1917

BY ADAMANTIOS TH. POLYZOIDES

When Mr. Polyzoides was in Athens last year he obtained, as correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES, the following interview with King Constantine, which he was pledged not to publish except by special permission of the King or in the event that he died or was deposed. His dethronement by the Entente now meets the condition.

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It was a few days after the burning down of the royal villa of Dekelia and its beautiful forest on July 14, 1916, that I was permitted to meet his Majesty, having a few days before expressed my desire to see him previous to my return to America. King Constantine received me in his study, where a few moments earlier he was in consultation with his Premier, who then, as now, was Alexander Zaïmis.

I found him in the best of spirits, as if his life had never been endangered in the midst of that conflagration in which his immediate suite and nearly two score soldiers lost their lives while fighting the flames surrounding his estate from every side, and as if he was not saved as by miracle twice in fourteen months.

"It was terrible, and yet a most remarkable experience, being in the midst of that hell," the King said in answer to my inquiry. "Yet I never felt any fear for my life; in fact, I never cared much for it," he went on with a smile. "I never cared much for my throne, either, and if I persist in keeping both, I do it for the sake of Greece, and for the sake of the Greek people, the only ones for which

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I care, and which are dear to my heart. I am saying this not because I want to boast of my love for Hellas, but in order to let my people know my sentiments, as I know their feelings toward me.

"Yes, the Greek people love their King, and if I ever lose my throne, it will not be because the Greek people will take it from me. I know it and I want America to know it on the day when this may possibly happen. I know that it is the Entente, and not the Greek people, that will have none of me. This effort to oust me is just as old as my first objection to the Dardanelles expedition; it dates from the day when, in the French Legation of Athens, the Entente Ministers assembled and talked about the possible changes in the line of succession to the Greek throne, while everybody, myself included, was despairing of my life, threatened by pleurisy, a year ago. I did not die then, and I did not perish in the fire of Dekelia, but in all this time the ill-feeling of the Entente against me has never relaxed.

"Well, I could be the most popular of all Kings, as far as the Entente Allies are concerned, had I joined in their struggle and led my people to ruin and destruction. Of course, I would lose nothing, no matter how great the sacrifices and the misery of my people, because such is the lot of Kings. The Belgians and the Serbians may be destroyed, but their Kings lose nothing of their former comforts. I would be comfortably installed wherever the Greek capital was transferred after Greece was reduced to nothingness following a crushing defeat."

"Would it be defeat necessarily?" I asked.

"There would be something worse than all the defeats the Greek race has suffered since it has been on earth," the King answered gravely. "No, Greece could not fare any better than any other small nation has fared on entering this war. We simply could not withstand, for longer than a fortnight, the blows of the Austro-German and Turco-Bulgarian troops launched against us. And the Greek Army once destroyed, all the powers of the universe could not save the Greek race from a Turco-

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Bulgarian onslaught, carried in full force against our noncombatant populations in European and Asiatic Greece, with the whole world simply looking on.

"This is the fate that threatens the Hellenic people when they enter the war, and from this fate I want to save them, sacrificing for this, if need be, not only my throne, but my life as well. I want to save the Greek nation from a catastrophe from which it will never recover, and this catastrophe, that I can see every day looming larger and larger, is this terrible world war. I may lose in my effort, but I shall know to the end of my days that I did my duty as a man, a Greek, and a King. I shall know that I kept my oath to my God, to my country, and to history, which, like God, is eternal."

"To force Greece into the war was the easiest way to my personal glory and benefit," continued his Majesty after a slight pause, "but I, the absolutist, the autocrat, the believer in the divine right of kings, as my opponents are prone to call me, was held down and nailed down to a pacifist policy simply because all the people of Greece who will do the fighting when war comes are against this war, and against sacrificing themselves in a vain effort, which will do nobody good.

"They call this struggle a fight for the rights of the weak and the oppressed, and yet they want us to believe that Greece is neither weak nor oppressed, when in fact we fare little better than Belgium. Is it in order to uphold our constitutional liberties? Rubbish! The present war takes little account of such small matters. Your liberty and your constitution count only when they are of any use to the Entente in a material way. If your Parliament stands for war, it is good; if it votes for peace, it is merely a band of crooks in the pay of Germany. These high-sounding names for lofty ideals and popular liberties have value only when they serve to rouse a people and march them to the slaughter house called nowadays 'the front.' If for the same ideals people want to sit quiet and mind their own business, then they are nothing."

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"But there are those who maintain that Greece, instead of sitting quiet and minding her own business, has been openly favorable to the Kaiser and Germany?" I remarked.

"You are a newspaperman," his Majesty retorted, "and you know how easily you can give life to a lie, when you have at your disposal all the means necessary to spread it, while the party which is mainly affected by your lie is gagged, and the freedom of speech and the benefit of a hearing are denied to it. Greece thought she was entitled to have a divided sympathy in this war. Still the general feeling was never in favor of the Germans, just as the general feeling, although favoring the Entente, was never in favor of committing suicide for the sake of the Allies. I spoke on this score many a time, and public opinion in and out of Greece knows my views."

"Whose victim then is Greece?" I asked.

"Originally she was the victim of the allied Ministers in Athens," King Constantine replied. "The Minister of France (M. Guillemin) and the Minister of Great Britain (Sir Francis Elliot) are acting more as Venizelist district leaders than as representatives of the best interests of their own countries. They want simply to put M. Venizelos in the place where I am now sitting. Is this wanted by their own Government? I have no means of knowing, but I doubt it. The Ministers of Russia (Prince Demidoff) and of Italy (Count Bosdari) profess to be friendly to me personally, but they naturally cannot be very friendly to the cause of Hellas. Of the neutral Ministers, some are absolutely noncommittal, but the rest are Venizelists, and I am sorry to add that even the Minister of the United States (Garret Drovers) must be included in the latter category.

"On the other hand, for I want to be fair, I think that an American Minister who is hostile to a King as a matter of principle is more popular in his own country. Think of a Royalist American! I do not expect that, of course, but I thirst for a square deal, and this has not been given to me from America, except in very

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few instances. People there seem to believe more readily their cousins across the Atlantic than they do the King of the Hellenes. This is natural as long as Athens communicates with America through London. But the most curious thing of all is that whenever I happen to speak my mind to an unprejudiced American I always find him on my side."

We then spoke of the war. The King seemed tired of the eternal discussion of that subject. Still when I asked him what he believed to be the possible outcome of the struggle, he answered:

"Germany will not be defeated, and the Entente will not be defeated. This thing is bound to drag on for years, and peace will only be signed when all the belligerents reach the end of their resources. This peace will not take into account the small nationalities; neither will it establish permanent rules of righteousness and justice. He who at the end of the war will be stronger than the others will get the best terms, and the weak and small will have to pay, as has been the case always since the world existed.

"I am not saying this for Greece alone; the rule applies to every little country which can neither get free nor live by itself. Belgium and Serbia when freed will owe their liberty to some one else, and he will get the best of their freedom, as is the case with Navarino and Greece. This is the reason why I want Greece to stay out of the war, and the Greek people are clever enough to view the situation in the same light.

"Another thing that I want you to bear always in mind is that the Entente Powers have always been, they are to-day, and they will be in the future, more pro-Bulgar than they have ever been pro-Greek. And this is another reason why we are neutral at this time. Bulgaria to-day, even when fighting against the Allies, has more friends in London and Paris than Greece has had since the days of Hugo and Béranger. It is a case of incurable Bulgaritis, this, from which all the Entente Powers are suffering. Unfortunately I can do nothing in this case," the King concluded laughingly.

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He had kept me nearly an hour; the Minister of War, General Callaris, was waiting to see him; the Serbian Minister, Mr. Balougitch, was also announced; I rose to take leave of his Majesty. He likewise rose, a towering figure over six feet tall.

"When do you expect to sail for America?" he asked me.

"In two days," I answered.

"Do you want to ask me any other question?"

"Yes, your Majesty," I replied, and my question was this: "What shall I tell people when they ask me why the fort of Rupel was delivered to the Germans and the Bulgars?"

"Tell them," his Majesty said gravely, "that the salvation of Greece is immensely more precious than all the Rupels of the world. In fact, the salvation of Greece is more precious than the Greek throne, and the life itself of Constantine."

APPENDIX 4

HOW "RECRUITS" TO THE "ANTI-BULGARIAN ARMY" WERE OBTAINED

In regard to the activities of the revolutionists who have employed the funds lent them by the Entente powers to endeavor to overthrow the constitutional government of Greece, a committee of the Mussulman members of the Greek Congress waited upon the American minister in Athens on November 24, 1916, and presented to him the following list of acts committed against the Mussulman citizens of Greece, loyal to the constitutional government, by revolutionary agents:

Six thousand Mussulmans of Kailar have been carried off by force and compelled to do hard labor on the construction of roads. Two thousand of these Mussulmans have disappeared.

The Mussulmans of Vlevitsa were required to furnish 60 Turkish pounds ransom. The day after this demand was made, the stock of oats of the village was seized and carried off, together with the mules belonging to the villagers. The village priest and six of the inhabitants, who refused to pay the sum demanded, were put to death.

At the village of Tzartzilar, near Cazani, the mayor of the village was killed while at work in his fields, and his horses stolen.

Each of the inhabitants of the district of Kailer has been forced to supply the Allies with six sheep or other food animals.

The horses, mules and donkeys, the stocks of wheat and the food animals of about seventy villages between Grammaticovo, Katranitza and Florina have been requisitioned without payment.

At Vodena 18 Mussulmans were arrested, and those who

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were young among the inhabitants of the village were sent to Kaimaktchalen to be used in construction work.

At Karatzova, between four and five thousand Mussulmans were forced to work on construction work, unpaid. The plow animals and stocks of seed wheat were confiscated. Each day ten Mussulmans were arrested and sent to Saloniki.

At Verria, the Mussulmans were forced to serve in the revolutionary army or to pay \$20 to buy themselves off. One Mussulman, Riaz-Ahmet, was killed.

In the Chalcidic peninsula conditions have been shown, upon official investigation, to have been even worse. The Chalcidic peninsula is under the military control of the Allied Orient armies.

September 7, a recruiting officer of the revolutionary movement arrested and imprisoned Dr. A. Zafiropoulos; Ch. Zographos and G. Gerozaho, farmers; Z. Gerozaho, public accountant; Demetrios Papoulis, a merchant, and others.

September 10, they put to death at Calatists B. Kymourtzis, Sarafianos, from whom they took 100 pounds, Demetrios Stinys, and his wife. Nicholas Samaras was first mortally wounded and then had his skull beaten in with the butt of a rifle; C. Catacolo was wounded in the feet; A. Catacolo and Caramessalas wounded, mortally, in the head; Demetrios Safourla in the left arm, and A. Caratzina badly wounded in the right leg.

At Vassilika the justice of the peace, Mr. Nicholas Didachos, Sacoudis and ten others were arrested and sent to Saloniki where they were imprisoned. In the same village, the mother and two sisters of Hercules Patica, who had escaped, were imprisoned in his stead. The village priest, Papajoannou, and all his family were first tortured and then imprisoned for aiding the escape of Patica. They burned the furniture of G. Tetradis's two sisters, because Tetradis had also escaped their "recruiting."

September 19, the revolutionists at Polygro forced Gregory Sinopoulos to sing his own requiem. Then they hanged him.

At Vavados, they arrested member of Congress Trago-

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nos, Ath. Cotsanos, Basil Cianos, G. Cianos, and the women of their families, and then set the village afire. They shot Stavros Cardalias.

Early in October at Portaria they arrested three veterans of the late wars, and while taking them to prison, shot them in the back.

At Ormylie, they executed Police Commissioner Patriarcheas, cut off his head and paraded it through the neighboring villages to terrorize the inhabitants.

On October 18, Lefkis, a lieutenant in the revolutionary army, accompanied by a number of soldiers of the National Defense, or former policemen, came to the village of Stavros in the region of Vrasna, in Chalcidic, for the purpose of "recruiting." He published a proclamation and waited results. But he waited in vain. Not a single volunteer was forthcoming. All the reservists of the village had taken refuge in the neighborhood, determined to resist any attempt at arrest on the part of the revolutionists. Lefkis, seeing that no result came of his proclamation and resolved not to give up, appealed to the priest of Stavros, a man seventy years old, and ordered him to turn over the recalcitrants to the revolutionists without delay. The priest, without a tremor, answered the demand by this simple phrase:

"The reservists will not enlist until the king calls them."

Lefkis, greatly enraged, ordered his men to hang the aged priest immediately, to set fire to his house, and to burn his family alive.

Despite this not a single sound recruit was procured!

On October 20, another band of revolutionists, on "recruiting duty," after having in vain brought disorder into the villages of Baltja, Dremiglava, Langada, Aivati, mistreating everywhere the families of reservists, suddenly encountered the reservists and opened fire upon them with a loss of one killed and two wounded. To avenge these losses, the chief of the revolutionists, ex-Major Diamantopoulos, accompanied by sixty men, attacked Langada the following day, took possession of it without difficulty, and brutally beat Mayor Papageorgiou and Elie Bossinaki because they had not furnished any "volunteers" to the

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National Defense. Before leaving the town the commander had six houses set on fire, and put to death three Turks whom he found on his way and whom his men had taken pains to relieve of their money before executing them.

The band continued to go through various villages on its "round of recruitment" without being able to recruit anybody. Everywhere that it passed, the unfortunate villagers were maltreated and their houses burned and pillaged. Near Dremiglava the revolutionists set fire to 160 barns, destroying an enormous stock of bran and a great number of beasts of burden. Here, too, six houses were reduced to ashes. . . .

The English, who passed through the district of the "anti-Bulgarian action" of the "National Movement" estimated the damage done at about \$160,000.¹

On November 2, 1916, it was learned in Athens that ten loyalist inhabitants of Castoria had been arrested in that town by the Venizelists. Three were reported to have been shot out of hand on a charge of espionage; the remainder were tried by "court martial." Similar measures were taken in almost every border town to "stamp out royalist sentiment," as Mr. Venizelos put it.

The ministry of foreign affairs in Athens also officially reports as follows:

On March 2, 1917, twenty French cavalrymen under command of an officer suddenly arrived at the Zidani monastery, near the village of Servia. They imprisoned the aged mother of the superior of the monastery, her maid-servant and her nephew. They arrested Superior Caliniko, four monks, and the notary of Servia, who had sought refuge thereafter having been hunted out of his office and out of the town hall in Servia. These six persons, the superior, the four monks and the notary, were shot out of hand in the courtyard of the monastery without trial of any kind. Afterwards the soldiers pillaged the monastery.

Other French detachments killed three residents of the village of Lougani, and two of the village of Grapis. These acts, committed in the "neutral zone" in which the

¹ "Bulletin Hellenique," No. 4, November 5, 1916.

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French have assumed the responsibility of maintaining order, have aroused the greatest indignation throughout the whole of Greece.

The Greek government has protested vigorously against these unheard-of acts, committed on the threshold of Thessaly. Measures are being taken to prevent any acts of retaliation by the local population which might serve as an excuse to the foreign troops to invade the territory whose integrity was guaranteed by the Entente note of January 8, 1917.

APPENDIX 5

ITALIAN OPINION ON THE ALLIED POLICY IN GREECE

RASTIGNAC IN "LA TRIBUNA," OCTOBER 10, 1916

Let us proclaim aloud the truth even though it be disagreeable to the Allies. In this long political crisis, the one personality that counts at Athens is King Constantine. He, at least, knows what he wants and seeks no concealment of it, and no one can reproach him with being undecided or equivocal in his position.

It is truly surprising that Mr. Venizelos to push through his program of intervention, to fulfil his anti-governmental (if not anti-constitutional) plans, feels the need of leaving the capital of the kingdom, which is the actual seat of the Government of the crown and which consequently should be the most propitious, favorable and appropriate place to accomplish any change. His departure from Athens is Venizelos's declaration of failure, and the effective confirmation of the completeness of the king's influence upon the public opinion of the country. Venizelos gone, Athens remained neither shaken nor agitated; she has kept her stubborn attitude, faithful to the policy of the king and hostile to that of the minister whom the king had dismissed on three occasions without protest from the people and without being called to account by them for it. . . .

After all, what does Venizelos represent and what does he personify that the Allies should repose such confidence in him? Not the people, certainly and surely not the king, from whom he is widely separated and with whom he is in irreconcilable contrast. Thus we find ourselves outside the field of reality and consequently outside the field of politics, which lives and is nourished upon reality. We are therefore wrong.

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The sedition of Venizelos solves no problem; it leaves all problems as they were, or complicates them still further to the detriment of the Allies. The policy that the expedition of Venizelos represents is not the policy that the inhabitants of Greece choose to-day, or which they wish to see realized. The authority and the prestige of Venizelos are gone, and the opinion and the sentiment of the Greeks are hostile and inimical to the leadership of Venizelos.

ARNALDO FRACCAROLI IN THE "CORRIERE DELLA SERA," NOVEMBER 7, 1917

Every day telegrams from western Europe sent out by various important news-agencies bring echoes from London and Paris—especially Paris—of that dear desire so long and so obstinately nurtured in spite of everything; every day the diplomacy of the Legations in Athens—especially the French Legation—takes some steps, makes some move, presents some note, with the purpose of arriving at this result: the intervention of Greece in the war—in spite of everything. Every day sheaves of telegrams from Saloniki and Athens recount ferment in Athens against the king and in favor of the Allies, agitation among Greek officers exasperated at the inaction to which the Government's policy condemns them, desertions in mass to join the new army of national defense being fabricated at Saloniki. They state that the king's government is now no more than a shadowy political and diplomatic fiction since all the people of Greece are trembling in body and soul in sympathy with that "provisional government" which Mr. Elephtherios Venizelos founded in Crete and afterwards transferred to Saloniki; that King Constantine has on his side only a tiny group of politicians and pro-Germans; that Mr. Venizelos has with him the whole soul of the nation, the whole people, the entire army.

This is the sort of thing that is daily set forth in the telegrams which my excellent French and English friends send daily to their newspapers.

Well—shall I tell the truth? After all, it will be better for all concerned.

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The truth is precisely the contrary of all of that! . . .

King Constantine has a point of view of his own and amongst the ideals of civilization for which the Allies are fighting is also that of respecting the point of view of others. . . .

Has King Constantine really choked down and trampled upon the ideals of his people? Has he actually prevented his people from realizing any imperious desire to enter the war on the side of the Allies? Is it really he, the king, who does not want war?

Let us for once in a way make a good job of telling that truth which not one of our Allies can be resigned to see and confess: it was never the Greek sovereign alone who did not want war; it was Greece itself; it was the Greek people. The sovereign only interpreted the sentiment of the people. Far from commanding, or imposing his personal will, King Constantine has only followed the will of the country. The country did not want war. What is more, the country does not want war now.

Proof of this assertion? They are obvious and complete. If the king had not interpreted and followed the will of the people, the people would have forced him to change his mind or would have turned him out. When a people wants war really, nobody can prevent it. Resistance only provokes revolution.

For some time certain politicians and diplomatists—with that deep subtlety of intuition which diplomatists have displayed in this war!—have nursed the hope that precisely that might come to pass. The interventionist party, captained by Venizelos, maintained this. The interventionists are few, but they made a big noise. They shouted that the whole people was with them, that the king was combatting the will of the people and the ideals of the nation. But the people, alas! remained unimpressed.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, those who wished to believe in the desire for intervention of the Greek people, believed. But now proof has appeared. Mr. Venizelos himself has furnished it—and it has proved just the op-

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posite. For, to call things by their real names, the insurrectional movement of Mr. Venizelos has resulted in decided failure. To believe anything else, one has to have a large dose of simplicity in one's makeup.

Venizelos is indisputably a very cunning man. He is certainly one of the cleverest politicians of the day in managing events, especially in placing himself in the light that best suits him. . . . But he is a manipulator, not a crusader or a creator. He failed to understand, or at least he pretended not to understand, the real sentiment of the people whom he flattered himself he guided. A cardinal error for a politician! So long as he insisted that he had the will of the people in his pocket and claimed to be their spokesman and guide, there were always some who believed it. But the moment he launched forth into adventure, that he abandoned his flag and uttered his cry of appeal, then the perfect and incontrovertible proof was forthcoming that he was backed by very few people indeed—exceedingly few. And that is where Venizelos, cunning politician that he is, overshot his own cunning: the truth was revealed by the negative result of his departure.

What aid has the insurrectional movement created by Venizelos brought the Allies? How many combatants has he been able to gather together after two years of propaganda and two months of his "provisional government of the committee of national defense," favored as he has been in every way—with ships, money and assistance of every kind from those who have believed in him? Two thousand men! I do not know what delusions Mr. Venizelos harbors; but the delusions of those who still believe in him must be remarkable!

This curious Greek phenomenon must be studied with a free mind and without prejudice, with the independent impartiality of a spectator so as not to reach a false conclusion through sympathy or antipathy. Just one thought in mind: the interest of the Allies. . . . In this way we may ask ourselves what real advantage, what aid can come to the Allies from the provisional government of Saloniki? We have seen what there is to expect: in two months, with unheard-of effort, two thousand men! And to arrive even

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at that result, we have had to pay out ten millions!
[Drachmae, that is \$2,000,000.00.] . . .

The game is not worth the candle!

"CORRIERE DELLA SERA," NOVEMBER 11, 1917

Greece does not wish to enter the war at any price. . . .
The Greek people are with the king because the king is
against war. The Greek army is with the king. It is only
necessary to live in Athens a very short time to be convinced
of the admiration, the devotion that is accorded King Con-
stantine by the Greek people. When the king passes in
the street, he is cheered. When he is spoken of, it is always
with enthusiasm. In theater, music hall or moving picture
show, the slightest allusion to the king produces a delirious
demonstration.

APPENDIX 6

THE LIBERAL PARTY OF GREECE AND E. K. VENIZELOS

During the period between Venizelos's resignation in March and his return to power after the elections of June 13, the Cretan visited Egypt. Here he was able to renew ties with the British government and especially with the Foreign Office which he had originally formed at the London conference of 1912. Of the close nature of these ties even the French were not ignorant. M. Gabriel Hanotaux wrote in December 1912:¹

"Engaged in a decisive game which doubtless will not be played again, will the astute minister [Venizelos] try to carry it through at any cost; and will he, by a cunning veering around towards certain Powers, seek to obtain advantages which his allies' friendship awakened to suspicion might be inclined to dispute with him?"

Certain it is that following his return from Egypt, Mr. Venizelos's policy seemed suddenly to crystallize in conformance with every desire of Great Britain, while England's unquestioning support of the Cretan thereafter did not waver, even when her allies found more serviceable to the common cause to support other influences in the near East than Venizelos. It is interesting to note in this connexion that Mr. Venizelos's first revolutionary attempt in September, 1916, was staged in Crete, under the protecting guns of the British fleet; and that the British naval authorities landed men to restore order under the revolutionary government, shipping the loyal forces back to old Greece.

¹ "La Guerre des Balkans et l'Europe," pp. 203-4.

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AN UNPUBLISHED STATEMENT MADE BY MR. VENIZELOS IN DECEMBER, 1915

The statement was held at Mr. Venizelos's request "for the present," as he did not consider the time ripe for its publication. Subsequently, however, he gave an almost identical statement to a correspondent of "Le Temps," of Paris, using the notes that had been submitted him of this interview as the basis for that accorded "Le Temps."

"I do not believe that King Constantine believes that I or my friends are plotting against him personally or against the idea of a constitutional monarchy in Greece. And if he should believe it, his belief may lead him into a course of action dangerous to himself and more dangerous still to the normal development of Greece in the way of intelligent self government.

"For Greece is not ready for a republic and may not be ready for centuries. I have never believed a republic suitable as a government for Greece at this epoch of her history. I have frequently told the king that Greece will need his family an hundred, perhaps two hundred years longer. . . .

"The liberal party of Greece to-day is a one man party. If anything were to happen to its leader [Venizelos himself] it would break up and its membership be affiliated with the old parties in Hellenic politics. If there were to be a republic, I should be chosen President; but there would be no one in the liberal party to succeed me. Greece would be in the position of Mexico under Porfirio Diaz. That was bad for Mexico and it would be even worse for Greece."

Professor A. Andreades of the University of Athens on the Liberal Party of Greece, January, 1917:

"I have been and still am a liberal in the English sense or the American sense. But the liberal party of Greece as it is constituted to-day is not a party in that sense at all. For years I have tried to secure from Mr. Venizelos some platform, some program of

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what the liberal party of Greece stands for. There has never been any such platform, except the occasional speeches of Mr. Venizelos himself, and they do not follow any consistent plan that a political party could adopt as its program. The liberal party of Greece stands for whatever Mr. Venizelos wants—and that is not a healthy political condition for any State to be in.”

E. K. Venizelos to General Corakas, November 7, 1916:

“When I decided to assume the responsibility of the political division of Greece I was not so foolish as to believe that our great national and political enterprise would immediately be crowned with success in one or even several months. I knew very well that the confusion in people’s minds caused by the audacity and the suddenness of the enterprise together with the prejudice against me that the German agents since expelled from the country so long cultivated among the reservists, and the demoralization due to so many vicissitudes already passed through, as well as the blind and absolute idolatry of the people for the person of our famous generalissimo, would constitute quite as much of an obstacle to our latest effort as the military weakness of the Allies in the Balkan peninsula.

“But I have never had the habit of basing my calculations upon purely logical and historical foundations rather than upon the principle of psychological mutations, of general conceptions however indefinite, and on the law of violence and of domination which is stronger than all laws, written or unwritten, real or hypothetical.

“The essential point of view of your thoughts and your actions must be the absolute conviction that the Entente—England and France—quite as much as the result of serious representations on our part as on account of their military situation in the Balkan peninsula—a situation which is becoming worse daily—have adopted our movement by substantial and active approval to such an extent that our final ascendancy

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over the State of Athens [constitutional Greece] by means of the whole weight of the Entente which will crush the artificial wall which separates us from that State, is only a question of time for us. I hope, moreover, that your receipt of this letter will coincide with the beginning of a last and decisive action on the part of the Entente against Old Greece, an action whose preparatory manifestations will have constituted a serious prologue for it.¹ If therefore, through having been deceived by misleading appearances, you are still wavering—you upon whom we have based a great part of the internal success of our enterprise against the hostile State of Athens, you will have to accept in your own mind and regard as absolutely certain, this final conviction [that is, that the Entente have adopted the Venizelist cause]. . . .

“What remains, after all, of this famous king who is still your king? Not even the shadow of himself! His authority has been reduced to shreds by one concession after another. His war teeth have been pulled one by one. The specter of hunger and suffering is already abroad throughout Old Greece, and will become still more terrible so soon as a new and very efficacious blockade shall be established.² The soul of the people is already at the last limit of human endurance; so near is this that one last blow—which is imminent—will suffice to finish it. . . .

“Here, I must emphasize that we have already reached a definite arrangement with the representatives of the Entente. Our plan of supremacy is such that it will have been realized before the moment when, perhaps, signs of weakness on the part of Rumania shall have become apparent. That being the case, why weaken? . . . At this moment you should be resolved to execute to the letter and without fear everything to the last detail of what we de-

¹ The letter was written just a week before Admiral Dartige du Fournet's demand for the surrender of the arms of Greece.

² A month after the date of this letter the Allies declared, formally, their blockade of Greece, which the Venizelists put to such profit in extending their movement.

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cided in our private conferences and everything of a complimentary nature which Mr. R.¹ on my order communicated to you recently. Success or failure depends often upon one minute. Our domination in the capital, even though it be achieved only in a negative way, will bring us little by little to be the masters of all that remains of Old Greece. To accomplish this it is necessary to get rid, at the proper moment, of all the persons designated, whoever they may be. Who is not with us is against us.

"This confidential letter must be read and duly analyzed in a secret meeting of all the important persons, and you must inform me immediately afterwards of your efforts. . . . You must emphasize at your meeting that this letter embodies in final and irrevocable fashion my views as well as those of the Provisional government."²

NOTE: On its publication in facsimile in Athens, Mr. Venizelos declared the above letter a forgery. I submitted it, however, to a dozen of his closest friends, including men who had worked with him in secretarial capacity and were familiar with his handwriting. All pronounced its authenticity unquestionable. One, still an ardent adherent of the Cretan, said: "It is not only Venizelos's handwriting, it is his own peculiar style. It is the soul of Venizelos laid bare."

EXTRACTS FROM AN INTERVIEW GIVEN BY VENIZELOS TO A CORRESPONDENT OF THE "CHICAGO DAILY NEWS," DECEMBER 30, 1916

We are too busy fighting the Bulgars to make war on our fellow countrymen now.

¹ Ex-Minister Repoulis?

² Venizelos entrusted the letter to ex-Deputy Revinthi, one of his followers, to be delivered by hand to General Corakas. Revinthi, aware of the contents of the letter demanded \$160,000 of Mayor Bannakis of Athens not to turn the letter over to the judicial authorities. The ringleaders of the revolutionary plot offered Revinthi \$100,000 for the incriminating document, but before the payment was made and the letter delivered, the failure of the Venizelist plot caused Revinthi to flee Athens. He was captured and the letter found on him. Arraigned in court, he

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The barbarous atrocities committed by the royalists in Athens and the murder and pillage will result in the vindication of our party. King Constantine has climbed down from the throne. He is the leader of a political part of Greeks in opposition to mine. If Germany wins Constantine becomes an absolute monarch; if the Entente wins I fail to see how the king can retain his crown. We have no sympathy with the doctrine of the divine rights of kings. Constantine's army has between 30,000 and 40,000 men. Its supplies have been sadly drained by the ten months' fruitless mobilization of last year. Much of the Greek war material was surrendered to the Bulgars and is now taking Greek lives. . . .

We desire the Entente to recognize the nationalist government as the responsible government of Greece. This government is supported by the majority of the Greek people; opposed to it is the minority led by Constantine and composed largely of the military. We are exponents of what the Entente is fighting for — namely, liberty and justice. . . .

The Entente has recognized our local administration and our ministers to the Entente were recognized yesterday.

. . . The islands have heard of the provisional government, but as yet they have seen little tangible evidence of it.

Recruiting goes on apace because the islanders have an ingrained hereditary hatred of the Bulgars.

. . . The blockade and reprisal measures against Athens as a punishment for the recent atrocities at first worked a hardship but that hardship has now been removed. . . . Unless we are officially recognized as the supreme government in Greece we cannot legally call to the colors Greeks residing in foreign territory.

A second big thing we want of the Entente is the Greek navy, which the Entente seized from the royal marine. A admitted the rôle he had played in this business and admitted also that he had not delivered the letter to General Corakas. General Corakas, before the court, confirmed this and identified the letter as in Venizelos's handwriting and style.

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nationalist battleship sailing among the Greek islands and into the ports of old Greece would be more effective in stamping royalist sentiment out of the remaining islands than would years of talk. We have told the people of the islands that we and the Entente are in firm accord, but the islanders ask: "Where is the Greek fleet?"

APPENDIX 7

AS TO CERTAIN CLAIMS MADE BY MR. VENIZELOS

I. That he was ignorant that the Allies planned to use Greece as a base of military operations in Serbia, and protested that violation of Greece's neutrality.

Report of speech in the Boule of the Hellenes by Prime Minister E. K. Venizelos, session of October 4, 1915. From "*La Politique de la Grece*," by E. Venizelos: Paris, Imprimerie de l'Est. 1916. pp. 36, 37.

"I do not wish to have my words misinterpreted, and I must declare to you that in the days when the announcement was made that a Franco-British expeditionary force was being sent to Saloniki, the Greek Government protested against this violation of neutrality. As I have already said, it could not remain indifferent in the face of dangers which, entirely apart from the violation of neutrality, might arise from the landing and passage through Greek territory of international contingents, for the idea was current in Greece that Serbian territory would actually be occupied and that the passage through Greek territory would be used by the Allies to put pressure upon Serbia to obtain concessions for Bulgaria. I was forced to declare to those powers, toward whom Greece is sincerely grateful, that, in so far as the passage through our territory and the violation of our neutrality was concerned, I did not feel obliged, in view of the general situation and the point to which the war had progressed, to oppose their passage by force of arms; but that I was determined to confront the colossus of the two great powers with the feeble forces of Greece to resist any debarkation of troops which seemed likely to endanger Hellenic interests."

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Same, session of November 3, 1915; *op. cit.* p. 150.

Mr. Venizelos, addressing Deputy G. Theotokis of Corfou: "I certainly should not refer to these matters if I did not feel that I must protest most energetically against your charges and express my surprise that as finished a statesman as you, and one so prominent, could mount the rostrum and accuse me of having provoked the debarkation of the Anglo-French army at Saloniki!"

Report of the Secret Session of the French Chamber of Deputies held on June 20, 1916. From "Le Temps," Paris, October 3, 1919:

M. Delcassé reviewed the march of events in the Balkans in 1915. The elections which Mr. Gounaris conducted in Greece had resulted in favor of Mr. Venizelos, who was returned to power. The danger threatening Serbia could be met only were Greece to go to the assistance of Serbia. There was a defensive treaty between the two peoples. Mr. Venizelos said to us:

"This treaty provides that in case Bulgaria attacks Serbia, in order to secure the coöperation of Greece, *Serbia must furnish a force of 150,000 men at once*. As a matter of fact, forced to divide her forces to confront Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria, *it will be impossible for Serbia to furnish these 150,000 men*." And turning to the French and British ministers in Athens he said to them, on September 22, 1915, "Can you furnish me these 150,000?"

"To be frank," M. Delcassé declared, "the prospect of sending French soldiers out of the country when the enemy was on French soil worried me; I had never cared to consider such a prospect, for it was plain to me that Germany would direct her greatest effort against France, first of all, to try to crush us. Supported by Russia, by England, by Italy, by Spain, freed by virtue of her alliances and her understandings from the necessity of sparing a single one of her soldiers, what France had to do was to concentrate all her forces on the frontiers against which the German attack was directed."

But Mr. Venizelos had asked a question, and had to be given an answer. "A favorable answer would permit him to sound the King of Greece." On September 23, with the

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approval of the Government, M. Delcassé telegraphed our Minister at Athens:

"You may say to Mr. Venizelos that the Government of the Republic, anxious to make it possible for Greece to fulfill the obligations of her treaty with Serbia, is ready, for its part, to furnish the troops which have been requested."

This telegram was immediately communicated to Sir Edward Grey, who replied the same evening:

"This telegram so completely expresses my thought that I have telegraphed to our Minister in Athens to read it to Mr. Venizelos in the name of His Majesty's Government."

M. Arthur Groussier interrupted M. Delcassé.

"But you have just said that you did not think that any troops could be sent to Greece, and yet in the name of France you told Venizelos the opposite! Shame."

And M. Renaudel:

"And you spoke in the name of France! That's the kind of diplomacy we had! Luckily we are in secret session!"

And M. Lauche:

"Setting a trap, in the name of France!"

M. Delcassé continued: "On September 24, therefore, Mr. Venizelos was assured of the coöperation of France and England. That same day we learned of the Bulgarian mobilization. . . . If troops were sent out there, they would arrive too late to save Serbia. The junction of the Austrians and the Germans with the Turks, through Bulgaria, was effected, and when the expeditionary force arrived in Saloniki, Serbia was half crushed and our expeditionary force was almost immediately compelled to take the defensive."

M. Delcassé added: "I heard somebody say: 'But if we had not been in Saloniki, the Germans would be there now.'"

"The time has come for straight talking, and I am here to speak out my mind. I wish to God the Germans were there, and not just with 250,000 or 260,000 men, as we have,

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but with 400,000, with 500,000 men. . . . There would be at least that many Germans less on the French front!

"Now you have the result of the Saloniki expedition; it did not prevent the junction of the Germans with the Turks, through Bulgaria; it did not save Serbia; it did not prevent Rumania, previously much more circumspect, from making commercial treaties, first with Germany and then with Austria; it did not prevent the government of the King of Greece from adopting toward us, and little by little accentuating, the hostile attitude with which you are familiar. But it did make easier for Germany the furious attack which she has been hurling at Verdun for the last four months."

II. *That in return for Greece's participation in the war on the side of the Entente, Greece was promised territorial concessions so extensive as to make possible "the formation of a great and powerful Greece, no longer forced wrongfully to draw in her frontiers, but restored to the frontiers within which in prehistoric times Greece exercised her sovereignty."*

Report of speech by Venizelos in the Boule of the Hellenes at the session of October 4, 1915, *op. cit.* pp. 13, 14.

"In resigning as prime minister last February, I left the Government which succeeded me in the presence of the following situation: the powers of the Triple Entente promised Greece very vast territorial concessions in Asia Minor, but asked no territorial sacrifices in return."¹

Report of a debate in the House of Commons from "The Times" of March 25, 1920; No. 42,368:

Mr. Bonar Law, replying to Lieut. Commander Kentworthy, said: ". . . Apart from any natural obligations she may have as an ally during a continuance of a state of war, Great Britain is bound by no secret agreement with Greece. . . ."

Lieut. Commander Kentworthy pressed for a reply to his inquiry whether promises of military and financial support

¹ Cf. also Appendix 1.

to the Greek Government had been made by His Majesty's Government in the event of a renewed conflict between Greece and Turkey.

Mr. Bonar Law: "I have already answered that specifically. *We are under no obligations of any kind to Greece.*"

III. *That he launched his "revolution" against the Constitutional Government of Greece on September 25, 1916, in response to overwhelming popular demand that Greece enter the war on the side of the Entente, and that it was certain that the moment the movement was begun, 200,000 Greeks would rally to his standard to fight the Bulgarians.*

Excerpts from "La Grece Venizeliste (Souvenirs vecus)" by General Maurice Sarrail, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies at Saloniki, published in "La Revue de Paris," December 15, 1919.

"The hereditary enemy, the Bulgar, was not at Noyon, but at the very gates of Macedonia. That fact created a strictly military situation which could not be ignored. Real or pretended patriotism and made-to-order martial spirit have before now in Europe proved the sole salvation of discredited political parties. The Venizelists were not long in realizing that the situation was capable of being exploited, notwithstanding the repugnance of every Greek to militarism and especially to war. . . .

"It was easy to see that whether he had any confidence in the force of the Entente or not, Venizelos counted rather upon time to bring a solution; he was in no hurry to seize time by the forelock; he seemed disposed to put off making any decision until events made it easy for him, or indicated, or rather dictated, a course for him to follow. . . .

"I confess that I received the news of a revolutionary movement with the greatest skepticism. Had not Venizelos in May, after Rupel, proclaimed to all the world that he was ready to raise the standard of revolt? 'I shall go to

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Saloniki,' he declared. 'I shall set up a provisional government and make an appeal to the people to fly to arms against the Bulgarians; but I shall take no stand against the king.' A few days later he declared: 'The king will remain in Athens, deserted, with only the police force and the troops of the garrison. I shall propose to him to rally to the national cause and to put himself at the head of the army; if the king refuses, his fall will be proclaimed.' This was the plan. It was not even tried. . . .

"I shrugged my shoulders when I was told that Venizelos was unwilling to return to Athens in the train of the Allies. A Minister of Greece need have no diffidence at playing the part of Talleyrand, especially if in addition to a Talleyrand's unscrupulousness he have also determination. In August Venizelos may have desired a revolution, but he had not the courage to launch it. The Venizelists, more venturesome than their leader, were possibly ready to throw off the royal yoke, but they feared to compromise themselves. And yet Venizelos and Venizelists were eager to seize the power in Greece; but neither Venizelos nor the Venizelists were willing to take any risks to accomplish their end. . . .

"This simple account of all that happened during those strange days shows how many times I might have broken up, nipped in the bud, a Venizelism which at that time [September, 1916] was virtually inexistent. Without me, without the responsibility I was not afraid to take, what would have become of Venizelist Greece? . . .

"Under these circumstances, what was the maximum military force that the Government of the National Defense could throw into the balance on our side? In spite of the legend which has enveloped Greece for centuries, the force to be counted on was inconsiderable. . . . Nevertheless, Venizelos did not despair, and like a new Sisyphus sought daily to bring to its goal the ever rolling stone of his mobilization. How the recruiting sergeants of the bygone days of the French monarchy must have trembled with delight in their graves to watch their Hellenic brethren at work! How many villages had to be surrounded by con-

APPENDICES

stabulary, the way we used to do it in the old days, before the required quota of recruits was forthcoming! How much shooting had to be done in the Chalcidic Peninsula and elsewhere to keep the men of draft age from escaping by sea or into the forests! How many deserters or those unwilling to serve had to be rounded up from hiding places. . . .

"On September 22, the first battalion left for the front. They were not a bad-looking lot, but to have turned out only 1000 men when an appeal had been made to the whole of Greece was no cause for wild enthusiasm. . . . I had received 1000 men of whose value as soldiers I knew nothing, whom I had taken in almost naked and whom I was forced to feed. . . . In March, 1917, there was still only a division of three regiments of infantry and the nucleus of an artillery regiment! . . .

"But at what price had we bought this military aid? Here are some of the telegrams he [Venizelos] sent:

("In part of Crete, the mobilization was making a poor showing.)

" 'Send Deputies to warm up zeal of the people — and give them each an expense fund of 500 drachmae.'

(In certain of the islands the mobilization was very unpopular. The draft men kept clamoring that they would join the colors only when called out by the king.)

" 'Send the Cretan constabulary.' ¹

(In Chios.)

" 'Send supplies before publishing the mobilization decree.'

(In Mytilene a town rebelled.)

¹ The brutality of the Cretan constabulary is almost as famous as that of the Cossacks.

CONSTANTINE I AND THE GREEK PEOPLE

“‘I want a company of soldiers, and all outstanding financial claims must be paid.’¹

In Crete Venizelos insisted on having all war allowances paid up before he would even go to the island. In Samos a representative of the Venizelist Government, to hasten the tardy levies, had the nerve to suggest that we promise the Samians land grants in Asia Minor! A cabinet minister telegraphed to this same island:


“‘If it is necessary, a reign of terror must be inaugurated.’”

¹ As the Allied fleet had used Mytilene as a base since 1915, there were accounts due the natives from the Allied authorities. Many of these were grossly padded, but here as in Crete and Saloniki, they all had to be paid before Venizelos would try to raise any soldiers.





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